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Abstract 
This thesis sees Habermas's and Foucault's projects as presenting two of 
the most prominent contemporary approaches to power and critique. It 
argues that Habermas's approach can be considered in terms of a juridico-
discursive model whereas Foucault's approach as a strategic model. A 
juridico-discursive model represents power as operating like a law which 
prohibits and negates. It seeks to submit power to the rules of right and is 
preoccupied with the tasks of drawing boundaries, setting limits and 
establishing principles of legitimation. A strategic model, in contrast, 
focuses on the deployment of power and the totality of means by which 
power effects are produced. This thesis examines Foucault's challenge to 
Habermas's theory by elaborating on the perspective of a strategic model. 
The first part of the thesis presents a critical exposition of Habermas's 
theory. It shows that Habermas's project is preoccupied with the task of 
constructing a basis for the differentiation of reason and unreason, 
achievements and evils of the Enlightenment, legitimate and illegitimate 
power. The second part of the thesis elaborates on the perspective of a 
strategic model and its challenges to Habermas's theory. It demonstrates 
the productive-ness of power, and the complex interplay between power 
and (1) knowledges and truths, (2) subjectivities, (3) Enlightenment 
discourses and reforms. The thesis argues that critique can no longer rely 
upon an a priori notion of truth, subject or reason. Rather than adopting a 
normative approach which relies upon a procedure of simple division and 
rejection, we should problematize the specific relations between power on 
the one hand, and certain knowledges, subjectivities, Enlightenment 
discourses and reforms on the other. Foucault's approach maintains a 
respect for the complexities of the productive effects of power, while 
experimenting with ways of transgressing the limits that are imposed on 
us. 
111 
This thesis represents an attempt to recast the Habermas/Foucault 
debate. I see that when the debate is construed in Habermasian terms, 
Foucault's work is often criticized in terms of its failure to provide a 
normative ground for critique, and its use is regarded as limited. I suggest 
that there are different ways of using Foucault's work. In adopting a 
normative approach, some commentators fail to appreciate the extent and 
nature of Foucault's insights into the mechanisms through which power 
effects are produced. In the concluding chapter, I take issue with the 
criticism of Foucault's lack of a normative ground and discuss how we 
should treat the role of normative framework in critique. 
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Introduction 
Habermas and Foucault have been seen as two opposing figures in 
discussions of social and political theory, although Foucault's essays on 
"What is Enlightenment?" allows some observers to treat him as an ally of 
the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. Nevertheless, there is still a 
tendency to dismiss Foucault's work on the basis of his failure to provide 
the ground of critique. Habermas, who is perhaps the most formidable 
critic of Foucault, pursues this criticism. He criticizes that Foucault 
"contrasts his critique of power with the 'analysis of truth' in such a 
fashion that the former becomes deprived of the normative yardsticks that 
it would have to borrow from the latter". He thinks that Foucault's critical 
project, for all its insights, is nevertheless enmeshed in serious 
"performative contradictions" (Habermas, 1986:108). Habermas's criticism 
of Foucault has been seconded by a number of critics.1 Even Bernstein, 
who attempts to have a "more sympathetic reading of what Foucault is 
doing", concludes that "Foucault's own inciting rhetoric of disruption 
forces us to raise questions, and at the same time, appears to deny us any 
means for effectively dealing with these questions" (Bernstein, 1992:305). 
While acknowledging the importance of the issue of the ground of 
critique, I do not take it as the basis on which we should dismiss Foucault's 
work. I see that there are difficulties created by Foucault's suspending the 
questions of the ground of critique, and Foucault may need to provide an 
answer to the question of "why fight?", but there are also problems with 
Habermas's way of treating Foucault. The first part of this chapter will be 
1 Prior to Habermas's critique of Foucault, Fraser (1989) has criticized Foucault in terms of 
"normative confusions" and suggested that he must elaborate a normative framework for 
his critique. Taylor (1986) argues that Foucault's critique, which aims at liberation, 
requires notions of truth and freedom. Foucault's refusal to elaborate a notion of truth or 
freedom is seen as contradictory to the intent of his work. For discussions which for the most 
part follow Habermas's argument, see Freundlieb, 1988; White, 1986; and Wolin, 1986. 
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devoted to a discussion of these problems. I want to point out that 
Habermas's criticisms of Foucault are made in terms of his own 
preoccupation and his own language, and hence deprive Foucault's work 
of the right to stand on its own. If Habermas had taken the nature of 
Foucault's project more seriously, the question of "why fight?" should at 
least have been addressed in a more appropriate way, that is, in a way 
which fits into the specific nature of Foucault's project. Furthermore, 
Habermas's failure to consider Foucault's work on its own terms leads to 
his inability to see the insights and the challenges that Foucault's work has 
for him. Instead of simply criticizing Foucault in Habermas's terms, I 
suggest that we need to look more closely at the issues that Foucault wants 
to address and the nature of his project. Only in this way can we begin to 
appreciate the insights of Foucault's work as well as the challenges that it 
may have for Habermas. 
In this thesis, I attempt to recast the debate between Habermas and 
Foucault by examining Foucault's challenges to Habermas's theory of 
power. To recast the debate in this way, however, is not intended to be an 
affirmation of the overall superiority of Foucault's work to Habermas's. I 
acknowledge that Foucault's work also has its weaknesses and limitations, 
and in the course of the discussion of Foucault's challenges in later 
chapters I shall raise problems about Foucault's analyses. In examining 
Foucault's challenge to Habermas, the purpose is to criticize Habermas; yet, 
as discussed in the second part of this chapter, the criticism is not as much 
a negation as a reflection on the limits and inadequacies of Habermas's 
theory. I suggest that Foucault's work shows the inadequacies of 
Habermas's ·analyses particularly when they are related to the question of 
the ways in which power effects are produced and maintained. Moreover, 
Foucault's work opens up the possibility of conducting critique without 
necessarily appealing to notions of truth or any normative ideals, and this 
implies an alternative to Habermas's way of critique which is preoccupied 
with the question of the ground of critique. 
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In the third part of this Introductory Chapter, I shall briefly summarize 
the contents of each of the following chapters in this thesis and elaborate 
on what I consider to be the strengths of Foucault's approach to power and 
critique. 
I 
The perception of Habermas and Foucault as two opposing figures 
basically has to do with Habermas's rejectionist criticism of Foucault's 
work. In a short but pungent essay titled "Modernity versus 
Postmodernity", Habermas identifies Foucault as one of those "young 
conservatives" who adopt an antimodern stance and elaborate a totalist 
critique of modernity (Habermas, 1981:13). Habermas, in contrast, locates 
his own project in the theoretical tradition that runs from Marx to the 
Frankfurt School. This tradition, as Habermas understands it, while critical 
of the problems of power and domination in modern societies, 
nevertheless, recognizes the achievements of the Enlightenment and still 
retains a certain hope of the emancipatory potential of the modern world. 
In a later work, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas 
(1987a:265-93) devotes two chapters to criticizing Foucault. In addition to 
an antimodern position, Habermas now identifies Foucault's positions as 
positivist, cryptonormativist and relativist. Let me explain what Habermas 
means. Habermas refers to the "felicitous positivistic" stance that Foucault 
claims for himself in describing the contingent, historical regimes of 
power /knowledge. This stance requires withholding or bracketing any 
evaluating judgement of the historically changing practices. Such pure 
"ascetic" description leads to relativism in the sense that there is no basis 
from which one can evaluate or judge these power /knowledge regimes. 
But Foucault does not consistently assume such a position. He exhibits 
"the passion of aesthetic modernism". He assumes a position of "arbitrary 
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partisanship of a criticism that cannot account for its normative 
foundations" (Habermas, 1987a:275-6). 
Habermas's criticism is seconded by a number of critics. White and 
Wolin, in particular, examine what Habermas describes as Foucault's 
"passion of aesthetic modernism". Wolin (1986), in his critique of 
Foucault, considers Foucault's aestheticism as an exclusive primacy of an 
artistic approach to life, in opposition to science and morality. This 
approach, for Wolin, is extremely one-sided and inadequate, as it provides 
no trace of human solidarity or mutuality, and is insensible to other 
human values. White (1986), in his essay "Foucault's challenge to critical 
theory", seems to be more willing to consider Foucault's insights. He sees 
that Foucault's contribution lies in his drawing our attention to the 
subjugation of the aesthetic-expressive capacities in our modern fixation 
on cognitive and juridical subjectivity. Nevertheless, preoccupied with the 
question of the basis of critique, White argues that Foucault's notion of 
aesthetic subjectivity is inadequate in providing a basis for the 
endorsement of new social movements. He contends that what Foucault 
needs is a notion of juridical subjectivity which is emphasized in 
Habermas's work. As Foucault lacks a notion of juridical subjectivity, 
White concludes that Foucault ultimately provides a less satisfactory 
account than Habermas. 
The appearance of Foucault's essays on "What is Enlightenment?" --
1n which he identifies the affinities between his project and the 
Enlightenment -- may lead critics to reconsider Foucault's relation to 
Reason and to the Enlightenment. McCarthy (1990), a well-known 
commentator of Habermas's work and the Frankfurt School, considers 
that both Foucault and the Frankfurt School are engaged in a critique of 
impure reason. He suggests that Foucault's work is better understood as a 
continuation and enrichment of the critical-theoretical tradition of 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School than a break from or antithesis of it. 
In his view, there are a number of affinities between Foucault's work and 
Critical Theory, and, in particular, Habermas's picture of the colonization 
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of lifeworld overlaps with Foucault's picture of a disciplinary society. 
Nevertheless, despite the friendly gesture that he adopts, McCarthy 
criticizes Foucault's work from a perspective similar to Habermas's. 
McCarthy maintains that Foucault's major problems lie in his 
ontologizing the concept of power and his failure to justify genealogy so 
that it is not simply another power moving in a thoroughly power-ridden 
network of social relations. Corresponding with the conclusion drawn by 
White and Wolin, McCarthy decides that neither Foucault's ontology of 
power nor his later concern with self-creation offers an adequate 
framework for critical social inquiry. 
While acknowledging the difficulties created by Foucault's suspension 
of the question of the basis of critique, I would like to point out that the 
readings of Foucault by Wolin, White and McCarthy are not without 
problems. Preoccupied with the issue of the ground of critique, they tend 
to overlook the specific nature of Foucault's project, and this leads to 
misunderstanding and misuse of Foucault's ideas. For instance, Foucault's 
discussion of an aesthetics of existence is read as an attempt to articulate a 
certain notion of subject or a certain normative basis of critique. Foucault, 
however, emphasizes that it is not intended to be used in that way. In 
contrast to White and Wolin's interpretation of his argument, Foucault 
states that the notion of an aesthetics of existence is not to be viewed as "a 
key to everything", and one must not treat them as "a principle", "a basis" 
that exists in history and is now rediscovered (Foucault, 1988a:14-15). 
From this perspective, the criticism of the inadequacy of Foucault's notion 
in providing a normative basis of critique is misplaced. We must examine 
more closely what the notion is intended to do and what issues Foucault 
wants to address so as to avoid a misunderstanding and misuse of his 
ideas. Habermas's reading of Foucault's essay "What is Enlightenment?", I 
contend, makes the same mistake. 
Foucault's essay "What is Enlightenment?" is received by Habermas as 
a sign of Foucault's finally recognizing the contradiction of his critique. 
This contradiction, in Habermas's view, is a result of Foucault's critique of 
5 
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truth and power which deprives itself of the basis of critique. The tension 
between Foucault's earlier work and the position announced in "What is 
Enlightenment?", for Habermas, reveals exactly this kind of contradiction. 
Habermas (1986:106-8) sees that in the end the force of this contradiction 
draws Foucault back into the circle of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity that Foucault thought he could explode. From Foucault's 
perspective, however, his discussions of Enlightenment in the earlier 
work as well as in his later essays do not reveal any contradiction of 
positions. Habermas's view of Foucault holding contradictory positions in 
fact reveals what Foucault calls the "blackmail" of the Enlightenment, that 
is, it insists that one is either "for" or "against" the Enlightenment. 
Foucault would not admit that his earlier work represents an anti-
Enlightenment position; nor would he admit that his essay "What is 
Enlightenment?" takes a pro-Enlightenment position. This is exactly "a 
simplistic and authoritarian alternative" that he tries to overturn 
(Foucault, 1986f:42-4). 
Habermas tends to read Foucault's essay "What is Enlightenment?" as 
a sign of Foucault's concession of defeat. This misreading of Foucault's 
essay, I contend, is a result of his failure to consider and evaluate 
Foucault's work on its own terms. Habermas's critique of Foucault in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity demonstrates the same problem.2 
Habermas criticizes Foucault on several grounds; including first, 
Foucault's positivism; second, Foucault's relativism; and third, Foucault's 
lack of a normative basis. Habermas's criticisms, as I shall show, reveaJ 
2 Dean (1994:128-9) argues that despite Foucault's claim to have escaped modernist 
narcissism, Habermas understands Foucault's work as an attempt to characterize modernity 
and as that which can be located within or in relation to the philosophical discourse of 
modernity. He refuses to read Foucault "as operating in any field other than the one he has 
outlined and defined the possible positions within". By translating Foucault's work into 
the discourse of modernity, Habermas could then attribute a general position to him, such 
as anti-modern, or that of a "young conservative". Dean says that not only is Foucault 
positioned as a dogmatic critic of modernity, but, as I argue here, his work is translated into 
the terms of critical theory. Dean (1994) criticizes the reading of Foucault from the 
perspective of Habermas's philosophy of history, and suggests to read Foucault in terms of 
a critical and effective form of history. 
6 
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that he has not put himself into the place of Foucault.3 He examines 
Foucault's intention and concern, but never tries to listen to Foucault's 
voice. Despite his knowledge of Foucault's work, his criticism is 
exclusively based on his own perspective. In this way, I argue, Habermas 
fails to appreciate the insights of Foucault's work and the kinds of 
challenge it may have for his theoretical framework. 
Habermas criticizes Foucault's genealogy as a kind of positivism which 
seeks to give a value-free historiography. He says that Foucault demands 
of his work the objectivity of a purely structural analysis, and excludes 
value judgement in favour of value-free historical explanation. Hence, 
Habermas continues, genealogy "retreats into the reflectionless objectivity 
of a nonparticipatory, ascetic description of kaleidoscopically changing 
practices of power" (Habermas, 1987a:275-6).4 Habermas also claims that 
the positivism of Foucault's genealogy has to do with Foucault's intention 
of constructing a better science. In his eyes, Foucault not only aims at the 
critical unmasking of the pseudo-science of human sciences, but has "a 
serious intent of getting a science underway that is superior to the 
mismanaged science" (Habermas, 1987a:279). 
Rajchman points out that this criticism is based on a 
misunderstanding of Foucault's passage in which he refers to the felicitous 
positivism of a genealogist.5 I suspect that the labelling of Foucault's work 
as positivism has to do with Habermas's inflexible and closed attitude 
towards the categorization of human sciences. In Knowledge and Human 
3 In the 1986 meeting between the German and French philosophers, Derrida criticized 
Apel of contradicting his own ethic of communication. Derrida said that Apel never put 
himself into the place of the other. He had not come to learn the truth but to teach the 
truth. The meeting ended in a failure of these groups of philosophers to have a dialogue. 
See Rochlitz, 1986, p.124. 
4 Habermas (1987a:276) argues that Foucault's positivism, therefore, leads to an 
"Involuntary presentism of a historiography that remains hermeneutically stuck in its 
starting situation". See his criticism of Foucault's presentism in Habermas, 1987a, pp.276-8. 
For an elaboration of Foucault's presentism as a fruitful perspective, see Dean, 1994, 
Chapter 2. 
5 In a reply on behalf of Foucault to Habermas's critique, Rajchman (1988:178-9) points out 
that Foucault was playing on words and the term "positivism' that Foucault used should be 
understood as the positivity of a domain of knowledge. 
7 
Interests, Habermas classifies knowledge into three categories: first, the 
empirical-analytic sciences which are guided by the technical interest; 
second, the historical-hermeneutic sciences which are guided by the 
practical interest; and third, Critical Theory which is guided by the 
emancipatory interest. Habermas sees that the genealogist does not "try to 
make comprehensible what actors are doing and thinking out of the 
context of tradition interwoven with the self-understanding of the actors"; 
instead "there is only an analysis of structures that are meaningless in 
themselves" (Habermas, 1987a:277,275). This characteristic of genealogy 
distinguishes it from the historical-hermeneutic science. On the other 
hand, for Habermas, the genealogist sees that one power complex is 
dissolved and replaced by another, and human subjects are inescapably 
trapped into these complexes of power. Hence this genealogical perspective 
does not allow for what Critical Theory claims as an emancipatory interest. 
Seeing that Foucault's genealogy falls into neither the category of 
hermeneutics nor that of critical theory, Habermas believes that Foucault's 
work naturally falls into the first category, an empirical science 
characterized by positivism. 
Foucault, however, states clearly that he never wants to establish 
genealogy in the form of a value-free positivism, nor does he aim at 
"getting a science underway that is superior to the mismanaged science". 
He claims that the intent of his project is "anti-sciences"; or, to be more 
exact, to attack the power effects associated with an organized scientific 
discourse within his society. Instead of getting a superior science under 
way, the objective of his project is to problematize this kind of intent.6 
6 Foucault states: "Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a more careful or 
exact form of science. They are precisely anti-sciences. Not that they vindicate a lyrical 
right to ignorance or non-knowledge: it is not that they are concerned to deny knowledge or 
that they esteem the virtues of direct cognition and base their practice upon an immediate 
experience that escapes encapsulation in knowledge. It is not that with which we are 
concerned. We are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of subjugated knowledges that 
are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects 
of the centralizing powers that are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized 
scientific discourse within a society such as ours" (Foucault, 1980c:83-4). 
8 
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Habermas's holding on to his own schema and his lack of an open and 
flexible attitude lead to his misunderstanding of Foucault's intent and a 
false accusation of Foucault's positivism. Moreover, as he does not open 
himself to the voice of Foucault, he not only fails to see Foucault's 
genealogies as a form of knowledge that does not fit into his tripartite 
schema of knowledge, but also the challenge that this form of knowledge 
poses to his tripartite schema. He fails to realize that Foucault's 
genealogies expose the inadequacy of his framework of knowledge. 
Foucault not only sees that different forms of knowledge are socially 
produced and that there is a nonreducible plurality of conceptual schemes, 
but he looks at knowledge from a particular perspective -- its relationship 
with discourse and power practices, or its role within a power complex. 
Habermas comments that this perspective not only deprives Foucault's 
work of any emancipatory power, but contains a kind of relativism. 
Foucault's relativism, for Habermas, not only refers to the view that the 
validity of knowledge is relative to the society or the age in which it is 
produced, but that the validity of knowledge is relative to the power 
complex to which it belongs. Habermas criticizes: 
from this perspective, not only are truth claims confined 
to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust 
their entire significance in the functional contribution 
they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of 
discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity claims 
consists in the power effects they have. (Habermas, 
1987a:279) 
Habermas contends that Foucault sees different forms of knowledge 
being no more and no less than the power effects they unleash, and this, 
he argues, results in two problems. Firstly, Foucault's theory cannot claim 
superiority as a truth claim. Its superiority can only be expressed in the 
effect of suppressing the hitherto dominant scientific discourse; it would 
exhaust itself in the politics of theory. Secondly, the subjugated 
knowledges that Foucault advocates cannot claim any superiority 
according to the standard of truth claims. These knowledges may conquer 
9 
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the do min ant discourses of today and overcome the current 
hierarchization of knowledge, but then they, in turn, would become 
another dominant discourse and establish a new hierarchy of knowledge 
(Habermas, 1987a:279-81). 
Based on Habermas's critique, the problem of Foucault's relativism 
has little to do with its inability to distinguish the superiority of different 
forms of knowledge, but rather with its inability to distinguish different 
forms of knowledge according to the standard of truth. Foucault's 
approach does not imply that all knowledges are as good or as bad as the 
other, for they can be differentiated according to the specific relation they 
have with certain dominant forms of power. Knowledges which oppose 
certain dominant forms of power can be differentiated from those which 
closely ally with them. It is true for Habermas to say that Foucault's 
genealogical knowledges, as well as the knowledges he advocates, cannot 
claim superiority according to the standard of truth; nevertheless, they can 
seek to claim superiority on the basis of their effect in opposing certain 
dominant forms of power. Moreover, it is also true to say that after 
conquering the dominant discourse today, the subjugated knowledges may 
themselves become the theoretical avant-garde of tomorrow and 
themselves establish a new hierarchy of power, but this is where the attack 
applies again. Foucault's approach does not divide knowledges once and 
for all; nor would it give us comfort in any form of knowledge. 
Knowledges which are opposed to a certain dominant form of power may 
one day tum out to be the ones which produce domination effects. That is 
why the battle goes on; it never ends. 
Therefore, Foucault 's approach does have its own way of 
differentiating knowledges, that is, according to their specific role played in 
a certain power complex at a particular point of time. Foucault's way of 
differentiating knowledges is, of course, different from Habermas's way. 
Instead of acknowledging the difference and the right of the other 's 
existence, Habermas's criticism is exclusively based on his own way of 
conceiving and differentiating knowledges. 
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Perhaps it is interesting to ask: why does not Foucault distinguish 
different forms of knowledge according to the standard of truth, as 
Habermas does? For Habermas, one of his enemies is relativism, and he is 
looking for the possibility of a theory to command universal consensus. 
He sees that only through the standard of truth can the validity of a theory 
transcend local agreements; only in this way can a project go beyond the 
status of a context-dependent practical enterprise. In contrast, as pointed 
out by Habermas, Foucault engages in a politics of theory. Foucault claims 
that he is not advancing a theory of power. Instead, he understands his 
work as "an analytics of power": a definition of the specific domains 
formed by relations of power (Foucault, 1979b:82). Hence different theories 
or forms of knowledge are identified as domains formed by relations of 
power. Foucault (1977:207-9) also sees his works as a "tool kit", without 
specifying how one may use it. Therefore, in terms of the nature of their 
projects, Habermas and Foucault are following different directions. 
Far from being ignorant of the different nature of Foucault's project, 
there is a sense in which Habermas understands it quite well, as he calls 
Foucault's work "a politics of theory". Nevertheless, despite his 
knowledge of Foucault's project, Habermas still construes Foucault's work 
in terms of a theory, rather than a politics of theory. For instance, he says 
that "Foucault's theory would exhaust itself in the politics of theory" 
(Habermas, 1987a:279); his critique is titled as "Some questions concerning 
the theory of power: Foucault again". Having construed Foucault's work 
in terms of a theory, Habermas evaluates it according to his own 
conception of a theory, the validity of which is based upon the standard of 
truth. He does not allow Foucault's politics of theory to contribute to a 
new conception of theory; nor does he allow it to be evaluated according to 
its own standard. 
Habermas's third criticism of Foucault reveals a similar phenomenon. 
Despite his knowledge of Foucault's intention and reasons for avoiding a 
normative basis, he criticizes Foucault's work in terms of a lack of a 
normative basis for the critique. Habermas says: 
11 
I 
i ,, 
I 
Foucault understands himself as a dissident who offers 
resistance to modern thought and humanistically 
disguised disciplinary power ... It is not Foucault's 
intention to continue that counterdiscourse which 
modernity has carried on with itself from its very 
beginning; he does not want to refine the language game 
of modern political theory (with its basic concepts like 
autonomy and heteronomy, morality and legality, 
emancipation and repression) and turn it against the 
pathologies of modernity -- he wants to undermine 
modernity and its language games. (Habermas, 1987a:282-
3) 
Hence, as understood by Habermas, Foucault avoids appealing to any 
humanist normative concepts in his critique, since this would merely 
strengthen a humanism which has become part of a normalizing form of 
violence. 
Not only does Habermas understand Foucault's intention, he is also 
able to see Foucault's work as a tactic, as a tool. Habermas says that 
Foucault's work cannot be seen as critique, but as a tactic and tool for 
waging a battle against modernity and the humanistically disguised 
disciplinary power (Habermas, 1987a:283). Nevertheless, Habermas 
criticizes: "if it is just a matter of mobilizing counterpower, of strategic 
battles and wily confrontations, why should we muster any resistance at all 
against this all-pervasive power circulating in the bloodstream of the body 
of modern society, instead of just adapting ourselves to it? ... why fight at 
all?" He asserts that it is only with the introduction of some normative 
notions can Foucault begin to answer these questions (Habermas, 
1987a:283-4). 
The problem of Habermas's criticism, I contend, is not so much his 
begging the question "why fight?" as his identifying it with the question of 
the normative foundation of critique.7 Habermas's project is preoccupied 
7 Habermas considers Foucault's refusal to address the question "why fight?" as a failure to 
account for the normative foundation of his critique. Habermas says, "his putative 
objectivity of knowledge is itself put into question ... by the arbitrary partisanship of a 
criticism that cannot account for its normative foundations" (Habermas, 1987a:276). Also he 
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with the construction of the normative ground of critique. He assumes 
that a critique must contain a normative basis, and since Foucault's work 
does not seek to construct any kind of normative basis, it cannot be 
regarded as a critique.8 Habermas's unwillingness to recognize Foucault's 
work as a kind of critique is again based on his own conception of critique. 
I would like to demonstrate that if Habermas had taken the character of 
Foucault's work more seriously, he should have changed his demand for a 
normative basis in Foucault's work, or at least raised the question "why 
fight?" in a more appropriate way.9 
If we take the character of Foucault's work seriously, I suggest, the 
question "why fight?" should no longer be understood in terms of the 
normative basis of critique, but rather as part of a tactic to mobilize 
counterpower. With Habermas's approach of critique, one is concerned 
says: "Because Foucault cannot accept this notion from Lebensphilosophie, he has likewise 
to refrain from responding to the question about the normative foundations of his critique" 
(Habermas, 1987a:286). 
8 Dean (1994:119) argues that while Foucault employs the term 'critique' to describe his 
work, he "transforms the sense of the term from that of a legislating subject passing 
judgement on a deficient reality to an analysis of the assumptions on which taken-for-
granted practices rest". Unlike Habermas's conception of critique, Foucault's critique does 
not appeal to any normative bases or universal grounds. Dean contends that it is time to 
drop both the term 'critique' and the perspective from which it derives. He suggests that 
we may use the term "criticism" to describe Foucault's analytic practice. 
9For a typical criticism of Foucault in terms of the question "why fight", see Fraser's 
article, which has been used by Habermas, in which she asks: "Foucault calls in no 
uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But why? Why is struggle preferable to 
submission? Why ought domination to be resisted?" (Fraser, 1989:283). Also in another 
article, she says, "we may question, for example, whether Foucault's rhetoric really does 
the job of dist~guishing better from worse regimes of social practices; whether it really 
does the job of identifying forms of domination ( or whether it overlooks some and / or 
misrecognizes others); whether it really does the job of distinguishing fruitful from 
unfruitful, acceptable from unacceptable forms of resistance to domination; and finally 
whether it really does the job of suggesting not simply that change is possible but also what 
sort of change is desirable" (Fraser, 1985:173). Bernstein attempts a sympathetic reading of 
Foucault's work and considers the question of "why fight" more in Foucault's terms. He 
asks, Foucault is constantly tempting us with his references to the possibility of no longer 
being, doing, thinking what we are, do, think, but these references are in danger of becoming 
empty unless we have some sense of which possibilities and changes are desirable and 
why" (Bernstein, 1992:301). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:264), two generous interviewers of 
Foucault, comment that Foucault "owes us a criterion of what makes one kind of danger more 
dangerous than another". 
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about the construction of a principle or an ideal which would 
unambigiously regulate our action. Habermas's rational reconstruction of 
the universal pragmatics is an attempt to locate a principle that no rational 
being would dispute and an ideal in which human beings are free from 
domination. Foucault's project, in contrast, does not follow this approach 
of critique. In his view, those who find power intolerable may rise up and 
fight against it. One does not need the basis of an unassailable principle in 
order to act. This approach of course does not exclude the fact that Foucault 
may also need to give certain "justification" or reasons for a fight. 
Nevertheless, the "justification" or reasons given are not to be understood 
as a normative foundation, but rather part of a tactic to mobilize 
counterpower. For instance, in mobilizing attacks against what Habermas 
notices as the humanistically disguised disciplinary power, Foucault 
portrays a picture of a panopticon society so as to show us the danger of 
this power. The problems and dangers of disciplinary power that Foucault 
describes can be seen as certain justification or answer to the question 
"why fight?", but they are not to be understood as a foundation that 
grounds our action safely, and once and for all. In light of the specific 
character of Foucault's work, they are better understood as metaphor or 
strategy which aims at moving people to fight. 
If one takes more seriously the specific character of Foucault's work, 
one may stop probing the question of "why fight?" and criticizing 
Foucault's genealogies in terms of their failure to answer normative 
questions. For Foucault's genealogies do not need to address normative 
questions in order to function as a tactic of mobilizing counterpower. 
Instead they- function as a tactic by opening up a distance between us and 
the familiar phenomena, producing discord and unsettling effects, so as to 
make us more ready for alternatives. Furthermore, if one takes Foucault's 
work as tactic which mobilizes counterpower, the question of why fight 
14 
would not be the only or major concern. For instance, one may probe 
other questions, or be concerned with "where and how to attack".1° 
In sum, Habermas's criticisms of Foucault's positivism, relativism and 
cryptonormativism reveal his unwillingness to consider and evaluate 
Foucault's work on its own terms. Hence not only does he fail to 
appreciate any of the insights of Foucault's work, he is also unable to see 
the challenge that Foucault may have for his own work, including the 
challenge to his tripartite schema of knowledge, his conception of theory, 
and his understanding of critique. 
II 
Habermas's project represents one of the most prominent approaches to 
critique of power. I acknowledge Habermas' s effort in developing a 
communicative ethics which may help in settling disputes of theoretical 
and normative claims and in providing an ideal of rational consensus so 
that one may question every power relation in terms of its 
nonconsensuality.11 Nevertheless, while recognizing the contributions of 
Habermas's project, I maintain that one should reflect upon the limits and 
inadequacies of it. In this thesis, I am going to examine "Foucault's 
Challenge to Habermas's Critique of Power". Nevertheless, it does not aim 
so much to be a negation of Habermas's project as an analysis and 
reflection upon its limitations. 
lO Foucault (1986b:343-4) mentions the problems of the mental hospital. He (1977:211) also 
discusses the problems of the excess of power in prison. However, he does not provide a 
further elaboration on them as specific sites of struggle and on where and how to attack. 
11 When asked about his view toward Habermas's notion of rational consensus, Foucault 
(1986d:379) points out that "it is perhaps a critical idea to maintain at all times: to ask 
oneself what proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in such a power relation, and 
whether that degree of nonconsensuality is necessary or not, then one may question every 
power relation to that extent." 
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To examine Foucault's challenges to Habermas implies a recast of the 
debate between Habermas and Foucault. I think that there are several 
reasons for the Habermas/Foucault debate to be recast in this way. Firstly, 
as noted by Kelly,1 2 insofar as the debate did take place, the amount of 
discussion by each philosopher about the other was unintentionally 
lopsided in Habermas's favour. Habermas devoted two chapter of The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity to criticizing Foucault, but as the 
book was published after Foucault's death, it received no reply. Therefore, 
I see my thesis as an attempt to provide a reply on Foucault's behalf to 
Habermas's criticism. Secondly, Habermas's critique of Foucault is directed 
at his writings up through the late 1970s, which focus on notions of 
power /knowledge and disciplinary-normalizing power. My thesis wi ll 
mainly make use of this period's writings of Foucault so as to provide a 
parallel response to Habermas's critique. 
Lastly, more importantly, insofar as the debate has taken place, it is 
often construed in Habermas's terms. Foucault's work is criticized 1n 
terms of its inadequacies in offering a comprehensive framework of 
critical inquiry or its failure to provide a basis or normative yardstick for 
critique. As discussed above, despite Foucault's own intention in the 
discussion of an aesthetics of existence, it is read and criticized in terms of 
its inadequacies for being a normative basis for critique. Little attention is 
given to whether we must have a normative basis in order to practise 
critique, and to whether Foucault's work provides us with an alternative 
understanding to critique. Moreover, there is little discussion as to what 
kinds of challenge Foucault's work poses to Habermas, and how 
Habermas's project may need to be altered in light of Foucault's work. 
In considering Foucault's challenge to Habermas, however, one must 
avoid being a polemicist. As discussed by Foucault (1986c:382), a polemicist 
confronts the other as an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is 
harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For a polemicist, 
12 Kelly (1994:4-5) has provided six overlapping reasons for the debate to be recast. My 
reasons have certain similarity with some of those given by him. 
125 One must notice that there are changes in Foucault's conceptions of power after mid 
1970s, particularly those involved with his notion of governmentality. This notion of 
governmentality not only indicates Foucault's leaving behind the concept of power-as-
domination that burdened his earlier discussions of power, but also allows Foucault to 
discuss discipline as one of the specific rationalities of government. Moreover, its emphasis on 
treating questions of the state and its activities in the context of specific rationalities of 
government could imply further challenges to Habermas's work on power and the state. See 
Hindess (1996) for a discussion of these challenges. My thesis is, however, not going to have a 
detailed discussion of the notion of governmentality, but would rather confine itself mainly to 
a discussion of Foucault's notions of power/knowledge and disciplinary power that have 
been taken up by Habermas. 1 h 
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the game does not consist of recognizing the other person as a subject 
having the right to speak, but of eliminating him from any possible 
dialogue. The aim is to defeat the enemy. In claiming that Foucault poses 
certain kinds of challenge to Habermas, I do not aim at a defeat of 
Habermas or an assertion of the overall superiority of Foucault, for 
Foucault's work also has its own problems and limitations. In addition, 
Foucault himself has expressed his admiration toward Critical Theory, and 
acknowledges the problem they have in common -- the history of 
reason.13 
Moreover, although Foucault avoids appealing to any normative 
notions, it cannot be denied that there are values presupposed by his 
project, and he also shares some of the values of Habermas. For instance, 
in an interview, Foucault (1986d:379) asserts that one must be against 
nonconsensuality, though one may not be for consensuality. He suggests 
that one should ask what proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in a 
power relation, and whether that degree of nonconsensuality is necessary 
or not. Hence, Habermas's notion of free communication is viewed by 
Foucault as a critical principle that one may use to question power 
relations. Moreover, Foucault (1986f:46) claims that his project is "to give 
impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom". 
His emphasis on the value of freedom is certainly a belief which he shares 
with Habermas. 
Perhaps, as Taylor notices, the value of freedom, and maybe truth too, 
must be presupposed by any critique of power.1 4 Nevertheless, 
13 In an interview, Foucault (1983:200-1) says that if he had been aware of the critical 
inquiries done by the Frankfurt School, he would have avoided some of the stupid remarks 
he made. He sees that they have a problem in common--the history of reason--but they 
approach it in different ways. He says, "I would not speak about one bifurcation of reason 
but more about an endless, multiple bifurcation -- a kind of abundant ramification". 
14 Taylor (1986), as Habermas does, tends to probe the foundation of Foucault's critique. He 
charges Foucault's position as incoherent since he refuses to appeal to notions of freedom 
and truth which must be presupposed in Foucault's critique of power. For a reply to Taylor 
on behalf of Foucault, see Patton, 1989; Connolly, 1985. Also see Patton, 1994 pp.68££; for a 
discussion of how Foucault's appeal to human freedom needs not be read as contradictory to 
his anti-humanist stance. 
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acknowledging that Foucault holds certain values is one thing; it is 
another to assume that he must construct a theory of these values in order 
to practise critique. While acknowledging that Foucault's critique 
presupposes certain values, in contrast to Taylor's view, I argue that one 
does not need to construct a notion of freedom or truth as the foundation 
in order to practise critique. This is exactly the novelty of Foucault's work. 
He shows us the possibility of practising critique without appealing to or 
constructing certain notions of freedom and truth. Furthermore, what 
Foucault tries to show is that these notions and discourses of freedom and 
truth are not as innocent and transparent as always assumed. They are 
often involved in the process in which power effects are produced and 
maintained. 
When the debate is construed in Habermasian terms, Foucault's 
refusal to address normative questions is often seen as the major weakness 
of his work. However, when the debate is recast in Foucault's terms, we 
are able to see the advantages of his suspension of the normative 
questions. They include, firstly, showing us an alternative to Habermas's 
approach of critique which is preoccupied with the question of the ground 
of critique, and secondly, allowing us to see more clearly how effects of 
power are produced and maintained. My thesis is an attempt to bring to 
light these strengths of Foucault's project. 
Habermas's project is preoccupied with the task of developing a 
yardstick so as to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate power. He 
constructs a notion of communicative action in order to provide the 
yardstick for critique. Power which is based on rational consensus arrived 
at in communicative action is considered as legitimate. Habermas's 
approach, I argue, can be considered as what Foucault calls "a juridico-
discursive model of power". I shall discuss at length what Foucault means 
by "a juridico-discursive model of power" in Chapter 3, and here I briefly 
mention two of its characteristics. Firstly, a juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis represents power as operating like a law which prohibits and says 
"no". As power is represented as negative, it has to submit to the rule of 
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right. Hence, secondly, the juridico-discursive mode of analysis represents 
power as submitting to the rule of right. When power is exercised within 
limits and operates in accordance with the principle of legitimation, it is 
seen as lawful and legitimate; illegitimate power is one which transgresses 
its limits and violates the principle of legitimation. With a juridico-
discursive model of power, one is preoccupied with defining the limit or 
right of power, or as what Habermas does, drawing the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate power. 
Foucault's approach not only questions this juridico-discursive model 
of power, but also provides an alternative to it. Foucault claims that the 
existence of power is not ensured by rights, but rather by techniques. In 
order to understand the concrete functioning of power, he argues, one has 
to look into the techniques of power rather than becoming preoccupied 
with the construction of normative principles. Foucault proposes a 
strategic model that emphasizes an examination of the totality of means by 
which power effects are produced and maintained. 
With a strategic model, one asks: by what means is power exercised? 
and by what means is power implemented effectively? In contrast to the 
juridico-discursive mode of analysis which represents power as one which 
negates and says "no", the strategic model discovers that in order for 
power to be implemented effectively, power must be productive. It 
produces utility; it produces knowledges; it produces identities and 
subjectivities. What Foucault shows is that there is a complex interplay 
between power and all these structures which were previously assumed to 
be devoid of power. Nevertheless, one should not conclude that these 
structures of knowledges, identities and subjectivities are bad because they 
are the instruments of power. Foucault does not mean then that 
everything is bad, but rather that everything is dangerous. This raises our 
awareness of the danger of structures of knowledges and subjectivities that 
might be drawn into the deployment of power. It also exposes the 
misguided comfort that Habermas's project tends to provide. 
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If power is productive, that is, if the exercise of power is linked to the 
production of utility, for example, criticism of power is not aimed at a 
rejection or negation. Instead, it is meant to problematize what is taken for 
granted, to inject anxiety and uncertainty, to raise our awareness of the 
danger. In this sense, Foucault provides us not only a new approach to 
critique, that is, to replace the juridico-discursive model with the strategic 
model, but also a new interpretation of the meaning of criticism. Criticism 
is not equivalent to rejection. Criticism consists of analyzing and reflecting 
upon limits. The philosophical ethos, as Foucault (1986f:45) says, is 
characterized by a limit-attitude, that one constantly analyzes and reflects 
upon the limits of one's thinking. Perhaps this insight can also be applied 
to the examination of Habermas's work in my thesis. 
In examining Foucault's challenge to Habermas, the purpose is to 
criticize Habermas's project. The criticism, however, is not as much a 
rejection as a reflection upon the limits of Habermas's project. In order to 
reflect upon the limits and the conditions of Habermas's way of thinking, 
this thesis starts with an analysis of the problematics and preoccupations of 
Habermas's project. The aim is to show that these problematics and 
preoccupations lead Habermas's project to take certain steps instead of 
others, and enable him to emphasize certain notions instead of others. 
This analysis of the preoccupations of Habermas's project is meant to 
provide a background for us to understand not only his critique of power, 
but also its limits. 
m 
This thesis is divided into two parts: one deals with Habermas's 
critique of power; the other with Foucault's challenge to Habermas's 
theory. The first part consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 examines the 
problematics and preoccupations of Habermas's project. As discussed 
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above, Habermas's criticisms of Foucault are exclusively based on his own 
perspective of critique. This chapter introduces the perspective that 
Habermas adopts, that is, one which sees that a critique must be grounded 
in reason. It points out that from the beginning his project has been guided 
by the problematic of the ground of critique. For he sees the problem of 
earlier critical theory in terms of a totalizing critique; that is, it turns 
against reason and hence deprives itself of the ground of critique. He 
intends to correct the mistake that earlier critical theory has made. He 
maintains that critique has to be grounded in reason in order for its claim 
to transcend the local contexts and obtain the status of universal truth. He 
believes that only in this way can truth be differentiated from falsehood 
and ideology. 
Habermas's effort to construct the basis of critique can be seen in terms 
of two stages. In an early stage, Habermas develops a theory of knowledge 
not only to clarify the cognitive status of different forms of knowledge but 
also to ground critical theory in one of the fundamental characteristics of 
human existence. He argues that critical theory is constituted by an 
emancipatory interest which frees consciousness from its dependence on 
hypostatized powers. In a later stage, Habermas turns to a rational 
construction of the pragmatic universals of speech acts so as to 
demonstrate that there is an internal relation between reason and 
communication and that this notion of reason can be reconstructed as the 
ground of critique. 
Chapter 2 discusses more specifically how Habermas uses his notion of 
communicative action to provide a yardstick for the differentiation of 
legitimate and illegitimate power. He considers power which is based on 
rational consensus arrived at in communicative action to be legitimate. 
With this communicative concept of (legitimate) power, Habermas 
believes that power can be disconnected from force and that the possibility 
of force is excluded from legitimate power. I argue that Habermas's 
communicative concept of power is not able to resolve the problem of 
coercion he perceives in relations of force. This chapter also discusses how 
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Habermas builds on a notion of lifeworld to analyze the problem of power 
and pathologies in modern societies. It examines Habermas's notion of 
lifeworld, which idealizes lifeworld as the background of communicative 
action and assumes it to be inherently unproblematic. I would like to show 
that with this idealized notion of lifeworld, I-Iabermas sees the causes of 
modern pathologies as lying elsewhere, and he produces a myth that 
lifeworld is inherently unproblematic. 
After a critical examination of Habermas's analysis of power, I discuss 
the kinds of challenge that Foucault's work poses to Habermas's theory in 
Part IL The first kind of challenge to consider comes from Foucault's 
analysis of disciplinary power. Habermas's critique of Foucault in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity focuses a great deal on Foucault's 
analysis of disciplinary power, but Habermas. never sees the challenge it 
may have for his own work. In Chapter 3, I argue that the challenge comes 
from, firstly, the concept of disciplinary power as a particular form of 
power that Habermas's framework would have difficulty in dealing with, 
and secondly, the strategic model associated \Vith Foucault's analysis of 
disciplinary power. Habermas's communicative concept of power 
presupposes a binary opposition between power and force, between 
internal enforcement and external enforcement. Foucault's disciplinary 
power, which may work through a subtle coercion of our body, can be 
considered as a particular form of power which subverts these binary 
oppositions. Moreover, for Habermas, there is a binary opposition 
between, on the one hand, a positive power which is enabling, 
noncoercive and based on a collective will, and on the other hand, a 
negative power which is constraining, coercive, and oriented toward 
particular interests. Disciplinary power, in contrast, is a form of power 
1Nhich coerces but at the same time enables. The coercive side of 
disciplinary power is ahvays connected with the productive side. 
I suggest that what is more significant is Foucault's strategic model of 
analysis behind his notion of disciplinary power. This strategic model of 
analysis, I argue, poses challenges to Habermas's juridico-discursive mode 
22 
' l1 
I 
i 
1~: 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
·j 
I 
I 
111! 
' 11111 
1, .. , 
1,1 
l, 
It•, 
~ 
II 
\ 
l/1: 
of analysis of power. Habermas's analysis of power, as discussed above, 
demonstrates some of the characteristics of a juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis. Firstly, concerned with the asymmetrical character of power, 
Habermas asks how to submit power to the rule of right. Secondly, for 
Habermas, power flows from the centre, the sovereign, and permeates to 
the base. Foucault's strategic model, which looks into the means by which 
power effects are produced and maintained, challenges these premises of 
Habermas's analysis of power. Not only are some of Habermas's 
conclusions about the power and pathologies in modern societies 
questioned, but his mode of analysis which is preoccupied with the 
distinction of legitimate and illegitimate power is challenged. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the challenge of Foucault's analysis of power 
and knowledge to Habermas's theory. I suggest that Habermas's study of 
knowledge in Knowledge and Human Interests can be considered as a 
juridico-discursive mode of analysis. The juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis represents power as submitting to the rule of right. It views power 
as legitimate when it is exercised within its limits. For Habermas, science, 
and other forms of knowledge too, submit to the rule of right. They are 
seen as unproblematic as long as they are confined to their own domain. 
From the perspective of Foucault's strategic model, however, certain 
knowledges are problematic not when they transgress the boundary of 
their own domain, but when they provide the means by which power is 
exercised. Moreover, I argue, the way in which they provide a means for 
the exercise of power is different from what Habermas assumes. They do 
not lend themselves to power as a victim that falls a prey to power, but 
rather form the internal condition by which power is exercised. In contrast 
to what Habermas sees as an external relation between knowledge and 
power, Foucault shows that there is an internal relation between these 
knowledges and power. 
Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge, I contend, poses another 
challenge to Habermas with regard to his representation of truth in the 
model of rational discourse. With the notion of an · ideal speech situation 
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presupposed in Habermas's discourse model, the production of truth is 
represented as free from power. Foucault challenges it by showing that 
power relations constitute the condition for the development of certain 
true knowledges, that is, power produces truths. If truths are shown to be 
part of the problem, we can no longer imagine that "truth will make us 
free". What shall we do with truth? The last part of the chapter is devoted 
to a discussion of these issues. 
Habermas claims that his project has moved away from the 
philosophy of the subject. In Chapter 5, I point out that his notion of 
communicative action still relies upon an a priori notion of the rational 
subject who possesses certain linguistic competences. Not only is his claim 
of moving away from the philosophy of the subject doubtful, but his 
reliance upon a certain notion of modern subjectivity allows Foucault to 
say something about his project. I would like to argue that there are two 
kinds of challenge that Foucault has for Habermas: one makes use of 
Foucault's notion of otherness to criticize Habermas; the other considers 
Habermas's "veakness from the perspective of Foucault's strategic model. 
In terms of Foucault's notion of otherness, Habermas can be criticized for 
his exclusion of those who fall behind his standard of rationality as the 
other. "The other" include those 'Who want to remain privatistic about 
their feelings and are unwilling to prove their claims, and those who lack 
argumentative capability. 
Nevertheless, this way of drawing insights from Foucault, I argue, 
presupposes a negative concept of power that Foucault seeks to surpass. 
From his strategic model, one sees that in order for power to be 
implemented effectively, po-,-ver cannot merely negate ; instead, it must be 
productive: power produces subjectivities. Therefore, the problem of 
Habermas's theory, I suggest, is not so much his exclusion of the other as 
his production of modern rational subjectivity, for it is through the 
production of modern subjectivities that modern forms of power begin to 
operate. In his latest works, Foucault's discussion of the Greek ethics 
presupposes a notion of an aesthetic subject. Is it, as Foucault's critics 
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understand, a basis to ground critique? If the answer is no, in what way 
does it help us reflect upon resistance against modern power? The last part 
of chapter 5 will seek to answer these questions. 
The other kind of challenge to be discussed relates to Foucault's idea of 
Enlightenment, which is also a central theme of the debate between 
Habermas and Foucault. In Habermas's view, Foucault is pessimistic and 
one-sided as he leaves out the bright side of the Enlightenment which 
includes the development of universalistic morality and systems of right. I 
argue that their difference should not be construed in terms of pessimism 
and optimism, or as one holding a one-sided view while the other holds a 
more balanced view. For Foucault is, like Habermas, able to see both the 
achievements and the evils of the Enlightenment. Foucault says that the 
Enlightenment has discovered liberties, but at the same time it has also 
invented the disciplines. In drawing our attention to the disciplines 
invented by the Enlightenment, Foucault does not mean to condemn the 
achievements of the Enlightenment as evil. What he wants to show is that 
if there are any achievements of the Enlightenment, they should not be 
viewed as pure and absolute, but rather as ambiguous. For it is the 
development of the disciplines which constitutes the other side of the 
process. The problem of Habermas is his squeezing the ambiguity out of 
these Enlightenment achievements and seeking to assert them as the 
elements of reason that provide us the basis of hope. 
In the second part of Chapter 6, I shall examine Foucault's essays on 
"What is Enlightenment?" and see whether, as Habermas's says, it reveals 
a contradiction with his earlier work. Habermas thinks that there is no 
way to reconcile the position announced in "What is Enlightenment?" 
with that of Foucault's earlier work. I argue that Foucault provides an 
example of how to subvert the "blackmail" of the Enlightenment. His 
position in the earlier work should not be read as an anti-Enlightenment 
stance, nor should his latest essays on "What is Enlightenment?" be read 
as pro-Enlightenment. Foucault's contribution lies particularly in his 
challenging these binary oppositions and "simplistic and authoritarian 
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alternatives". His use of reason, as discussed in the essay "What is 
Enlightenment?", is not one that draws limits and boundaries or that 
· constructs binary oppositions, but rather one which respects the 
complexities of reality while experimenting with how to transgress it. 
In Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, I summarize the insights of 
Foucault's work and its challenges for Habermas's theory. I point out that 
from Habermas's perspective, there could be four kinds of weakness in 
Foucault's work; but if we look at things from the perspective of Foucault, 
all of them would fall into place. In Habermas's view, firstly, Foucault fails 
to provide a principle according to which one can differentiate legitimate 
and illegitimate power; secondly, Foucault's knowledges fail to claim 
superiority according to the standard of truth; thirdly, Foucault adopts an 
anti-Enlightenment stance and fails to affirm the achievements of the 
Enlightenment; fourthly, Foucault's normative positions fail to claim 
superiority according to the standard of universal validity claims. 
However, from Foucault's perspective, we see that firstly, the 
preoccupation with a differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate 
power belongs to a juridico-discursive model of power which Foucault 
seeks to surpass. He introduces us to a strategic model of power which 
focuses not so much on the questions of right and legitimacy, but rather on 
the techniques and mechanisms by which power effects are produced. In 
this way we see that truth is the means through which power operates. 
Therefore, secondly, instead of appealing to the notion of truth as the 
ground of critique, Foucault seeks to problematize the status of truth. 
Foucault challenges Habermas by showing that the problem is no longer 
falsehood and ideology, but truth. Thirdly, from the perspective of a 
strategic model, we see that achievements of the Enlightenment are so 
much "entangled" with "evils" that they could no longer be considered as 
pure achievements. Foucault is opposed to the simplistic alternative of 
pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment that Habermas has in mind, 
and he engages in a permanent critique of the historical era of the 
Enlightenment which is an attempt to break free from this "blackmail" of 
the Enlightenment. 
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Lastly, we are left with Habermas's criticism of Foucault's lack of a 
normative ground, and the second part of Chapter 7 will deal with this 
issue. I argue that Foucault's critique should be seen as an alternative to 
Habermas's normative approach of critique. It does not provide any 
normative principle that enables one to differentiate legitimate and 
illegitimate power or that commands universal consensus. Instead of 
worrying about the possibility of coming to a rational agreement, 
Foucault's critique is a case of injecting anxiety and uncertainty into forms 
of action and thought. It questions what we have taken for granted; it 
questions the principles which we often rely on. The questioning is, 
however, not carried out by providing answers to normative questions, 
but by opening a distance between us and the familiar phenomena, 
producing discord and unsettling effects. While refusing to provide 
normative principles, it is capable of moving people to fight, for it shows 
the intensification and excess of power in modern western societies and 
the danger of modern forms of power. 
I acknowledge that Foucault's suspension of the normative question 
would create difficulties since we would not be able to have a principle 
according to which we can differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power, 
acceptable and unacceptable resistance, desirable and undesirable changes. 
Nevertheless, Foucault's approach implies a determination to leave the 
questions to the reflection and decision of individuals. The difficulties 
created by Foucault are perhaps the difficulty of theoreticians to limit their 
role to a critical-historical analysis as well as the difficulty of individuals to 
be mature and able to reflect and make decision for themselves. 
I conclude that one must notice the limitation of Foucault's work. 
That is, he shows us what he perceives to be the current problem, the 
main danger of modern western societies. Nevertheless, other people, 
Habermas, for instance, could perceive a different kind of danger. If 
Habermas's ideal cannot provide a safeguard against the danger of a fully 
panopticized society, Foucault's work is also unable to provide a safeguard 
against the danger of a form of life in which people no longer demand 
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rational, normative legitimation of social authority, but just cynically go 
along out of privatized strategic considerations. I think what we obtain 
from Foucault is not a set of doctrines, but rather a certain way of 
philosophizing and a certain awareness of the danger of modern western 
societies. Each of us must make an ethico-political choice every day to 
determine what is the main danger. 
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Chapter 1 
HABERMAS'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Habermas sees his project as both a continuation and a critical evaluation of 
earlier critical theory (which primarily means the works of the Frankfurt 
School). On the one hand, Habermas agrees with earlier critical theory's 
attempt to shift from the critique of the political economy to the critique of the 
socio-cultural sphere. That is, the problem of power and domination in late 
capitalist societies is no longer mainly to do with inequalities and exploitation 
in the production sphere. Instead, power, in the name of rationality, extends 
itself to the socio-cultural sphere to instrumentalize our action orientation. 
The critique of the instrumental rationality becomes the major task of critical 
theory. On the other hand, Habermas considers the major weakness of earlier 
critical theory as lying in its confusion of reason with this instrumental form 
of rationality. In his view, earlier critical theory adopts a totalist critique of 
Western reason, and hence turns its back on the very foundation of critique. In 
other words, for Habermas, the basis of critical theory is undermined by the 
line that the Frankfurt School pursues. 
Therefore, from the beginning Habermas has been preoccupied with two 
tasks: firstly, searching for the ground of critique, and secondly, providing a 
critique of power and ideology in modern societies. Before discussing 
Habermas's analyses of power and pathologies in modem societies, as I shall 
do in Chapter 2, this chapter introduces the development of Habermas's 
theoretical framework in terms of an attempt to accomplish the first task. In 
particular, his efforts in developing a theory of know ledge and a theory of 
communicative action are considered as attempts to provide a ground of 
critique. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I presents Habermas's 
diagnosis of the problems of earlier critical theory. While locating his project 
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in the tradition that runs from Marx to the Frankfurt School, Habermas sees 
both the collapse of faith in Marx's theory and the shift of the Frankfurt School 
to a totalizing critique of reason as undermining the basis of critical theory. 
Hence he is concerned with developing a theoretical framework so that critical 
theory can be grounded in an affirmative way. Part II discusses Habermas's 
theory of knowledge as a preliminary attempt to solve what he perceives as 
the problems of earlier critical theory. In his work Knowledge and Human 
Interests, Habermas not only clarifies the cognitive status of different forms of 
knowledge, but also provides a ground for critical theory in one of the 
fundamental characteristics of human existence -- power. He argues that 
critical theory is guided by an emancipatory interest which aims to free 
consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. This 
emancipatory interest, he claims, is the interest of reason. In his later works, 
he seeks to construct more clearly a notion of reason so as to provide a ground 
for critique. Part III discusses Habermas's theory of communicative action as 
his attempt to demonstrate an internal relation between reason and 
communication. In order to accomplish this task, firstly, he tries to 
demonstrate communicative action as the original mode of language use; 
secondly, he carries out a rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of 
the possibility of understanding; and thirdly, he sets up a model of rational 
discourse. 
Besides an explication of Habermas's theoretical framework, this chapter 
seeks to show that Habermas's preoccupation with certain problematics leads 
him to take some steps instead of others, and enables him to emphasize some 
concepts instead of others. The analysis of the preoccupations of Habermas's 
project is intended to be a reflection upon the limits of Habermas's theory. 
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1.1 Habermas and Earlier Critical Theory 
Habermas constantly situates his project within the tradition of Marx and the 
Frankfurt School (here I shall primarily consider Marcuse, Horkheimer and 
Adorno). He shares with them the problematic of the critique of power and 
ideology. In an article titled Science and Technology as "Ideology", Habermas 
(1989) identifies his project as a continuation of Marcuse's critique of science 
and technology as ideology. However, from Marcuse's discussion, Habermas 
sees the problem of Marx's theory: contrary to Marx's understanding, the 
forces of production do not contradict relations of production. Instead, with 
the advance of science and technology, the productive forces become the 
basis which legitimates relations of domination. Marx's theory, which once 
provided critical theory with the basis of critique, is increasingly put into 
question. In Habermas's view, one should construct an alternative basis for 
critique. To his disappointment, Horkheimer and Adorno 's critique of 
Enlightenment does not pursue this direction. For him, critique becomes 
totalizing and is headed toward a dead end. In this section, I shall look into 
Habermas's diagnosis of the problems of earlier critical theory so as to 
understand the preoccupations of Habermas's project. 
Habermas (1989) takes up Marcuse 's discussion of science and 
technology, and writes: Marcuse points out that science and technology 
represent a kind of instrumental-purposive rationality that results not only in 
domination of nature but domination of men. Men as well as nature are 
subjected to .the scientific, calculated control made possible by the principles 
and techniques of science and technology. Marcuse says, 
not only the application of technology but technology itself 
is domination (of nature and men) -- methodical, scientific, 
calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and 
interests of domination are not foisted upon technology 
"subsequently" and from the outside; they enter the very 
construction of the technical apparatus. (Habermas, 
1989:238) 
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While men are increasingly subjected to the calculated control of 
bureaucratic regulation and government surveillance, nevertheless, they are 
unable to recognize this kind of domination. For science and technology 
function as an ideology which conceals domination and repression. Marcuse 
argues, as summarized by Habermas, that objectively superfluous repression 
exists in the form of an intensified subjection of individuals to the enormous 
apparatus of production and distribution, and a deprivation of free time, yet 
this repression is not recognized by people because the legitimation of 
domination has assumed a new character: it refers to the constantly increasing 
productivity following from scientific and technical progress that keeps 
individuals living in increasing comfort (Habermas, 1989:238). In other words, 
the ideology of science and technology, which promises material comfort, 
prevents people from being aware of their own situation, their situation of 
being dominated and repressed. 
For Habermas, Marcuse's critique of science and technology can be seen 
as a challenge to Marx's theory. Marx claims that the productive forces 
unleashed by capitalism would provide an objective condition for overcoming 
it. He assumes that there would be contradiction between the productive 
forces and the relations of production, and finally revolutionary action would 
take place. Marcuse, however, is able to see that at the stage of scientific-
technical development, the forces of production enter into a new constellation 
with the relations of production. The continual growth of productive forces is 
now dependent on scientific-technical progress that has been serving the 
function of legitimating political power. Therefore, Habermas states, instead 
of being the basis of critique in the interest of political emancipation, the 
forces of production become the basis of legitimating domination (Habermas, 
1989:239). 
In addition to the critique of productive forces, there are other socio-
historical factors which lead to the collapse of the faith in Marx's theory. 
Habermas (1973:195-8) summarizes the changing socio-historical scene in 
terms of four historical facts. First, in the stage of organized capitalism the 
sphere of commodity exchange and social labor requires centralized 
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organization or state administration. The traditional base-superstructure 
model no longer applies as politics is no less dependent on the economic 
sphere than the economic sphere is dependent on politics. Second, in 
advanced capitalism the standard of living has risen to an extent that 
"alienation" is no longer expressed as economic misery. It may find its remote 
reflection in a poverty of leisure, an externally manipulated motivation, and a 
satisfaction of false needs. Third, under these conditions, the avant-garde of 
the socialist revolution, the proletariat class, has been dissolved. Fourth, the 
Russian Revolution did not bring about a truly emancipated society. It 
established a rule of functionaries and Party cadres which enforced control 
over broad social domains. 
What is worth noticing is the impact of the collapse of faith in Marx's 
theory on earlier critical theory. Habermas (1982b:21) states its impact in this 
way: "the critique of ideology has lost its foundations. Moreover, if the forces 
of production are increasingly merging symbiotically with the relations of 
production which they at one time were supposed to destroy, then there is 
also no more driving force on which critique could set its hopes". Since earlier 
critical theory had relied upon Marx's theory to provide the foundation of 
critique, the collapse of faith in that theory is believed to have a disturbing 
effect on earlier critical theory. In order to see this impact, we should first of 
all understand the relation between earlier critical theory and Marx's theory. 
Roderick(1986:32-41) provides a concise account of the way in which 
earlier critical theory based itself upon Marx's theory.1 In the 1930s, he writes, 
the critical theorists still adopted an affirmative attitude toward the possibility 
of emancipation. In their critique of ideology, Horkheimer and Adorno 
adopted the method of "immanent critique"~ which was supported by Marx's 
theory of history. By "immanent critique", Roderick says, critical theory is to 
confront "the existent, in its historical context with the claim of its conceptual 
principles, in order to criticize the relationship between the two and thus 
transcend them" (Roderick, 1986:37; Horkheimer, 1974:182). By locating the 
1 Also see Habermas, 1982a, p.231; for his own view on how immanent critique depends 
upon a theory of history. 
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contradiction between bourgeois ideals, like justice, equality and freedom, 
and social reality, they seek to expose the irrationality of capitalism. 
According to Roderick, Horkheimer still looked to the proletariat class as the 
addressees of critical theory. It was hoped that through raising the 
consciousness of the proletariat, the critique would create the subjective 
condition, and when the subjective condition converges with the objective 
condition, the proletariat would be able to bear its historical role (Roderick, 
1986:37-8). 
Therefore, Roderick elaborates, the critical theory advocated by 
Horkheimer was dependent upon Marx's theory of historical materialism to 
provide the ground; otherwise the method of immanent critique can have 
relativistic implications. For it could only appeal to truths or values which are 
internal to a particular society in a particular historical period, and one could 
question the validity of using these concepts as the standards of critique. With 
the help of a theory of history, however, it is able to avoid this kind of 
relativism. For Marx's theory of historical materialism provides a picture of 
the progression of humankind's history which tells what people are and what 
they could become. Hence according to Marx's theory, the potential of the 
concepts of critique is supported by the objective historical development 
(Roderick, 1986:39-42). 
By the 1940s, Roderick says, this formulation of critical theory, which 
depended upon Marx's theory to provide the ground, was abandoned. As 
mentioned before, the changing historical scenes posed a challenge to Marx's 
theory. In particular, experiences like Russian Stalinism, the rise of Fascism, 
the failure of the social-revolutionary labor movement in all industrial 
societies, and the post-war stabilization of capitalism all resulted in the 
disappointment of revolutionary expectations (Roderick, 1986:38; Habermas, 
1991:366-7). Earlier critical theory could no longer look upon the proletariat as 
the subject of history. In Habermas's view, it is necessary to reconstruct the 
basis for critical theory. Yet, to his disappointment, earlier critical theory has 
not pursued this end. Instead of searching for an alternative foundation, 
critique becomes totalizing. 
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For Habermas, Adorno's diagnosis of the "totally-administered society" 
and Marcuse's thesis of "one-dimensional man" are too pessimistic since they 
portray a picture of complete loss of freedom and autonomy in late-capitalist 
societies. Likewise, for Habermas, the criticism of Enlightenment provided by 
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment is one-sided. Habermas 
thinks that the path they take has led critical theory to a dead end. In an article 
titled "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment", Habermas (1982b) 
elaborates his criticisms of the Dialectic of Enlightenment as follows: firstly, 
Horkheimer and Adorno overlook the achievements of the Enlightenment and 
merely conduct a negative critique; secondly, they turn against reason and 
thus deprive themselves of any ground for critique. 
Habermas writes that in contrast to our understanding that enlightenment 
represents a liberating force vis-a-vis myth and the authority of tradition, 
Horkheimer and Adorno propose that "myth is already enlightenment; and 
enlightenment reverts to mythology" (Habermas, 1982b:14). In the view of 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas elaborates, people develop their identity 
by learning to control external nature at the price of repressing their inner 
nature. Hence the ego which originally outsmarted its mythical fate by 
sacrificing a substitute is again overwhelmed by this mythical fate as soon as 
it is forced to internalize this self-sacrifice (Habermas, 1982b:16). For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas writes, Enlightenment is not only 
marked by the domination of an objectified external nature, but also a 
repressed inner nature. 
Habermas does not deny that Enlightenment brings about the domination 
of an objectified external nature and a repressed inner nature. What he wants 
to point out is that this is only one side of the Enlightenment. Habermas 
believes that in the spheres of science, morality and art, Enlightenment has 
brought about gains in freedom and autonomy. He argues that certain 
elements of cultural modernity, like the self-reflexion of science that allows it 
to have the status of theoretical knowledge, the universalist foundations of 
law and morality that have been embodied in democratic institutions, and the 
liberating force of an aesthetic experience that is contained in the work of 
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avant-garde art and the discourses of art criticism, should be affirmed 
(Habermas, 1982b:18). Yet, for Horkheimer and Adorno the spheres of science, 
morality and art do not offer any hope. Habermas summarizes: they are 
convinced that science has been absorbed by instrumental reason and 
becomes merely a technologically exploitable knowledge. They also believe 
that with the disintegration of religious and metaphysical world views, all 
moral standards lose their credibility in face of the sole authority of science. In 
their analysis of mass culture, Adorno and Horkheimer show that art is 
drained of its innovative and critical power when fused with entertainment 
(Habermas, 1982b:17). 
In Habermas's view, the one-sidedness of Horkheimer and Adorno's 
critique is based on their thesis that "the process of enlightenment is from the 
very beginning dependent on an impulse of self-preservation which mutilates 
reason because it can only make use of it in the form of purposive-rational 
domination of nature and instinct" (Habermas, 1982b:17). This thesis, 
Habermas contends, leads to two problems. First, it turns against reason 
which is for Habermas the very foundation of critique. Second, it assumes that 
reason only serves the impulse of self-preservation, and hence reason is 
stripped of its validity claims and assimilated to sheer power. 
According to Habermas, when critique becomes totalizing, it poses 
serious problems for critical theory in terms of its ground of critique. In his 
words: 
Critique becomes total: it turns against reason as the 
foundation of its own analysis. The fact that the suspicion 
of ideology becomes total means that it opposes not only 
the ideological function of the bourgeois ideals, but 
rationality as such, thereby extending critique to the very 
foundations of an immanent critique of ideology. 
(Habermas, 1982b:22) 
In order to ground critique, Habermas thinks that we must retain a certain 
notion of reason. This notion of reason must be able to differentiate reason 
from a purposive-instrumental form of rationality. For Habermas, since 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not have such a notion of reason, what they see is 
36 
I 
lllf1 
I 
I 
~ 
l 
I~ 
; 
la 
,, 
9 
! 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
reason subjected to the dictates of purposive rationality, even in the spheres of 
modem science, morality and art, whereas in Habermas's eyes, it is a mistake 
to collapse the reason in science, morality and art into an instrumental reason. 
Habermas contends that because Horkheimer and Adorno see reason 
regress to a form of rationality at the service of self-preservation, hence behind 
the ideals of objectivity and the truth claims of science, behind the normative 
claims of Christianity and a universalist morality, they find nothing but the 
imperatives of self-preservation and domination (1982b:24). Habermas thinks 
that this is unacceptable since they overlook the validity claims behind 
theoretical and practical reason, and they simply reduce validity claims into 
power claims. Habermas argues that if "all proper claims to validity are 
devalued and if the underlying value-judgements are mere expressions of 
claims to power rather than to validity, according to what standards should 
critique then differentiate? It must at least be able to discriminate between a 
power which deserves to be esteemed and a power which deserves to be 
disparaged". Without the standard of validity claims, "there are only struggles 
between power and nothing is left to transcend the struggles" (Habermas, 
1982b:27). Therefore, Habermas states, reason cannot be reduced to the power 
of self-preservation; validity claims cannot be reduced to power claims. 
To close our discussion of Habermas's criticism of earlier critical theory, it 
has to be pointed out that Habermas does not only think critique has to be 
grounded, but that critique has to be grounded in reason. When we talk about 
the ground of a critique, we mean the critique must be justified, or supported 
by arguments and evidence. Justification can be given in relation to the local 
context of ~ritique, with a consideration of the needs under certain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, for Habermas, critique must be grounded in 
reason. What does Habermas have in mind by "reason"? For Habermas, it is a 
realm of truth and universal validity claims. When critique is grounded in 
reason, its claim is capable of transcending the local context and commanding 
universal consensus. In this way, critique will be differentiated from falsehood 
and ideology and will obtain the status of truth. 
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In sum, from the beginning Habermas's project has been burdened by the 
task of constructing a notion of reason which can provide the ground of the 
critique. In the following sections, I shall discuss his theory of knowledge and 
his theory of communicative action and see the steps he has taken in 
accomplishing the task . 
1.2 Habermas's Theory of Knowledge 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas (1978) distinguishes three 
different forms of knowledge, each of them linked to a particular kind of 
knowledge-constitutive interest and grounded in a certain fundamental 
characteristic of the human species. This can be seen as firstly, an attempt to 
confine scientific knowledge to its proper domain so as to counter the 
domination of science and technology in late-capitalist societies, and secondly, 
an attempt to clarify the proper domain of critical theory as well as its ground. 
According to Habermas, there are three distinctive forms of knowledge, 
each linked to certain fundamental characteristics of human existence. The 
first form of knowledge is empirical-analytic sciences. It is related to the 
technical interest in control. This interest is generated in the activity of labor. 
To labor, or to engage in productive activity generates an interest in 
dominating the natural and social environment. Empirical-analytic sciences 
provide us with the knowledge for this rational, instrumental activity. Besides 
technical interest, there are non-technical interests which constitute 
knowledge. Historical-hermeneutic sciences o..rea form of knowledge which is 
constituted by the practical interest, an interest of mutual understanding 
which overcomes conflicts of interpretation and misunderstandings that arise 
in practical life.2 This practical interest is related to an essential characteristic 
2 Habermas (1978:176) says that in its very structure hermeneutic understanding is designed 
to guarantee, within cultural traditions, the possible action-orienting self-understanding of 
individuals and groups as well as reciprocal understanding between different individuals 
and groups. Without such a hermeneutic understanding, the communication may break 
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of human species: language. Linguistic communication is a mode of existence 
which cannot be reduced to that of labor. It concerns the action-orienting self-
understanding of individuals and groups as well as reciprocal understanding 
between individuals and groups. As constituted by the practical interest, 
historical-hermeneutic sciences provide us with knowledge of 
intersubjectively established meanings. 
The third form of knowledge concerns another kind of non-technical 
interest: the emancipatory interest. Habermas identifies critical theory as a 
form of knowledge constituted by the emancipatory interest, an interest in 
human autonomy and responsibility. This form of knowledge involves self-
reflection. For instance, critical theory reflects upon the characteristics of 
human existence, the nature and status of human knowledge, and so on. 
Furthermore, it is a form of knowledge which is concerned with questions of 
values and standards. Critical arguments are supplied for judging and 
justifying the choice of certain values and standards. 
In talking about knowledge as interest-constituted, Habermas refers 
'constitution' to two meanings (Keat and Urry, 1982:223). First, the interest 
provides a criterion for what is counted as real, or what is counted as the 
object of study. For empirical-analytic sciences, what is real is what can be 
detected, measured and manipulated by means of controlled experiments. 
Nevertheless, guided by a different interest, historical-hermeneutic sciences 
can have a totally different object of study. The study of meanings needs not 
be excluded as unreal by the criteria of empirical-analytic sciences. Second, 
the interest determines the character of the standards employed in assessing 
the truth or .falsity of statements made about these objects. For instance, in 
association with the technical interest, we have the standard of falsification 
which rejects statements that fail to predict. On the other hand, critical theory, 
which deals with the justification of values and norms, needs not fulfil the 
criterion of predictive ability. 
down, and a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the condition of 
the success of instrumental action: namely the possibility of unconstrained agreement and 
non-violent recognition. According to Habermas, because this is the presupposition of 
practice, we call the knowledge-constitutive interest of cultural sciences "practical". 
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With the concept of knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas carries 
on the project of a critique of science in his own particular way. Similar to 
other critiques of ideology, Habermas's work unmasks the interest behind 
scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, while the interest behind ideology is 
traditionally understood as deriving from either the psychological 
constellations of individuals or the objective positions of social groups, 
Habermas refers the interest underlying science to a fundamental interest 
which constitutes science as such. No science can ever free itself from this 
interest because it owes to it the constitution of its own logical-methodological 
rules. The problem of science, for Habermas, is not so much that this interest 
distorts knowledge or obscures objectivity; on the contrary, it owes its 
objectivity to this interest. The problem of science is that it overlooks the fact 
that it is constituted by a certain interest and that it lacks the ability to reflect 
upon this knowledge-constitutive interest. For Habermas, science has an 
inadequate self-understanding when it claims to be value-free or interest-free. 
Furthermore, Habermas argues, when science claims to be the only legitimate 
form of knowledge, it overlooks the possibility of other knowledge-
constitutive interests, each of which has its own right to exist.3 While the 
interest in technical control is related to the fundamental condition of the 
human species of work, the practical interest is related to that of interaction. 
The emancipatory interest, on the other hand, concerns the problems of 
power. 
Habermas's critique of science is connected with his attempt to provide a 
ground for different modes of knowledge. Nevertheless, there are many 
ambiguities in the way he grounds critical theory. By relating the interest of 
science to work and the interest of hermeneutic science to language, 
Habermas intends to ground different modes of know ledge in the 
fundamental conditions of human existence. However, when it comes to 
critical theory it is not clear whether critical theory is to be grounded in a 
3 In Chapter 4, I shall compare Habermas's critique of science with Foucault's analyses of 
knowledge and power. I point out that Habermas seeks to circumscribe the role of science in 
a particular domain. Science is considered as unproblematic when it is confined within its 
own domain. Foucault, on the other hand, achieves a radical problematization of science by 
showing that the relation between science and power is internal rather than external. 
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fundamental characteristic of human existence: power. In Knowledge and 
Human Interests, it is not clear whether "power" should be seen as a 
fundamental condition of existence or as a pathological phenomenon that 
needs to be removed. At times, Habermas's discussion of power seems to 
place 'power' on the same anthropological footing as work and interaction. 
For instance, he refers 'power' to a definite means of social organization. He 
states, the three categories of possible knowledge "originate in the interest 
structure of a species that is linked in its roots to definite means of social 
organization: work, language, and power" (Habermas, 1978:313). 
Nevertheless, more often he treats power as a pathological phenomenon. For 
instance, he claims that the emancipatory interest sets in motion a process of 
self-reflection which "frees consciousness from its dependence on 
hypostatized powers"; it determines what statements "express ideologically 
frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed" 
(Habermas, 1978:313, 310). Hence the emancipatory interest can be read as an 
interest which seeks to undo the damage done in the other two areas.4 
However, if "power" is read in the latter sense, critical theory is considered in 
terms of opposition to the harm done by power, and there is still not an 
affirmative ground for critical theory. For Habermas, this simply repeats the 
mistake of earlier critical theory. With a determination to provide an 
affirmative ground for critical theory, Habermas seeks to have a notion of 
reason which would allow critical theory to be differentiated from false 
ideology and grounded in an affirmative way. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas attempts to specify the 
relation between critical theory and reason. Habermas argues that the interest 
of critical theory is the interest of reason: an interest in emancipation. He 
traces the development of the concept of reason from Kant, Hegel and Fichte 
and notices that the act of reason is to produce freedom. Enlightenment sees 
4 In a discussion of Habermas's notion of knowledge-constitutive interests, Lenhardt 
(1972:239) elaborates that the domain of natural science creates the preconditions for total 
annihilation through warfare, or for ecological disaster; the domain of interaction may have 
problems of intolerance, mystification of the bases of power and inequality, and development 
of other pathological modes of communication. He says that it is these distortions that self-
reflection is capable of dissolving. 
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reason in terms of its undoing dogmatism. Reason emancipates individuals 
from the error and unfree existence of dogmatism. Critical theory, Habermas 
argues, contains the same interest. It is a form of knowledge which involves 
self-reflection. In self-reflection, which is the mode of inquiry of critical 
theory, reason grasps itself as interested. This brings about "a critical 
dissolution of objectivism, that is the objectivistic self-understanding of the 
sciences, which suppresses the contribution of subjective activity to the 
pre-formed objects of possible knowledge" (Habermas, 1978:212). In this sense, 
critical theory undoes the dogmatism of science. It involves self-reflection 
which "is at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension and liberation 
from dogmatic dependence" (Habermas, 1978:208). 
In addition to the view that the interest of reason is to emancipate, 
Habermas specifies the materialistic dimension of reason. He does not agree 
with Fichte's or Hegel's conception of reason. In contrast to Fichte's absolute 
self-positing of ego, and Hegel's absolute movement of mind, Habermas 
argues that the self-formative process of human species is not unconditioned. 
In the same way as Marx, Habermas sees the self-formative process as 
contingent upon the conditions of nature. The difference between them is that 
Habermas considers the conditions as having both objective and, subjective 
natures, that is, the conditions of instrumental action and symbolic 
interaction. To this extent the self-formative process assumes the form of the 
technical and practical interests in natural sciences and hermeneutic sciences. 
As reason's interest in emancipation is invested in the self-formative process 
of human species, it aims at realizing the conditions of symbolic interaction 
and instrumental action. Habermas says, in self-reflection, reason combines 
knowledge and interest (1978:210-11). 
In this sense, for Habermas, the role of critical theory does not only 
concern a critique of the dogmatism of science, but a reflection upon the 
subjective and objective conditions of the self-formative process. Critics 
however point out that Habermas has conflated two different senses of "self-
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reflection".5 Habermas, in a postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, 
acknowledges that there are two meanings of reflection. 
It occurred to me only after completing the book that the 
traditional use of the term 'reflection', which goes back to 
German Idealism, covers ( and confuses) two things: on the 
one hand, it denotes the reflection upon the conditions of 
potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and acting subject 
as such; on the other hand, it denotes the reflection upon 
unconsciously produced constraints to which a determinate 
subject ( or a determinate group of subjects, or a determinate 
species subject) succumbs in its process of self-reflection. 
(Habermas, 1975:182) 
The first meaning of reflection is related to the Kantian idea of a critique 
of knowledge which involves reflection on the conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge; the second meaning is related to the Marxian idea of a critique of 
ideology which involves reflection that enables subjects to be freed from 
hidden constraints in the structure of social action. The first meaning of self-
reflection contains a transcendental account of the a priori conditions of 
knowing for human subjects; the second meaning of self-reflection contains a 
practical account of the history of a specific group of subjects.6 
As we shall see, Habermas's determination to provide an affirmative 
ground for critical theory leads him to move further away from the second 
approach of critique -- a historical self-reflection -- toward the first approach --
a transcendental reflection. He turns to a rational reconstruction of the 
universal conditions of reaching understanding. Instead of helping people to 
reflect upon the hidden constraints in their historically-specific contexts, the 
project of rational reconstruction concerns an elaboration of the general rules 
of human competences that govern the speech of humankind; instead of 
advancing a critique of the phenomenon of power and ideology in a particular 
context, critical theory turns to search for the universal and the necessary. 
5 For a discussion of criticisms of Habermas and an elaboration of the distinction between 
historical self-reflection and transcendental reflection; see McCarthy, 1984, pp.91££. 
6 See Roderick's (1986:65-9) discussion of the tension between Kantian approach and Marxian 
approach of critique. 
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1.3 Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action 
Speaking in a transcendental voice, Habermas claims: 
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not 
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises 
us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and 
responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence 
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained consensus. (Habermas, 1978:314) 
Habermas's project turns to language to provide an affirmative ground 
for critical theory. With a rational reconstruction of the universal conditions 
for the possibility of understanding, Habermas seeks to establish the theses 
that reason can be separated from power, and reason is internally connected 
to communicative action. He takes several steps in establishing the theses. 
Firstly, he distinguishes between different uses of language and regards an 
orientation to understanding as the original use of language. Secondly, after 
establishing the primacy of communicative action, he looks into the universal 
conditions for the success of a speech-act. Thirdly, he constructs a model of 
rational discourse which shows the rational basis of communicative action. I 
would like to show that, preoccupied with the construction of a notion of 
reason to ground critique, Habermas has taken certain steps instead of others, 
and has emphasized certain notions at the expense of others. 
Communicative action as the original mode of language use 
Habermas calls his work a theory of communicative action rather than a 
theory of communication. For he recognizes that there can be different uses of 
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language in communication. When participants are oriented to reaching 
understanding, they are engaging in communicative action; nevertheless, 
when participants are oriented to success and consequences, it is an 
instrumental-strategic use of language. With an account of Austin's speech-act 
theory, Habermas seeks to accomplish two tasks: first, developing a 
demarcation between communicative action and strategic action, and second, 
establishing the primacy and centrality of communicative action. 
Habermas (1991:288-293) takes up Austin's speech-act theory and 
distinguishes between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. According to 
Habermas, for Austin, the speaker performs an action in saying something 
\ 
through illocutionary acts. It usually contains a performative verb in the first 
person present, for example, "I promise you (command you, confess to you) 
that p". On the other hand, through perlocutionary acts, the speaker produces 
an effect upon the hearer. That is, by carrying out a perlocutionary speech act, 
the speaker brings about something in the world. Habermas summarizes 
Austin's distinction in the following way: an illocutionary act is- "to act in 
saying something"; a perlocutionary act is "to bring about something through 
acting in saying something" (Habermas, 1991:289). 
Nevertheless, if illocutionary acts are embedded in contexts of interaction, 
then perlocutionary effects are often produced. That is, saying something 
often brings about something in the world. Habermas acknowledges the 
difficulties and controversies with regard to the demarcation between 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Nevertheless, he determines to have a 
strict and clear-cut demarcation between them in order to support his 
demarcation between communicative action and strategic action, between 
reason and power. 
According to Habermas (1991:290-2), we can adopt a few criteria to make 
clear the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He 
suggests that an illocutionary act is characterized by its self-sufficiency. That 
is, the communicative intent and the illocutionary aim follow from the 
manifest meaning of what is said, so that the hearer may understand and 
accept the utterance. For instance, S asserted to H that he gave notice to his 
45 
l., 
111 
firm.Swill have achieved illocutionary success if H understands the utterance 
and accepts it as true or right. By contrast, the communicative intent of 
perlocutionary acts does not follow the manifest content of the speech act. For 
instance, through informing H that he had given notice to his firm, S gave H a 
fright (as he intended to do). In sum, perlocutionary acts are firstly 
characterized by the fact that the effects go beyond the manifest meaning of 
the speech. Secondly, Habermas says, the effects are intended rather than 
unintended. Moreover, for Habermas, the intention of perlocutionary acts is 
often concealed. 
Habermas asserts that whereas illocutionary aims may be achieved only if 
they are expressed, perlocutionary aims (like to give a fright, to cause upset, to 
plunge into doubt, to annoy, to mislead, to offend, to infuriate, to humiliate 
and so forth) may not be admitted as such. The speaker often conceals the aim 
in order to produce the desired effect. The perlocutionary aim can only be 
identified through the speaker's intent, or it can be inferred from the context 
of interaction. As we shall see, Habermas's criticism of perlocutionary acts 
relies a great deal upon the claim that perlocutionary aims are concealed. 
Nevertheless, it is in accord with our experience that in order to produce 
effects on other people, one does not have to hide the intention. To give a 
fright, to annoy, to infuriate, to humiliate and so forth does not require one to 
hide the intention in order to achieve the aim. Habermas's definition of 
perlocutionary acts in this way delimits them into a particular kind of speech 
act which distinguishes them from illocutionary acts. The demarcation 
between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts then serves as a basis for 
a demarcation between strategic action and communicative action. 
After demarcating illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts, Habermas 
moves on to establish the connection between perlocutionary acts and 
strategic action, and that between illocutionary acts and communicative 
ruform12r 
action. He shows that like other goal-directed action in general, the of a 
perlocutionary act has a certain purpose in mind. Speech acts are 
instrumentalized as a means to the success of the purpose. Hence for 
Habermas, the perlocutionary act is actually a special class of strategic 
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interaction in which speech acts are instrumentalized. In contrast, Habermas 
argues, participants of illocutionary acts only pursue illocutionary aims. What 
participants do is come to an understanding of the speech act itself. This is 
what Habermas counts as communicative action. Communicative action is 
defined by him as "those linguistically mediated interactions in which all 
participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their 
mediating acts of communication". On the other hand, he regards strategic 
action as those interactions in which at least one of the participants wants to 
produce perlocutionary effects on others (Habermas, 1991:295). 
After drawing a demarcation between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
acts, with the former corresponding to communicative action and the latter 
corresponding to strategic action, Habermas seeks to establish the primacy 
and centrality of communicative action. He states, "the use of language with 
an orientation to reaching understanding is the original mode of language 
use", upon which the instrumental use of language use in general, is 
"parasitic" (Habermas, 1991:288). Habermas argues that in order to achieve 
perlocutionary aims the hearer has to understand what the speaker is saying, 
otherwise the speaker would not be able to bring about the desired effect. 
Therefore, Habermas concludes, perlocutionary effects have to depend first of 
all on illocutionary successes. To this extent, Habermas says, perlocutionary 
acts are "not an original use of language but the subsumption of speech acts 
that serve illocutionary aims under the conditions of action oriented to 
success" (Habermas, 1991:293). 
According to Habermas's argument, one may conclude that illocutionary 
acts are primary and perlocutionary acts are secondary. However, Habermas 
does not classify perlocutionary acts as "secondary", but rather as "parasitic". 
It still leaves the question of why communicative action is privileged whereas 
perlocutionary acts are condemned as parasitic. Since Habermas defines 
perlocutionary acts as concealed strategic action, they are seen as a kind of 
communication pathologies. Habermas writes, "[a] speaker can pursue 
perlocutionary aims only when he deceives his partner concerning the fact 
that he is acting strategically"(Habermas, 1991:294). Hence, for Habermas, in 
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order to achieve perlocutionary aims, deception or manipulation is involved. 
According to his classification of action types, this belongs to the 
communication pathologies that he identifies in concealed strategic action. It 
is a case of manipulation, in which at least one party is oriented to success but 
pretends to satisfy the presuppositions of communicative action.7 
Habermas further argues that perlocutionary acts are not suitable to be a 
model of action coordination, for they may contain an asymmetrical character 
of concealed strategic action, that is, at least one party is deceiving other 
participants regarding the fact that he is not satisfying the presuppositions of 
illocutionary acts. Habermas hence selects the model of communicative action 
in which, "all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one 
another and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation ... in 
order to arrive at an agreement that will provide the basis for a consensual 
coordination of individually pursued plans of action" (Habermas, 1991:294-5). 
Since Habermas views perlocutionary acts in terms of deception and 
manipulation, they are therefore considered as parasitic and not suitable to be 
a linguistic model of action coordination. Whereas, for Habermas, 
communicative action is characterized by the intersubjective binding effects of 
speech-acts, and hence serves as a better model of action coordination. 
Nevertheless, one may argue against Habermas that in open strategic action 
participants also coordinate their action according to an understanding or 
agreement of the distribution of sanction and reward. What makes 
communicative action superior to strategic action? In the following sections, 
Habermas's attempt to prove the superiority of communicative action in terms 
of its internal relation to reason will be considered. 
7 In his classification there are other pathologies, like self-deception, in which at least one 
party deceives himself/herself about the fact thats/he is oriented to success. Such cases of 
unconscious deception can be explained by psychoanalysts in terms of defence mechanisms. 
See Habermas, 1991, p.332. 
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A rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of the possibility of 
understanding 
After defining the immanent telos of communication as an orientation to 
understanding, Habermas looks into the universal conditions that make 
possible the understanding. Whereas in the performance of actual speech the 
conditions for understanding may involve extra-linguistic, empirical and 
contingent factors, Habermas opts for a rational reconstruction of the 
universal, a priori conditions of understanding. In this sense, his project does 
not concern the study of the actual use of speech in concrete situations, but 
rather the study of the idealized use of speech. He looks into the 
communicative competence of an ideal speaker and regards it as the universal 
condition that makes possible understanding in communication. 
Habermas says, in addition to linguistic competence, that is, the rules in 
phonetics, syntactics, and semantics, there are "rules that a competent speaker 
must master in order to form grammatical sentences and to utter them in an 
acceptable way". The mastery of these rules allows the speaker to "fulfil the 
conditions for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, no matter to 
which particular language the sentences may belong and in which accidental 
contexts the utterances may be embedded" (Habermas, 1979:26). Habermas 
thinks that in a similar way to the rules of linguistic competence, these rules of 
communicative competence admit of rational reconstruction in universal 
terms. 
In an earlier article, Habermas (1970:364) specifies communicative 
competence in terms of the mastery of the dialogue-constitutive universals, 
which include personal pronouns, interrogative, imperative and assertive 
formators, model formators and the like. In later discussions, Habermas views 
communicative competence in terms of a speaker's ability to achieve the 
pragmatic functions of an utterance. He states that there are three pragmatic 
functions of an utterance: to represent something, to express an intention, and 
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to establish a legitimate interpersonal relation. Propositional sentences can be 
used to represent a state of affairs; intentional verbs, modal forms, and so on 
can be used to express an intention; performative phrases, illocutionary 
indicators, and the like can be used to establish a legitimate interpersonal 
relation (Habermas, 1979:28). Communicative competence refers to the ability 
of a speaker i) to choose the propositional sentence in such a way that the 
truth conditions of the proposition stated are supposedly fulfilled; ii) to 
express it in such a way that the linguistic expressions represent what is 
intended; iii) to perform the speech-act in such a way that it conforms to 
recognized norms that govern interpersonal relations (Habermas, 1979:29). In 
other words, communicative competence concerns the ability to express what 
is supposed to be expressed. 
In addition to the condition that the meaning of an utterance is clearly 
expressed, Habermas is interested in the conditions under which the hearer is 
motivated to take an affirmative position (to accept it). Communicative 
competence, in the latter sense, involves the ability of a speaker to motivate 
the hearer to accept the utterance. Hence, without making it explicit, 
Habermas's project of rational reconstruction gradually shifts from the 
reconstruction of the conditions of the possibility of understanding to the 
reconstruction of the conditions of the possibility of agreement. 
Habermas (1991:297-9) claims that in order to achieve illocutionary 
success, the audience not only has to understand the meaning of an utterance 
but to accept it. According to Habermas, the acceptability of an illocutionary 
act depends upon a condition: the speaker's guarantee for securing claims to 
validity. In other words, a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept 
his speech-act because he can assume the warranty for providing convincing 
reasons that would stand up to the hearer's challenges or criticisms. For 
instance, S told H to stop smoking. Whether H is willing to accede to the 
request depends on S's guarantee for securing the claim to validity. That is, 
when H has doubts about the request, Sis ready to provide reasons like safety 
regulations in order to support the claim (Habermas, 1991:297-302). 
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With a theory of communicative competence, Habermas is able to argue 
that communicative action contains validity claims, and validity claims are 
connected to reasons or grounds. Nevertheless, to say that communicative 
action is connected to reasons is different from saying that communicative 
action is connected to reason. For a hearer to accept an utterance, the speaker 
needs to assume the warranty to provide reasons. But reasons can be of 
whatever kind as long as it is acceptable to the hearer. Hence, reasons given 
may be related to regulations, traditions, or even sanctions and rewards. 
Nevertheless, for Habermas, these reasons would not serve the purpose of 
demonstrating the rational basis of communicative action. In order to argue 
that communicative action is connected to reason, and not just reasons, 
Habermas has to delimit 'reasons' in terms of 'reasons that can convince the 
hearer so that the acceptance of an utterance is motivated in a rational way'. It 
is through the construction of a model of rational discourse that Habermas 
delimits reasons in a particular way and portrays an internal relation between 
communicative action and reason. 
Rational discourse 
According to Habermas, when communicative action is seen as a model of 
action coordination, it is a kind of interaction in which participants coordinate 
their action plans on the basis of a consensual agreement achieved. There are 
three kinds of validity claims raised in speech-acts: first, the claim of 
truthfulness ·or sincerity; second, the claim of normative rightness; third, the 
truth claim. Participants who are oriented to understanding must have 
agreement with regard to all of these validity claims. In some cases they can 
be challenged by the hearer. For instance, Habermas writes, a professor makes 
a request "please bring me a glass of water" to a seminar participant. The 
seminar participant may think "no; you really only want to put me in a bad 
light in front of other seminar participants". In this case, the claim of 
truthfulness is challenged. Or he may think "no; you can't treat me like one of 
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your employees". In this case, the claim of normative rightness is challenged. 
Or he may think "no; the next water tap is so far away that I couldn't get back 
before the end of the session". In this case, the truth of the presupposition is 
challenged (Habermas, 1991:306-7). When any of these claims are challenged, 
Habermas contends, one has to provide reasons to clarify the 
misunderstanding in order not to give up communication; otherwise, one may 
resort to force and other strategic action. The warranty to provide reasons is 
seen as a necessary condition for action oriented to understanding. In 
Habermas's words, there is a "speech-act-immanent obligation to provide 
ground" in communicative action (Habermas, 1979:63-4). 
In Habermas's view, one can provide immediate justification to expel ad 
hoc doubts. For instance, as elaborated by McCarthy, if there are disturbances 
concerning the intention of one party (say, by accusing him/her of lying, 
deceiving, misleading, pretending), mutual trust has to be restored through 
assurances, consistency of action, readiness to draw, accept and act on 
consequences, or willingness to assume implied responsibilities and 
obligations. On the other hand, the right of a party to perform the speech act 
can be questioned, for example, on the grounds that his role or status does not 
entitle him to do so, or that the act contravenes recognized norms, accepted 
values, or established authorities. In this case, one may need to appeal to these 
recognized norms, accepted values, established authorities, and so on. Finally, 
when the truth of what one says is challenged, the disturbance can be 
overcome by supplying information, citing experiences or authorities 
(McCarthy, 1984:289). 
However, Habermas argues, when the claim to truth or the claim to 
normative rightness is challenged in a fundamental way so that the above 
means to resolve disagreement fail, communication has to be continued at a 
different level -- rational discourse. According to Habermas, rational 
discourse is a special form of communication in which validity claims are 
redeemed. Theoretical discourse concerns the redemption of truth claims; 
practical discourse concerns the redemption of normative claims. In the 
process of argumentation, Habermas states, participants thematize a 
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problematic claim. Relieved of the pressure of action and experience, in a 
hypothetical attitude, they test with reasons, and only with reasons, to see if 
the claim can rightfully stand (Habermas, 1991:25). Habermas argues that the 
agreement achieved is then based on the force of reason. 
Habermas delineates more specifically the symmetry conditions that 
guarantee the reign of reason. These symmetry conditions are specified in the 
notion of an ideal speech situation.8 
1. Each subject who is capable of speech and action is 
allowed to participate in discourses. 
2a. Each is allowed to call into question any proposal. 
b. Each is allowed to introduce any proposal into the 
discourse. 
c. Each is allowed to express his/her attitudes, wishes and 
needs. 
3. No speaker ought to be hindered by compulsion --
whether arising from inside or outside -- from making 
use of the rights secure under (1) and (2). 
(Habermas, 1990:89) 
These rules guarantee the reign of reason in a number of ways. Firstly, 
they purify the motives of participants. They define those who engage in 
discourse as people who have no other purposes in mind but a cooperative 
search for truth. For Habermas, in this way, the argumentation process is not 
distorted by purposes of deception or manipulation, and in this sense 
communicative action is distinguished from concealed strategic action. 
Secondly, the agreement achieved cannot draw its force directly from the 
social force of norms or traditional values. Any proposal, or any originally 
accepted framework, can be thrown into question. Hence not only the claim 
8 In response to the criticism of the counter factual character of the notion of an ideal speech 
situation, Habermas argues that the everyday appeal to validity-claims implicitly points to its 
possibility. Idealizations are built into everyday practice. He maintains that "the ideal speech 
situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct, but rather an 
unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse" (McCarthy, 1984:310). Whenever 
we enter into a discourse with an intention to arrive at a rational agreement about certain 
claims, Habermas states, we must have already made this supposition, otherwise we would 
be caught up in a performative contradiction. For his elaboration of the nature and character 
of the ideal speech situation, see Habermas, 1990; 1982a. 
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itself but the conceptual framework behind the claim can also be contested. To 
arrive at a rational consensus would include the reflective weighing of the 
relative adequacy of competing frameworks, so that the rational consensus is 
in no sense contingent upon a particular framework. Thirdly, the rules 
guarantee that the discussion must be free from the influence of power or 
force. Participants have to produce cogent arguments that are convincing in 
virtue of their intrinsic properties. Only in this way is the agreement achieved 
rationally motivated rather than empirically motivated. Under these 
conditions, the consensus achieved is based on the mere force of the better 
argument, and as Habermas calls it, the force of reason. 
With the model of rational discourse and the notion of an ideal speech 
situation, communicative action is seen as connected to reason. It is in this 
sense that Habermas thinks communicative action is superior to strategic 
action. Habermas states that in cases of open strategic action like the issue of 
simple imperatives, what makes the speaker expect the hearer to follow the 
imperative is his control over the positive and/ or negative sanction 
(Habermas, 1991:300). In other words, the success of the imperative depends 
upon the speaker's holding power over the hearer. In this sense, the open 
strategic action expresses a power claim. The acceptability of the speech-act is 
empirically motivated by the fear of punishment or the desire for rewards. 
Therefore, though open strategic action can also be used as a model of action 
coordination, it is based on an agreement which is motivated by empirical 
considerations; whereas, for Habermas, the agreement achieved in 
communicative action is motivated in a rational way. Nevertheless, one can 
still probe the question of why agreement based on empirical considerations is 
seen as inferior. If power relations are unavoidable in our life, and if particular 
interests require negotiating compromise, one may argue against Habermas 
that strategic action which coordinates action on the basis of an empirically 
motivated agreement should have its own right to exist. 
Habermas has portrayed an internal relation between communicative 
action and reason; this, however, is not achieved without cost. In order to 
designate an internal relation between reason and communicative action, 
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Habermas has twisted the meaning of "understanding" to serve his particular 
purpose. In defining communicative action in terms of an orientation to 
understanding, he refers "understanding" to different things in different 
analyses. In our ordinary use of the term "understanding", it refers to the 
ability of knowing the meaning of something. In this sense, we have "I 
understand what you said". In Habermas's reconstruction of communicative 
competence, he seems to have this meaning in mind when he refers 
communicative competence to the mastery of the rules that enable one to 
express what is supposed to be expressed. In this sense, communicative 
competence is the universal condition for participants to understand the 
meaning of an utterance. Nevertheless, at other times "understanding", for 
Habermas, is an agreement or a consensus. For instance, he says that when 
validity claims are questioned, participants oriented to understanding have to 
provide justification so as to clear up the disturbance and arrive at an 
agreement to coordinate action. However, in the model of rational discourse, 
the "understanding" Habermas has in mind is not only an agreement, but a 
rational agreement. When participants are oriented to understanding in 
discourse, it means they are oriented to "a process of mutually convincing one 
another on the basis of pure reasons". "Coming to an understanding" in this 
sense has been twisted to a particular kind of communication which is aimed 
at achieving a rational agreement. 
To refer "understanding" as "a rational agreement" is quite different from 
our ordinary use of "understanding". Besides an ability to comprehend the 
meaning of something, we refer "understanding" to putting oneself into the 
position of the other so as to be aware of the other's feelings or views. In this 
sense, we say "please be understanding". Or we may say, "the employer and 
the workers have not reached an agreement yet, but they have come to an 
understanding with each other". Habermas's focus on rational agreement 
undermines the importance of this meaning of "understanding". It is possible 
to argue that, based on this meaning of "understanding", we can pursue 
another model of action coordination. Instead of pursuing Habermas's line of 
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rational agreement, some feminists propose a model of "care" for action 
coordination. 9 
There is another observation of the limits of Habermas's model of rational 
discourse. In discourse, validity claims are treated as cognitively testable 
validity claims, and it is in this sense that communicative action is considered 
as connected to reason. Nevertheless we must notice that discourse concerns 
only the test of truth claims and normative claims: theoretical discourse 
concerns the redemption of truth claims; practical discourse concerns the 
redemption of normative claims. Rational discourse, however, cannot deal 
with the redemption of the claim of truthfulness. When the sincerity or 
truthfulness of an utterance is doubted, the speaker is obliged to prove 
trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the proof is not carried out in discourse. 
Instead, Habermas states, the speaker may provide assurance, and the claim 
of truthfulness can only be checked against the consistency of the speaker's 
subsequent behaviour (Habermas, 1979:64). Therefore, one may argue that the 
claim to truthfulness marks the limits of discourse. 
In contrast to the truth claim which deals with the external world as a 
totality of facts, and the normative claim which deals with the social world as 
a totality of normatively regulated interpersonal relations, the truthfulness 
claim deals with "a particular inner world (of the speaker) as the totality of his 
intentional experiences". It is based on this particular inner world that a 
speaker expresses his subjectivity (Habermas, 1979:67-8). If the inner world is 
the basis for the self-understanding of individuals, a theory which studies the 
condition of understanding in communication should have laid much 
emphasis on_ the domain of inner world. As Habermas's theory is concerned 
not so much with understanding as with rational agreement, he constructs a 
model of discourse which focuses exclusively on the truth and the normative 
claims. The focus on cognitively testable claims should be seen as pursuing a 
9 For instance, in arguing for a positive recognition and re-evaluation of traditional feminine 
virtues of nurturance and compassion, Gilligan (1988:xix,xx) proposes an ethic of care, which 
is a distinctively feminine moral ground for decision-making, problem-solving, action and 
choice. 
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line at the expense of the importance of the truthfulness claim and the inner 
world of individuals. 
Conclusion 
This chapter not only introduces the problematics of Habermas's project and 
the theoretical framework developed in response to those problematics, but 
also serves as a critique of Habermas's work. The criticism, however, is 
intended not as much a negation as a reflection upon the limits of his theory. 
It shows that Habermas's preoccupation with certain problematics leads him 
to take certain steps instead of others, and enables him to emphasize certain 
notions at the expense of others. In this concluding section, I shall briefly 
summarize the steps that he has taken. 
Habermas claims that through engaging in self-reflection, the 
emancipatory interest of critical theory is an interest of reason. Nevertheless, 
one should differentiate two different senses of "self-reflection". A Marxian 
sense of reflection concerns a critique of ideology which enables subjects to be 
freed from hidden constraints in the structure of social action. A Kantian sense 
of reflection, on the other hand, concerns a search for the universal conditions 
of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and acting subject. Since 
Habermas thinks that critical theory needs to be grounded in an affirmative 
notion of reason, hence, instead of pursuing a Marxian sense of reflection 
which freed _subjects from the constraints of historically-specific contexts, he 
opts for a Kantian kind of reconstruction of the conditions of understanding; 
instead of engaging in a critical-historical reflection, Habermas moves toward 
a transcendental reflection of the universal conditions of speech. 
In order to designate an internal relation between reason and language, 
Habermas has taken a few steps in developing his theory of communicative 
action. He determines to draw a strict demarcation between illocutionary acts 
and communicative action on the one hand, and perlocutionary acts and 
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strategic action on the other. He refers to the former as a domain of reason and 
validity claims, whereas the latter as a domain of power, deception and 
manipulation. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the discussion, the production 
of perlocutionary effects does not necessarily involve deception or 
manipulation. Perlocutionary effects actually arise when illocutionary acts are 
embedded in the context of interaction. Habermas delimits perlocutionary 
acts to ones where the intentions are concealed to suit his purpose. 
The other step that Habermas takes is to reconstruct the conditions of the 
possibility of understanding in communicative action. He is interested not 
only in the rules which enable a speaker to express what s/he wants to 
express, but in the conditions under which the hearer is motivated to accept 
the utterance. Therefore, without making it explicit, Habermas shifts from a 
reconstruction of the conditions of the possibility of understanding to a 
reconstruction of the conditions of the possibility of agreement. Lastly, for 
Habermas, the focus on agreement is not enough, for strategic action also 
coordinates action on the basis of agreement. In order to be differentiated 
from strategic action, communicative action is not simply oriented to 
agreement, but rational agreement. Habermas develops a model of rational 
discourse so as to guarantee that the agreement arrived at in communicative 
action is rationally motivated. 
In this way, Habermas achieves the task of constructing a notion of 
communicative reason so as to provide a ground for critical theory. 
Nevertheless, what must be rendered explicit is the twist he has given to the 
term "understanding". While communicative action is defined as oriented to 
understanding, "coming to an understanding" is delimited as a particular kind 
of communication which is aimed at rational agreement. Moreover, despite 
the fact that communicative action is defined as oriented to understanding, 
the claim of truthfulness is not received the same attention as the truth claim 
and the normative claims. In concentrating on rational discourse and 
cognitively testable validity claims, Habermas leaves out the importance of 
the claim of truthfulness and the whole domain of a particular inner world. 
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To close the discussion, I would like to cite the comments of Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1986) on Habermas's project. They argue that if one looks back at 
the arguments by which Habermas arrives at his universal norms, one would 
find him making two interpretive moves disguised by the fact that they 
constitute the heart of western philosophical tradition. First, Habermas 
privileges the communicative use of language without taking into 
consideration that other philosophers of language, such as Heidegger and 
Charles Taylor, have interpreted language as that which first opens up an arena 
for action by letting things appear as something. Second, Habermas proceeds 
to exclude the perlocutionary effects of what is said and assert that ideally 
only the illocutionary contents should play a role in reaching agreement. This 
move, they argue, excludes rhetoric as well as authority based on 
accumulated experience, and further reduces language from its 
communicative function to an intellectualist function. They conclude that 
because his work contains "these two important interpretive reductions, 
Habermas's universal objective communicative norms turn out to be quite 
modern in their ungroundedness" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986:119). It is hoped 
that this chapter has shed light on the limits of Habermas's project as well as 
the kinds of ungroundedness associated with his theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 2 
HABERMAS'S ANALYSIS OF POWER AND 
PATHOLOGIES OF MODERN SOCIETIES 
Habermas's project focuses on two tasks: first, searching for the ground of 
critique, and second, providing a critique of power and pathologies in 
modern societies. As discussed in Chapter 1, in developing a theory of 
communicative action, Habermas constructs a notion of communicative 
reason as the ground of critique. Now we come to see how he accomplishes 
the second task. For Habermas, a critique of power concerns a differentiation 
of legitimate and illegitimate power. His notion of communicative action, he 
contends, provides the yardstick according to which one can differentiate 
legitimate and illegitimate power. In the first part of this chapter, I shall 
discuss how Habermas uses his notion of communicative action to ground 
legitimate power. Habermas further analyzes the pathologies of modern 
societies from the standpoint of communicative action. He argues that 
modern pathologies are a result of the replacement of communicative action 
in the spheres which are dependent upon it as the mechanism for action 
coordination. The second part of the chapter will discuss how Habermas uses 
his notion of communicative action to provide an analysis of pathologies in 
modem societies. 
Habermas's critique of power attempts to differentiate legitimate and 
illegitimate power. This differentiation, for him, is also a differentiation 
between reason and force. Illegitimate power is one which is connected to 
force and implies a problem of coercion. Legitimate power, on the other hand, 
is one which is connected to reason. His notion of communicative reason, he 
asserts, provides the basis for legitimate power. He considers power which is 
based on the consensus achieved in communicative action as legitimate and 
connected to reason. This legitimate power, for Habermas, is separated from 
force and avoids the problem of coercion. In Part I, I intend to examine 
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whether Habermas's communicative concept of power is successful in 
resolving the problem of coercion which he perceives in a relation of force. I 
point out that in developing a communicative concept of power, Habermas 
has produced two distinct versions: one conceives legitimate power as a form 
of communicative action; the other conceives power in terms of purposive-
instrumental action of which the legitimacy is defined by determination of 
collective goals in communicative action. I argue that these two versions of 
communicative concept of power contain contradictions overlooked by 
Habermas, and they are both far from successful in resolving the problems of 
force and coercion. 
In analyzing pathologies of modern societies, Habermas not only relies 
upon his notion of communicative action, but also produces a concept of 
lifeworld which consists of systems of culture, society and personality that 
serve as the background for communicative action. Part II will present 
Habermas 's concept of lifewor ld and show how he uses the concept to 
analyze pathologies of modern societies. It points out that since Habermas 
considers communicative action as separated from power (or force), likewise, 
lifeworld, being the background of communicative action, is seen as 
inherently free from power. The phenomena of modern pathologies hence 
require an explanation elsewhere than the lifeworld. Habermas develops a 
thesis of "colonization of lifeworld" which explains modern pathologies as a 
result of the invasion of certain alien or external forces, namely forces of 
monetarization and bureaucratization, into the lifeworld. Habermas's thesis 
requires him to separate out from these forces an innocent domain of 
lifeworld; this demarcation, as I shall argue, does not seem to be possible nor 
desirable. 
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2.1 Communicative Action and Legitimate Power 
For Habermas, his theory of communicative action provides not only a basis 
of critique in reason, but also a yardstick according to which one can 
differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. Nevertheless, throughout his 
discussions of power, Habermas does not have only one way of applying the 
concept of communicative action but uses it in different ways and hence 
produces different versions of a communicative concept of power.1 I shall 
delineate two distinct versions of Habermas's communicative concept of 
power: an earlier version which conceives legitimate power as arising in 
communicative action; a later version which conceives power in terms of 
purposive-instrumental action of which the legitimacy is defined by 
determination of collective goals in communicative action. I shall discuss each 
of the versions in Part I of the chapter. 
There are questions that I would like to put to Habermas. In producing 
the earlier version of communicative concept of power, Habermas criticizes 
instrumental-strategic action in terms of its relation to force and coercion, and 
determines to have a notion of legitimate power which is under the category 
of communicative action. He argues that legitimate power only arises in 
communicative action. His later version of communicative concept of power, 
however, understands legitimate power in termsof instrumental-purposive 
action rather than as a form of communicative action. Is there any 
1 Habermas (1982a:269) says, "I am inclined, on the one hand, to agree with Hannah Arendt in 
regarding communicatively shared convictions as a source of legitimate power, and the 
communicative practice of everyday life in the life-world as a generator of power that is 
acknowledged without coercion (Zwang). On the other hand, both the Weberian concept of 
domination (Herrschaft), in the sense of institutionalized mixtures of power and force, and 
the Parsonian concept of power, as a subsystem medium, (to be sure, only for problems of 
employing authorizations to power in modem societies) are useful". For his discussion of 
Arendt's concept of power, see Habermas, 1977; for his discussion of Weber's concept of 
power, see Habermas, 1976; for his discussion of Parsons' concept of power, see Habermas, 
1987b. In these discussions, Habermas applies his concept of communicative action in 
different ways. My examination of Habermas's communicative concept of power mainly 
focuses on his discussions of Arendt's and Parsons' concepts of power. 
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contradiction incurred by upholding these two different versions of a, 
communicative concept of power? Habermas is preoccupied with drawing a 
demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate power. For him, while 
illegitimate power is one which is connected with force and coercion, 
legitimate power is separated from force and coercion. What I want to ask is: 
how far is he successful in accomplishing the task? 
Legitimate power arises in communicative action 
In an earlier discussion of power, Habermas argues that legitimate power 
arises only in communicative action. He says, "[l]egitimate power arises only 
among those who form common convictions in unconstrained 
communication" (Habermas, 1977:18). This section presents Habermas's 
criticism of the instrumental-strategic concept of power and discusses the 
alternative that he provides, that is, a communicative concept of power. I 
point out that for Habermas, power which is conceived in terms of 
instrumental-strategic action implies an exercise of force and the possibility of 
coercion. In order to deal with the problem of force and coercion, he thinks we 
must have a concept of power which is separated from force and excludes the 
possibility of coercion. Habermas's way of dealing with the problem of force 
and coercion, as I shall argue in this section, is not without problems. Before 
0.. 
discussing the problems, I shall first present this version of ,...communicative 
concept of power. 
According to Habermas, one can start from a model of communicative 
action and have a communicative concept of power. This communicative 
concept of power provides an alternative to an instrumental-strategic concept 
of power. He is critical that political theorists from Hobbes to Schumpeter 
have focused on the phenomenon of power acquisition and maintenance and 
identified power with a potential for successful strategic action, and thus 
overlooked the possibility of formulating a concept of power in terms of 
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communicative action. Power, Habermas argues, instead of representing the 
ability to achieve certain desirable results in a strategic action, should be 
understood as "the ability to agree upon a common course of action in 
unconstrained communication" (Habermas, 1977:3).2 Although agreement is 
implied in both the instrumental-strategic concept of power and the 
communicative concept of power, nevertheless, for Habermas, there are two 
kinds of difference. Firstly, the agreement formed in the instrumental-
strategic action is not seriously intended while in the latter case it is. Secondly, 
in the former conception of power, the agreement reached may involve 
coercion while in the latter case the agreement points to a noncoercive 
establishment of intersubjective relations. I shall elaborate on Habermas's 
view of these differences with reference to his comments on Weber's concept 
of power. 
Habermas asserts that Weber views power from a teleological model of 
action in which individuals choose appropriate means to realize the goal they 
set for themselves. To the extent that the realization of the goal depends on 
the behavior of others, the individuals adopt different means to instigate 
others to the desired behavior. These means, like the threat of sanctions or 
persuasion, may bring about certain agreements. Nevertheless, Habermas 
says, as the individuals are oriented to their own success, the agreement 
reached only serves the purpose of attaining their respective goals. Habermas 
2 Habermas (1977) understands it as Arendt's view of power, and he endorses this view in his 
discussion of a communicative concept of power. He says that Arendt sees power as the 
ability to agree upon a common course of action in unconstrained communication. She does 
not refer power to the disposition over means of influencing another's will, means which are 
to be possesse~. Instead, for Arendt, power arises among a group of people who form 
common convictions and act in concert. Arendt says, as reproduced by Habermas, "power 
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the 
property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only as long as the 
group keeps together" (Habermas, 1977:4). Arendt sees this power in critical-revolutionary 
activities like the Hungarian uprisings of 1956 and the civil disobedience and student protests 
of the sixties, "when revolutionaries seize the power that lies in the streets; when a populace 
committed to passive resistance confront alien tanks with their bare hands; when convinced 
minorities contest the legitimacy of existing laws and organize civil obedience; when the 
'pure desire for action' manifests itself in the student movement" (Habermas, 1977:13). These 
incidents, for Arendt, show that power is not to be possessed by any group or person; instead 
it springs up between men when they act together according to their common convictions, 
and power vanishes the moment they disperse. 
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argues, "an agreement of this sort, which is pursued one-sidedly with the 
proviso of being instrumental for one's own success, is not meant seriously" 
(Habermas, 1977:4). 
A seriously intended agreement, for Habermas, must be pursued as an 
end in itself and cannot be instrumentalized for other purposes. In his words, 
"power is not an instrumentalization of another's will, but the formation of a 
common will in a communication directed to reaching agreement" 
(Habermas, 1977:4). Such formation of a common will is characterized by the 
fact that participants are oriented to understanding, and pursue illocutionary 
aims only. They have no other purposes except a cooperative search for 
understanding. For Habermas, this communicative concept of power allows 
one to separate power (Macht) from force (Gewalt) and coercion (Zwang). 
Habermas argues that Weber's conception has confused "power" with 
"force" (Habermas, 1977:3-4). In Weber's teleological model, Habermas says, 
individuals must have at their disposal the means to instigate others to the 
desired behavior so as to attain their own goals. Weber calls this disposition 
over means to influence the will of others "power". Nevertheless, Habermas 
would rather regard it as force. "Force", for Habermas, means the disposition 
over means of coercion. In a relation of force, because one can assert one's will 
over others even against opposition, coercion is implied. In this sense, for 
Habermas, Weber's concept of power not only confuses power and force, but 
also fails to exclude the possibility of coercion. Habermas argues, "the only 
alternative to coercion exercised by one side against the other is free 
agreement among participants" (Habermas, 1977:4). His communicative 
concept of power, for him, is oriented toward such a free agreement among 
participants; it is oriented toward a formation of common will in which 
participants "do not use language perlocutionarily, that is, merely instigate 
other subjects to a desired behavior, but illocutionarily, that is, for the 
noncoercive establishment of intersubjective relations" (Habermas, 1977:6). 
Habermas is correct to say that Weber's concept of power does not 
exclude the possibility of coercion; nevertheless, I argue, it is not clear if this is 
a weakness. Habermas believes that in order to deal with the problem of force 
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and coercion, one should produce a concept of power which is distinguished 
from force and excludes the possibility of coercion. Weber's approach, I 
suggest, can be read as a different way to deal with the problem of force and 
coercion. Weber defines power as the probability that an individual is in a 
position to carry out his own will even if there is resistance. In other words, the 
exercise of power may or may not involve coercion and there may or may not 
be resistance. One needs to engage in specific analyses of the means used by 
the individual in order to see whether coercion is involved. In some cases, 
means like persuasion and influence might be used, which are different from 
means of coercion. Nevertheless, Habermas does not follow this path. While 
noticing that in Weber's concept of power there can be a whole range of 
means to influence others' will, such as "by the threat of sanctions, by 
persuasion, or by a clever channelling of choices", Habermas is not interested 
in differentiating these means and seeing which of them is involved in a 
certain exercise of power. Instead he lumps them together in the category of 
"force", and seeks to produce a concept of power which is separated from this 
category. 
Habermas says that what is exercised in strategic action is "force in a more 
or less refined, more or less latent manner". It is only through linking power 
to communicative action that power is separated from force. In his words: 
the concept of force (Gewalt) already has a central place in 
the action theory sketched above: to the degree that 
interactions cannot be coordinated through achieving 
understanding, the only alternative that remains is force 
exercised by one against others (in a more or less refined, 
more or less latent manner). The typological distinction 
between communicative and strategic action says nothing 
else than this. (1982:269) 
Facing the possibility of coercion in strategic action, Habermas seeks to 
provide a communicative concept of power which is insulated from this 
possibility. 
Habermas's concern to separate power and force is again revealed in his 
discussion of Parsons' concept of power. While Parsons thinks that power in a 
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political system can be generated through political influence, Habermas 
insists that power can only be generated in communicative action. For 
Parsons, the generation of power means a rise in the activities of the political-
administrative system. To increase the output of the system requires an 
increase on the input side. Political leaders can exert their influence to arouse 
new needs in the electorate so that an increase in demand results. As a 
stronger input of mass loyalty is obtained, the political-administrative system 
can increase its activities and hence power is generated in the process. In 
opposition to Parsons' view, Habermas holds that this is only an increase in 
force, not an increase in the legitimate power of the political system. 
Habermas argues that, as Parsons says, there is a fine line between 
responsible political leadership which commits the collectivity to the 
fulfilment of obligations and reckless overextendedness. To generate power 
through persuasion or manipulation does not allow one to perceive this fine 
line. He asserts that legitimate power cannot be generated from above, but 
only among those who participate in unconstrained communication 
(Habermas, 1977:19-20). 
In short, for Habermas, legitimate power cannot be generated in 
constrained communication, like persuasion or manipulation. He sees that 
only unconstrained communication guarantees the legitimacy of power; only 
unconstrained communication separates power from force; only 
unconstrained communication excludes the possibility of coercion. It is the 
condition of "unconstrained communication" that guarantees power to be free 
from force and coercion. 
Neverth~less his communicative concept of power is not only to do with 
unconstrained communication, but agreement formed in unconstrained 
communication.3 Habermas defines legitimate power on the basis of free 
3 In Habermas's view, power has to be based on common convictions in unconstrained 
communication in order to be regarded as legitimate, otherwise it can be seen as under the 
influence of ideology which produces illusionary convictions. A basic problem of this model 
is that it assumes "nonillusionary common convictions" and "unconstrained communication" 
always go together, but in fact they do not. Firstly, instead of agreement, there can be 
disagreement in unconstrained communication; secondly, instead of illusionary convictions, 
nonillusionary convictions can be formed in constrained communication. In other words, 
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agreement. What he adopts is a consensual approach. He is interested in "the 
formation of a common will", "the formation of common convictions", "the 
ability to agree upon a common course of action" in unconstrained 
communication. This consensual approach, I argue, brings back the possibility 
of coercion in his communicative concept of power. 
Habermas seems to assume common convictions are a natural result of 
unconstrained communication and that they provide the basis for legitimate 
power to be separated from force and coercion. Nevertheless, one may ask: 
why should we assume that common convictions or consensus is a natural 
outcome of unconstrained communication? Even if an ideal speech situation 
exists, nothing guarantees consensus in argumentation. On the contrary, the 
ideal speech situation points toward a plurality of standpoints in 
argumentation. Lyotard (1984:65-6) points out that it is not possible, or even 
prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of 
legitimation in the direction of a search for universal consensus. For it is clear 
that language games are heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of 
pragmatic rules. Participants hence are not even able to agree on the rules 
according to which they engage in argumentation. Moreover, instead of 
assuming consensus as the goal of dialogue, Lyotard argues, it is only a 
particular state of discussion. 
If consensus is a particular state of discussion, it cannot be taken for 
granted. On the contrary, it is what is in need of an explanation. For instance, 
to be able to arrive at a consensus presupposes a high degree of homogeneity 
among participants, and even coercion in bringing about this kind of 
homogeneity. As will be discussed in Part II of the thesis, Foucault's analysis 
of disciplinary power shows that it is disciplinary coercion that 
brings about such homogeneity. 
Therefore, instead of assuming common convictions are the natural 
outcome of unconstrained communication, one should ask whether coercion 
unconstrained communication does not have to be followed by common convictions, and 
common convictions do not have to be formed in unconstrained communication. Haberrnas 
cannot assume that they always go together. 
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is the precondition that makes common convictions possible. In this sense, 
Habermas is mistaken in thinking that his communicative concept of power 
has excluded the possibility of coercion. He claims that the condition of 
unconstrained communication has excluded the possibility of coercion; 
nevertheless, his emphasis on agreement formed in unconstrained 
communication reinstates this possibility. His communicative concept of 
power, I conclude, is far from successful in dealing with the problem of 
coercion. 
In this section, we have discussed Habermas's earlier version of 
communicative concept of power which conceives legitimate power as arising 
in communicative action. Habermas nevertheless realizes that there are 
problems with conceiving power as a form of communicative action. In a 
criticism of Arendt's work, Habermas admits that to see power merely in 
terms of communicative action would make the mistake of screening all 
strategic elements out of politics, and removing politics from its relation to the 
economic and social environment in which it is embedded through the 
administrative system (Habermas, 1977:16). Therefore, he thinks that we need 
to have a communicative concept of power in which there is a place for 
strategic action. In the following section, I shall discuss the other version of 
Habermas's communicative concept of power. 
Power serves the realization of collective goals 
Habermas thinks that there is a need to produce a communicative concept of 
power which has a place for instrumental-strategic action. He considers 
Parsons' systems-theoretical concept of power as useful since it deals with the 
purposive-rational action associated with the employment of power in 
political rule. In taking up Parsons' concept of power, Habermas now 
conceives of power as a medium for the realization of collective goals. In other 
words, rather than conceiving of power as a form of communicative action, he 
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now understands power in terms of purposive-rational action that serves the 
realization of collective goals. In arguing that collective goals have to be 
determined in rational discourse, Habermas supplements Parsons' concept of 
power with a dimension of communicative action and produces a 
communicative concept of power. 
This section presents Habermas's formulation of a different version of a, 
communicative concept of power. I argue that with this version of -the 
communicative concept of power he produces a myth that power is safe while 
after all power is inherently linked to the force and coercion that he perceives 
in instrumental-strategic action. Before discussing this version of 
communicative concept of power, let us first look into Parsons' concept of 
power. I would like to show that Parsons' concept of power implies the 
possibility of coercion and requires force to play a counterpart. Habermas, in 
taking up Parsons' concept of power, seems to overlook the problem of force 
and coercion that he was once concerned about in his earlier discussion of ~e.. 
communicative concept of power. 
Parsons considers power from the perspective of a political system. A 
political system is a system of hierarchical positions in which people make 
binding decisions for the realization of collective goals. Power, for Parsons, is 
the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by 
units in a system which would serve the realization of collective goals 
(Parsons, 1969:361). With this conception of power, Parsons argues against C. 
Wright Mill's zero-sum concept of power. According to Parsons, Mills tends 
to think that people who hold power have usurped it where they had no 
right, and that they intend to use it for attaining sectional interests and to the 
detriment of others. Parsons argues that although power is sometimes 
exercised for attaining sectional interests, this is only a secondary and derived 
phenomenon (Parsons, 1960:220-1). Power, Parsons says, in its central place in 
the political system, serves the attainment of collective goals, and authority is 
the institution within which the incumbent has "the legitimated right to make 
certain categories of decisions and bind a collectivity to them" (Parsons, 
1969:322). In other words, Parsons produces a concept of power which has its 
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bearing on collective interests rather than sectional interests, and the exercise 
of which is based on a legitimate right. 
The hierarchical component of the political system, or the right of some 
people to use power over other people, has been one of the central concerns of 
theories of power. Parsons, by formulating the inequality of power in a 
legitimate form, has in effect dissolved thrs concern. He writes, "the power of 
A over Bis, in its legitimized form, the right of A, as a decision-making unit 
involved in collective process, to make decisions that take precedence over 
those of B, in the interests of the effectiveness of the collective operation as a 
whole" (Parsons, 1969:36). According to Parsons' formulation, the inequality 
of power is legitimized in terms of its bearing on the collective goals. In order 
to have goal-attainment, from Parsons' perspective, there must be priorities as 
to which decisions take precedence over others, and which decision-making 
agencies have the right to make decisions at what levels. The hierarchical 
ordering is hence seen as indispensable, as well as functional, for goal-
attainment. 
While admitting that the hierarchical component of the political system is 
indispensable and functional for goal-attainment, one can still worry about 
the problems associated with an asymmetry of power. Habermas ho..s 
criticized. that Weber's concept of power implies the possibility within a social 
relationship to impose one's will over another even against opposition. Now 
this possibility of coercion reappears in Parsons' concept of power. Motivated 
by this worry, one may ask: could there be a case where the decision made by 
the higher authority is in opposition to the wishes of the subordinates, and 
hence requir~s coercion for compliance? 
Parsons answers that the problem of coercion arises only when the power 
of the higher authority-holder is not completely institutionalized (Parsons, 
1982:115-28). By institutionalization, Parsons means the integration of the 
complementary role-expectation with the generalized value system. For 
Parsons, this integration relies basically upon the socialization process in the 
family, school, play groups and community. It gives individuals need-
dispositions which can only be gratified by conformity with institutionalized 
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role-expectation. The sanctions associated with role-expectation will also 
reinforce the need-dispositions to conform with the expectation. The 
institutionalization of value-orientation patterns constitutes the mechanisms 
of integration for a social system. 
Nevertheless, as Parsons points out, there are integrative problems of a 
social system, and these problems, I argue, imply the possibility of coercion. 
Parsons says, "this type of analysis asserts the imperfect integration of all 
actual social systems" (Parsons, 1982:128). For instance, it is not unusual to 
have more than one set of value-orientations in a social system. They may 
imply different sets of role-expectation patterns which compete with one 
another. From Parsons' perspective, the question is how to integrate them 
around a basic pattern. However, from the perspective of traditional concerns 
about power, the question is whether this kind of integration involves 
coercion and repression. In this sense, the process of institutionalization may 
have already involved coercion. Power which is dependent upon 
institutionalization of value patterns can be seen as dependent upon coercion. 
Not only does Parsons' notion of power imply the possibility of coercion, 
it also requires force to play a counterpart. As revealed in Parsons' definition 
of power, sanctions are specified in securing compliance. Parsons says, power 
is the "generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations 
... and where in case of recalcitrance there is a presumption of enforcement by 
negative situational sanctions" (Parsons, 1969:361). He regards the application 
of negative sanctions as a deterrent of unwanted action, force being the 
ultimate deterrent. Force, Parsons says, can be seen as a kind of backup of 
power, like gold as a backup of money. When other means of effectiveness 
which are dependent on institutionalized order fail, force is used to cope with 
the danger. In this sense, power and force can be seen as two sides of the same 
coin. Power is inherently linked to force. 
Habermas's criticism of Parsons' concept of power can be seen as 
motivated by the concern a,boJ; coercion. Nevertheless, I argue, instead of 
keeping in mind the possibility of coercion and allowing this possibility to 
remind us of the danger of power, Habermas thinks that it can be 
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compensated for by allowing people to participate in the determination of 
collective goals. Habermas argues that since power exercised at the societal 
level has to be expressed as organizational power, that is, those who have a 
right to exercise power occupy a position in an organization in which power 
relations are ordered hierarchically, this asymmetrical character of power calls 
for a more demanding normative anchoring of power. For the one who is 
subordinated is structurally disadvantaged; the one in higher authority can 
cause harm to those who disobey. Habermas argues that this disadvantage to 
one of the parties can only be compensated for by reference to collectively 
desired goals. In contrast to Parsons' relying on the cultural value system to 
provide consensus on the collective goals, Habermas argues for a 
participatory model in the determination of collective goals. He says, "the 
disadvantage can be offset only if those subject to him can themselves 
examine the goals and either endorse or repudiate them" (Habermas, 
1987:271). 
According to Habermas, in Parsons' model power also needs to secure 
confidence, but Parsons thinks that power can draw legitimation from the 
cultural value system, and the institutionalization of public office can bring 
about compliance. Nevertheless, Habermas would like to argue that the 
structural characteristics of power require a higher ground for securing 
confidence. Besides the fact that power is characterized by an asymmetry, 
Habermas argues, there is another structural characteristic of power: power 
does not only ask for compliance, but obligation. In other words, it is not only 
a matter of obedience to laws, but carrying out a duty. Habermas argues that 
the fulfilment of obligations has to be based on the recognition of normative 
validity claims (Habermas, 1987:271). His model of rational discourse enables 
collective goals to be determined in accordance with the recognition of 
validity claims. 
Habermas provides a model of rational discourse for the determination of 
collective goals. He argues that those who are affected by power "have to be 
in a position to contest [the claim] that the goals set are collectively desired or 
are, as we say, in the general interest". Hence, "the connection to consensus 
73 
formation in language, backed only by potential reasons, is clear" (Habermas, 
1987:271-2). According to Habermas's discourse model, by proposing 
something as a collective goal, one is making a claim that a certain norm 
would satisfy the general interest . The validity of the normative claim has to 
be tested in practical discourse. The aim of practical discourse is to come to 
rationally motivated consensus about the proposed norm. This consensus is to 
be based solely on the force of a better agreement and should not be the result 
of any constraints in discourse. The absence of constraints is characterized by 
what is presupposed in discourse: an ideal speech situation.4 It refers to the 
pragmatic structure of discourse in which all participants can have a 
symmetrical distribution of chances to employ speech-acts, and where the 
discussion is free from any distorting influences, including open domination, 
conscious strategic behavior and self-deception. With the presupposition of an 
ideal speech situation, Habermas contends that the consensus arrived at 
concerning a certain norm is rationally motivated. 
In the process of discursive-will formation, Habermas argues, the norms 
which serve general interests would command the recognition of all. He says: 
only communicative ethics guarantees the generality of 
admissible norms and the autonomy of acting subjects 
solely through the discursive redeemability of the validity 
claims with which norms appear. That is, generality is 
guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim 
generality are those on which everyone affected agrees (or 
would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or 
would enter into) a process of discursive will-formation. 
(Habermas, 1975:89) 
Therefore, on the one hand, the discourse model allows the claims of power to 
be redeemed in a rational way, that is, solely on the basis of the force of the 
better argument; on the other hand, it allows the recognition of a claim which 
serves general interests. 
4 See Chapter 1 for my discussion of Habermas's model of rational discourse and the notion 
of an ideal speech situation. 
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In the same way as Parsons, Habermas is concerned with the legitimation 
of power. They agree that the asymmetry of power relations can be 
compensated for or legitimated by reference to collective goals. The 
difference is that instead of relying on the institutionalization generated in the 
cultural value system, Habermas proposes a discourse model for the 
determination of collective goals. Habermas thinks that because collective 
goals are open for discursive tests and determined according to their bearing 
on general interests, the power grounded in this way cannot be used against 
the people concerned. Nevertheless, I contend, in taking up Parsons 1 notion of 
legitimate power and supplementing it with a dimension of communicative 
action, Habermas seems to leave behind the criticisms that he once made 
about instrumental-strategic action. He also fails to recognize the 
contradiction that is incurred in upholding the two versions of 
communicative concept of power. 
Applying his theory of communicative action in this way, Habermas 
moves away from the former communicative concept of power which places 
it in the category of communicative action rather than instrumental-strategic 
action. According to the earlier communicative concept of power, participants 
have no other purpose except a cooperative search for understanding. 
Nobody would use any empirical means to instigate others to desirable 
behavior and the possibility of coercion associated with strategic action is to 
be excluded. Habermas criticizes Parsons' work from this perspective. He says 
that Parsons repeats a teleological concept of power at the level of systems 
theory. Like Weber, Parsons sees power as serving the realization of certain 
goals. Both of their conceptions of power fail to see power as produced by a 
seriously intended agreement which cannot be instrumentalized for other 
ends (Habermas, 1977:5). In this sense, Parsons' concept of power is flawed 
from the beginning. Now, in taking up Parsons' concept of power, Habermas 
moves to a self-defeating position. 
Arguing in line with Parsons, Habermas sees power in terms of 
instrumental-strategic action. Instead of seeing it as a kind of communicative 
action, like the earlier version of communicative concept of power, he sees 
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communicative action as providing an appropriate basis for legitimation of 
power. Power which goes through a discursive test of collective goals is 
considered as legitimate. In supplementing power with a dimension of 
communicative action, Habermas produces a myth that power is safe while 
after all, power, being a medium for the realization of collective goals, is itself 
to do with disposition over means of sanctions. Force is the backup of power; 
force and power are inherently linked to each other. In addition, as discussed 
before, there is a possibility for coercion when the power of the higher 
authority holder is not completely institutionalized. In this sense, power is 
connected to the force and coercion that Habermas once opposed in 
instrumental-strategic action. Guided by the insights of Foucault's works, as 
will be discussed in the following chapters, one may see that in order to serve 
the realization of economic and administrative goals of society, power 
disciplines and coerces our bodies so as to produce both docility and utility. 
In opposition to Habermas's theory, I think that the focus on collective goals 
does not resolve the problem of coercion but only hides the problem with a 
language of legitimation. 
2.2 Modern Pathologies and Lifeworld 
In his analysis of power, Habermas argues that legitimate power has to be 
grounded in common convictions formed in unconstrained communication. 
The questions that I posed earlier are: what makes 'common convictions' 
possible? Why shall we expect agreement rather than disagreement in 
unconstrained communication? Habermas's concept of lifeworld can be seen 
as an attempt to answer these questions. Instead of looking into the forces that 
make consensus possible and asking to what extent they involve coercion, 
Habermas assumes from the beginning that lifeworld is a background of 
socio-cultural systems which serves the purpose of communicative action. 
From this perspective, the pathologies of modern societies are not conceived 
as being generated from the lifeworld, but rather from the external forces in 
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the economic and political systems. Habermas's analysis, I argue, produces a 
myth that the lifeworld is inherently unproblematic. 
Part II discusses Habermas's diagnosis and explanation of the pathologies 
of modem societies. I shall first of all introduce his concept of lifeworld which 
is idealized and designed as a background that supports communicative 
action. Secondly, I shall present Habermas's view of rationalization in terms 
of "the uncoupling of system and lifeworld". Thirdly, Habermas's view of 
modern pathologies will be discussed. In particular, we shall see how he 
explains modern pathologies in terms of his thesis of "colonization of 
lifeworld". I shall close the discussion by making critical comments on 
Habermas's analysis. 
Habennas 's idealized concept of lifeworld 
The concept of lifeworld has been seen from the beginning as a supplement to 
the concept of communicative action. While the discourse model scrutinizes 
the conditions for the formation of explicit knowledge, for Habermas, the 
concept of lifeworld points to a background of implicit knowledge. In the 
model of rational discourse, Habermas reconstructs the conditions that are 
presupposed in communicative action which allow a redemption of validity 
claims, namely the truth claim and the normative claim of rightness. The 
discourse model points to the way in which explicit knowledge is formed: in 
theoretical dtscourse, which scrutinizes the truth claim, empirical-theoretical 
knowledge is obtained; in practical discourse, which scrutinizes the normative 
claim of rightness, moral-practical knowledge is obtained. Nevertheless, 
Habermas says, in the analysis, "the role of implicit knowledge is not given its 
due" (Habermas, 1991:335). The cooperative process of interpretation, he 
states, has to assume the existence of a background of implicit knowledge, 
without which it is doubtful if a consensus is possible at all. Habermas 
considers lifeworld in terms of this background of implicit knowledge. 
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Habermas refers to lifeworld as a totality of socio-cultural facts that serves 
as a cognitive reference system for communicative action. It is defined as a 
matrix of culture, society and personality. Corresponding to each of these 
components, one finds processes of cultural reproduction, social integration 
and socialization. Instead of seeing power and pathologies as generated in 
these processes, Habermas constructs an idealized lifeworld in which each of 
the components of lifeworld only serves the purpose of communicative 
action. He defines the components of lifeworld, namely culture, society and 
personality, in this way: 
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from 
which participants in communication supply themselves 
with interpretations as they come to an understanding 
about something in the world. I use the term society for the 
legitimate orders through which participants regulate their 
memberships in social groups and thereby secure 
solidarity. By personality I understand the competences that 
make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him 
in a position to take part in processes of reaching 
understanding and thereby to assert his own identity. 
(Habermas, 1987:138) 
In other words, culture, society and personality are seen as a background of 
competences and implicit knowledge that enables individuals to participate in 
the process of reaching understanding in communicative action. Lifeworld is a 
concept delimited for Habermas's own theoretical purpose. 
According to Habermas, on the one hand, the components of lifeworld 
provide the inputs for communicative action; on the other hand, 
communicative action is the medium through which culture, society and 
personality are reproduced. Habermas writes that in coming to an 
understanding about the situation, participants stand in a cultural tradition 
that at once they use and renew; in coordinating their action by way of 
intersubjectively recognizing validity claims, they are at once relying on 
membership of social groups and strengthening the integration of these 
groups; when interacting with a competent reference person, the growing 
child internalizes the value orientations of the group and acquires generalized 
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capacities for action. Put in another way, Habermas is stating that, under the 
aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action serves to transmit and 
renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of action coordination, 
communicative action contributes to social integration and solidarity; under 
the aspect of socialization, communicative action serves the formation of 
personal identities (Habermas, 1987:137). 
In this sense, Habermas portrays an internal relation between lifeworld 
and communicative action in which they are linked to each other in a circular 
relation: lifeworld produces communicative action (as it provides the 
background inputs that make communicative action possible) and 
communicative action reproduces lifeworld. As communicative action is seen 
as internally connected to reason, so too, it is argued, is lifeworld. In the 
discussion of the rationalization processes, Habermas produces a concept of 
rationalized lifeworld. 
Habermas views rationalization in terms of a process in which structural 
differentiation takes place between the components of lifeworld. Instead of 
the existence of a mythical worldview -- which is spread over all the social 
structures and tightly bound up with daily routines -- social institutions, 
legitimate orders and the formation of personality are gradually uncoupled 
from the world-views. Corresponding to the differentiation of culture, society 
and personality, Habermas says, there is a differentiation of form and content. 
On the cultural level, traditions separate off from the concrete contents of 
worldviews and shrink to formal elements like world-concepts, 
communication presuppositions, argumentation procedures, and so forth. At 
the level of society, principles of legal order and of morality are not tied to 
particular contexts and are established in a more abstract way. On the level of 
personality, the cognitive structures acquired in socialization are detached 
from the concrete contents of cultural knowledge, and hence the objects in 
connection with which the formal competences can be exercised become more 
variable (Habermas, 1987:146). 
Habermas sees that in the structural differentiation, +h~ communicative 
practice is no longer linked to an ascribed normative consensus, but rather to 
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the rationality potential of communicative action, to a consensus which is 
based on the force of the better argument, the force of reason. As he puts it, 
the further the structural components of the lifeworld and 
the processes that contribute to maintaining them get 
differentiated, the more interaction contexts come under 
the conditions of rationally motivated mutual 
understanding, that is, of consensus formation that rests in 
the end on the authority of the better argument. (Habermas 
1987:145) 
Habermas produces a concept of rationalized lifeworld in which culture, 
society and personality are all connected to the rationality potential of 
communicative action. According to this concept of rationalized lifeworld, 
Habermas sees that on the cultural level, traditions are under continuous 
reflective revision; at the level of society, legitimate orders are dependent 
upon formal procedures for positing and justifying norms; on the level of the 
personality system, an abstract ego identity is continuously stabilized through 
self-reflection and self-steering (Habermas, 1987:146). 
With such an idealized concept, Habermas portrays lifeworld as 
inherently unproblematic and free from power. Seeing that pathologies such 
as a loss of meaning and freedom are widespread in the lifeworld, Habermas 
maintains that the lifeworld is not accountable for them. He would rather 
explain the pathologies in terms of the effects of systemic mechanisms. In 
order to understand modern pathologies, Habermas thinks that we need to 
consider the rationalization process in terms of "the uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld". This uncoupling, in his view, later develops into an intrusion of 
the system mechanisms into lifeworld. 
The uncoupling of system and lifeworld 
Habermas sees that the rationalization process witnesses an "uncoupling 
between system and lifeworld". That is, as a result of processes of 
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differentiation, the lifeworld which is at first coextensive with the system gets 
cut down into a subsystem. While the economic and the political subsystems, 
or what Habermas calls the system, are responsible for material reproduction, 
the lifeworld is now responsible for symbolic reproduction. From the 
system perspective, the interchange between the lifeworld and the system is 
considered as a kind of mutual influence. Nevertheless, Habermas thinks that 
the system perspective is not adequate in capturing the effects of the system 
media on the lifeworld and he would rather emphasize an internal 
perspective of the lifeworld. 
From a system perspective, the thesis of "uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld" means a differentiation between the subsystems of a larger system. 
While each of the subsystems are specialized in a certain function, there are 
interchanges between the subsystems so that each is under the influence of 
the other subsystems. From this perspective, Habermas talks about a 
"mediatization" of the lifeworld. It refers to "'interference' phenomena that 
arise when system and lifeworld have become differentiated from one 
another to such an extent that they can exert mutual influence upon on 
another" (Habermas, 1987:186). For instance, Habermas elaborates, economic 
and political subsystems are linked to the lifeworld via institutions of civil 
and public law. The market economy is institutionalized via the bourgeois 
private law and the political state is institutionalized via the authority of 
public office. The institutionalization allows the mutual influence between the 
system and the lifeworld. On the one hand, the system is subjected to the 
normative restrictions of the lifeworld, and on the other hand, the lifeworld is 
modified according to the systemic constraints of material reproduction 
(Habermas, 1987:185). 
Nevertheless, in order to understand the effects of the structural 
differentiation on the lifeworld, Habermas thinks that we need to adopt an 
internal perspective of it. From this perspective, one can see that system 
media, namely, money and power, work through the action orientation of 
people and take the place of communicative action in the role of action 
coordination. According to Haberrnas, the structural features of system media 
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enable them to bypass the process of consensus formation in action 
coordination. In the case of money, he elaborates, the standard situation is 
defined by the process of exchanging goods. Participants have clear interest 
positions -- to optimize their own economic interests. The money code can 
schematize one's responses in such a way as to either accept or reject another's 
offer to exchange. Through the money code, the parties can reciprocally 
condition the other's response without relying on the cooperative process 
presupposed by communicative action. What is expected is thus an 
objectivating attitude and a rational orientation toward action consequences 
(Habermas, 1987:264). 
Similarly, Habermas argues, the structural features of the power code 
enable it to replace the role of communicative action. For the power code can 
schematize one's response either to submit to or oppose the command of the 
one in power. As the one in power can apply sanctions when facing 
disobedience, he can condition one's response without relying on his 
willingness to cooperate. Again, the result is an objectivating attitude and a 
rational orientation toward action consequences (Habermas, 1987:268). In 
contrast to communicative action, which coordinates action on the basis of 
rational consensus, Habermas says: 
media such as money and power attach to empirical ties; 
they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable 
amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, 
strategic influence on the decisions of other participants 
while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented 
communication. (Habermas, 1987:183) 
With an-example of bureaucratic organizations, Habermas illustrates 
how, with an uncoupling of system and lifeworld, system media replace the 
role of communicative action in action coordination. In modern societies, he 
writes, economic and political subsystems emerge as formally organized 
domains. Economic production is organized as private enterprises; public 
administration is organized as public bureaucracies. Habermas argues that 
these bureaucratic organizations, steered by media of money and power, 
"sheer off from lifeworld contexts and congeal into a kind of norm-free 
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sociality ... They become peculiarly indifferent to culture, society, and 
personality" (Habermas, 1987:304). Nevertheless, as we shall see, these 
organizations do not really congeal into a kind of norm-free sociality. Neither 
are they really indifferent to lifeworld contexts in general. Instead they are 
indifferent to communicative action and to Habermas's idealized concept of 
lifeworld. 
Habermas argues that bureaucratic organizations are peculiarly 
indifferent to lifeworld contexts, namely personality, culture and society 
(Habermas, 1987:308-9). Regarding the indifference between bureaucratic 
organizations and personality, he claims that organizations render themselves 
independent from members' own dispositions and goals, and from their 
private life-contexts. Only those motives, value orientations and performances 
which are functionally necessary are viewed as relevant. Through the 
medium of money, that is, in the form of wages, bonuses, pensions and so 
forth, economic organizations secure the necessary motivations. From 
Habermas's description, however, it is not clear if bureaucratic organizations 
are indifferent to personality as a whole. It seems that they still require the 
personality system to provide relevant motivations. Nevertheless, they may 
not require the kind of personality defined by Habermas's idealized concept 
of lifeworld, that is, an abstract ego identity which is stabilized through self-
reflection and self-steering. 
Likewise, bureaucratic organizations are not indifferent to culture as a 
whole. Instead, they instrumentalize culture for their own purposes.Habermas 
says that there is an indifference between organizations and culture. Cultural 
traditions are treated as ideologies that would restrict organizations' 
sovereign exercise of their competence to shape their own programs. Hence 
organizations usually adopt ideological neutrality. Nevertheless, in case of 
legitimation needs, organizations may convert traditions as raw materials for 
purposes of ideology planning. In this case, cultural traditions are 
instrumentalized for certain purposes, and for Habermas, they are robbed of 
their binding power which, according to his theory, is based on the rational 
consensus achieved in communicative action. 
83 
I 
I~ 
1, 
I 
II 
I•· 
~; 
II 
II 
!,II 
I! 
:1 
I 
1,, 
I 
I 
I 
i 
According to Habermas, the indifference of organizations toward society 
1s referred to their "neutralizing the normative background of informal, 
customary, morally regulated contexts of action". He states that in pre-
rationalized societies, social labor and political domination are normatively or 
morally regulated; in modern societies, they are institutionalized via positive 
law. Modern law is uncoupled from ethical motives, and functions as a means 
for demarcating areas of legitimating choice for private legal persons and 
fields of legal competence for office-holders. Therefore, in addition to the 
instrurnentalization of culture and personality, Habermas sees an elimination 
of moral-practical elements in bureaucratic organizations. 
Not only are bureaucratic organizations indifferent to the lifeworld that 
Habermas has in mind, they are also indifferent to the communication 
practice that Habermas formulates in the concept of communicative action. As 
Habermas points out, there are still processes of communication, otherwise 
social relations within the organizations could not be sustained, nor would 
the realization of organizational goals be possible. Nevertheless, while 
"interactions are still connected via the mechanism of mutual understanding", 
Habermas says, "members of organizations act communicatively only with 
reservation. They know they can have recourse to formal regulations, not only 
in exceptional but in routine cases; there is no necessity for achieving 
consensus by communicative action" (Habermas, 1987:310-11). As the 
communication practice in organizations has recourse to formal regulations, 
the role of communicative action is replaced. 
Therefore, Habermas contends, system media no longer only achieve 
effects throug~tatent functional interconnection of action, as a system-
functionalist may see, but rather work through the action orientation of 
people. This is why he thinks the system perspective has to be supplemented 
with the internal perspective of the lifeworld. From the internal perspective of 
lifeworld, one sees that bureaucratic organizations in political and economic 
systems are steered by system media which bypass processes of consensus 
formation in action coordination. 
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One might say that system media of money and power now take on the 
role of social integration; nevertheless, Habermas's conception of lifeworld 
does not allow this conclusion. He sees that lifeworld is internally related to 
communicative action. It is only through communicative action that lifeworld 
is reproduced. The role of communicative action is justified in terms of a 
universal interest of humankind that is grounded in one of the fundamental 
conditions of our existence--language. From this perspective, he states, it is 
doubtful whether integrative operations could be converted from the 
mechanism of reaching understanding in language to systemic mechanisms 
without a transformation of anthropologically deep-seated structures 
(Habermas, 1987:312). According to his theory of communicative action and 
lifeworld, Habermas does not consider system media as new mechanisms of 
social integration, but rather as an intervention of system integration into the 
very forms of social integration, as a "structural violence" done to the 
lifeworld (Habermas, 1987:187). The mutual influence between lifeworld and 
system that is perceived from the system perspective can develop into a 
destructive influence on the lifeworld. Habermas considers the destructive 
influence in terms of his thesis of "colonization of lifeworld". 
Colonization of lifeworld 
According to Habermas, system mechanisms replace the role of 
communicative action not only in bureaucratic organizations, but also in the 
domains that are dependent on mutual understanding as the basis of action 
coordination. It is in the latter sense that Habermas refers to a colonization of 
lifeworld.5 Habermas says: 
in the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social 
integration even in those areas where a consensus-
dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced, that 
5 See White, 1988, pp.107-15; for a systematic elaboration of Habermas's thesis "colonization 
of lifeworld". 
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is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at 
stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld 
assumes the form of a colonization. (Habermas, 1987:196) 
The colonization thesis hence presupposes certain domains as dependent 
upon communicative action. Habermas draws a boundary between these 
domains and those which can be steered by system media. For Habermas, the 
economic and political subsystems are domains to be steered by system 
media, whereas the private spheres (connected with family, neighbourhood, 
voluntary associations) as well as public spheres (for both private persons and 
citizens) are domains which are dependent upon communicative action for 
action coordination. Habermas seeks to show how the latter domains are 
colonized by the forces generated from the former domains. Nevertheless, as I 
shall point out in the discussion, it is not clear whether a demarcation 
between these two domains, one inherently linked to system mechanisms, the 
other inherently linked to mechanism of mutual understanding, is at all 
possible. Nor is it clear if such a demarcation is desirable. 
Habermas writes that in modern societies, state and economy are the 
subsystems differentiated out from the lifeworld via the media of power and 
money. Against those areas that are systematically integrated, socially 
integrated areas take the shape of private and public spheres. The 
institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family, which specializes 
in socialization. The institutional core of the public sphere comprises 
communicative networks like the press and mass media. It allows for the 
reproduction of culture as well as the formation of public opinion. The public 
sphere is important for the generation of legitimation for power (Habermas, 
1987:318-19): 
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Institutional orders 
of the lifeworld 
Private sphere 
Public sphere 
Interchange relations 
1) Employee 
P' 
-------------------------------> 
Labor power 
M 
<-------------------------------
Income from employment 
2) Consumer 
M 
<--------------------------------
Goods and services 
M' 
---------------------------------> 
Demand 
la) Client 
M' 
---------------------------------> 
Taxes 
p 
<----------------------------------
Organizational accomplishments 
2a) Citizen 
p 
<----------------------------------
Political decisions 
P' 
-----------------------------------> 
Mass loyalty 
M = MONEY MEDIUM ; P = POWER MEDIUM 
Media-steered 
subsystems 
Economic 
system 
Administrative 
System 
Figure 1. Interchange between lifeworld and system (Habermas, 1987:320. With 
modifications). 
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As represented by the Figure 1, there are interchanges between these 
socially integrated domains and the media-steered subsystems. From the 
system perspective, Habermas says, the economic subsystem exchanges 
wages against labor with the private sphere, as well as goods and services 
against consumer demand. The political administrative subsystem exchanges 
organizational performances for taxes with the private sphere, as well as 
political decisions for mass loyalty. From the perspective of the lifeworld, 
Habermas states, various roles crystallise around these interchanges: the roles 
of the employee and the consumer, as well as the roles of the client and the 
citizen. 
Habermas argues that the roles of the consumer and the citizen are 
constituted differently from those of the employee and the client; for they 
define those areas that are dependent upon lifeworld contexts and thus 
cannot be steered away by system mechanisms. Habermas says, in 
interchanges of (1) and (la), the roles of the employee and the client are 
constituted in legal form with reference to organizations. That is, they can be 
considered as the role of a member of an organization. On the one hand, a 
member makes a contribution to the organization; on the other hand, he 
receives benefits from the organisation. An employee contributes to the 
economic production of the enterprise and receives benefits in the form of 
wages; a client contributes to the state in the form of taxes and receives 
services in return (Habermas, 1987:319-21). 
Nevertheless, for interchanges of (2) and (2a), Habermas argues, the roles 
of the consumer and the citizen have a different character. They are not 
constituted i~ the same way as those of the employee and the client. The legal 
norms associated with the roles of the consumer and the citizen have to be 
filled in by the action orientations which express a private way of life, or a 
cultural or political form of life. The roles of the consumer and the citizen 
refer to prior self-formative processes in which preferences, value orientations 
and attitudes have taken shape. These action orientations, Habermas argues, 
cannot be "bought" or "collected" in the sense of what an organization does to 
its members. Instead they are developed in relation to processes of 
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socialization and socio-cultural integration of the lifeworld. Habermas 
contends that it is in this sense that we can talk about the autonomy of the 
consumer and the sovereignty of the citizen. As the action orientations of 
these roles are rooted in the private and public spheres, Habermas states, 
they are tied to the lifeworld contexts and the role of communicative action 
cannot be taken over by steering media in the subsystems (Habermas, 
1987:321-2). 
According to Habermas, the forces of monetarization and 
bureaucratization require all these roles to go through an abstraction process 
in order to adapt to the regulation of the steering media. For the role of the 
employee, concrete work activities have to be abstracted into labor power in 
order to be exchanged for wages; for the role of consumer, use-value 
orientations have to be transformed into consumer preferences; for the role of 
the citizen, public opinion and collective expressions of will have to be 
transformed into mass loyalty. In the case of the client, Habermas thinks that 
the reification effect of abstraction is more typical. He argues that within the 
relationship of clients to the administration of the welfare state, "elements of a 
private way of life and a cultural-political form of life get split off from the 
symbolic structures of the lifeworld through the monetary redefinition of 
goals, relations and services, life-spaces and life-times, and through the 
bureaucratization of decisions, duties and rights" (Habermas, 1987: 322). For 
him, this is a typical example of colonization since forces of monetarization 
and bureaucratization have invaded the domains of cultural reproduction, 
social integration and socialization. 
By "colo:D-ization of lifeworld", Habermas means the phenomenon that the 
imperatives of subsystems make their way into the lifeworld, like colonial 
masters coming into a tribal society and forcing a process of assimilation upon 
it (Habermas, 1987:355). In other words, the forces of monetarization and 
bureaucratization not only transform the economic and political subsystems, 
but also turn back destructively upon the lifeworld domains and force an 
assimilation upon them. Habermas explains modern pathologies in terms of 
his thesis "colonization of lifeworld". 
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Habermas argues that modern pathologies are a result of the forces of 
monetarization and bureaucratization invading the domains of lifeworld, 
namely the private and the public spheres. He states that the effect of 
monetarization in the private sphere is obvious. As the private life-forms of 
the consumer and the employee are subject to the imperatives of,~onomic 
system, communicative practice is one-sidedly rationalized into-,.tilitarian 
way. Consumerism, possessive individualism, motives of performance and 
competition, hedonism and so forth gain strength. In the public sphere, 
Habermas argues, bureaucratization disempowers spontaneous opinion 
formation and uncouples political decision from the lifeworld contexts. 
Practical questions are transformed into technical questions (Habermas, 
1987:325). He concludes that with monetarization and bureaucratization of 
everyday life in both private and public spheres, the moral-practical elements 
are driven out from these spheres. This results in problems of motivation and 
orientation (or a loss of meaning), problems of legitimation and cultural 
impoverishment (Habermas, 1987:322-7). 
In delineating these two domains, one inherently linked to system 
mechanisms, the other inherently linked to the mechanism of mutual 
understanding, Habermas seeks to show how the latter domain is colonized 
by the imperatives of the former domain. Modern pathologies are explained 
in terms of this colonization. Nevertheless, the demarcation that Habermas 
draws between the domains of system and lifeworld is not without problems. 
First of all, it tends to exaggerate the differences and occlude the 
similarities between the domains of system and lifeworld. As Fraser points 
out from a f~minist perspective, the household, which Habermas considers as 
a domain of lifeworld, is actually like the paid workplace, a site of labor. 
Moreover, in the paid workplace, women are assigned to feminine, service-
oriented occupations, the same as they are assigned to in the household. 
Lastly, in both the spheres of the household and the paid workplace, women 
are subordinated to men. By characterizing the family as a domain of socially 
integrated symbolic reproduction, and on the other hand the paid workplace 
as a domain of system-integrated material reproduction, Fraser argues, 
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Habermas's theory fails to recognize the labor of childcare and housework in 
the family. Likewise it fails to focus on the problems of sexual segregation in 
the workplace as well as women's subordination in both spheres (Fraser, 
1985b:107). In this sense, I contend, the problem of Habermas's demarcation of 
the domains of lifeworld and system is not only to do with the difficulty or 
impossibility of drawing a boundary; it is also a matter of desirability for it 
hides the problems within the domain of lifeworld. 
Habermas, of course, does not deny the problems of power and 
instrumental-strategic action in the domains of lifeworld. Nevertheless, he 
tends to represent the domains of lifeworld as inherently innocent and 
unproblematic. The problems are hence seen as a result of invasion by some 
alien forces. This representation, as feminist studies show, is mistaken. From 
Habermas's perspective, the male-headed, nuclear family is seen as having 
only an extrinsic and incidental relation to system mechanisms of money and 
power; nevertheless, from a feminist perspective, empirical analyses of 
familial decision-making, handling of finances and wife-battering show that 
families are thoroughly permeated with the media of money and power. They 
are sites of egocentric, strategic and instrumental calculation as well as sites of 
usually exploitative exchange of labor and sex. Furthermore, they are 
frequently sites of coercion and violence (Fraser, 1985b:107). Moreover, the 
public sphere, too, is not a domain inherently free from power. Instead it is a 
domain dominated by men, for its requirement of abilities of articulation and 
argumentation discourages women's participation. Instead of an orientation 
to collective will, the opinion formed or expressed in the public sphere often 
reflects a male point of view. 
From a feminist perspective, the private and public spheres are far from a 
domain of mutual understanding; they are rather a domain which has its own 
problems of domination and repression. Moreover, as Fraser points out, 
Habermas's thesis of colonization of lifeworld assumes that the vector of 
motion is from system to lifeworld and not vice versa (Fraser, 1985:125). The 
feminist perspective, however, shows us that it could be women's 
subordination in the lifeworld which leads to problems in the system domain. 
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For instance, problems like sexual segregation at work and male dominance 
in the political-administrative institutions are actually rooted in the private 
sphere. Therefore, rather than imagine the problem of power in terms of a 
vector from the system to the lifeworld, one should be aware of the 
permeation of power in both spheres; and if there were a vector, it should be 
seen as channelling influence not only from system to lifeworld, but also from 
lifeworld to system. 
Conclusion 
In sum, Habermas's analysis of power is preoccupied with how to distinguish 
legitimate power from illegitimate power. This differentiation, for him, is also 
a differentiation between reason and force. Legitimate power is one which is 
connected to reason, whereas illegitimate power is one which is connected to 
force and implies the possibility of coercion. Habermas suggests that in order 
for power to be regarded as legitimate, it must be grounded in communicative 
action. In discussing how to ground power in communicative action, I point 
out, he produces two distinct versions of communicative concept of power, 
and both of them, I argue, are far from successful in dealing with the 
problems of force and coercion. 
Habermas maintains that in an instrumental-strategic relation, power 
means the ability within a social relationship to assert one's will over others 
despite oppqsition. The only alternative to this kind of coercion, he claims, is 
free agreement among participants. Hence he produces an earlier version of 
communicative action which considers legitimate power as arising only in 
free agreement. Habermas believes that by conceiving of power as a kind of 
communicative action, he has successfully separated legitimate power from 
instrumental-strategic action and from the coercion implied in instrumental-
strategic action. Nevertheless, I argue, since he insists on not only an 
understanding but an agreement among participants, this agreement 
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presupposes a high degree of homogeneity among participants and, in this 
way, he brings back the possibility of coercion that is required for achieving 
such kind of homogeneity. 
In contrast to the above version of communicative concept of power, 
Habermas takes up Parsons' theory and produces a different version of 
communicative concept of power. Though he still argues that legitimate 
power is based on communicative action, nevertheless, he does not conceive 
of power as a kind of communicative action but rather as purposive-
instrumental action which serves the realization of collective goals. While he 
supplements Parsons' concept of power with a dimension of communicative 
action by arguing that collective goals are to be determined in rational 
discourse, nevertheless, as he noticed in the earlier discussion of the. 
communicative concept of power, Parsons' concept of power requires force to 
play a counterpart and implies the possibility of coercion. Now in focusing on 
the question of what legitimates power, Habermas hides the problems of force 
and coercion in a language of legitimation. He produces a myth that power is 
safe while after all power, which is to do with disposition over means of 
sanctions and an instrumentalization of agreement for realization of collective 
goals, is no less dangerous than before. 
In his analysis of pathologies of modern societies, Habermas produces 
another myth that lifeworld is inherently innocent and free from power. He 
constructs an idealized concept of lifeworld based on which modern 
pathologies are criticized. The major flaw of this idealized concept of 
lifeworld, I suggest, lies not only in its counterfactual character, but in its 
calling for ~n explanation of modern pathologies elsewhere than the 
lifeworld. Habermas's thesis, "colonization of lifeworld", can be read in this 
sense. According to the thesis, modern pathologies are explained in terms of 
an intrusion of the external forces of monetarization and bureaucratization 
into the lifeworld. They are conceived in terms of a forced assimilation of the 
lifeworld, a colonization of the inherently innocent lifeworld. 
Habermas's argument implies that the lifeworld domains, namely, the 
private and public spheres, are inherently unproblematic. Nevertheless, in 
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contrast to what Habermas assumes, feminist studies show that the private 
and public spheres are themselves permeated with problems of power and 
coercion. The nuclear, male-headed family is a site of egocentric, strategic and 
instrumental calculation, as well as a site of usually exploitative exchange of 
labor and sex, and frequently a site of coercion and violence. Moreover, the 
public sphere, too, is not as innocent as assumed. It is very often a sphere 
dominated by men. Habermas's demarcation between the domains of system 
and lifeworld is hence not only questioned in terms of its plausibility but its 
desirability, for it hides all the problems of the private and public spheres of 
the lifeworld. 
According to Habermas's thesis, "colonization of lifeworld", pathologies 
are diagnosed in terms of a vector of motion from the system to the lifeworld. 
That is, it conceives of pathologies as a result of the invasion of forces from 
the economic and political systems into the lifeworld. It fails to focus on 
problems like sexual segregation of workplace and male domination of 
political-administrative institutions, which all have their root in the problem 
of women's subordination in the private sphere of lifeworld . 
If the thesis of colonization of lifeworld is problematic, then the resistance 
strategy that it informs--decolonization--is bound to be fruitless.6 Instead of 
standing on the side of lifewor ld, and fighting against or pushing back the 
influence of system mechanisms on the lifeworld, one needs to be reminded 
of the pervasiveness of the problems of power, and to fight against power 
from all sides. Foucault's analysis of power, I suggest, has the advantage of 
reminding us of the danger of power and the pervasiveness of power in all 
our life sph~res. Moreover, instead of hiding the problem of coercion in a 
language of legitimation, Foucault's work brings the problem to the fore. 
From Foucault's perspective, a lot of Habermas's concepts are exposed as 
myths and misguided comfort. In the second part of the thesis, I shall 
consider the challenges of Foucault's work for Habermas's theory. 
6 For a discussion of the inadequacies of decolonization as an emancipatory solution for 
women's subordination and oppression; see Fraser, 1985b, p.127. 
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Chapter 3 
DISCIPLINARY POWER AND ITS 
CHALLENGE TO HABERMAS'S THEORY 
Habermas holds that in an instrumental-strategic relation, power means 
the possibility within a social relationship to assert one's will over others 
despite opposition. Seeing the likelihood of coercion, Habermas asks: how 
can we have an image of power which is legitimate and excludes the 
possibility of coercion. In formulating a communicative concept of power, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, he thinks that he has provided a secure ground 
for power in communicative action. I argue that he produces a myth that 
power is safe while power, as he understands it, which is to do with 
disposition over means of sanctions and an instrumentalization of 
agreement for realization of collective goals, is no less dangerous than 
before. Moreover, I point out that Habermas's diagnosis of modern 
pathologies produces another myth--that the lifeworld is inherently 
unproblematic--while feminist studies show that the family, a central 
institution of the lifeworld, is itself permeated with problems of 
domination and coercion. 
Instead of focusing on the question "what legitimates power?", I 
contend that what we need is an approach which reminds us of the danger 
of power and the ever present possibility of coercion; and instead of 
assuming that the lifeworld is an innocent sphere, we need an approach 
which reminds us of the pervasiveness of power in all the spheres of our 
lives. Foucault's work, I suggest, could be read in terms of its advantages in 
pointing out these characteristics of power. In the second part of the thesis, 
I shall elaborate on the insights of Foucault's work, and show in what 
ways it challenges Habermas's critique of power. 
95 
.... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
',ji 
I 
IE 
' 
Ii 
1:•· 
I 
! 
I 
a 
,, 
f 
l 
•~' 
I 
111 
, I 
l 
In this chapter, I argue that Foucault provides us with an alternative 
approach to Habermas's critique of power. Habermas's approach, I suggest, 
could be understood as a juridico-discursive mode of analysis which 
Foucault seeks to surpass. The juridico-discursive approach represents 
power as law which prohibits and negates, As power is conceived as 
negative, it has to be subjected to the rules of right. When power is 
exercised within the limits and operates according to the principle of 
legitimation, it is considered as lawful, as legitimate. The primary task, 
therefore, is to draw limits and boundaries, to limit power to its own 
domain, to submit power to the rules of right. Habermas, who is 
preoccupied with drawing a demarcation between legitimate and 
illegitimate power, between lifeworld and system, provides us with a 
juridico-discursive mode of analysis of power. 
For Habermas, any critique of power must provide a normative 
principle for the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power. He 
devotes his efforts to formulating a communicative concept of power in 
order to provide a normative basis for it. Power which is grounded in 
communicative action is considered as legitimate, whereas power which is 
not grounded in communicative action can be questioned in terms of its 
legitimacy and people are right to resist. Habermas criticizes Foucault's 
analysis of disciplinary power in terms of a lack of such a normative 
principle. He asks how Foucault can answer the question "why fight"? if 
he does not ground his critique in any normative principles. Why should 
we muster any resistance at all against this disciplinary power? Why ought 
domination be resisted (Habermas, 1987a:284)?1 
1 Habermas understands that Foucault sees disciplinary power as domination that has to be 
resisted. This understanding, I contend, has some evidence in Foucault's work Discipline and 
Punish. As pointed out by Hindess, Foucault fails to distinguish between domination and 
power at this stage in his work (1996:114; 162, note 5). Foucault seems to regard discipline as 
oppressive regimes that bring about docile bodies through coercion. According to Pasquino 
(1993:79), Foucault came to realize that this earlier treatment of power 'threatened to lead 
to an extremist denunciation of power -- envisaged according to a repressive model' 
(reproduced in Hindess, 1996:98). This one-sided, rejectionist understanding of discipline 
overlooks the fact that self-discipline, for example, by means of meditation, can be a 
practice that enables individuals to overcome or control the external effects of domination 
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Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power, I suggest, should not be 
considered from the perspective of a juridico-discursive model. On the 
contrary, we should read it in terms of an alternative approach--a strategic 
model--to the juridico-discursive mode of analysis. Rather than ask what 
legitimates power or how to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate 
power, Foucault's strategic model raises the question how the effects of 
power are produced and maintained. From this perspective, Foucault sees 
that the existence of power is not ensured by rights, but rather by 
techniques. That is, the effects of power take place in the body through the 
employment of a wide range of disciplinary techniques. These techniques 
coerce our body, manipulate its elements, its gestures and its behaviour. In 
light of Foucault's strategic model, the problem of disciplinary coercion is 
brought to the fore. Moreover, Foucault's analysis of the spread of 
disciplinary power demonstrates that no spheres can be privileged as the 
basis of hope. In contrast to Habermas's separating out an innocent sphere 
of lifeworld, Foucault shows the pervasiveness of disciplinary power and 
the permeation of power in all the spheres of our lives. 
This chapter argues that from the perspective of Foucault's strategic 
model, not only are some of Habermas's conclusior power and modern 
pathologies questioned, but his mode of analysis, which preoccupied with 
a demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate power, between system 
and lifeworld, is challenged. Before discussing the insights of Foucault's 
analysis of disciplinary power, I shall first consider the affinities between 
Habermas's critique and the juridico-discursive mode of analysis. 
upon themselves. Foucault's later studies on the Greek practice of self-discipline 
demonstrate this possibility; see Foucault, 1987; 1990. 
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3.1 Habermas's Theory and the J uridico-Discursive Mode of Analysis 
Foucault says that we must break free of the juridico-discursive mode in 
our analysis of power. 
Whether desire is this or that, in any case one continues 
to conceive of it in relation to a power that is always 
juridical and discursive, a power that has its central place 
in the enunciation of the law. One remains attached to a 
certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty, which 
was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the 
monarchic institution. It is this image that we must 
break free of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law 
and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the 
concrete and historical framework of its operation. We 
must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes 
law as a model and a code. (Foucault, 1979b:89-90) 
The juridico-discursive model of power, as I shall elaborate in this 
section, has three characteristics: first, it represents power in the image of 
law, of prohibition or censorship; second, it privileges the theory of 
sovereignty; and third, it privileges the theory of right. Foucault 
constantly presents his analysis as a challenge to the juridico-discursive 
mode. 2 Habermas's theory, of course, does not correspond perfectly to 
Foucault's target of critique. Nevertheless, because of his preoccupation 
with the problematic of legitimacy, as well as his construction of a 
framework which defines the right and the domain of power, I regard 
Habermas's ·analysis as juridico-discursive. I shall first present Foucault's 
2 Foucault says that the aim of the inquiries is to move toward an analytics of power which 
frees itself from a certain representation of power that he would term "juridico-discursive" 
(1979b:82). According to Foucault, the juridico-discursive mode represents power as law 
which prohibits and represses. "It is this conception that governs both the thematics of 
repression and the theory of law as constitutive of desire. See his discussion of the juridico-
discursive conception of sex in 1979b, pp.82-90. For his discussion of the juridical notion of 
power which contains a reference to a theory of sovereignty and a theory of right, see 1980c, 
pp.92-108. 
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view on the juridico-discursive model of power, and then consider the 
affinitiet~abermas's work and the juridico-discursive model of power. 
Foucault: on the juridico-discursive mode 
According to Foucault (1979b:82-5), the juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis represents power in the form of law which merely refuses, 
prohibits, and says no. It is a power which resembles the biblical law "thou 
shalt not go near", "thou shalt not touch". The rule of prohibition, he 
states, is linked to repression, renunciation, and a denial of existence. 
Foucault illustrates it with an example of sex. Power affirms that such a 
thing, sex, is not permitted. The prohibition is linked to renunciation: 
power prevents it from being said; power denies its existence. Power, in 
the representation of law, is characterized by rejection, exclusion, refusal, 
blockage, concealment, or mask. This negative conception of power, 
Foucault states, assumes that power can do nothing but negate ; or if it 
ever produces, they are boundaries and limits. It places things in a binary 
system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden. It establishes the rule. 
In Foucault's view, the juridico-discursive mode which represents 
power in the form of law privileges the theory of sovereignty. Despite 
criticisms of absolutist power as arbitrary and unlawful, Foucault argues, 
the history of the monarch actually went hand in hand with the system of 
law. A fundamental trait of Western monarchies was that they were 
constructed as the system of law. They expressed themselves through 
theories of law; they made their power work in the form of law. As seen in 
the old reproach that the Boulainvilliers directed at the French monarchy, 
the monarchy used the law and the jurists to do away with rights and 
bring down the aristocracy (Foucault, 1979b:87). Not only is the 
monarchical power represented in the form of law, other forms of 
sovereign power are represented in the same way. The association of 
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power-law with sovereignty has an implication for the juridico-discursive 
mode. 
The emphasis on the category of sovereignty implies that power is 
attributed to an identifiable source. This does not require the sovereign to 
be a monarch. Instead it can be a conglomerate of persons and institutions 
vested with legislative powers. Nevertheless, the sovereignty image does 
require the source of power to be internally coherent, stable and 
identifiable.3 While focusing on sovereignty, this mode of analysis does 
not overlook local power relations. Yet, when looking at local power 
relations, one tends to ask: "what is the source of power behind the 
multiplicity of local power relations?" In other words, it represents power 
in a way which flows from the centre and permeates to the base; which 
reproduces itself from top to bottom, down to the most molecular 
elements of society. This mode of analysis assumes that there is a 
uniformity of the apparatus. From top to bottom, in its overall decisions 
and in its capillary interventions, whatever the institutions on which it 
relies, it acts in a uniform and comprehensive manner; it operates 
according to the same form, varying only in scale (Foucault, 1980c:99; 
1979b:84-5). 
According to Foucault, side by side with the ca~egory of sovereignty is 
the category of right. "Right in the West is the King's right" (1980c:94). In 
Western societies, since medieval times, Foucault writes, it is the power of 
the monarchy that provides the focus around which legal thought has 
been elaborated. Studies have centred basically on the King, his rights, his 
power and its eventual limitations. The theory of right aims at imposing 
limits upon the sovereign, submitting it to the rules of right. It is within 
these limits that the power exercised is considered as legitimate. The 
principle of power-as-law in the juridico-discursive mode hence has a 
meaning other than the negative conception of power. It means that 
power has to be exercised within limits, power has to be operated according 
to rule. The boundary and the limit of power are to be defined and spelled 
3ct. Cousins and Hussain, 1984, p.233-5. 
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out clearly. This image of power can be seen in the criticism of the 
eighteenth-century monarchy. Foucault writes, the power of the monarchy 
was condemned for its transgression of the limits, its constant 
overstepping of the legal framework and setting itself above the law. It 
assumed a pure and rigorous juridical system to which all mechanisms of 
power had to conform. There had to be no excesses, no irregularities of 
power. Power had to be exercised in the very form of the law (Foucault, 
1979b:88). In the nineteenth century another criticism of the political 
institutions occurred. It was also based on the same image of power. 
Foucault writes, this time the criticism was directed against the legal 
system itself. It criticized the legal system as merely a way of exerting 
violence, of appropriating that violence for the benefit of the few, and of 
exploiting the injustices of domination under the cover of law. This type 
of criticism, in Foucault's words, "is still carried out on the assumption 
that, ideally and by nature, power must be exercised in accordance with a 
fundamental lawfulness" (Foucault, 1979b:88). 
When power is exercised within its limits, it is considered as lawful, as 
legitimate. The setting of limits hence is at the same time the 
establishment of the right of power; the drawing of boundaries is at the 
same time the fixing of the legitimacy of power. Foucault says, "[t]he 
essential role of the theory of right, from medieval times onwards, was to 
fix the legitimacy of power; that is the major problem around which the 
whole theory of right and sovereignty is organized". Therefore, the theory 
of right not only seeks to impose limits; at the same time it tries "to show 
the nature of the juridical armoury that invested royal power, to reveal 
the monarch as the effective embodiment of sovereignty, to demonstrate 
that his power, for all that it was absolute, was exactly that which befitted 
his fundamental right" (Foucault, 1980c:95). Foucault reminds us that this 
establishment of the legitimate right of the sovereignty implies an 
establishment of the legal obligation to obey. Confronted with the power-
law, the subject is obliged to obey (Foucault, 1980c:95; 1979b:95). The 
juridico-discursive mode hence presents to us a picture with a legitimate 
power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other. 
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In sum, the juridico-discursive model represents power in a negative 
way: it prohibits; it constrains. This power can be located in an identifiable 
source, whether it is the monarch in the past or the democratic 
sovereignty in modern societies. As power is constraining, one seeks to set 
limits and draw boundaries. The setting of limits and boundaries is also 
the establishment of the right of power and the obligation to obey. One 
must admit that Habermas does not have a simplistic negative conception 
of power; nevertheless, I argue, his analysis contains features which enable 
it to be regarded as juridico-discursive. 
Habermas and the juridico-discursive mode 
I suggest that Habermas's analysis can be read as a juridico-discursive 
mode. Nevertheless, this does not mean that he has a simplistic, negative 
concept of power. In Habermas's view, power does not have to be 
conceived as repressive, or as a tool that serves sectional interests. Instead 
power can be productive and used to serve collective interests. He agrees 
with Parsons that power can be defined as the generalized capacity to 
secure the performance of binding obligations that are legitimized with 
reference to collective goals. In other words, power can be seen in terms of 
serving the realization of collective goals. Moreover, Habermas points out 
that power does not only ask for compliance but obligations; it is not only a 
matter of obedience to laws, but carrying out of duties (Habermas, 
1987b:271). In this sense, Habermas's understanding of power is rather 
positive or productive. Instead of merely negating, power motivates 
performance; it produces performance of obligations.4 
While seeing that power is productive, Habermas emphasizes that one 
cannot overlook the problems of power. For him, these problems include 
4 This reveals a weakness in Foucault's discussion of the representation of power-law. 
When power is represented as law, it does not mean that power merely negates. The 
purpose of law is not only to negate and prohibit, but to motivate the performance of duties. 
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the asymmetrical character of power and the possibility of coercion in the 
exercise of power. Habermas says, in order to be used for collective goals, 
power has to be expressed in an organizational form, that is, power has to 
be organized in terms of hierarchical relations. Those who exercise power 
have to occupy a position in a hierarchy of a collective organization. The 
one in the higher position is to make binding decisions whereas the one in 
the subordinated position is to carry out the decisions. For Habermas, this 
asymmetrical character of power is a problem since the one in a higher 
position can deliver sanctions to those who disobey. In other words, those 
in a subordinate position are structurally disadvantaged because the one in 
a higher position can always cause harm to them when they disobey. This 
structural disadvantage can be exploited by the one in a higher position 
when he uses power for his own interests. Or this structural disadvantage 
can imply a problem of coercion when the one in a higher position 
imposes his own will over those in a subordinate position. Facing these 
problems of power, the step that Habermas takes is to propose a model that 
would eliminate the possibility of coercion. His effort in constructing such 
a model can be seen in terms of a search for a better model of legitimation. 
For Habermas, the legitimization of power with reference to collective 
goals is not capable of resolving the problem of coercion. Power can be 
legitimated in the name of the collective goals while in reality serving 
particular interests and coercing individuals' will. Habermas, therefore, 
proposes a model of discourse according to which those affected by power 
are allowed to participate in the contest, discussion and determination of 
goals. It is to guarantee that the goals determined are collectively desired, 
that the formation of a collective will replaces the imposition of 
somebody's will over others, and that the orientation to collective 
interests replaces the domination of sectional interests. The discourse 
model, therefore, enables Habermas to come to the following conclusions: 
firstly, the problem of coercion is resolved, and thus one can have a power 
which is productive, noncoercive, and oriented to collective interests; 
secondly, as the possibility of coercion is eliminated, the problem of the 
asymmetrical character of power, though it cannot be eliminated, is 
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"offset" or "compensated" (Habermas, 1987:271). In relation to these 
conclusions, I shall highlight two points about Habermas's theory. 
For Habermas, there can be a positive and a negative conception of 
power. From a positive conception, power is used for collective interests; 
power manifests collective will; power is noncoercive. From a negative 
conception, power is used for particular interests; power manifests a 
particular will; power is coercive. For Habermas, these two conceptions do 
not point to two different perspectives of looking at power, but rather two 
different categories of power. In other words, Habermas does not mean 
that one can see the same power from different perspectives: the 
productive aspect of power from the perspective of the positive conception 
and the repressive aspect of power from the perspective of the negative 
conception. Instead Habermas contends that there are two categories of 
power: one is positive, the other is negative. The problem for him is: how 
to specify the rules and conditions that separate one from the other; how 
to provide a model that separates the positive power from the negative 
power, the noncoercive power from the coercive power. This problem is 
based on the presupposition that such kind of separation is possible. 
Foucault, in contrast, provides an analysis of power that challenges this 
presupposition. Foucault shows that power is productive and at the same 
time coercive. This challenge will be discussed in Part II of this chapter. 
Secondly, facing the asymmetrical character of power, the question that 
Habermas asks is: how can this problem be compensated? This question 
can be seen in terms of Habermas's concern about the problematic of 
legitimacy. When Habermas asks "how can the asymmetry of power be 
compensated", what he means is: despite the asymmetry, how can power 
still be recognized as legitimate, or what legitimates power? The pursuit of 
these questions reveals an affinity of Habermas's theory with the juridico-
discursive model of power. From the beginning Habermas's theory is 
preoccupied with the question of how to distinguish legitimate power 
from illegitimate power. Now the asymmetry, for Habermas, does not 
necessarily render power illegitimate. He thinks that with reference to the 
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goals which are collectively desired and collectively determined, power 
can still be recognized as legitimate. The establishment of the legitimacy of 
power, as Foucault claims, is at the same time the establishment of the 
legal obligation to obey. In effect, by grounding power in communicative 
action, his theory is saying this: despite the problem of the asymmetry of 
power, power is legitimate and one is obliged to obey. 
Habermas's analysis of system and lifeworld further reveals its affinity 
with the juridico-discursive mode. In taking up Parsons' conception of 
power as a medium of the political system, Habermas translates this 
abstract conception into a concrete, institutional concept of power. He 
locates power in the central political institutions, in the system of state 
administration. As what is presupposed in the theory of sovereignty, 
power is located and traced to an identifiable source: the modern 
administrative state. After locating power in the state, the domain of 
power has to be defined; the boundary between the domain of power and 
the other has to be drawn. According to Habermas, the role of power, being 
a system medium which regulates action on the basis of a purposive-
instrumental orientation, has to be confined to the sphere of the political 
system. In contrast, communicative action, which is oriented to a 
consensual-discursive process, is responsible for action coordination in the 
sphere of lifeworld. In other words, Habermas draws a boundary between 
power and the political system on the one hand, and communicative 
action and lifeworld on the other. A transgression of the boundary is 
regarded as pathological. The pathologies of modern societies are 
explained as a consequence of the transgression of the boundary. 
According to Habermas 's thesis "colonization of the lifeworld", 
modem pathologies are conceived in terms of an intrusion of the system 
mechanisms into the domain of lifeworld. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
modem pathologies are seen as a result of the penetration of the medium 
of power into the sphere that requires communicative action as the 
mechanism of social integration. For instance, Habermas writes, the 
expansion of the role of experts and bureaucrats leads 
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to a suppression of the discussion or op1n1on formation in the public 
sphere. The role of a citizen is reduced to voting and individuals now 
relate to the state via the role of the client and on the basis of a purposive-
instrumental orientation. For Habermas, this development cannot avoid 
pathological consequences, as revealed in problems like identity crisis and 
legitimation crisis. The solution, following naturally from the diagnosis, is 
a circumscription of the role of the mechanisms of power to the proper 
domain. That is, experts and bureaucrats still have their role in the 
political system, but communicative action has its role in the public sphere 
so that the decisions of experts and bureaucrats are guided by the 
discursive will. The diagnosis as well as the solution reveal a 
presupposition of the juridico-discursive mode: how to draw the limit and 
boundary of power so that its right is confined to a certain domain. In 
Habermas's theory, power belongs to the sphere o/;political-administrative 
system whereas communicative action belongs to the sphere of lifeworld. 
The boundary is drawn. The right of power is spelled out. When the 
tAf 01'.\, 
mechanisms of power intrude
11 
the sphere of communicative action, power 
is condemned. 
3.2 Foucault's Analysis of Disciplinary Power and its Challenge to 
Habermas 
Foucault says that we must break free of the juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis which represents power in the form of law. The juridico-
discursive mode, he argues, fails to capture the new forms of power in 
modern western societies.5 In this chapter, I shall focus on one of these 
5 Besides disciplinary power, Foucault discusses other modem forms of power. For instance, 
he says, the second form, namely the bio-power, formed somewhat later and focused on the 
species body, aims at regulatory control of the biological processes of the population 
including its propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity (Foucault, 1980a:139). In his "Govemmentality" lecture, Foucault (1991) discusses 
the pastoral form of power in western societies, which operates through the metaphor of 
the shepherd and his flock. The shepherd's exercise of pastoral power over his flock is 
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modern forms of power--discipline--and see what kinds of challenge it 
poses for Habermas's theory. My focus on disciplinary power is 
intended to provide a parallel response to Habermas's criticism of 
Foucault which is based on his reading of Foucault's ideas of discipline.6 I 
shall first summarize Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power and then 
discuss the ways in which it runs counter to Habermas's theory of power. I 
argue that Foucault's challenge lies not only in his providing an 
alternative account of modern power that Habermas's theory overlooks, 
but also in his presenting a mode of analysis which is different from the 
juridico-discursive mode. 
Foucault: on disciplinary power 
Foucault writes that a new form of power emerged in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries which "centred on the body as a machine: its 
disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, 
the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into 
the systems of efficient and economic controls"(Foucault, 1979b:139). This 
power took the form of a disciplinary control over the body and its forces. 
It aims at imposing a relation of utility-docility upon the body, that is, a 
parallel increase in both the usefulness and the docility of the body. While 
previously there had been other forms of power which produced docile 
bodies, Foucault contends, this form of power was new in a number of 
ways. Firstly, in terms of the principle of utility. While asceticism also 
involved a disciplining of the body, its function was to achieve 
renunciations rather than increases of utility. Secondly, in terms of the 
based on a concern for the flock's welfare rather than its liberty. For a systematic and useful 
discussion of these different forms of power as well as Foucault's concepts of power, 
domination, and government, see Hindess, 1996, Chapter 5. 
6 Habermas's criticism of Foucault is mainly based on his reading of Foucault's ideas of 
discipline and power /knowledge. In this chapter, I focus on disciplinary power. In Chapter 
4, I shall discuss Foucault's analysis of power /knowledge and see what kinds of challenge 
it has for Habermas. 
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principle of docility, this new form of power was different from slavery for 
it could now dispense with the costly and violent means of appropriation 
of bodies and yet still obtain as much utility. Thirdly, in terms of its 
bearing on the operations of the body, it is different from vassalage, which 
relied more on the products of labor and the ritual marks of allegiance 
(Foucault, 1979a:137). What guarantees a relation of utility-docility is the 
effects it has on the operations of the body. 
According to Foucault, this new form of power can be represented in 
terms of a political anatomy of the body. "The human body was entering a 
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it". 
"What was then formed was ... a calculated manipulation of its elements, 
its gestures, its behaviour" (Foucault, 1979a:138). In order to ensure the 
meticulous control of the operations of the body, a series of disciplinary 
methods and techniques are employed. They operate according to a 
codification which partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. 
Firstly, consider spatial arrangement. In order to achieve a 
distribution of bodies in space, Foucault writes, discipline employs 
techniques like enclosure: the specification of a place heterogeneous to all 
others and closed in upon itself. Besides the great "confinement" of 
vagabonds and paupers, there were colleges and secondary schools, 
military barracks, workshops and factories. Take the factory as an example: 
the guardian only opened the gate in the morning for the return of 
workers to work and the gate was closed until the end of the day when 
workers finished work. The aim was to derive maximum advantage and 
to minimiz~ interruptions to work. Nevertheless, Foucault elaborates, 
enclosure is neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient for 
discipline. In order to control in a more flexible and detailed way, it 
requires the technique of partitioning. That is, each individual is 
distributed in a space so that each has his own place. Its aim is to establish 
presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to 
interrupt dangerous communications, to be able to supervise the conduct 
of each individual at every moment. Besides achieving surveillance, the 
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distribution also aims at setting up useful communication and useful 
cooperation. In the workshop, the distribution is linked to the division of the. 
production process. On the one hand, the spatial distribution ensures 
productivity; on the other hand, it enables the individual, his force, and 
each variable of his force--strength, promptness, skill, constancy--to be 
observed (Foucault, 1979a:141-5). 
The method of partitioning, or spatial distribution reaches an ideal 
{he, 
form in"Panopticon, which is intended by Bentham as the design of a 
prison. According_ to Foucault, the Panopticon is an architectural figure 
Strve$t"1> pro Ma -tl,,e, ~Lets of 
which a gaze. It contains rings of cells encircling a central 
observation tower.7 Each individual in this building can be seen and 
observed from the central tower. But the side walls of the cell prevent him 
from being seen or coming into contact with his companions. Hence "he is 
seen but he does not see". On the one hand, the invisibility breaks 
dangerous communication and guarantees order; on the other hand, the 
visibility induces a state of consciousness of being watched and produces 
the effects of ceaseless supervision. The inmate has the tower before his 
eyes. He does not know when exactly he is being watched, but he is sure 
that he may always be so. Hence the inmate is subjected to his own 
supervision. He is caught up in a power situation of which he himself is 
the bearer. The panoptic apparatus makes possible continuous and 
permanent surveillance, even it is discontinuous in action (Foucault, 
1979a:200-1). 
Besides the partitioning of space, disciplinary method also involves 
the partitioning of time. Foucault writes that the use of a time-table had 
been an old method found in monastic communities. It was then adopted 
7 Foucault elaborates on the Panopticon as follows: "at the periphery, an annular building; 
at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner 
side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the 
whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to 
the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from 
one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and 
to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By 
the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower ... " (1979a:200). 
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by schools, workshops and hospitals. But the discipline altered this 
method of temporal regulation by refining it. The division of time became 
a more minute division of time; the governing of activities was in more 
detail. Foucault illustrates the detailed partitioning of time with the 
following example: 
At the last stroke of the hour, a pupil will ring the bell, 
and at the first sound of the bell all pupils will kneel, 
with their arms crossed and their eyes lowered. When 
the prayer has been said, the teacher will strike the signal 
once to indicate that the pupils should get up, a second 
time as a sign that they should salute Christ, a third that 
they should sit down. (Foucault, 1979a:150) 
In the working place, there was likewise a detailed partitioning of time 
(Foucault, 1979a:150).8 This detailed partitioning of time is to make sure of 
the quality of time used, that each minute is spent in a useful way, that a 
totally useful time is the result. In contrast to the old principle underlying 
the time-table of non-idleness, a negative principle that forbade the waste 
of time, Foucault says, the use of the time table is now for a positive 
economy. It makes possible an ever-growing use of time, an extraction of 
more available moments, and from each moment, ever more useful forces 
(Foucault, 1979a:154). 
Nevertheless, in Foucault's view, what is more novel about the 
method of discipline is its partition of movements, its temporal 
elaboration of an act. He gives the example of the training of a marching 
troop, in which the body had to adjust to temporal imperatives, and there 
had to be a precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements. 
The length of the short step will be a foot, that of the 
ordinary step, the double step and the marching step will 
be two feet, the whole measured from one heel to the 
next; as for the duration, that of the small step and the 
ordinary step will last one second, during which two 
8 For example, if workers arrived later than a quarter of an hour after the ringing of the 
bell, or if any one of the companions was asked for during work and lost more than five 
minutes, their wages would be reduced in a corresponding rate. See Foucault, 1979, p.150. 
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double step would be performed; the duration of the 
marching step will be a little longer than one second. 
The oblique step will take one second; it will be at most 
eighteen inches from one heel to the next ... (Foucault, 
1979a:151) 
In contrast to the time-table which provides the general framework for 
an activity, it is a programme which assures the elaboration of the act 
itself, a programme that controls its development and its stages from the 
inside. Therefore, Foucault says, we do not only have time-tables that 
punctuate gestures, we have a web that constrains gestures and sustains 
them throughout their entire succession. "The act is broken down into its 
elements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each 
movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of 
succession is prescribed" (Foucault, 1979a:151-2). These methods make 
possible a meticulous control of the operations of the body. They achieve 
an uninterrupted, constant coercion, a supervision over the process rather 
than the result of an activity. 
Disciplinary power as a form of power that Habermas's theory fails to 
capture 
For Habermas, the coercive power is to be separated from the noncoercive 
power; the productive power is to be separated from the negative power. 
His construction of the notion of communicative action, which links 
power to the formation of collective will and the attainment of collective 
interests, is intended to exclude the possibility of coercion. I argue that 
Habermas's theory fails to capture a modern form of power --discipline--
and the way it operates and brings about subjection. 
Foucault's concept of disciplinary power requires the body to be the 
centre of attention. The body is the target of its control; the body is the 
object of power. "It is always the body that is at issue -- the body and its 
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forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their 
submission" (Foucault, 1979a:25). It is the body that is trained; it is the body 
that is forced to carry out the task. In order to be a useful body, it has to be a 
subjected body. The subjection, as shown by Foucault's analysis, may be 
obtained by violence or ideology, but very often it is obtained by subtle 
coercion.9 On the one hand, while the subjection is obtained in a way that 
is direct and physical, it does not have to involve violence. It uses neither 
weapons nor terror but more subtle instruments. On the other hand, 
while the coercion is subtle, it does not have to rely on mechanisms of 
ideologies. Its mechanism is rather a series of subtle instruments which 
bears more directly on the material, physical elements. These instruments 
include time-tables, exercises, compulsory movements, regular activities. 
Based on these instruments, subtle coercion is carried out through a 
multiplicity of continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our 
body, govern our gesture and dictate our behaviour. The effects of power 
take place in the body and its elements. There is a conditioning or, more 
precisely, a constitution of our gestures, our movements, our attitudes, 
our behaviours. 
Foucault's analysis implies a challenge to the traditional theories 
which assume the subjection to be based either on an external 
enforcement or an internal enforcement. As discussed by Cousins and 
Hussain (1984:241-2), Hart, the jurisprudential theorist differentiates an 
external mechanism and an internal mechanism in explaining why legal 
subjects obey law. In Hart's view, on the one hand, laws are externally 
enforced by legal authorities which have the capacity to apply force when 
they disobey. On the other hand, the acceptance by the legal subjects is no 
less important. It is based on their acceptance that laws are internally 
enforced. Foucault, in contrast, shows that the explanation of submission 
9 Foucault points out that there can be a variety of ways in which subjection is obtained. He 
says: "This subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can 
also be direct, physical, pitting force against violence; it may be calculated, organized, 
technically thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet 
remain of a physical order"(Foucault, 1979: 26). 
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requires nothing like a binary opposition between external enforcement 
and internal enforcement. 
As Cousins and Hussain point out, the notion of internal enforcement 
is of special importance to traditional theories since it is the obverse of the 
notion of legitimation. Rules which are recognized as legitimate are 
internally enforced, while those which are not recognized as such can only 
be externally enforced. Habermas's theory, which is preoccupied with the 
problematic of legitimacy, focuses on the internal enforcement. According 
to Habermas, as power is organized in the form of asymmetrical relations, 
those in the subordinate position are structurally disadvantaged, especially 
when the enforcement of certain rules or decisions is against their will. In 
order for power to be recognized as legitimate, Habermas suggests that the 
possibility of the coercion of will has to be excluded. In proposing a model 
of discourse, Habermas thinks that the problem of coercion has been 
resolved. He is, however, unable to realize that the coercion that power 
implies can be more direct, more physical, bearing more on material 
elements. The effects of power can take place not through a coercion of 
will or seizing of our consciousness, but rather through a coercion of our 
body. Foucault says: 
What I want to show is how power relations can 
materially penetrate the body in depth, without 
depending even on the mediation of the subject's own 
representations. If power takes hold on the body, this 
isn't through its having first to be interiorized 1n 
people's consciousness. (Foucault, 1980a:186) 
For Habermas, the possibility of coercion has to be excluded so that we 
may have a legitimate power which is productive as well as noncoercive. 
As pointed out before, Habermas has two categories of power: one is 
positive and noncoercive; the other is negative and coercive. Foucault's 
notion of disciplinary power causes difficulties for Habermas since the 
productive side of disciplinary power cannot be separated from its coercive 
side. Disciplinary power imposes a relation of docility-utility upon the 
forces of the body. This means that the body becomes a useful force only if 
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it is both a productive body and a subjected body. In other words, it 
becomes productive when it is subjected; it becomes subjected when it is 
useful. As discussed above, the subjection is obtained by subtle coercion. 
Hence we may say: the body becomes productive when it is coerced; the 
body becomes coerced when it is productive. The productive side and the 
coercive side of power are linked together. Their separation seems 
impossible as the coercive side is an indispensable condition for its 
productive character. 
Foucault (1979a:152) illustrates this form of power with an example of 
the training of handwriting. In the training of a pupil's handwriting, the 
productive side of power is linked to its coercive side. The coercion which 
power imposes upon the body involves a calculated manipulation of its 
elements and its gestures. There is an exact position for each part of the 
body: the back, the elbow, the chin, the right arm, the left arm, the right 
foot, the left foot. 10 The teacher will place the pupil in the posture that is 
required for good handwriting. If the pupil changes the position, the 
teacher will correct it. It is through such kind of coercion that utility is 
produced. But how does coercion guarantee a positive result; how does 
coercion maximise utility? 
Disciplinary power coerces our body not simply by imposing a series of 
gestures; it imposes the best relation between a gesture and the overall 
position of the body, which is the condition of good handwriting, of 
efficiency and speed, and even of health. For example, it requires a pupil to 
sit at a distance of two fingers from the table, so that s/he would not 
acquire the _habit of pressing the stomach against the table which is 
harmful to the health. In this sense, coercion maximises utility because 
IO "The pupils must always hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left 
side, slightly inclined, so that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested 
upon the hand, unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat 
more forward under the table than the right. A distance of two fingers must be left between 
the body and the table; for not only does one write with more alertness, but nothing is more 
harmful to the health than to acquire the habit of pressing one 's stomach against the 
table; the part of the left arm from the elbow to the hand must be placed on the table. The 
right arm must be at a distance from the body of about three fingers and be about five fingers 
from the table, on which it must rest lightly" (Foucault, 1979a:152). 
114 
knowledge is involved. It is a knowledge about the body, and its elements. 
Knowledge is at work in order for coercion to produce utility. In the next 
chapter, I shall discuss the relationship between knowledge and power in 
detail. 
Besides imposing the best relation between the gesture and the overall 
position of the body, disciplinary power may produce utility through 
imposing the best relation between the body and the object it manipulates. 
For instance, in the training of the use of the rifle, each part of the body is 
correlated with a certain part of the object according to a certain gesture.1 1 
It consists of a breakdown of the total gesture into two 
parallel series: that of the parts of the body to be used 
(right hand, left hand, different fingers of the hand, knee, 
eye, elbow, etc.) and that of the parts of the object 
manipulated (barrel, notch, hammer, screw, etc,); then 
the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a 
number of simple gestures (rest, bend) ... (Foucault, 
1979a:153) 
Again in contrast to what Habermas's theory presupposes, the coercive side 
of power cannot be separated from its productive side. It is through 
coercion that the effective use of the rifle is brought about. 
Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power cannot be denied its novelty. 
While it runs counter to Habermas's theory in a number of ways, 
nevertheless it may not be clear whether Foucault can successfully 
challenge Habermas's theory. Fraser, for instance, comments that "what 
11 "Bring the weapon forward . In three stages. Raise the rifle with the right hand, 
bringing it close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right knee, the end of 
the barrel at eye level, grasping it by striking it with the right hand, the arm held close to 
the body at waist height. At the second stage, bring the rifle in front of you with the left 
hand, the barrel in the middle between the two eyes, vertical, the right hand grasping it 
at the small of the butt, the arm outstretched, the trigger-guard resting on the first finger, 
the left hand at the height of the notch, the thumb lying along the barrel against the 
moulding. At the third stage, let go of the rifle with the left hand, which falls along the 
thigh, raising the rifle with the right hand, the lock outwards and opposite the chest, the 
right arm half flexed, the elbow close to the body, the thumb lying against the lock, resting 
against the screw, the hammer resting on the first finger, the barrel perpendicular" 
(Foucault, 1979a:153). 
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Foucault needs, and needs desperately, are normative criteria for 
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (Fraser, 
1989:33). In other words, Fraser judges that Foucault's analysis does not 
provide any normative criteria for us to distinguish whether disciplinary 
power is acceptable or unacceptable. Moreover, if it is unacceptable, Fraser 
asks, why is struggle preferable to submission? why ought domination to 
be resisted? She concludes that it is only with the introduction of 
normative notions of some kind that Foucault could begin to answer these 
questions (Fraser, 1989:29). Taylor thinks that the most important question 
is how to distinguish legitimate disciplinary power from illegitimate 
disciplinary power? He suggests that the coercion or constraints that 
disciplinary power implies can be justified in terms of its role in 
democratic politics (Taylor, 1986:81-2). Habermas could not agree more. For 
him, though there may be problems associated with power, such as its 
asymmetrical character, power can be justified as long as it is legitimized in 
terms of its bearing on collectively determined goals. Therefore, even if 
power involves coercion of the body, Habermas may see it as justified as 
long as power is legitimized in terms of its bearing on collectively 
determined goals. From the perspective of Habermas's theory, the coercion 
of the body can be "offset" or "compensated" when power is legitimized. 
Though his theory overlooks the coercion forced on the body, Habermas 
can still maintain that it is the coercion of the will that is determinant. 
There is no doubt that in terms of the problematic of legitimacy, it is 
the coercion of the will that is determinant. And it is quite true that 
Foucault's analysis cannot answer the question "why fight?". Nor does it 
try to provide any justification for submission or resistance. Nevertheless, 
what should be noticed is that the problematic of legitimacy and the 
question of normative justification both belong to the juridico-discursive 
mode that Foucault's analysis seeks to eschew. Foucault's contribution or 
challenge, I suggest, should better be considered in terms of its presenting 
an alternative mode of analysis to the juridico-discursive mode. 
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A strategic model -- an alternative mode of analysis 
The significance of Foucault's work, I contend, lies in its providing not 
only a novel account of new forms of power, but an alternative mode of 
analysis of power. I shall call this mode of analysis "a strategic model". The 
term "a strategic model" has been applied to different meanings in 
' (, 
Foucault's work. 12 Here I shall use only one of the meanings in my 
discussion. The word "strategy", as Foucault explains, can be used to 
designate the means employed to attain a certain end. When power is 
analyzed from the perspective of strategy, it means that one is concerned 
with "the totality of the means put into operation to implement power 
effectively or to maintain it" (Foucault, 1982:225). In other words, the 
strategic model concerns the means that bring about the effects of power. 
In contrast to the juridico-discursive mode which focuses on the question 
"how power is legitimized", this mode of analysis is preoccupied with the 
question "how power is exercised". Foucault claims that it is a question of 
"how". "How", not in the sense of "how does it manifest itself?" but "by 
what means is it exercised?" By asking the question how, one is interested 
in the power effects, in "what happens when individuals exert power over 
others?" (Foucault, 1982:217). Unlike a normative model, which pursues 
normative justifications for submission or resistance of power, a strategic 
model seeks to understand the means by which the effects of power are 
produced and maintained. 
In this section, I shall elaborate on how to read Foucault's analysis of 
disciplinary · power from the perspective of a strategic model.13 I argue 
12In Foucault's work, the term "strategy" or "strategic model" can have different meanings. 
Here I only select a version of them and explain Foucault's analyses on the basis of my 
understanding of the strategic model. For his discussions of "strategic model" and 
"strategy", see Foucault, 1979b, p.102; 1982, pp.224-5. Also see his analysis of the strategies 
of sexuality in 1979b, pp.103-14. For a fruitful discussion of the notion of strategy, see 
Gordon, 1979., pp. 246-58. 
13 Here I mainly suggest disciplinary power be seen in terms of the perspective of a 
strategic model to discover what kinds of challenge it poses for Habermas's theory. On the 
other hand, one may see disciplinary power in terms of Foucault's notion of governmentality 
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that, from this perspective, not only some of Habermas's conclusions of 
power and modern pathologies are questioned, but so too is his juridico-
discursive mode of analysis questioned. 
A strategic model is concerned with how the effects of power are 
produced. According to Foucault, the existence of power is not ensured by 
rights, but rather by techniques. The meaning of this assertion is that the 
effects of power are not produced or maintained by rights, but by 
techniques. The notion of right cannot explain the capacity to produce 
power effects, or how power is implemented effectively. One has to look 
into the concrete mechanisms, the techniques and the instruments 
through which power effects are produced. Therefore, in outlining a new 
form of power in modern societies, Foucault focuses on the techniques 
that are used. His detailed description of the techniques of partition of 
time, space and movement allows us to understand how power is 
implemented effectively; his analysis of the coercion of the body allows us 
to see the processes by which power penetrates the body and is inscribed 
onto it. Hence his analysis of the disciplinary coercion is not to be 
seen as evidence for the legitimacy or illegitimacy of disciplinary power, 
but rather as a demonstration of how power is exercised or implemented 
effectively. 
Likewise, Foucault's discussion of the utility produced by disciplinary 
power should be read from the perspective of a strategic model. In 
Foucault's view, power, in order to be implemented effectively, cannot 
merely negate.14 If power merely negates, it is doubtful if it can secure its 
footing and _ maintain its effects. The exercise of power usually possesses 
certain political usefulness or economic utility so that it can be accepted; 
the coercive mechanisms usually produce utility in order to be widely 
and draw implications for Habermas 's critical theory. Hindess (1996) has provided an 
interesting elaboration of discipline as a form of governmentality, and examined the 
implications these other forms of govern.mentality have for the liberal rationality of 
government that Habermas 's critical theory relies upon. See Hindess, 1996, Chapters 5 and 
6. 
14 See Foucault's discussion of the productive aspect of power and his criticism of the notion 
of repression in 1980b, pp. 118-21. 
118 
-.... 
I' 
I 
f I 
II 
ri ,I 
,,. 1 n 
1 
I• 
1·, 
I' 
]1 
II 
I 
I i 
I 
11 
II 
I' 
!11 
I' 
'I: 
I• 
• 
used. In order to produce utility, as discussed before, the coercive process 
involves the use of knowledge. It is a much more sophisticated 
mechanism than a simple application of coercion. It involves impositions 
of the best relation between the gesture and the body, of the best relation 
between the gesture and the object. It is through the employment of 
knowledge that coercion maximizes utility. The connection of the coercive 
side and the productive side of power is again not to be seen in terms of 
the problematic of legitimacy. Foucault has no intention of saying: because 
the coercion is productive, power is still considered as legitimate. Nor does 
he intend to say: because power is coercive, power is not to be recognized 
as illegitimate. What Foucault demonstrates is an interplay between the 
techniques of power, the coercion they accomplish, and the utility the 
coercion produced. It is a demonstration of the means by which power is 
implemented effectively. 
According to this strategic model, in order to understand how power is 
exercised, one has to focus on techniques rather than rights. The other 
related characteristic is that one has to focus on the diverse local 
institutions rather than the central political institutions. Instead of 
focusing on the state, it focuses on the diverse local institutions in which 
power mechanisms are at work. The shift of focus does not imply a denial 
of the importance of the state, but rather a focus on the micro-mechanisms 
according to which different forms of power, including state power, 
operate. Foucault asserts that it does not mean that the state is not 
important. Nevertheless, firstly, the state cannot occupy the whole field of 
power relations. There are relations of power which cannot be captured by 
the notion of state. Secondly, the state can only operate on the basis of 
other, already existing power relations. State power can only secure its 
footing where it is rooted in a whole series of indefinite minute power 
networks that supply it with the necessary basis (Foucault, 1980b:122). 
Therefore, even if we want to look at the state power, one has to start from 
the lowest level, and investigate how mechanisms of power are able to 
function. In this sense, Foucault's mode of analysis does not suggest a 
straightforward refutation of the theory of-t~tate or the theory of the 
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dominant class. Instead it replaces the descending analysis with an 
ascending analysis of power. 
In advocating an ascending analysis, Foucault argues that while the 
confinement of the insane or the repression of sexuality may have 
something to do with the domination of the bourgeois class, we need to 
identify the real agents (the family, parents, doctors etc.) who are 
responsible for the phenomena of exclusion and repression, and not just 
lump them under the formula of a generalized bourgeoisie. Moreover, 
what serves the interest of the bourgeoisie is not so much the exclusion or 
the repression but the techniques and mechanisms of that exclusion and 
repression. For the bourgeoisie could not care less about the insane or 
infantile sexuality, and the capitalist system is quite able to tolerate the 
opposite practice. It is the mechanisms of exclusion and repression that are 
necessary for the bourgeoisie to maintain their interest (Foucault, 
1980c:100-1). Therefore, what one needs is an ascending analysis. One 
should start by looking into the micro-mechanisms, studying how they 
emerged historically in diverse local institutions, revealing their political 
usefulness and lending themselves to economic profit, and finally being 
colonized and maintained by global forms of domination and the state. "It 
is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the 
economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given 
context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these 
mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole" 
(Foucault, 1980c:101). 
Foucault summarizes the difference between his mode of analysis and 
the juridico-discursive mode in the following way: 
In the very first place, it seemed important to accept that 
the analysis in question should not concern itself with 
the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their 
central locations, with the general mechanisms through 
which they operate, and the continual effects of these. On 
the contrary, it should be concerned with power at 
extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those 
points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more 
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regional and local forms and institutions. Its paramount 
concern, in fact, should be with the point where power 
surmounts the rules of right which organize and delimit 
it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in 
institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and 
equips itself with instruments and eventually even 
violent means of material intervention. (Foucault, 
1980c:96) 
Instead of seeing how power is organized by the rules of right, 
Foucault's analysis looks into how power becomes embodied in 
techniques. In addition, far from concerning itself with power in the 
central political institutions, his analysis is concerned with power "at the 
points where it becomes capillary, that is, power in its more regional and 
local forms and institutions". These two interrelated features, the concern 
with techniques and the focus on diverse local institutions, differentiate 
Foucault's mode of analysis from Habermas's juridico-discursive mode. I 
suggest that the insights of Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power 
cannot be fully examined from the perspective of the juridico-discursive 
mode of analysis. Rather one should appreciate its insights from the 
perspective of a strategic model. 
First of all, it is on a strategic model that Foucault's discovery of a new 
form of power, discipline, is based. Instead of focusing on the legitimate 
forms of power in the central political institutions, Foucault's analysis is 
concerned with "power in its more regional and local forms and 
institutions". Therefore Foucault's analysis starts by looking into diverse, 
local institutions like the prison, the school, the army, the hospital and the 
workshop. He discovers that a new form of power emerged in these 
institutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which he 
calls discipline. This disciplinary power, though it can be taken over by the 
state institutions, is basically a local form of power and is linked to diverse, 
local institutions. Secondly, as the strategic model focuses on techniques, 
Foucault approaches disciplinary power as a technology. The local 
character as well as the technological character of disciplinary power imply 
certain kinds of challenge to Habermas's theory. 
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According to Foucault, discipline "is a type of power, a modality for its 
exercise ... an 'anatomy' of power, a technology". It comprises a whole set 
of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets 
(Foucault, 1979a:215). The term "technology" implies that discipline 
possesses an intrinsic rationality of its own, and that it represents a specific 
level of intelligence and progressivity.1 5 Foucault characterizes its 
intelligence, progressivity and rationality in terms of a relation of docility-
utility that it imposes on the body. While some of the instruments and 
procedures were used in the past, like time-tables, enclosure, and spatial 
distribution, they are now modified, refined and combined in a different 
way to produce a new modality of power. This modality "implies an 
uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity 
rather than its result, and it is exercised according to a codification that 
partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement" (Foucault, 
1979a:137). As the term technology signifies, this form of power implies a 
certain sense of progress. It minimizes the cost and maximizes the utility 
in its exercise. 
The appearance of discipline, or maybe technology in general, does not 
come as a sudden invention. It is rather "a multiplicity of often minor 
processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, 
or imitate one another, support one another" (Foucault, 1979a:138). It goes 
through processes of development, then gets into circulation, and finally 
becomes widely used in society. According to Foucault, discipline was at 
work in secondary schools at a very early date, later in primary schools. It 
slowly spread to hospitals, and a few decades later to the military 
organization. Then it spread to workshops, as manifested by the 
militarization of the large workshops (Foucault, 1979a:138). 
Throughout the eighteenth century, Foucault writes, there was an 
increase in the number of institutions that employed disciplinary 
methods. While discipline was first adopted in enclosed institutions for 
15 See Gordon's (1979) discussion of the concept of "technologies", as well as the relation 
between programmes, technologies, and strategies. 
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negative reasons such as to neutralize dangers, to fix disturbed populations 
and to avoid idleness, it is increasingly used for its positive function of 
producing useful individuals. It becomes attached to the essential 
functions of a society: material production, the transmission of 
knowledge, the diffusion of aptitudes and skills (Foucault, 1979a:210-11). 
Therefore discipline is no longer confined to enclosed institutions. It has 
spread to different sectors of society, with diverse domains of its 
application. 
With the spread of discipline, Foucault says, one can speak of the 
formation of a disciplinary society. 
Not because the disciplinary modality of power has 
replaced all the others, but because it has infiltrated the 
others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an 
intermediary between them, linking them together, 
extending them and above all making it possible to bring 
the effects of power to the most minute and distant 
elements. (Foucault, 1979a:216) 
Discipline has spread to different domains of a society, and interwoven 
with other social relations, like the parent-child relation, the teacher-pupil 
relation, the doctor-patient relation, the supervisor-worker relation and so 
on. What does this spread of disciplinary power tell us? What kinds of 
implication does it have for Habermas's theory? 
The fact that power permeates society and is spread over all its domain 
does not itself constitute any challenge to Habermas's theory. For 
Habermas thinks that this is exactly the phenomenon that we face and the 
problem that we need to tackle. The major difference between Foucault's 
and Habermas's theories should rather be seen in terms of the way they 
conceive of the spread of power. I shall raise two points in relation to this. 
Firstly, Habermas talks about the spread of power as a colonization of 
lifeworld. According to the thesis "colonization of lifeworld", there is a 
vector of motion from the system to the lifeworld. The spread of power is 
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conceived as an intrusion of the system mechanisms into the lifeworld. 
Foucault's analysis, in contrast, speaks against this conception.16 
Discipline, as discussed above, is developed in a multiplicity of minor 
processes, of different origins and diverse locations. These processes repeat 
one another, imitate one another, modify one another, and support one 
another. Discipline does not spread from the system to the lifeworld, or 
from the political system to the family. The family is one of those locations 
in which discipline emerged, and was developed and perfected. As power 
gradually emerged and developed in diverse, local institutions, the 
institutions of lifeworld are no less likely to be inhabited by power. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, feminist studies show that the family is permeated 
with its own problems of power, and the system of domination is spread 
from the family to the economic and political systems. Fraser says that 
instead of drawing the battle line between the system and the lifeworld, 
from a feminist perspective, there is a more basic battle line between the 
forms of male dominance linking system to lifeworld and us. From the 
perspective of Foucault, perhaps we may say that the battle line should be 
drawn between power, which penetrates all these spheres, and us . 
Secondly, Habermas's analysis of modern pathologies conceives the 
spread of power in terms of a transgression of the limit and boundary. This 
analysis can be regarded as a juridico-discursive model which assumes that 
power is organized according to the rules of right and that its right can be 
delimited to a certain domain. Foucault's strategic model, in contrast, 
focuses on techniques rather than on rights. It approaches disciplinary 
power as a technology. Being a technology, discipline has nothing like a 
proper domain of its own. Instead of a transgression of limits and 
boundary, the spread of discipline should be conceived as a spread of the 
technology. 
Discipline, being a technology which comprises a set of techniques and 
procedures, is characterized by flexibility and adaptability. Its techniques 
16 For the study of state power, there may be a vector of motion, but it is the other way 
round. Foucault suggests an ascending analysis to replace the descending analysis. 
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and procedures can be broken down, modified and adapted according to 
the domain of application. Its flexibility and adaptability can perhaps be 
compared to the technology of the computer. While the technology of 
computer is developed and used as information system by economic or 
administrative institutions, it can be adapted to the needs of other 
domains of application, for example, to provide distance learning 
programs for educational purposes, to provide games for entertainment, 
or to provide a means for design and artistic expression. Discipline, which 
is characterized by such a flexibility and adaptability, can be adopted and 
used by different kinds of institutions and for different purposes. 
For instance, Foucault writes, discipline was employed by 'specialized' 
institutions like the penitentiaries of the nineteenth century for correction 
purposes. It can also be taken over by institutions that use it as an essential 
instrument for a particular end, like schools and hospitals. Moreover, 
discipline can be taken up by different forms of power, like the state power. 
Police, as a state apparatus, can use discipline to ensure the surveillance of 
society by the state power. According to Foucault, the eighteenth-century 
police added a disciplinary function to its role as the auxiliary of justice in 
the pursuit of criminal and as an instrument for the political supervision 
of plots, opposition movements or revolt. They adopted a panopticon 
method of surveillance, employing observers, secret agents, and informers 
to carry out an unceasing observation of the population (Foucault, 
1979a:213-6). While discipline can be easily taken over by state apparatuses, 
nevertheless, Foucault says, "it may be identified neither with an 
institution nor with an apparatus" (Foucault, 1979a:215). Perhaps one 
should imagine discipline in terms of the fact that a technology cannot be 
reduced to its institutional user. 
In contrast to Habermas's attempt to delimit the right of power to a 
certain domain, Foucault's analysis shows that there is no such a domain 
for the technology of disciplinary power. Because of its technological 
character, discipline is able to circulate widely in the society and penetrate 
every sphere of our life. 
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Conclusion 
From the perspective of a juridico-discursive model of power, one is 
concerned with how to submit power to the rules of right; one is 
preoccupied with the construction of normative principles for the 
differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power. Habermas comments 
that Foucault fails to provide any normative principles in his critique of 
disciplinary power. Foucault's suspension of the normative question, I 
argue, introduces us to an alternative approach to power, which is, in 
many ways, both stimulating and fruitful. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, Foucault is concerned with 
the means by which power is implemented effectively. In order to 
investigate this, he focuses on techniques rather than rights; he examines 
diverse local institutions rather than central political institutions. In this 
way, his analysis brings to light many things which the juridico-discursive 
model of power fails to capture. For example, in terms of right, it is 
claimed that prison aims at restoring individuals as juridical subjects. 
Nevertheless, focusing on the techniques and instruments used in prison, 
one sees that there are time-tables, exercises, compulsory movements and 
regular activities which function not so much to restore juridical subjects 
as to produce docile bodies. Hence, side by side with right, Foucault shows 
that there is a disciplinary form of power which coerces the body and puts 
into surveillance its elements, its behaviour, its gestures. Habermas's 
preoccupation with right leads to his failure to see the techniques of 
discipline, as well as the element of domination and coercion inherent in 
the techniques. 
In order to examine how power effects are produced, Foucault does not 
focus on the central political institutions, but rather looks into the diverse 
local institutions where power mechanisms are at work. He sees that there 
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is a technology of discipline which is developed from a multiplicity of 
minor processes, of different origins and diverse locations. Its 
technological character enables it to be used by different institutions and 
for different purposes. The institutional orders of lifeworld, that is, the 
family institution and the public sphere, are as likely to use it as the central 
state institutions. Habermas's theory, which locates power at the central 
state institutions, fails to recognize the local as well as technological 
character of power. His preoccupation with a juridico-discursive model of 
power leads to his failure both to recognize the pervasiveness of power 
and to understand the way in which power is spread to different spheres of 
our life. 
Foucault's insights are not exhausted by the discussion in this chapter. 
He shows that discipline is a form of power which combines with 
knowledge in its operation. As mentioned before, in the training of 
handwriting and the use of rifles, discipline does not simply coerce, it 
imposes the best relation between the gesture and the overall position of 
the body; it imposes the best relation between each part of the body and the 
object it manipulates. All these require knowledge to play a part. From the 
perspective of a strategic model, one is concerned with the totality of 
means by which power effects are produced. In other words, one is 
concerned with the involvement of knowledge in the operation of power. 
In the next chapter, I shall discuss Foucault's analysis of power and 
knowledge and show the kinds of challenge it has for Habermas's theory. 
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Chapter 4 
POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
Both Habermas and Foucault are concerned about the domination of 
scientific knowledges in modern western societies. They conduct a critique 
of science so as to open up space for other knowledges. Despite these 
similarities, the kind of critique they carry out differs from each other in a 
fundamental way. Habermas's critique of science, I suggest, can be 
considered in terms of a juridico-discursive mode which is guided by the 
question of how to submit science to the rules of right. For him, when 
science operates within the limits of its own domain, it is seen as lawful, as 
legitimate; when science transgresses the boundary and invades the 
domains of others, it is seen as unlawful, as illegitimate. In other words, 
science is unproblematic when it operates according to the rules of right. 
Habermas's discourse model further represents science in itself as 
unproblematic. He portrays an internal relation between reason and 
science. Hence while science may lend itself to the formation of ideologies 
and fall a prey to power, it is not regarded as internally linked to power, 
but rather to truth and reason. 
Foucault's analysis, I contend, can be considered in terms of a strategic 
model which focuses not so much on the question of right, but rather on 
the mechanisms through which power effects are produced. Instead of 
fixing the legitimacy of science or asking what is the proper domain of a 
certain knowledge, Foucault examines the role of certain knowledges in 
the production of effects of power. From this perspective, he sees that on 
the one hand, power produces knowledges and on the other hand, these 
knowledges produce power effects. That is, there is a mutual production 
between knowledge and power. Nevertheless, one may ask: what is the 
novelty of Foucault's analysis, for Habermas could not have overlooked 
this mutual production of knowledge and power? He is certainly aware of 
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the fact that in late capitalist societies, science lends support to state 
domination and thus produces power effects. On the other hand, he would 
not deny that the state might encourage the development of science to 
serve its own domination, and hence there is a power's production of 
knowledge. If Habermas could not be blind to the mutual production of 
knowledge and power, what challenges does Foucault's analysis pose to 
Habermas? 
In this chapter, I argue that Foucault and Habermas have very 
different views about the ways in which knowledge relates to power. 
When Foucault says "power produces knowledge", his point is not simply 
that power, as an external force , encourages knowledge by applying and 
using it for its own purpose. Instead Foucault shows that power constitutes 
the internal condition of the possibility of certain knowledges. Similarly, 
when Foucault sees knowledge from a strategic model as part of the 
totality of means by which power is exercised, he does not treat those 
knowledges as external to the power effects produced. Instead they form 
the internal condition of power, without which the production of power 
effects would not be possible. In contrast to Habermas, Foucault 
demonstrates that there is an internal rather than external relation 
between knowledge and power. 
If knowledge is internally linked to power, it is knowledge rather than 
false ideologies that produces power effects. It is true knowledge, or truth, 
that implies power. The problem is no longer falsehood or ideology, but 
truth. Foucault's work, therefore, not only problematizes knowledge, but 
also truth. If truth is problematized, on what basis can Foucault's critique 
stand? If truth is part of the means by which power is exercised, we can no 
longer assume that "truth will make you free". If truth is internally linked 
to power, what are we going to do with truth? 
This chapter first discusses Habermas's critique of science. Then it 
examines the challenges that Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge 
poses to Habermas's critique. The last section elaborates the implications of 
Foucault's analysis for those who believe that "truth will make you free". 
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4.1 Habermas: on Knowledge and Power 
Habermas has always been critical about the spread of scientific knowledge 
and the role it plays in late-capitalist societies. He sees that the major 
problem of science lies in the overexpansion of its role into the spheres 
that require communicative action as mechanism for action coordination. 
Science, allied with state bureaucratization, disempowers the public's 
opinion formation and uncouples political decision from the public 
sphere of the lifeworld. Democratic decision-making loses its function, and 
state technocrats take over the role in the decision-making of social and 
political issues. Habermas asserts that the role of science must be 
circumscribed to a certain domain. His work Knowledge and Human 
Interests can be read as an early attempt to define the domain of science. 
Habermas's critique of science is an approach which seeks to draw 
limits and boundaries. I regard his approach as "juridico-discursive" since 
it is preoccupied with how to submit science to the rules of right.1 From 
the perspective of a juridico-discursive modet science is regarded as 
unproblematic as long as it is confined to its own domain. Habermas's 
discourse theory further represents science or true knowledge as pure, 
innocent, unproblematic, and outside power. I shall first discuss 
Habermas's critique of science in Knowledge and Human Interests and 
then examine his representation of knowledge in the discourse theory. 
In Knowledge and Human Interests,, Habermas differentiates three 
distinctive forms of knowledge, each guided by a cognitive interest and 
grounded in a fundamental condition of human life. The first form of 
1 See my discussion of a juridico-discursive mode of analysis in Chapter 3. Specifically, one 
of the major characteristics of the juridico-discursive model is its representation of power as 
organized by the rules of right. When power is submitted to the rules of right, it is regarded 
as lawful, as legitimate. Illegitimate power is one which transgresses the boundaries and 
invades others ' right. 
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knowledge is empirical-analytic sciences. They are what we normally 
understand as science, which is guided by a technical interest in 
dominating the natural and social environment. This technical interest in 
control is linked to a fundamental condition of human existence: labor. It 
becomes a cognitive interest which constitutes the domain of empirical-
analytical sciences, their objects of study and their procedures of analysis. 
Habermas holds that this cognitive interest in technical control cannot 
replace other cognitive interests, which guide the second and third forms 
of knowledge. 
According to Habermas, the second form of knowledge is historical-
hermeneutic sciences, which provide us with knowledge of 
intersubjectively established meanings. They are guided by a practical 
interest of mutual understanding, an interest grounded in a fundamental 
condition of human life -- linguistic communication. Critical theory, the 
third form of knowledge, is linked to another fundamental condition of 
human life -- power. It is guided by an emancipatory interest which seeks 
to free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers. For 
Habermas, since each of these forms of knowledge is guided by an interest 
which is grounded in a fundamental condition of human existence, one 
should be as important as the other; one should have the same right to 
exist as the other. The problem of science, he contends, lies in its 
monopolization of the field of knowledge. 
Habermas argues that guided by a false self-understanding and 
supported by a false philosophy, science seeks to monopolize the whole 
field of kno_wledge and in effect suppresses the right of other forms of 
knowledge. Scientism, the false self-understanding of science, and 
positivism, the philosophy developed by Comte, are the two major targets 
of Habermas's critique. According to Habermas, "scientism" and 
"positivism" identify knowledge with science. They assume that what 
science does defines the meaning of knowledge. In his words, 
"scientism" means science's belief in itself: that is, the 
conviction that we can no longer understand science as 
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one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify 
knowledge with science. The positivism that enters on 
the with Comte makes use of elements of both 
the empiricist and rationalist traditions in order to 
strengthen science's belief in its exclusive validity after 
the fact, instead of to reflect (reflektieren) on it, and to 
account for the structure of sciences on the basis of this 
belief. (Habermas, 1978:4-5) 
In Habermas's view, the problem of scientism and positivism is that they 
fail to recognize that there are forms of knowledge other than science, each 
of them has its own right to exist. 
Habermas's critique of science, I suggest, can be considered in terms of 
a juridico-discursive model which seeks to submit science to the rules of 
right. What preoccupies Habermas is a demarcation of domains, a drawing 
of limits and boundaries. When science functions within its own domain, 
it is considered as lawful, as legitimate. The problem of science lies in its 
attempt to monopolize the whole field of knowledge. In subjecting other 
forms of knowledge to the demand of technical interest, science invades 
others' domains and deprivet~ their own right to exist. For Habermas, 
science is condemned when it transgresses its own boundary and 
suppresses the rights of other forms of knowledge. 
Habermas's critique of science in a more recent article "Technology 
and Science as 'Ideology"' can be considered in the same terms; 
nevertheless, this time, science is condemned for its invasion of the 
domain of communicative action. Habermas analyzes how the expansion 
of the role of science and technology leads to a replacement of that of 
communicative action. In late capitalist societies, he writes, the ideology of 
free exchange is replaced by a substitute program, that is, a program of 
government action designed to compensate for the dysfunctions of free 
exchange. Policies are oriented to the provision of a minimum of welfare 
and to the guarantee of secure employment and stable income. The 
substitute program thus obliges the political system to maintain stabilizing 
conditions for the growth of the economy and to guard against risks that 
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may threaten the economic growth. As politics is oriented toward the 
elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks, the state 
administration is no longer concerned with realization of practical goals. 
The solution of technical problems becomes the only concern and 
technical issues dominate the agenda. Science and technology are then 
looked upon as the only source for the solution of these issues (Habermas, 
1989:251-2). 
In Habermas's view, science lends itself to the formation of ideologies 
and achieves a replacement of the role of communicative action. In 
particular, Habermas points out that there is a technocracy thesis which 
becomes a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of 
the depoliticized mass of the population. This technocracy thesis sees the 
development of the social system as determined by the logic of scientific-
technical progress. When this belief has taken root, 
then propaganda can refer to the role of science and 
technology in order to explain and legitimate why in 
modern societies the process of democratic decision-
making about practical problems loses its function and 
"must" be replaced by plebiscitary decisions about 
alternative sets of leaders of administrative personnel. 
(Habermas, 1989:253) 
Habermas argues that this ideology justifies the elimination of practical 
questions and the suppression of the role of communicative action. It 
enables society's self-understanding to be detached from the frame of 
reference of communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic 
interaction and replaces them with a scientific model. 
Science here is condemned for its replacing the role of communicative 
action. For Habermas, while science does have a role in solving technical 
problems, it cannot take over the role of communicative action in the 
opinion formation of practical issues; while the development of the social 
system does depend upon the logic of scientific-technical progress, it also 
relies upon the development of the practical/moral dimension which 
should be under the coordination of communicative action. He sees that 
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now science, allied with ideologies and the state domination, exercises an 
illegitimate power in its invasion of the domain of communicative action. 
A juridico-discursive mode of analysis condemns power when it 
transgresses boundaries and invades others' domains. On the other hand, 
the right of power is affirmed when it is exercised within limits. 
Habermas's analysis of science can be considered as juridico-discursive. 
That is, his critique of science at the same time functions as a legitimation 
of science. While science is criticized in termsof its invading the domain of 
communicative action, its right is affirmed in the critique. For example, 
Habermas would be happy to see that science is employed by enlightened 
citizens, who participate in public discussion of social issues, for solving a 
technical problem. In other words, the right of science, in relation to its 
role in solving technical issues, is affirmed. As long as science works in its 
proper domain, it is considered as legitimate, as unproblematic. 
What should be noticed is that Habermas tends to see science in itself 
as unproblematic. Science is problematic only when it is guided by a false 
self-understanding or linked to a false ideology and results in a 
suppression of the right of other forms of knowledge or the right of 
communicative action. For Habermas, science is innocent and 
unproblematic, as it is internally connected with reason. 
In a critique of the work of Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas argues 
that science is linked to reason. Habermas writes, there are achievements 
of the Enlightenment which show that reason is still at work. They are 
elements of cultural modernity which demonstrate an increase in freedom 
and autonomy. One of these elements, Habermas believes, is the self-
reflection of science that allows it to have the status of theoretical 
knowledge. He comments: 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment does not do justice to the 
rational content of cultural modernity that was captured 
in bourgeois ideals (and also instrumentalized along 
with them). I am thinking here of the specific theoretical 
dynamic that continually pushes the sciences, and even 
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the self-reflection of the science, beyond merely 
engendering technically useful knowledge. (Habermas, 
1982b:113) 
For Habermas, the self-reflective dimension of science reveals that 
science is inherently linked to reason. His discourse theory serves to 
demonstrate more carefully the internal relation between science, or true 
knowledge in general, and reason. 
According to Habermas, science, or theoretical knowledge in general, 
contains truth claims, that is, statements which are asserted to be true. 
While knowledge contains truth claims, it does not follow that the 
statements asserted to be true are really true statements. For Habermas, to 
make a distinction between true knowledge and false knowledge is an 
important task, and his discourse theory provides the criteria for the 
distinction. According to his discourse theory, true knowledge is one 
whose truth claims can be made good, whereas false knowledge is one 
whose truth claims cannot be made good. Truth claims, Habermas 
maintains, can only be made good through discussion and argumentation 
in discourse. Participants in discourse have no other purposes except a 
cooperative search for truth. With a suspension of the pressure of 
experience and decision, they are to produce cogent arguments that are 
convincing in virtue of their intrinsic properties. Participants are to 
evaluate these arguments solely on the basis of the force of the better 
argument. The consensus they arrive at is seen as backed by the force of 
reason. 
In this way, Habermas aims to portray an internal relation between 
knowledge and truth, between knowledge and reason. True knowledge is 
knowledge which can be grounded in a notion of truth. Habermas here 
provides a notion of truth which emphasizes good arguments, 
intersubjective justification and rational consensus. True knowledge is 
one whose claim is supported by good arguments; true knowledge is one 
whose claim can be intersubjectively justified; true knowledge is one 
whose claim can command rational consensus. In brief, true knowledge is 
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one whose claim is backed by the mere force of reason. In this sense, the 
notion of truth is inseparable from the notion of reason. Knowledge, 
which is internally linked to truth, is also internally linked to reason. In 
portraying an internal relation between knowledge and truth, between 
knowledge and reason, Habermas's discourse theory represents science as 
internally linked to truth and reason. 
Habermas's discourse theory not only portrays an internal relation 
between knowledge on the one hand, and truth and reason on the other, 
but also represents knowledge as outside power. According to his discourse 
theory, truth claims have to be put to test in argumentation. The claims 
are to be backed up by rationally motivated consensus rather than 
empirically motivated consensus. "Empirically motivated consensus", 
according to Habermas, is based on the consideration of empirical interests. 
The parties involved put forth claims which are backed up by the 
possession of means of reward and punishment. "Rationally motivated 
consensus", in contrast, is solely based on the force of the better argument. 
But what guarantees the consensus achieved in discourse is rationally 
motivated? 
In order to guarantee that argumentation would lead to rationally 
motivated consensus, Habermas specifies the rules and conditions of 
discourse in the notion of an ideal speech situation. One of the rules 
specifies that no speaker ought to be hindered by external or internal 
constraints from making use of their rights in the participation of 
discourse. "External constraints" are referred to the influence of power or 
the threat of force; "internal constraints" are referred to ideological 
distortions and self-deception.2 With an exclusion of external and internal 
constraints, the argumentation process is safeguarded.from any kind .. of 
distorting influence and hence is subject merely to the force of reason. 
According to the notion of an ideal speech situation, the discursive test 
must exclude power relations or any influence of power. The presence of 
2 See Chapter 1, p.53, the rules of an ideal speech situation. Also see McCarthy, 1978, 
p .306-7. 
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power relations runs counter to the symmetrical conditions of discourse; 
the influence of power forms an external constraint for participants. It is 
only with an absence of power relations that rationally motivated 
consensus is possible; it is only when the discursive test is insulated from 
the influence of power that true knowledge is possible. In this way, the 
production of knowledge is represented as outside power. Power is 
represented as external to truth, as lacking in truth. 
On the one hand, Habermas's discourse theory portrays an internal 
relation between science and reason; on the other hand, it portrays an 
external relation between science and power. This, of course, does not 
mean that science is always opposed to power. Indeed Habermas's analysis 
of late-capitalist societies is concerned with the way in which science lends 
itself to ideological formations and serves as an instrument of state 
domination. Yet when science joins hands with power, science is seen as a 
victim which falls a prey to power. In addition, for Habermas, it is 
ideologies like the technocracy thesis and the scientific model rather than 
science itself that are to be blamed. Science is seen as outside power, 
innocent and in itself unproblematic. 
In sum, Habermas's critique of science is guided by the juridico-
discursive mode of analysis which sees science as unproblematic when it 
operates within its own domain. With a discourse model, science is 
represented as internally linked to truth and reason. While science may 
lend itself to the formation of false ideologies and fall a prey to power, 
science in itself is regarded as pure, unproblematic, and outside power. 
Foucault's c\nalysis of power-knowledge, in contrast, portrays a much 
closer relation between knowledge and power. As I shall discuss in Part II, 
Foucault shows us that the ways in which knowledge relates to power are 
different from what Habermas's critique portrays. 
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4.2 Foucault's Analysis of Power and Knowledge and its Challenge to 
Habermas 
Unlike Habermas, Foucault does not start with a notion of knowledge 
which is linked to reason and stands outside power. Instead he starts with 
the perspective of a strategic model which examines the ways in which 
power effects are produced. In this way, he finds that there is a much closer 
relation between knowledge and power. Foucault sees that in order for 
power to be implemented effectively, power produces knowledge. On the 
other hand, knowledge provides the means by which power effects are 
produced. In other words, there is a mutual production between power 
and knowledge. They are linked together in a circular relation: power 
producing and sustaining knowledge, while knowledge inducing and 
extending effects of power. Foucault's analysis, I contend, allows us to see 
that the ways in which power relates to knowledge are different from 
Habermas assumes. Before elaborating Foucault's insights for Habermas, I 
need to clarify a confusion caused by Foucault's discussion of power and 
knowledge. 
Seeing that there is a close relation between power and knowledge, 
Foucault uses the term "power-knowledge", by which he intricates them 
as closely as a dash will allow. Foucault's use of the term "power-
knowledge", nevertheless, gives the impression that knowledge is always 
linked to power, that power and knowledge directly imply one another. 
Indeed he has made general statements like these: 
We should admit rather that power produces knowledge 
... that power and knowledge directly imply one another; 
that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations. (Foucault, 1979a:27) 
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Foucault seems to assert that whenever there is power, there is knowledge; 
whenever there is knowledge, there is power.3 It is however not difficult 
to recognize the problem of this assertion. For it is hard to see the power 
effects directly implied by knowledges like the age of the universe, or the 
feeding habits of dinosaurs. Foucault's observation of the close relation 
between power and knowledge, I contend, should not be generalized to all 
kinds of knowledges. Instead it describes the specific relations between 
certain knowledges and power relations.4 
For instance, with an analysis of the specific relations between the 
knowledge of sexuality and power relations in modern western societies, 
Foucault shows that the knowledge of sexuality is closely linked to power 
in a relation of constitutive interdependence. He says, 
if sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, 
this was only because relations of power had established 
it as a possible object; and conversely if power was able to 
take it as a target, this was because techniques of 
knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of 
investing it. (Foucault, 1979b:98). 
The knowledge of sexuality cannot be formed without power relations, and 
vice versa, power cannot be exercised without the knowledge. Foucault 
states that there are "local centres" of power-knowledge: the relations 
between the penitents and confessors, the relation between the children 
and an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses, educators, and doctors 
(Foucault, 1979b:98). In these local centres of power-knowledge, power and 
knowledge depend upon each other; they directly imply one another. 
3Keenan tends to read Foucault's notion of power-knowledge in this way. He says: "Power 
and knowledge are tangled up in the knot of a "not-without." Each presupposes the other: 
no knowledge without power, no power without knowledge. No outside, no priority" 
(Keenan, 1987:14). 
4 In opposition to an essentialist reading of Foucault, Wickham (1983) urges for a mode of 
analysis which treats its objects in terms of their specificity, their particular conditions of 
existence, without reference to an eternal, external essence. In a more recent article, 
Wickham (1990) argues that when the concepts of the postmodern are used to construct 
general frameworks, they block specific analyses, and become another source of 
totalization. Also see Hindess, 1977; Minson, 1980; for an elaboration of a non-essentialist 
analysis which emphasizes the specificity of objects. 
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While power and knowledge are shown to be linked together, one must, 
nevertheless, bear in mind the local and specific character of "power-
knowledge". 
After clarifying the local and specific character of Foucault's analysis of 
power-knowledge, we come back to its insights for Habermas. From the 
perspective of a strategic model, Foucault argues that in order for power to 
be implemented effectively, it must be productive: power produces utility; 
power produces knowledge. In contrast to Habermas's discourse theory 
which represents the production of knowledge outside power, Foucault 
argues that power produces knowledge. Foucault's first kind of challenge 
to Habermas's critique, I suggest, comes from his analysis of power's 
production of knowledge. 
Power produces knowledge 
When Foucault says "power produces knowledge', he does not simply 
mean that power, as an external force, encourages knowledge by applying 
it and using it for its domination. Habermas would have no difficulty of 
recognizing the fact that the state might encourage the development of 
science by using science to serve its domination. What Foucault means is 
rather that power constitutes the historical condition of possibility of 
knowledge. In contrast to Habermas's transcendental project which 
delineates the a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, Foucault 
engages in genealogies which examine the historical conditions of the 
possibility of some knowledges. The historical conditions of the modern 
human sciences are understood in relation to the elaboration of a whole 
range of techniques and practices for the discipline, surveillance, 
administration and government of human individuals. From this 
perspective, one sees that power, its demands, its techniques, and its 
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relations, constitute the historical condition for the development of these 
knowledges. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows that the demands of a 
new economy of power constitute the condition for the development of 
psychological knowledge. In the eighteenth century, he writes, humanist 
discourses brought about a series of penal reforms. Nevertheless, in 
contrast to the traditional understanding that these discourses brought 
about a more humane form of punishment and an advance of human 
rights, Foucault argues that they aimed at a new economy of powers which 
"allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, 
uninterrupted, adapted and 'individualised' throughout the entire social 
body" (Foucault, 1980b:119). The objective of the penal reform, Foucault 
says, was not so much to punish less, but to punish better, to punish more 
effectively (Foucault, 1979a:80-2). An effective punishment would include 
the prevention of a repetition of the offence. 
In order for the punishment to prevent a repetition of the offence, it 
took into the account "the profound nature of the criminal himself, the 
presumable of his wickedness, the intrinsic quality of his will". It asked: 
'Of the two men who committed the same theft, how much less guilty is 
he who scarcely had the necessities of life than he who overflowed with 
excess?" (Foucault, 1979a:98). It suggested the need for an individualization 
of sentences, in accordance with the particular characteristics of each 
criminal. This individualization, Foucault points out, was different from 
what was found in the old jurisprudence because it took into account of 
the intention of the defendant. "What was now beginning to emerge was a 
modulation that referred to the defendant himself, to his nature, to his 
way of life and his attitude of mind, to his past, to the 'quality' and not to 
5 By "a new economy of power", Foucault means that the "new techniques are both much 
more efficient and much less wasteful (less costly economically, less risky in their results, 
less open to loopholes and resistances) than the techniques previously employed which 
were based on a mixture of more or less forced tolerances (from recognized privileges to 
endemic criminality) and costly ostentation (spectacular and discontinuous interventions of 
power, the most violent form of which was the 'exemplary', because exceptional, 
punishment)" (Foucault, 1980b:119). 
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the intention of his will" (Foucault, 1979a:99). This constituted the 
condition for the development of psychological knowledge. "One 
perceives, but as a place as yet unfilled, the locus in which, in penal 
practice, psychological knowledge will take over the role of 
jurisprudence"(Foucault, 1979a:99). The new economy of power, which 
demands an effectiveness of punishment, constituted the condition for the 
development of a scientific knowledge that reveals the profound nature of 
individuals. 
In order to punish more effectively, the new economy of power also 
emphasized a rehabilitation and transformation of the individual. Power 
relations as well as the production of knowledge are required for achieving 
this aim. In prison, Foucault writes, the rehabilitation that it operates is a 
process that unfolds between prisoners and those who supervise them. 
When the prisoner first arrived, the inspectors already sought to 
demonstrate their power and transform the individual. 
On first entering the prison, the prisoner will be read the 
regulations; 'at the same time, the inspectors seek to 
strengthen in him the moral obligations that he now 
has; they represent to him the offence that he has 
committed with regard to them, the evil that has 
consequently resulted for the society that protected him 
and the need to make compensation for his example and 
his amendment. They then make him promise to do his 
duty gladly, to behave decently, promising him or 
allowing him to hope that, before the expiration of the 
term of the sentence, he will be able to obtain his 
discharge if he behaves well. (Foucault, 1979a:125) 
In achieving the aim of transformation, a whole corpus of 
individualizing knowledge was produced. In contrast to Habermas's view 
that knowledge is developed outside power, Foucault argues that power 
relations constitute the condition for the development of this 
individualizing knowledge. They included relations between 
administrators and the prisoner, between immediate supervisors and the 
prisoner, and between inspectors and the prisoner. The administrators did 
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not just keep records about the crime that the individual committed, but a 
whole series of information that revealed the nature of this individual. 
Foucault writes, 
when the new prisoner arrived, the Walnut Street 
administration received a report concerning his crime, 
the circumstances in which it was committed, a 
summary of the examinations of the defendant, notes on 
his behaviour before and after the sentences: 
indispensable elements if one wished to 'decide what 
steps will have to be taken to destroy his old habits'. 
(Foucault, 1979a:125-6) 
Throughout the detention prisoners would be observed, and comments 
would be made about them. Their conduct will be noted daily by their 
immediate supervisors. "The inspectors ... , visited the prison each week, 
would be kept informed of events, follow the conduct of each prisoner and 
decide which of them deserved a shortening of his term" (Foucault, 
1979a:126). All these power relations enabled the administration to build 
up a whole corpus of knowledge about each individual. 
Another example to show that knowledge is not developed outside 
power. In History of Sexuality, Foucault discusses the way in which 
knowledge of sexuality is produced through techniques of power and 
relations of power. Foucault writes, the production of truth, including the 
truth of sex, has always relied upon a technique of power -- confession. In 
the Christian penance, Foucault argues, confession was already a ritual 
which unfolds within a power relationship. For one does not confess 
without the _presence of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but 
the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, 
and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and reconcile 
(Foucault, 1979b:61-2). Gradually confession is no longer linked to the 
practice of penance. While it is spread to other sites, nevertheless, 
confession is still a practice imbued with power relations. The technique of 
confession involves a new series of power relations in the production of 
truths: children and parents, students and educators, patients and 
psychiatrists, delinquents and experts. 
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Power relations and the technique of confession are the conditions 
that constitute a scientific knowledge of sexuality. Foucault writes, 
beginning in the nineteenth century, sexuality, being a specific field of 
truth and knowledge, is situated at the point of intersection of the 
technique of confession and the scientific discursivity. The truths 
confessed are used to formulate a science of sex, which represents the 
uniform truth of sex, the truth of truths. Since the meaning of this truth is 
often blind to the individual who confesses, the extraction of meaning and 
its interpretation require the authority of professional and scientific 
knowledge. Medical and psychiatric professionals become not simply the 
forgiving master, the judge, but the master of truth (Foucault, 1979b:63-9). 
It is only through their power that the truth of truths is produced. The 
power relationship between the patient and the psychiatrist constitutes the 
condition for the production of the scientific knowledge of sexuality. 
Therefore, in opposition to the representation of power and 
knowledge in Habermas's discourse model, Foucault argues, 
we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to 
imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power 
relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop 
only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests 
... We should admit rather that power produces 
knowledge. (Foucault, 1979a:27) 
While Habermas's discourse model represents the production of 
knowledge as free from power, Foucault's analysis examines the ways in 
which power produces knowledge. In contrast to Habermas's view that it is 
only with an absence of the influence of power that knowledge is possible, 
Foucault's analysis shows that the demands of a new economy of power 
constitute the historical condition for the development of psychology; in 
contrast to Habermas's view that it is with a suspension of power relations 
that knowledge is possible, Foucault's analysis shows that it is based on 
power relations that a whole corpus of scientific knowledge of sexuality is 
constituted. 
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From the perspective of the strategic model, in order for power to be 
implemented effectively, power produces knowledges. On the other hand, 
when examining the totality of means through which power produces 
effects, one would see that knowledge forms part of the totality of means. 
In other words, there is a mutual production between power and 
knowledge: on the one hand, power produces knowledge, and on the 
other hand, knowledge produces power. The second kind of Foucault's 
insights that I shall consider is his analysis of the way in which knowledge 
produces power effects. 
Knowledge produces power effects 
The flaw of Habermas's discourse model lies in its overlooking power's 
production of knowledges. Nevertheless, Habermas certainly has not 
overlooked the power effects that knowledge produces. His critique of 
science and technology shows the way in which they lend themselves to 
ideological formation and hence serve as an instrument of state 
domination. What must be noticed however is that knowledge in this case 
is represented as something which originally stands outside power but at a 
certain point falls a prey to power. Power effects are produced in a way 
which follows the assumption that knowledge is outside power. 
Habermas's understanding of the power effects of knowledge is based on 
the assumption that science in itself is unproblematic. Foucault's work, in 
contrast, presents a different approach to conceive the power effects of 
knowledge. This constitutes what I consider the second kind of challenge 
that Foucault poses for Habermas's critique of knowledge. 
For Foucault, if certain knowledges produce power effects, firstly, they 
are not originally outside power and then fall a prey to power like a 
victim. Instead they form an internal condition for the implementation of 
power effects. Secondly, it is not so much that knowledge lends itself to 
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ideological formation that power effects are produced, but1 rathe; it is true 
knowledge itself that produces power effects. In other words, the problem 
is not ideology, but rather truth. I shall elaborate these two points in the 
fallowing discussion. 
When Foucault says "power produces knowledge", he does not mean 
that power, as an external force, encourages knowledge by applying it for 
its purpose, but rather power constitutes an internal condition for the 
possibility of knowledge. Similarly, when he says "knowledge produces 
power", he does not treat knowledge as external to the power effects 
produced. Instead knowledge forms the internal condition without which 
the production of power effects would not be possible. In his analysis, the 
power effects are inseparable from knowledges. The power effects that 
knowledges produce are more immediate, more direct. 
Foucault's analysis shows that knowledge can provide an internal 
condition for the implementation of power effects. The power effects that 
knowledge produces are immediate, for they reside in the categories and 
classification within a knowledge. For instance, the individualizing 
knowledge produced in prison contains a classification of prisoners. This 
classification constitutes an internal condition for the exercise of 
power, without which an hierarchical surveillance would not be able to 
implemented. From 1797, Foucault writes, the prisoners were divided into 
four groups in order to achieve hierarchical surveillance. The first group 
included those who were explicitly condemned to solitary confinement 
and those who had committed serious offences in the prison; the second 
group included those who were known as old offenders and whose 
depraved morality, dangerous character, irregular disposition, or 
disorderly conduct were apparent; the third group included those whose 
character and circumstance led one to believe that they were not habitual 
offenders; the fourth group included those whose character was still not 
known, or those who did not deserve to be put into the preceding 
categories (Foucault, 1979a:126). 
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This classification of prisoners is directly linked to hierarchical 
surveillance. It induces immediate effects of normalizing power. 
Normalizing power means that the effects of power works through the 
norm: "the Normal is established as a principle of coercion" (Foucault, 
1979a:184). The norm involves a normal-abnormal dichotomy, and in 
prison, this is a harmless-dangerous dichotomy. The norm provides the 
rule to compare, differentiate, hierarchize, and exclude. In the example of 
the division of the prisoners, prisoners were differentiated and 
hierarchized according to their potentiality of danger. The first group, 
those who had committed serious offences, is regarded as the most 
dangerous group; those who were believed to be non-habitual offenders 
are regarded as the harmles~~
0
With a division between dangerous and 
harmless, the norm not only hierarchizes, but also excludes and 
invalidates. For instance, the most dangerous individuals are condemned 
to solitary confinement; they are excluded from being considered for 
pardon or a reduced term. The effects of power were directly implied in the 
categories and classification. 
The scientific knowledge of sexuality, too, induces immediate 
effects of normalizing power. It provides an internal condition for the 
exercise of power. It defines sexuality as 'by nature' a domain "susceptible 
to pathological processes, and hence one calling for therapeutic or 
normalizing interventions" (Foucault, 1979b :68). In therapeutic 
interventions, medical and psychiatric professionals exercise their 
normalizing judgment. An individual 's sexual conduct is placed under 
the rule of the normal and the pathological. The result is not only a 
labelling of sexual conduct as normal or abnormal, but a labelling of the 
individual as normal or abnormal. The individual is pressured to 
conform to the standard of the normal. The effects of normalizing power 
are implied in the knowledge of sexuality. They circulate right at the point 
where scientific statements are formed. 
Foucault says, the examination of the power effects of knowledge is 
"not so much a matter of knowing what external power imposes itself on 
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science, as of what effects of power circulate among scientific statements" 
(Foucault, 1980b:112). Knowledge is not seized by external power so that 
power effects are produced. It is knowledge itself that induces power 
effects. Moreover, knowledge doesnot lend itself to ideologies in order to 
produce power effects. The effects of power circulate among scientific 
statements, among true knowledge. It is truth rather than ideology that 
induces effects of power; it is true knowledge rather than false knowledge 
that produces power effects. The problem is not ideology or falsehood, but 
truth. 
The development of psychology, for instance, provides us true 
knowledge about individuals. It is through this true knowledge that power 
effects are produced in prison. It reveals the true nature of the individuals 
and allows them to be judged 'in truth'. Foucault says, the disciplinary 
machinery in prison 
operates a differentiation that is not of acts, but of 
individuals themselves, of their nature, their 
potentialities, their level or their value. By assessing acts 
with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth'; 
the penalty that it implements is integrated into the cycle 
of knowledge of individuals. (Emphasis added. Foucault, 
1979a:181) 
Know ledge does not fall a prey to power. Nor does it lend itself to 
ideologies in order to produce power effects. The critique that we need is 
not exactly a critique of ideology. It is rather a critique which helps us focus 
on truth. Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge, as Gordon says, "is not a 
scalpel serving to extract from the body of good, true science those 
ideologies which act as a comprador allies of repressive power (Gordon, 
1979:29). Foucault maintains, the question for today is not so much error, 
illusion, false knowledge, or ideology; it is truth itself. He wants to shift 
our attention from ideology to truth. 
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In Foucault'csview, the notion of ideology is problematic, particularly 
when it is used to explain power effects.6 The notion of ideology assumes 
that power works through a negation of truth. It is associated with a 
negative concept of power, a power which negates and represses, a power 
which says 'no'. Foucault criticizes this negative concept of power from 
the perspective of a strategic model which focuses on the mechanisms 
through which power effects are implemented. In his view, the negative 
concept of power is wholly inadequate to the analysis of mechanisms and 
effects of power. If power never did anything but to say no, he argues, how 
would one be brought to obey to it? In order for power to be implemented 
effectively, there must be mechanisms other than those which simply 
repress. Power must be productive rather than repressive. 
Foucault states, power produces desires and interests; power produces 
knowledge and truth. What he tries to do in the discussion of penal 
reforms, of psychiatric power, and of the control of sexuality, is to 
demonstrate the extent to which the mechanisms that were brought into 
operation in these power formations were something quite other, or in 
any case something much more, than repression. In order to understand 
how the effects of power are implemented effectively, Foucault maintains, 
we must replace the negative or repressive concept of power with a 
positive or productive concept of power. 
Foucault's analysis shows that if knowledge produces power effects, it 
is not through the negation of truth, but its production. If knowledge does 
serve state domination, it is not through establishing a reign of 
ideology tha_t negates truth, but rather through defining a field of empirical 
truth. As Gordon says, 
if certain knowledges of 'Man' are able to serve a 
technological function in the domination of people, this 
is not so much thanks to their capacity to establish a 
reign of ideological mystification as to their ability to 
define a certain field of empirical truth (Gordon, 1979:29). 
6 For Foucault's criticism of the notion of ideology, see Foucault, 1980c, p.102; 1980b, p.118-
121. 
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In discussing a new form of power which focuses on the regulation of 
the population, Foucault shows that power effects are produced through 
establishing "sex" as a field of empirical truth. Foucault writes, besides the 
emergence of disciplinary power, there is another form of bio-power, 
emerged somewhat later, which focuses on the body. This form of power 
focuses on the species body, on the biological processes including 
propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity (Foucault, 1979b:139). This form of power concerns the 
regulation of the population. "Population" becomes an economic and 
political problem: "population as wealth, population as manpower or 
labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the 
resources it commanded" (Foucault, 1979b:25). 
At the heart of the economic and political problem of population, 
Foucault argues, was sex. It was necessary to analyze the birth-rate, the age 
of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and 
frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making them fertile or sterile, 
the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the impact of 
contraceptive practices. It was essential for the state to know what was 
happening with its citizens' sex, and the use they made use of it (Foucault, 
1979b:25-6). Sex becomes a matter of police, a matter of government. It is 
constituted as a thing to be administered, a domain that calls for control 
and regulation. It is established as a field of empirical truth in which a 
whole web of analyses and knowledges were produced which took form in 
demography, biology, medicine, psychology, psychiatry, ethics, pedagogy, 
and other human sciences, without which the effects of bio-power would 
not be able to be implemented. 
What must be noticed is that if these knowledges are able to serve the 
domination of the state, it is not through the formation of false ideologies 
but the constitution of a field of empirical truth. It is through the 
production rather than the negation of truth that power effects are 
produced. Foucault says, "The political question, to sum up, is not error, 
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illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself" (Foucault, 
1980b:133). 
Foucault's problematization of truth would disconcert those who 
believe that "truth will make you free". From their perspective, if truth is 
problematized, on what basis shall we lay our hope for emancipation and 
freedom? on what basis does Foucault's critique stand? In Part III, I shall 
further elaborate the implications of Foucault's work, and discuss what we 
could do with truth. 
4.3 "Truth will make you free"? 
Foucault's problematization of truth has been criticized as contradictory to 
the intent of his project~5Taylor argues that Foucault's project which aims 
at liberation, must require a notion of truth. Without a notion of truth, he 
says, Foucault's critique cannot be coherent. 
The Foucaultian notion of power not only requires for 
its sense the correlative notions of truth and liberation, 
but even the standard link between them, which makes 
truth the condition of liberation. To speak of power, and 
to want to deny a place to 'liberation' and "truth', as well 
as the link between them, is to speak incoherently. That 
is, indeed, the reason why Foucault seems to be 
contradictory himself in the passages ... (Taylor, 1986:93) 
In this section, I shall respond to Taylor's criticism of Foucault's lack of 
a notion of truth. I argue that Foucault's work, indeed, as Taylor says, 
functions as unmasking, but what it unmasks is truth rather than 
falsehood. What he seeks to undermine is our will to truth. From the 
perspective of Foucault, we can no longer rely upon truth to make us free. 
I shall discuss what we could do with truth, and elaborate Foucault's 
insights for those who believe that "Truth will make us free". 
6
-
5 
Habermas assumes that a critique has to claim superiority according to the truth claim. In his view, 
Foucault's problematization of truth is contradictory to the intent of his project. He comments that " if 
the truth claims that Foucault raises for his genealogy of knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted 
to no more than the effects that this theory is capable of releasing within the circle of its adherents, then 
the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point" (Habermas, 
l 987a:279). 
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Taylor (1986:90-93) argues that Foucault's critique of power requires 
not only notions of truth and liberation, but the standard link between 
them. Power, Taylor says, is considered in terms of its imposition on our 
significant desires, interests, and purposes which frustrates them, prevents 
them from fulfilment or even from formation. A critique of power hence 
must aim at some relative lifting of the impositions. This is what is 
understood as liberation. Liberation, Taylor claims, requires truth.7 For 
power proceeds "by foisting illusion on us; it proceeds by disguises and 
masks; it proceeds thus by falsehood". He argues that the impositions of 
disciplinary power on our desires and purposes also involve false 
pretences. Truth is required for unmasking and lifting of the impositions 
of disciplinary power. 
One can hardly deny that Foucault's work functions in a certain 
way as unmasking and relative lifting of constraints. For instance, his 
analysis of disciplinary power allows us to see how power actually works 
so as to loosen its grip on us.8 Nevertheless, in focusing on the ways in 
which power operates, Foucault shows that power works through the 
production of truth rather than its negation. Therefore, while Taylor is 
7 In a reply to Taylor's critique of Foucault, Patton (1989) points out that what Taylor has 
in mind is a negative freedom. Patton argues that Foucault is concerned with expanding the 
sphere of positive freedom rather than, as Taylor assumes, with enlarging the sphere of 
negative freedom. Patton says, "Foucault is not a philosopher of consciousness concerned to 
describe or to theorize the experience of attempting to overcome internal limits to freedom. 
Rather, his concern is with the external supports of the forms of social consciousness and 
being. He attempts to chart some of the institutions, practices and bodies of knowledge 
which help to define and to maintain particular kinds of individuality" (Patton, 1989:264). 
To understand ·the debate between Taylor and Patton, see Taylor, 1986; Patton, 1989; Taylor, 
1989. 
81n this sense, one may say that Foucault reveals the "truth" of the operation of power. As I 
shall point out later in the discussion, Foucault's work can be seen as having the truth 
effects of unmasking. Nevertheless, he refuses to consider his work as truth which unmasks, 
for he aims at questioning a whole tradition which represents truth as outside power, as 
lacking in power. Indeed, power, as Taylor says, proceeds by false pretences and masks, but 
this does not mean that power simply proceeds by falsehood. Foucault seeks to affirm that 
power proceeds by truth; power proceeds by the false pretences and masks of truth. In 
Taylor's view, if truth is produced by power and becomes its masks, truth has turned to be 
untruth. His view is based on the assumption that truth must be pure, innocent, and external 
to power. It is this assumption that Foucault seeks to attack. 
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correct to say that Foucault aims at unmasking, he overlooks the fact that 
what Foucault unmasks is not falsehood, but truth. 
For Taylor, power proceeds by falsehood and hence we need 
truth to oppose power. Foucault's analysis of power, in contrast, shows 
that power works in a more complicated way. Foucault argues that power 
does not simply proceed by falsehood or a negation of truth, but rather by a 
production of truth. For him, the negative concept of power that Taylor 
holds is totally inadequate for the analysis of the mechanisms and effects 
of power. In order for power to be implemented effectively, power must be 
productive rather than repressive, positive rather than negative. In the 
discussion of the regulation of the population, l:4oucault shows that it is 
Jo...--1!> I Yl 
through the constitution of "sex" as a specificAof empirical truth that power 
effects are achieved; in the discussion of the confessional practice, Foucault 
shows that it is through the production of a scientific knowledge of 
sexuality that the effects of normalizing power are induced. In order to 
understand how power effects are induced and maintained, Foucault 
argues that we should focus on the production of truth. 
The problem of Taylor or those who believe that "Truth will make 
you free" not only lies in their failure to understand the ways in which 
power operates. Also, by assuming that power proceeds by falsehood, these 
theories of power in effect hide the actual procedures and mechanisms by 
which power operates. Therefore, what needs to be unmasked is the 
relationship between power and these theories. As Foucault's criticism of 
the juridical-discursive notion of power indicates, "power is tolerable only 
on the cond,ition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is 
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms" (Foucault, 
1979b:86). What enables power to hide its mechanisms includes 
theorizations of power in terms of a negative concept of power and on the 
basis of the assumption that "truth will make us free" .9 
9 Foucault criticizes the juridical-discursive theories of power in terms of their masking of 
the mechanisms of power: "The theory of sovereignty, and the organization of a legal code 
centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of 
discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination 
153 
,1 
i 
1
1 
j 
II 
I 
i 
I 
l 
I 
I 
11 
I 
I' 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I'll 
~. 
'I 
If 
I 1••• I' 
l~ 
Taylor's theorization of power not only hides the actual procedure by 
which power operates, but also demonstrates a will to truth that Foucault 
seeks to undermine. What Foucault unmasks is not only truth but also the 
will to truth. For Taylor and those who believe that "truth will make you 
free", we are freed only by allowing truth to surface. They demand one to 
speak the truth, to produce true knowledge, and to construct the notion of 
truth. They demand the production of truth to perform the function of 
unmasking, but they fail to unmask the will to truth behind their demand. 
In Foucault's analysis, we see that a whole web of discourses of sex is 
produced based on the will to truth. These discourses require one to tell 
the truth of sex. "One goes about telling, with the greatest precision, 
whatever is most difficult to tell" (Foucault, 1979b:59). One is to search for 
the truth, to ponder the truth, to tell the truth, to submit to the power of 
truth. 
It is this will to truth that governs our pursuit of knowledge. What 
preoccupies us is the division between true and false. Foucault argues that 
when viewed from the level of a proposition, or the 
inside of a discourse, the division between true and false 
is neither arbitrary nor modifiable nor institutional nor 
violent. But when we view things on a different scale, 
when we ask the question of what this will to truth has 
been and constantly is, ... what is, in its very general 
form, the type of division which governs our will to 
know, then what we see taking shape is perhaps 
something like a system of exclusion, a historical, 
modifiable, and institutionally constraining system. 
(Foucault, 1970:54) 
Not only should one be reminded of the will to truth that governs 
one's analytic practice, one should also notice the arbitrary, historical, 
inherent in its techniques and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the 
State, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights. The Juridical systems -- and this applies 
to both their codification and to their theorizations -- have enabled sovereignty to be 
democratised through the constitution of a public right articulated upon collective 
sovereignty, while at the same time this democratization of sovereignty was 
fundamentally determined by and grounded in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion" 
(emphasis added; Foucault, 1980c:105). Also see Foucault, 1979b, p .86. 
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modifiable, and institutionally constraining character of the will to truth. 
According to Foucault, despite the fact that the will to truth has been 
present from ancient times to the present, it has taken different forms at 
different times. For the Greek in the sixth century B.C., he writes, the true 
discourse was pronounced by the one who spoke of right and according to 
the required ritual. The true discourse dispensed justice; it prophesied the 
future destiny of people. From the Platonic period, truth no longer resided 
in rituals or in positions of power, but in the utterance itself, its meaning, 
its object. In modern western societies, the will to truth takes form in the 
domination of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. With 
the dominance of a scientific discourse, the operation of truth defines the 
range of objects to be known, the functions and the positions of the 
knowing subject. This will to truth rests on an institutional support. It is 
reinforced and renewed by the practices of pedagogy, like the system of 
books, publishing, libraries, and laboratories (Foucault, 1970:55-6). 
Foucault contends that the will to truth exerts a power of constraint 
over other discourses. It is linked to a machinery which disqualifies those 
that fall below the standard of truth. In modern western societies, there are 
knowledges excluded because of their failure to meet the required standard 
of scientificity. Foucault refers to them as subjugated knowledges, that is, 
knowledges which "have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity". They 
include knowledges of the delinquent, or of the psychiatric patient, the ill 
person, and even the nurse and the doctor, which are marginalized by the 
science of medicine. These knowledges are local and specific, with no 
common meaning. What unites them is the fact that they are opposed by 
the well-established scientific knowledges (Foucault, 1980c:82). 
In light of Foucault's work, Taylor's critique should be questioned if it 
contains a will to truth which has constraining effects on other discourses. 
Taylor's critique demands one to speak the truth. It condemns Foucault's 
project for its lack of a notion of truth; it charges Foucault as incoherent for 
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his refusal of appeal to truth. Foucault is fully aware of the charges, yet he 
still refuses to ground his work on the basis of truth. In perfo.-ming the 
function of unmasking, Foucault avoids appealing to truth. For what he 
seeks to unmask is precisely how power works through the production of 
truth; what he seeks to undermine is the will to truth that underlines the 
demand for the production of truth. 
Foucault understands his task as undermining the will to truth. In 
modern western societies, this will to truth takes the form of the 
dominance of science. In opposition to this will to truth, Foucault uses his 
genealogies for an insurrection of subjugated knowledges. He allies with 
"local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges" to oppose 
"the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and 
order knowledges in the name of some true knowledge or some arbitrary 
idea of what constitutes a science and its objects" (Foucault, 1980c:83). In 
calling for an insurrection of subjugated knowledges, Foucault does not 
provide a theory to support them or unite them according to a notion of 
truth. In his view, this would be a danger of constructing, with our own 
hands, the kind of unitary discourse that we struggle against (Foucault, 
1980c:86). Foucault asserts that in the struggle against the domination 
effects of the scientific discourse in our society, we cannot rely upon global 
theories like Marxism and psychoanalysis, for they belong exactly to the 
unitary body of scientific discourse that we struggle against. Nor should we 
construct a global theory on our own. He insists on maintaining the local 
and specific character of criticism, one which indicates "an autonomous, 
non-centralized kind of theoretical production", one "whose validity is 
not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of thought" 
(Foucault, 1980c:81). 
In order to undermine the will to truth, Foucault refuses to produce 
truth. He does not see his work as truths, but rather as "fictions". He says, 
I am fully aware that I have never written anything 
other than fictions. For all that, I would not want to say 
that they were outside the truth. It seems plausible to me 
to make fictions work within truth, to introduce truth-
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effects within a fictional discourse, and in some way to 
make discourse arouse, "fabricate," something which 
does not yet exist, thus to fiction something. One 
"fictions" history starting from a political reality that 
renders it true, one "fictions" a politics that does not yet 
exist starting from a historical truth (Foucault 1979c:75). 
While these fictions may produce truth effects, for instance, they may 
function like truths to unmask, Foucault maintains that what he seeks is 
"to introduce truth-effects within a fictional discourse". He does not 
consider it as effects within a truth discourse. He wants his work to 
fabricate a new forms of politics. One may say that in this sense, his work 
functions like truth which guides politics. Nevertheless, Foucault see¾if 
"fiction,' a new form of politics. He does not consider it as truth which 
grounds politics. 
Foucault's work shows that we can no longer rely upon truth to 
provide the basis of hope. "[T]ruth isn't outside power, or lacking in 
power ... Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraints. And it induces regular effects of power" 
(Foucault, 1980b:131). If truth is shown to be internally related to power, 
shall we reject truth once and for all? what shall we do with truth? 
Foucault demonstrates an example of how he avoids appealing to a notion 
of truth in his work. Nevertheless, there is not just a single way of 
resistance. Instead of refusing to play the game of truth, one may seek to 
play it in a different way. As Foucault says: "We escaped then a 
domination of truth, not by playing a game that was a complete stranger to 
the game of_ truth, but in playing it otherwise or in playing another game, 
another set, other trumps in the game of truth" (Foucault, 1988a:15). 
I suggest that one may seek to play another game in the game of truth. 
In a game of truth, of course, one has to recognize that there are truths. 
Nevertheless, truths should not be considered as innocent, pure, and 
external to power. Instead they should be seen in terms of a multiplicity of 
discourses whose truth claims are localized and should be played with an 
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ironic consciousness of their own relativity and relation to power.1° One 
should not treat truth as an innocent and secure basis on which one is to 
oppose power. Rather one can play upon truth claims in struggles against 
power. In this sense, one may not need to reject truth once and for all. 
Instead, one should consider truth in terms of a politics of discourse, a 
politics of truth.1 1 
Let us look at what is meant by a politics of discourse or a politics of 
truth. According to Foucault, discourse is conceived as tactical elements 
which operate in the field of power relations. The tactical function that a 
discourse performs is neither uniform nor stable. Sometimes a discourse 
serves power and other times it resists power. Foucault says, 
discourses are not once and for all subservient to power 
or raised up against it ... discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, 
a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting 
point for an opposing strategy. (Foucault, 1979b:101) 
He gives an example of the appearance of discourses of homosexuality in 
the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the discourses provided the 
condition for an advance of social control into this area of perversity; on 
the other hand, it also made possible a "reverse" discourse. Using the same 
vocabularies and categories by which it was disqualified, homosexuality 
began to speak for itself, to demand the recognition of its legitimacy and 
naturalness (Foucault, 1979b:101). 
lO Rorty considers Foucault's insights in terms of his ironic stance toward the final 
vocabulary -- the vocabulary that can have no noncircular argumentative recourse when 
·1t Ls questioned, such as the terms 'true', 'good', 'beautiful', 'progressive'. Rorty 
elaborates that an ironist is aware of the contingency and fragility of the final vocabulary 
and of the fact that these terms are subject to change. When an ironist phrases her/his 
argument in another final vocabulary, s/he does not think that this vocabulary is closer to 
the reality or truth, but is simply playing the new off against the old. An ironist fears that 
s/he would be limited by the vocabulary in which s/he inherited in the socialization, and 
s/he would experiment with other vocabularies so as to re-create her/himself. See his 
discussion of the ironist elements that he finds useful in Foucault's work; in Rorty, 1989, 
Chapter 3. 
11 Foucault says that each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth. For 
his discussion of the regime of truth in modem western societies; see Foucault, 1980b, pp.131-
3. 
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One cannot attempt an a priori classification of discourse according to 
white-and-black categories. It is not possible to draw a line between 
discourses which are inherently bad and serve power on the one hand, 
and those which are inherently liberating and resist power on the other. In 
a politics of discourse, all discourses are open to contradictory uses. They 
may be used to serve power or to resist power. One cannot simply assume 
that a discourse of truth is more safe and less possible to be invested by 
power. For power could invest all discourses. There may be discourses 
which talk about the design of some projects in modifying the constraint 
of a certain power. Nevertheless, none of these projects can, simply by its 
nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that liberty will 
be established by the project itself. Foucault asserts that the liberty of 
individuals are never assured by theories, institutions, and laws that are 
intended to provide them. On the contrary, these theories, institutions, 
and laws are often capable of being turned around (Foucault, 1986e:245). 
In this sense, one should not simply rely upon truth, or a truth 
discourse to provide us with freedom. Truth, or a discourse of truth, is not 
by its nature inherently liberating. Freedom is not established by truth 
itself. If truth makes us free, it is perhaps through one's engaging in a 
politics of truth. One has to negotiate the meanings of truth, and to play 
upon the truth claims in the opposition of power. For instance, the 
discourse of homosexuality makes possible an advance of social control 
into this area of perversity. Individuals are judged in truth their nature of 
sexuality and whether it requires therapeutic intervention. When 
homosexuality begins to speak for itself, the same vocabularies could be 
used. They reveal the truth of their sexual nature. They might argue that, 
like heterosexuals, they never choose their own sexuality; they are born to 
be homosexual. Their sexuality is just as natural and normal as that of 
heterosexuals. In the name of truth they oppose power that has been 
imposed on them. The truth discourse is turned around and used to fight 
against power. 
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One should not imagine that truth is inherently liberating. Nor 
should one think that truth is absolutely liberating. A truth discourse may 
be used to serve power or to resist power. Nevertheless, both uses are 
within power. When a discourse is used to oppose power, it does not 
destroy power. On the contrary, it induces effects of power. In our example 
of the resistance of homosexuality, by demanding the recognition of its 
naturalness in the name of truth, it results in a wider acceptance of 
homosexuality. Nevertheless, its reliance upon the normal-abnormal 
dichotomy may induce effects of normalizing power. For example, it is 
claimed that those who are born homosexual should be regarded as 
normal as those who are born heterosexual. Then, how about those who 
choose to be homosexual? They would be classified as abnormal and 
regarded as in need of therapeutic treatment. Therefore, resistance is never 
a domain that is absolutely free from power. If one plays upon truth to 
oppose power, one should not imagine truth as absolutely liberating. 
Resistance can provide the condition of existence for an exercise of power. 
This is where attack should be launched again. The fight goes on; it never 
ends. 
To sum up, in demanding that Foucault ground his critique in a 
notion of truth, Taylor himself has put his faith in truth and believes that 
"Truth will make us free". He overlooks the fact that truth is neither 
absolutely nor inherently liberating. We should not imagine that truth 
will bring us to a state which is power-free. Instead, truth often induces 
effects of power. We cannot expect truth itself to establish liberty. Rather 
liberty is what must be exercised. If truth can ever make us free, it is 
because we · exercise our freedom in opposing power by engaging in a 
politics of truth. While truth is not, as people might imagine, pure, 
innocent, and outside power, what we could do is to enable truth to 
function in a different way in a field of power relations. We may play 
upon truth claims against power; nevertheless, they should be played with 
an ironic consciousness of their own relativity and relation to power. 
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Conclusion 
I would summarize Habermas's critique of knowledge in three points. 
Firstly, guided by a juridico-discursive mode of analysis, Habermas 
considers science problematic only when it transgresses the boundary and 
invades others' domains. Science is seen as unproblematic as long as it 
operates within its own domain. Secondly, Habermas's discourse model 
further asserts that scientific knowledge in itself is unproblematic. 
Knowledge is portrayed as external to power; the production of knowledge 
is seen as outside power. Thirdly, while knowledge may join hands with 
power, the power effects produced are regarded as external to knowledge. It 
is ideologies rather than knowledge that are responsible for the power 
effects. Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge, I contend, challenges 
each of these assertions. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, which focuses on the ways 
in which power effects are produced, Foucault sees that knowledge can be 
linked to power in a relationship of constitutive interdependence. As the 
example of sexuality shows, the constitution of a field of knowledge 
depends on power relations establishing sexuality as an object, and 
conversely, power can take sexuality as a target only when it is invested 
with cognitive relations. Power and knowledge are shown to be linked in a 
constitutive interdependence. Power constitutes the internal condition of 
the possibility of certain knowledges, and these knowledges provide the 
means without which the exercise of power would not be possible. 
Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge implies several challenges for 
Ha berm as. 
Firstly, in contrast to what Habermas's critique assumes, these 
knowledges are not problematic only when they illegitimately invade the 
domains of others; they are always problematic since they are linked to 
power in a constitutive relation. Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge 
in effect achieves a radical problematization of knowledge. His 
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problematization of knowledge, unlike Habermas's, does not depend on a 
critique of knowledge as illegitimate. Nor does it depend on a critique of 
knowledge as false knowledge or ideology. Instead it is based on an 
examination of the internal relation between knowledge and power. 
If there are knowledges internally linked to power, one can put into 
question Habermas's discourse model which represents knowledge as 
external to power. Foucault's studies demonstrate that it is power, its 
demands, its techniques, its relations, that constitute the internal 
condition for the existence of certain knowledges. In contrast to what 
Habermas's discourse model represents, power is not lacking in the 
production of knowledge. On the contrary, it is power that produces 
certain knowledges. The second kind of Foucault 's challenge hence 
consists in his analysis of power's production of knowledge. He urges us to 
"abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can 
exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge 
can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests". 
Habermas's discourse theory, I suggest, can be considered in terms of this 
tradition. 
Foucault's third kind of insight lies in his analysis of the ways in 
which power effects are produced. In contrast to Habermas's critique, 
knowledges do not stand originally outside power and then fall a prey to 
power in order to produce power effects. Nor do they lend themselves to 
false ideologies in order to produce power effects. Instead these 
knowledges are the internal condition of power, without which the 
exercise of power would not be possible. The power effects are internally 
linked to these knowledg~ they are directly implied in these knowledges. 
The problem is no longer ideologies or falsehood, but rather true 
knowledges, truth itself. 
According to Foucault's analysis, we can no longer assume that truth 
will make us free. The comfort that Habermas provides us in legitimate 
knowledge and in true knowledge is exposed a.s be."in5 misguided. Instead of 
laying our hope in truth, what we should do is to engage in a politics of 
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discourse, in a politics of truth. As Foucault says, "it's not a battle 'on 
behalf' of truth but a battle about the status of truth and the economic and 
political role which it plays".(Foucault, 1980b:132). 
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Chapter 5 
SUBJECT AND POWER 
Foucault suggests that we leave aside the question of "what legitimates 
power" and focus instead on the processes and mechanisms through 
which power effects are produced. In Chapter 4, we discussed the role of 
knowledge in the production of power effects. In this chapter, we turn 
to the role of "subject" and discuss Foucault's analysis of the 
relationship between the subject and power. 
Foucault's approach, I contend, is not to ask who dominates and 
who are dominated. Nor is it to construct a theory of the subject as the 
basis of resistance. Instead he examines how power works at the level 
of on-going subjugation, at the level of continuous and uninterrupted 
processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our 
behaviors. In these processes, he sees that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, and materially constituted. In contrast to one's 
representing the subject vis-a-vis power, Foucault shows that the 
subject is one of power's prime effects. 
One cannot deny the novelty of Foucault's analysis of the subject 
and power. Nevertheless, what kinds of challenge could it possibly pose 
to Habermas, who claims that his project has moved away from the 
philosophy of the subject? 
Habermas contends that one should replace the paradigm of the 
philosophy of the subject with the paradigm of intersubjectivity. In the 
paradigm of intersubjectivity, the notion of communicative reason 
replaces the notion of an isolated, autonomous cognitive subject in the 
discussion of power. However, as I shall argue in Part I, since his 
notion of communicative reason relies upon an a priori notion of the 
rational subject who possesses certain linguistic competences, how far 
his project has moved away from the philosophy of the subject is 
doubtful. Moreover, its reliance upon a certain notion of modern 
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subjectivity allows me to use Foucault's work to comment on his 
project. 
What kinds of challenge does Foucault's work pose to Habermas's 
theory? I suggest that one may read Foucault's insights in terms of the 
thesis of "an exclusion of the other". That is, Foucault shows that the 
constitution of subjects often involves an exclusion of the other. In 
constituting and identifying ourselves as the rational, the normal, the 
sane, the nondangerous subjects, we have to identify the irrational, the 
abnormal, the insane, the dangerous, and exclude or condemn them as 
the other. Habermas's theory, which presupposes a notion of modern 
rational subjectivity, can be questioned in terms of its exclusion of the 
other. As noted by White (1986), in the formation of modern 
subjectivity, there are certain aspects of subjectivity that have been 
systematically excluded and devalued in the modern world. "If 
Foucault is right about the exclusion and devaluation of the body and 
the aesthetic-expressive capacities, then critical theory is obliged to press 
this question upon itself" (White, 1986:424). In Part II, I shall press this 
question upon Habermas's theory, and examine the implication of 
Habermas's discussion of the rational and responsible subject in terms 
of an exclusion of the other. 
While this is a way to draw insights from Foucault's work, 
nevertheless, I argue, it brings us back to a negative concept of power 
that Foucault seeks to surpass. It assumes that if Habermas's project has 
a problem, it has to do with its negating or excluding a certain 
subjectivity. Moreover, when power is represented as negative, one 
may, as White does, turn to the question of how to submit power to the 
rule of right. In this way, one would search for a principle of legitimacy, 
which Foucault's work refuses to provide. In order to appreciate 
Foucault's insights, I suggest that we should read his work from the 
perspective of a strategic model which emphasizes the productive 
aspect of power. 
From the perspective of the strategic model, we are concerned not 
so much with an exclusion of the other as with a production of certain 
subjectivities. For it is through the production of subjects that power 
begins to operate. Therefore, I argue, instead of merely pressing upon 
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itself the question of an exclusion of the other, Habermas's theory 
should be questioned in terms of whether it involves a production of 
certain subjectivites, and whether there is a tactical integration of its 
production of subjectivites with the modern practices of power-
knowledge. 
In Chapter 4, Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge and his 
problematization of knowledge have been shown. In this chapter, I 
discuss Foucault's problematization of the subject and introduce the 
matrix of knowledge-power-subjectivity according to which power 
operates. Facing the modern alliance of knowledge-power-subjectivity, 
what can we do to undermine the mechanisms of power? In his later 
works, Foucault's discussion of the Greek ethics points to an aesthetic 
subject. Is he, as his critics understand, providing us with a theory of 
the subject that grounds critique and resistance? If the answer is no, in 
what way does Foucault's discussion help us reflect upon resistance of 
modern power? Part III is devoted to answering these questions. 
5.1 Habermas: Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity and Power 
Habermas sees that there are unresolved problems with the philosophy 
of the subject and understands his project as offering a solution to those 
problems. Part I considers the solution that Habermas offers and 
discusses whether his project has successfully moved away from the 
philosophy of the subject. 
In the philosophy of the subject, he states, there is a thematization 
of two incompatible aspects of the subject: the transcendental aspect and 
the empirical aspect. On the one hand, the subject is one which adopts 
an objectifying attitude that an observer assumes toward entities in the 
external world. In this sense, the subject views itself as the dominating 
counterpart to the world. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is an 
empirical subject, and it has to view itself as entity within the world. In 
this sense, it is also the object of knowledge. The thematization of 
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these two aspects of the subject reveals the hectic to and fro between the 
transcendental and empirical modes of inquiry, and the unresolved 
back-and-forth between the transcendental I and the empirical I. The 
movements between these two aspects of the subject, Habermas 
contends, are as inevitable as they are incompatible. In his view, 
Foucault's discussion of the three doubles in modern thought -- the 
transcendental/ empirical double, the cogito / unthought double, the 
double of the return/ retreat of the origin -- once again shows the 
symptoms of the exhaustion of the paradigm of the philosophy of the 
subject but does not offer any solution (Habermas, 1987a:294-5). 
Habermas claims that his project provides the way out of the 
philosophy of the subject. 
What solution does Habermas offer? He claims that the paradigm 
of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of 
mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action. 
With a shift to the latter paradigm, 
the. objectifying attitude in which the knowing subject 
regards itself as it would entities in the external world 
is no longer privileged. Fundamental to the paradigm 
of mutual understanding is, rather, the performative 
attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate 
their plans for action by coming to an understanding 
about something in the world. (Habermas, 1987a:296) 
The solution that Habermas offers is: to replace subjectivity with 
intersubjectivity. Instead of a reflection upon an essential subjectivity, 
he seeks .for a reflection upon the rules deposited in successful 
utterances that account for intersubjectivity or people's understanding 
with one another. He carries out a rational reconstruction of the "rules 
that a competent speaker must master in order to form grammatical 
sentences and to utter them in an acceptable way" (Habermas, 1979:26). 
Besides the rules for the formation of grammatically acceptable 
sentences,1 Habermas reconstructs the condition under which the 
1 The rules for the formation of grammatically acceptable sentences include the use of 
propositional sentences to represent a state of affairs; the use of intentional verbs, 
model forms, and so on to express an intention; and the use of performative phrases, 
illocutionary indicators, and the like to establish a legitimate interpersonal relation 
(Habermas, 1979:28). 
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hearer is motivated to take an affirmative position to the utterance. He 
states that the acceptability of an illocutionary act depends upon a 
condition: the speaker's guarantee for securing claims to validity. A 
speaker can motivate a hearer to accept the speech-act because the 
speaker can assume the warranty to provide convincing reasons when 
challenged or criticized by the hearer (Habermas, 1991:297-302). 
Habermas argues that as there is a speech-act-immanent-obligation 
to provide grounds for one's claims, reason is implied in the structure 
of language. In his view, to rationally motivate a hearer to accept one's 
claim requires one to ground the claim on the basis of the mere force of 
the better argument. This presupposes the notion of an ideal speech 
situation in which power relations and other constraints are absent in 
the argumentation, so that the consensus arrived at is based on reason. 
In this sense, Habermas argues, the redemption of validity claims in 
our speech-acts points to a notion of communicative reason. 
For Habermas, the turn to the paradigm of intersubjectivity and the 
introduction of a notion of communicative reason not only provide 
the way out of the paradigm of the philosophy of the subject, but also 
establish a new foundation in the discussion of power. Habermas 
views power both in terms of a subject-object relation and a relation 
between human subjects. Nevertheless, no matter whetherpower is 
viewed in terms of a subject-object relation or a relation between 
human subjects, Habermas asserts that the success of power is based on 
truth. Instead of presupposing an isolated autonomous knowing 
subject in . the discussion of truth and power, Habermas suggests a 
notion of communicative reason as the basis of power. 
When power is conceived from a subject-object relation, power 
refers to the ability to bring about a certain effect upon the object. A 
success in the exercise of power means a mastery of the object, and this, 
Habermas maintains, is regulated by the truth of judgements 
(Habermas, 1987a:274). While power's truth dependency has to remain, 
he nevertheless contends that we no longer need to presuppose an 
isolated, autonomous knowing subject. In his view, the paradigm of 
intersubjectivity allows us to talk about truth and power in a way that 
no longer relies upon the repertoire of the philosophy of the subject. 
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While truth is characterized by its ability to compel universally and 
rationally, in the paradigm of intersubjectivity, it no longer compels 
through monological consciousness, but rather through dialogue and 
argumentation between members of a linguistic community. Truth, 
according to Habermas, is a truth claim, that is, statements asserted to 
be true in a linguistic community. Being a truth claim, its validity has 
to be affirmed through intersubjective justification. The condition of 
truth, in the paradigm of intersubjectivity, is the rational consensus of 
members of a linguistic community. Truth, that is, the basis for the 
success of power, is to be grounded in communicative reason. The 
notion of communicative reason hence replaces the presupposition of 
an isolated, autonomous knowing subject in the discussion of power in 
a subject-object relation. 
For Habermas, the paradigm of intersubjectivity provides a new 
basis for the discussion of power not only in a subject-object relation, 
but also in a relation between human subjects. If the success of power 
over nature or natural objects is expressed by mastery, the success of 
power between human subjects, Habermas holds, is represented by an 
acceptance of that power relation as legitimate. The notion of 
legitimacy, in his view, implies that justification has to be given for 
domination. To assert that the domination is legitimate is to lay a claim 
to its validity. This claim to legitimacy, like the truth claim discussed 
above, has to be examined, tested and justified. It is only when the 
claim is supported by the mere force of the better argument that the 
legitimacy of the power relation is backed by reason (Habermas, 1976:95-
102). Power, through the notion of legitimacy, is once again grounded 
in communicative reason. 
Habermas believes that the paradigm of intersubjectivity has 
overcome the problems of the philosophy of the subject. While in the 
paradigm of the philosophy of the subject there are unresolved 
tensions between the transcendental subject and the empirical subject 
and between transcendental and empirical modes of inquiry, Habermas 
claims, the separation between the transcendental and the empirical no 
longer applies to his reconstructive science in the paradigm of 
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intersubjectivity.2 In place of an intuitive analysis of self-consciousness 
and a reflectively objectified knowledge, he states, we have a 
recapitulating reconstruction of knowledge already employed. 
Because such reconstructive attempts are no longer 
aimed at a realm of intelligible beyond that of 
appearances, but at the actually exercised rule-
knowledge that is deposited in correctly generated 
utterances, the ontological separation between the 
transcendental and the empirical is no longer 
applicable .... In this way, the spell of an unresolved 
back-and-forth between two aspects of self-
thematization that are as inevitable as they are 
incompatible is broken. Consequently, we do not 
need hybrid theories any more to close the gap 
between the transcendental and empirical. 
(Habermas, 1987a:298) 
Habermas's claim that his reconstructive project has moved away 
from the transcendental philosophy, I suggest, can be questioned. 
Habermas understands that what his project does is to render explicit, 
"from the perspective of those participating in discourses and 
interaction", the pretheoretical grasp of rules on the part of competent 
speakers (emphasis added, Habermas, 1987a:296). Nevertheless, we can 
trace in his work that from time to time Habermas is not exactly 
analyzing from the perspective of those participating in discourses and 
interaction. Rather he raises himself above the participants, engages in 
a monological reflection, and proclaims the truth about language from 
above. Take an example of his claim: "The human interest in 
autonomy- and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be 
apprehended a priori. ... Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the 
intention of universal and unconstrained consensus" (Habermas, 
1978:314). He proclaims the telos of language; he proclaims what is 
inherent in linguistic understanding. Communicative rationality, for 
him, is not a value, or a decision agreed upon by participants. It is 
2 McCarthy discusses Habermas's reconstructive project as a "transformed 
transcendental philosophy". He points out that it is, on the one hand, like Kant's 
transcendental philosophy which aims at disclosing the conditions of possibility, but 
the focus shifts from the possibility of experiencing objects to the possibility of reaching 
understanding; and on the other hand, an inquiry of empirical speakers and successful 
utterances. See McCarthy, 1984, pp.278-9. 
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portrayed as what is inherent in linguistic understanding, as something 
that is to be apprehended a priori, as foundations that any speaker 
"cannot avoid having recourse, intuitively, to" .3 
One should appreciate Habermas's diagnosis of the problem of the 
philosophy of the subject and his intention to provide the way out 
through the turn to a paradigm of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, the 
basic flaw of his project lies in the fact that it is oriented toward not an 
analysis of an intersubjective understanding of participants in a certain 
community, but rather an a priori notion of universal communicative 
competence. Habermas holds that the illocutionary force of an 
acceptable speech act cannot be traced back to any particular 
institutional or normative contexts; it consists in the fact that it can 
move a hearer on the basis of the speech-act-immanent obligation to 
provide justification for claims. This conception of illocutionary 
force, as Miller points out, causes the failure of Habermas's project to 
advance beyond a philosophy of the subject. Instead of having 
intersubjectivity as the basis, Habermas's analysis relies upon an a 
priori notion of the competent speaking subject as the basis for 
intersubjectivity. In Miller's words, 
Illocutionary force depends on a notion of the 
essential capacities of subjects which provide the 
conditions of possibility of communication. Without 
these attributes illocutionary force, and indeed 
communication itself, would not be able to function. 
It is, I argue, this attempt to elaborate the notion of 
intersubjectivity through the concept of illocutionary 
force which undercuts Habermas's attempt to 
produce a universal pragmatics. To the extent that 
illocutionary force is conceived as separate from 
normative and institutional conditions of possibility, 
the 'pragmatic' dimension of speech is, I suggest, 
thereby excluded from a universal pragmatics. The 
3 Habermas says: "Whenever speaking and acting subjects want to arrive purely by way 
of argument at a decision, they cannot avoid having recourse, intuitively, to foundations 
that can be explained with the help of the concept of communicative rationality. 
Participants in discourse do not have to come first to an agreement about this 
foundation: indeed, a decision for the rationality inherent in linguistic understanding is 
not even possible. In communicative rationality we are always already oriented to 
those validity-claims, on the intersubjective recognition of which consensus is possible" 
(Habermas, 1982a:226-7). 
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'universal' dimension of speech, which in turn 
depends on an a priori conception of the attributes of 
subjects as rational beings, becomes the absolute basis 
of intersubjectivity. In this way intersubjectivity is 
restated as a transcendental foundation for critical 
theory. (Miller, 1987:78) 
Therefore, far from being able to move away from the paradigm of 
the philosophy of the subject, Habermas's theory of communicative 
action actually relies upon an a priori notion of the subject. In 
particular, it presupposes the notion of a "responsible" and "rational" 
subject who has certain attributes and capacities. Human beings are 
conceived as responsible subjects "who, as members of a 
communication-community, can orient their actions to 
intersubjectively recognized validity claims" (Habermas, 1991:14) . 
Moreover, throughout Habermas 's work, human beings are 
characterized as rational speaking and acting subjects who are willing 
and able to provide grounds or justification for their assertions, claims, 
and expressed feelings. Rationality is seen as a disposition of any 
speaking and acting subjects and is expected to be expressed in 
behavior.4 
The dependence upon an a priori theory of the subject as the basis 
of intersubjectivity has important consequences for Habermas 's 
discussion of power. In contrast to his claim that the paradigm of 
intersubjectivity provides an alternative basis for the discussion of 
power, it is this a priori notion of the subject that provides an essential 
basis for ~egitimate power. Legitimate power, for Habermas, is not 
simply based upon the intersubjectivity of participants in a certain 
community; it is to do with rational subjects who engage in discussion 
in the pursuit of consensus. Illegitimate power, on the other hand, is to 
4 For instance, Habermas claims: "In contexts of communicative action, we call someone 
rational not only if he is able to put forth an assertion and, when criticized, to provide 
grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an 
established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the 
given situation in light of legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he 
makes known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, 
confesses a deed, etc., and is then able to reassure critics in regard to the revealed 
experience by drawing practical consequences from it and behaving consistently 
thereafter" (Habermas, 1991:15). 
172 
'.I 
fl 
do with distorted communication which negates this modern rational 
subjectivity. In this sense, Habermas's communicative concept of 
power still privileges a certain notion of modern rational subjectivity 
as the basis of hope. 
Foucault's work, in contrast, does not take for granted any 
presupposition of modern subjectivity. On the contrary, he seeks to 
show the specific conditions of existence of certain modern subjects. 
The subject, for Foucault, is the product of discourses and practices, the 
product of power relations. Foucault's way of examining the relation 
between power and the subject, I argue, has implications for 
Habermas's project. Instead of representing the subject vis-a-vis power, 
as Habermas does with his communicative concept of power, Foucault 
shows that the subject is one of power's prime effects. Far from being 
able to provide us a basis of hope, notions of modern rational 
subjectivity are shown to be part of the problem. 
• 
5.2 Foucault's Analysis of Subject and Power and its Challenge to 
Habermas 
In order to analyze the relationships that can exist between constitution 
of subjects and practices of power, Foucault thinks that it is necessary to 
reject an a prioritheory of the subject. He says, 
What I refused was precisely that you first of all set up 
a theory of the subject ... and that, beginning from the 
theory of the subject, you come to pose the question 
of knowing, for example, how such and such a form 
of knowledge was possible. (Foucault, 1988a:10) 
What Foucault wants to know is how subjects emerge, how subjects 
constitute themselves, and the way in which the constitution of 
subjects is linked to power. 
What insights does Foucault's work have for Habermas? First of 
all, Habermas's theory, which relies upon an a priori notion of the 
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rational subject, is bound to be inadequate in capturing the 
relationships that can exist between power and the constitution of the 
rational subject. In the following discussion, I shall first present 
Foucault's novel analysis of the subject and power. Then I shall discuss 
the challenges it has for Habermas's theory. I argue that there can be 
more than one way of using Foucault's work, and suggest that the 
challenge can be posed from the perspective of a strategic model. 
Foucault: on subject and power 
Foucault shows how mechanisms of power are involved in the 
constitution or production of subjects. For instance, in Discipline and 
Punish, he demonstrates that discipline 'makes' individuals. That is, 
in disciplinary processes, certain bodies, certain gestures, certain desires 
come to be identified and constituted as individual subjects. 
Disciplinary power is, on the one hand, a power of subjection, which 
subjects the body to a set of procedures, analyses, norms and controls, 
and on the other hand, an individualizing power, the operation of 
which involves creation of a subject with identity and individuality. By 
what means does disciplinary power operate as a power of subjection 
and an individualizing power? 
Disciplinary power is one which employs a series of techniques and 
methods in order to ensure the meticulous control of the operations of 
the body. It operates according to a codification which partitions as 
closely as possible space, time, and movement. Through a partitioning 
of space, bodies are individualized Mel put under observation and 
control. The spatial arrangement serves the function of 
individualization and classification. Each is defined by the place it 
occupies, and by the gap that separates it from others. The spatial 
partitioning enables one to have its own place, both in the sense of AA 
architectural boundary and in the sense of a rank, a place in an 
hierarchy. Hence, "discipline is an art of rank". The rank expresses 
one's status and value, knowledge and ability. Each is to identify 
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oneself according to the rank, as what happened in the classroom or 
college. 
In the eighteenth century, 'rank begins to define the 
great form of distribution of individuals in the 
educational order: rows or ranks of pupils in the class, 
corridors, courtyards; rank attributed to each pupil at 
the end of each task and each examination; ... And, in 
this ensemble of compulsory alignments, each pupil, 
according to his age, his performance, his behavior, 
occupies sometimes one rank, sometimes another; he 
moves constantly over a series of compartments --
some of these are ideal compartments, marking a 
hierarchy of knowledge and ability, others express the 
distribution of values or merits in material terms in 
the space of the college or classroom. It is a perpetual 
movement in which individuals replace one another 
in a space marked off by aligned intervals. (Foucault, 
1977:146-7) 
The partitioning of time achieves similar purposes of subjection 
and individualization. Temporal control over bodies is achieved by 
implementing time-tables, which organize and govern individuals' 
activities down to the smallest intervals. Moreover, as Clifford (1989) 
elaborates, the regulation of time fosters the production of temporal 
norms -- expectations regarding the length of time necessary to 
accomplish a task, master a skill, or recover from an illness. 
Individuals are expected to conform to these norms and they are 
judged according to the norms. For example, students are expected to 
master certain educational knowledge and skills within the duration of 
an academic year. They are classified and ranked according to whether 
they meet such temporal demands and expectations. 
Disciplinary time is the time of regulated, controlled, 
seriated, normalized activity -- a time which does not 
merely accompany or mark the activity of 
individuals, but which subjects them to temporal 
demands and expectations through which they are 
defined and individualized. (Clifford, 1989:91-2) 
The partitioning of movement or the temporal elaboration of an 
act also serves similar functions. By means of a calculated control of 
movement, gesture and behavior, the subjectivity is constituted and 
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regulated in a material way. What is produced is not simply a 
conditioned or manipulated subject, but rather one with aptitudes and 
capacities. As seen in the training of handwriting, while the body is 
subject to power and control, what is produced is a capable subject. 
Good handwriting 
presupposed a gymnastics -- a whole routine whose 
rigorous code invests the body in its entirety, from 
the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger ... 
The teacher will place the pupils in the posture that 
they should maintain when writing, and will correct 
it either by sign or otherwise, when they change their 
position. (Foucault, 1979a:152) 
As a result, a capable subject is produced, one which is capable of 
good handwriting. This is what Foucault tries to show -- the productive 
side of disciplinary power. That is, the exercise of disciplinary power 
brings about efficiency and utility; and the operation of disciplinary 
power involves a production rather than a suppression of the subject. 
The chief function of the disciplinary power is to 
'train' ... It does not link forces together in order to 
reduce them; it seeks to bind them together in such a 
way as to multiply and use them. . .. Instead of 
bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it 
separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its 
procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary 
and sufficient single units. It 'trains' the moving, 
confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into 
a multiplicity of individual elements ... (Foucault, 
1979a:170) 
In short, the operation of disciplinary power involves a production 
rather than a negation of subjectivity, a fostering rather than a 
suppression of individuality. The subjects produced by discipline 
possess capabilities and individualities. In addition, they are concrete 
and real, each linked to specific practices, institutions, and bodies of 
knowledge. These subjects include the student, the soldier, the factory 
worker, the prisoner. Through processes of hierarchization and 
normalization, these subjects are further differentiated and 
individualized from one another: the over-achiever, the delinquent, 
the recidivist, the deserter, the normal, the abnormal. 
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In particular, Foucault (1979a:251-6) elaborates the production of a 
new class of subjects -- the delinquent -- which made possible the 
penitentiary function of the prison. In order for the penitentiary 
apparatus to exercise power, it requires the production of an entirely 
new class of subjects. The penitentiary apparatus, of course, also 
receives convicted persons and offenders; nevertheless, the object to 
which it applies itself is rather different from the convicted offender: it 
is the delinquent. The delinquent is to be distinguished from the 
offender by the fact that it is not as much his act as his life that is 
relevant in characterizing him. This amounts to an exercise in 
biographical investigation. The observation of the delinquent goes 
beyond the circumstances under which the crime is committed to his 
life. It seeks the causes of his crime in his psychology, social position 
and upbringing. A delinquent is one with a slow formation. The 
'criminal' character exists before and even outside the crime. At the 
junction of the penal and psychiatric discourses is the formation of the 
notion of the 'dangerous' individual.5 The delinquent is defined as the 
dangerous. Through processes of hierarchization and normalization, 
these subjects are further differentiated according to their degree of 
danger. For example, with Ferrus's classification, Foucault writes, the 
delinquent is further differentiated into three types, each is conceived 
in terms of the degree and nature of danger, and accordingly linked to a 
particular practice of power-knowledge.6 
5 See Foucault, 1978, for an elaboration of the psychiatrization of criminal danger in 
the 19th century. 
6 Foucault writes, "there are those who are endowed 'with intellectual resources above 
the average of intelligence that we have established', but who have been perverted 
either by the 'tendencies of their organization' and a 'native predisposition', or by 
'pernicious logic', an 'iniquitous morality', a 'dangerous attitude to social duties'. Those 
that belong to this category require isolation day and night, solitary exercise ... The 
second category is made up of 'vicious, stupid or passive convicts, who have been led 
into evil by indifference to either shame or honor, through cowardice, that is to say, 
laziness, and because of a lack of resistance to bad incitements'; the regime suitable to 
them is not so much that of punishment as of education, and if possible mutual 
education: isolation at night, work in common during the day ... Lastly, there are the 
'inept or incapable convicts', who are therefore incapable of competing in work with 
intelligent workers and who, having neither enough education to know their social 
duties, nor enough intelligence to understand this fact or to struggle against their 
personal instincts, are led to evil by their very incapacity. For these, solitude would 
merely encourage their inertia; they must therefore live in common ... " (Foucault, 
1979a:253-4). 
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In the eighteenth century, Foucault writes, side by side with 
disciplinary power, another form of bio-power emerged which was 
oriented toward a regulatory control over the population. This form of 
bio-power, he argues, operated i¾f'ast through the production of 
subjects. As I shall elaborate below, the subjects produced included the 
hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and 
the perverse adult. 
With an emergence of this bio-power, between the state and the 
individual, sex became a public issue.7 A whole web of discourses, 
analyses, knowledges centering on sex were produced. Through these 
discourses, a norm of sexual development from childhood to old age 
was defined, and all the possible deviations were carefully described. 
Not only the sexuality of the adult and adolescent was examined, but 
also the sexuality of the child, and the mad people. Foucault points out 
that there were four great strategies developed in the eighteenth 
century which formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power 
centering on sex: hysterization of women's bodies, pedagogization of 
children's sex, socialization of procreative behavior, and 
psychiatrization of perverse pleasure. Each of these strategies privileged 
certain targets as objects of knowledge and points for intervention, and 
in doing so, each produced a certain subject: the hysterical woman, the 
masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult 
(Foucault, 1979b:103-5). 
Foucault's work analyzes the relationships between power and the 
production of subjects. What kinds of insights does it have for 
Habermas's theory? I would like to point out that there can be two 
different ways of drawing insights from Foucault's work: one 
emphasizes the negative aspect of power; the other focuses on the 
7 This form of bio-power focuses on "population" as an economic and political problem: 
population as wealth, population as manpower, population balanced between its 
growth and the resources it demanded. At the heart of this economic and political 
problem of population was sex: it was necessary to analyze the birth rate, the age of 
marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate births, the precocity and frequency of sexual 
relations, the ways of making them fertile and sterile, the effects of unmarried life. Sex 
became a matter of public interest, a thing to be administered. "It was essential that 
the state know what was happening with its citizen's sex, and the use they made of it, 
but also that each individual be capable of controlling the use he made of it" (Foucault, 
1979b:25-6). 
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productive side of power. From the former perspective, one sees that 
the constitution of subjects is always linked to a negation and 
subjugation of the other.8 From the latter perspective, in contrast, one 
sees that power does not merely negates, it also produces. This 
perspective emphasizes the production of subjectivites as a mechanism 
through which power operates. In the following sections, I shall discuss 
each of these perspectives and show the kinds of challenge they pose to 
Habermas's theory. 
Foucault's challenge: an exclusion of the other 
Foucault understands his project as an attempt to show how we have 
indirectly constituted ourselves through the exclusion of some others: 
criminals, mad people, and so on. In constituting and identifying 
ourselves as the nondangerous, the good subjects, we have to identify 
the dangerous and the bad subjects as the other. The production of a 
class of dangerous subjects -- the delinquent -- is connected to the 
constitution of ourselves as the nondangerous, the good subjects. "The 
other" exists, only to be condemned, excluded, and transformed. 
In constituting and identifying ourselves, as the sane, the normal, 
we have to identify "the other" -- the insane, the abnormal. "The 
other" refers not only to other people, but also to other selves inside us. 
The constitution of ourselves, for instance, as the rational subject is 
accomplished by a subjugation of other selves inside us and an 
exclusion of them as the irrational. Foucault says, "the subject is either 
divided inside himself or divided from others" (Foucault, 1982:208). 
8 Love (1989:276-8) argues that Foucault allows us to see "subjectivity is already 
subjugation". The problem of Habermas's theory, she contends, is that it fails to protect 
otherness within self and within society. She argues that the debate between 
Habermas and Foucault defines the tasks of social and political theory by raising some 
important questions, one of which is: When does subjectivity become subjection? See 
Love, 1989; for a discussion of the debate between Habermas and Foucault. 
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Connolly (1987:106) describes the division within oneself as a 
bifurcated self. He points out that, on the one hand, we have an 
autonomous, rational, and responsible agent which endorses the 
normative order of the modern society, and when the self breaks the 
codes to which it has consented, it is held responsible for the 
infringement. On the other hand, in relation to the constitution of an 
autonomous, rational and responsible self, we have an exclusion of the 
other, including a locus of desires, feelings, and wishes, which does not 
fit within its confines. This modern rational self, as Connolly argues, is 
only an historical product. It should not be understood in a 
transcendental sense as the natural or true self. As there is not a natural 
or true self predesigned to fit neatly into the mould, the production of 
the modern rational self requires an exclusion of the other, that is, an 
exclusion of the selves which do not fit into the mode. In Connolly's 
words, 
the human is the incomplete animal, completed only 
within the frame of social form. But since humans 
were not designed to fit neatly into any social form, 
and since no ideal form has been predesigned to 
mesh with every desire and stirring within the self, 
every particular form of completion subjugates even 
while it realizes something in us, does violence to 
selves even while enabling them to be. (Connolly, 
1987:13) 
In an article titled "Foucault's challenge to critical theory", White 
(1986) also sees Foucault's contribution in terms of his reminding us of 
what has _been excluded, devalued, marginalized and unlearned in 
modern life. Specifically, in relation to the process of the formation of 
modern subjectivity, White says, there are some aspects of subjectivity 
that have been systematically excluded and devalued in the modern 
world. "Foucault allows us to glimpse in an arresting manner the 
degree to which subjectivity in modernity closes off access to the 
subject's own pre-rational, embodied otherness". This otherness can be 
referred to "the body and aesthetic-expressive capabilities" that are 
devalued and marginalized in the process of "our modern fixation on 
cognitive and juridical subjectivity" (White, 1986:424). 
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White considers that Foucault's challenge to Habermas's theory 
consists in questions of whether the conceptual framework of 
Habermas's theory is blind to a negative power, a power which negates 
and excludes the pre-rational, aesthetic self. White says, 
critical theory must continually hold itself open to 
the possibility that its own concepts make it blind to 
some dimensions of power. . .. If Foucault is right 
about the exclusion and devaluation of the body and 
the aesthetic-expressive capacities, then critical theory 
is obliged to press this question upon itself. (White, 
1986:424) 
While White's discussion, as I shall examine later, has its own 
problems, nevertheless, I agree with him that critical theory is obliged 
to press upon itself the question of "an exclusion of the other". I 
contend that Habermas's project, indeed, tends to subjugate, negate and 
exclude the other. To establish this, however, requires a close analysis 
of Habermas's discussion of the rational subject. 
In portraying a rational subject as one who is able and willing to 
provide grounds for assertions, Habermas has privileged the cognitive 
and juridical self at the expense of "the other", of the pre-rational self, 
or the self which does not fit into the mould. In Habermas's work, 
those who can provide grounds for their assertions are seen as rational; 
those who fail to demonstrate such competence are condemned as 
irrational. 
Rationality is understood to be a disposition of 
speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in 
modes of behavior for which there are good reasons 
or grounds. (Habermas, 1991:22) 
Anyone who is so privatistic in his attitudes and 
evaluations that they cannot be explained and 
rendered plausible by appeal to standards of 
evaluation is not behaving rationally. (Habermas, 
1991:17) 
In the examples given by Habermas, we could see that those who 
fail to justify their preferences or feelings according to the culturally 
established norms are regarded as irrational, as deviant, as the other. 
For instance, there is somebody who wants a saucer of mud. Habermas 
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states, this person is rational when the want can be justified according 
to certain culturally established standards, such as for the enjoyment of 
its rich river-smell. Those who fail to justify their expressions 
according to the established norms are defined as deviant. In the 
examples of a special liking for the smell of rotten apples and a 
horrified reaction to open spaces, Habermas says, those who explain 
their libidinous reaction to rotten apples by referring to the 
"infatuating", "unfathomable", "vertiginous" smell, or who explain 
their panicked reaction to open spaces by their "crippling", "leaden", 
"sucking" emptiness fail to meet with understanding in the everyday 
contexts of most cultures. Their failure to justify the evaluations 
according to the culturally established norms renders the experiences 
deviant (Habermas, 1991:17). 
While these examples are mainly concerned with institutionally 
bound speech-acts, Habermas is in fact more interested in 
institutionally unbound speech-acts of which the illocutionary force 
cannot be traced back to the binding force of the normative context. He 
sees that a rational person should be able to adopt a reflective attitude 
toward one's own cultural standards. 
We call a person rational who interprets the nature of 
his desires and feelings [Bedurfnisnatur] in the light 
of culturally established standards of value, but 
especially if he can adopt a reflective attitude to the 
very value standards through which desires and 
feelings are interpreted. (Habermas, 1991:20) 
Habermas ·asserts that, when challenged in institutionally unbound 
speech-acts, individuals have to justify their assertion by producing 
cogent arguments that are convincing in virtue of their intrinsic 
properties. The arguments cannot draw their force directly from the 
social force of norms or traditional values. They must provide 
arguments as if they are going to convince a universal audience. 
According to Habermas's theory, those who lack the intention to 
justify their feelings and attitudes, say, they might want to remain 
privatistic in their attitudes and preferences, are regarded as deviant. 
Moreover, those who lack the ability to engage in argumentation are 
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regarded as irrational. What Habermas fails to recognize is the fact that 
the intention and ability to engage in argumentation are very often 
connected with masculinity in modern societies. 
In a critique of Habermas's work, Fraser (1985:108) points out that 
the capacities for speech "are connected with masculinity in male-
dominated, classical capitalism. They are capacities which are in myriad 
ways denied to women and deemed at odds with femininity". She cites 
the studies about the effects of male dominance and female 
subordination in everyday communication between husbands and 
wives, and says: "The research shows that men tend to control 
conversations, determining what topics are pursued, while women do 
more 'interaction work' like asking questions and providing verbal 
support". From the research findings mentioned by Fraser, we can 
speculate that, compared with women, men tend to be more 
enthusiastic about argumentation and have argumentative ability. 
While women ask questions, men are the ones who answer, who make 
assertions and justify assertions. From this perspective, men's 
enthusiasm and capabilities for speech and argumentation should be 
seen as part of the problem of male dominance in our society. Failing to 
thematize the masculine subtext underlying the model of rational 
subjectivity, Habermas 's theory may only lend strength to the 
devaluation of women and femininity in a male-dominated society. 
Some feminists argue for a reconceptualization of social and 
political theory based on women's experiences. They do not only affirm 
women's experience and femininity, but also propose mothering and 
nurturance as the basis of new models for the moral-political 
community. For instance, in articulating an ethic of care, Gilligan 
(1988:xix,xx) argues for a positive recognition and revaluation of 
traditional feminine virtues of nurturance and compassion. She 
suggests that there is a different voice--a voice of care and connection--
to that of the dominant moral discourse. This voice represents neither 
a deficiency nor an anomaly, but rather an ethic of care: a distinctively 
feminine moral ground for decision-making and problem-solving, 
action and choice. 
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Miller (1976:38-9), on the other hand, argues that a devaluation of 
emotions is a serious cultural error. She points out that most women 
do have a greater sense of the emotional components of human 
activity than most men, partly as a result of their subordinated position 
in which they must learn to be attuned to the vicissitudes of pleasure 
and displeasure of the dominant group. Nevertheless, this 
characteristic of women should be treated as strengths or capacities; 
specifically, it represents the capacities to experience, express, and 
interpret emotions, to cultivate cooperativeness, and to facilitate 
working and living together. Furthermore, these capacities or 
characteristics of women "represent potentials that can provide a new 
framework, one which would have to be inevitably different from that 
of the dominant male society" (Miller, 1976:27). They could become the 
building blocks of a new and more humane culture. 
A more detailed discussion of their views is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, what should be emphasized is that from a 
feminist perspective, Habermas's work should be questioned in terms 
of its devaluation of women's experiences and abilities and an 
exclusion of them as the other. By defining rational subjectivity in 
terms of the abilities of speech and argumentation, Habermas's theory 
in effect excludes femininity and women as "the other". Measured 
against Habermas's standard of rational subjectivity, women are likely 
to be rejected as irrational. 
In short, Habermas's discussion of rational subjectivity implies an 
exclusion of "the other" -- the deviant, the irrational. In institutionally 
unbound speech-acts, those who fail to have argumentative abilities 
are considered as irrational; in institutionally bound speech-acts, those 
who remain privatistic in their attitudes and feelings are considered as 
deviant. 
As White notices, "the other" can be referred to the pre-rational, 
aesthetic self which fails to conform to Habermas's model. One should 
conclude that Habermas's theory is to be criticized because of its 
exclusion of the other. Yet, to my surprise, White does not come to the 
same conclusion. 
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White argues that though Habermas's project emphasizes the 
juridical and cognitive aspects of the subject, it does not completely 
neglect the aesthetic aspect; on the contrary, it provides us with the 
conceptual resources to link the juridical and cognitive aspects with the 
aesthetic subjectivity. Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics, 
White notes, shows that there are three general pragmatic functions of 
language, that is, the cognitive, interactive and aesthetic-expressive 
functions, each of which can provide the basis for understanding one of 
the aspects of subjectivity. Habermas's theory, he asserts, provides a 
more comprehensive framework for understanding different aspects of 
subjectivity: the cognitive, the juridical, and the aesthetic-expressive 
aspects (White, 1986:425). White concludes that Foucault's work does 
not successfully challenge Habermas's theory; Habermas's theory does 
not contain the kind of negative power that negates and excludes the 
aesthetic self. 
I would like to point out that White's conclusion is mistaken as it 
has confused Habermas's notion of aesthetic self with Foucault's 
notion of otherness. While Habermas does talk about the aesthetic self, 
it is not the kind of "pre-rational, embodied otherness" disclosed by 
Foucault's work. The aesthetic self that appears in Habermas's theory is 
treated as part of the modern structure of consciousness. It is to be 
analyzed as one of the spheres of validity. According to Habermas, the 
aesthetic-expressive aspect of subjectivity can be analyzed in terms of 
whether individuals' expression is truthful or not. When individuals 
reveal their subjective experience, they are laying a claim to 
authenticity and truthfulness. What is revealed can be challenged as 
whether it is a sincere and truthful expression. For Habermas, rational 
subjects should be ready and able to prove trustworthy, either by giving 
assurances to dispel doubts or bj allow,:,thers to check the consistency 
of their subsequent behavior. 
... We even call someone rational if he makes known 
a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or mood, 
shares a secret, confesses a deed, etc., and is then able 
to reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience 
by drawing practical consequences from it and 
behaving consistently thereafter. (Habermas, 1981:15) 
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In Habermas's view, though the redemption of the claim of 
truthfulness cannot be done on the basis of the mere force of argument, 
as in the case of truth and normative claims, one still needs to prove 
trustworthy by other means. The expression of our subjective feelings 
is to be open for objective appraisal. Proof is always required. While 
Habermas's theory affirms the existence of inner worlds, of subjective 
feelings and experiences, they have to be governed by the standard of 
rational subjectivity. Those who fail to prove trustworthy are 
rejected as irrational. In this sense, Habermas's discussion of the 
aesthetic self does not, as White believes, accommodate otherness; on 
the contrary, it excludes "the other" as irrational. 
The problems of White's discussion consist both in its confusing 
Habermas's notion of aesthetic self with Foucault's notion of 
otherness, and in its preoccupation with a juridico-discursive mode of 
analysis. A juridico-discursive mode of analysis not only represents 
power as one which negates, represses and excludes, but also seeks to 
submit power to the rule of right. It seeks to have a principle with 
which one can differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. As 
White is preoccupied with how to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate power, he comes to the question of how to distinguish 
legitimate forms of otherness from illegitimate forms. 
White argues that, while we should be more open to otherness, 
'otherness' is not just something to be fostered, but also constrained. 
He says that no theorists would give blanket endorsement to the 
explosions. of violence associate with, say resurgence of ethnic group 
nationalism in the Soviet Union or with the growth of street gangs in 
Los Angeles. It is necessary to engage in political reflection about the 
possible guidelines to distinguish different forms of otherness and to 
condemn some of them (White, 1991:133). 
White's focus on the question of differentiation of legitimate and 
illegitimate otherness leads him back to Habermas's communicative 
ethics, on the basis of which he suggests a notion of intersubjective 
otherness. He argues in line with Habermas that there is an obligation, 
implicit in linguistic interaction, to justify the norms one proposes. A 
just outcome can emerge only if the norms proposed are agreed on by 
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all those affected by the norms. In light of this, whether certain forms of 
otherness are to be fostered or constrained has to be tested in 
Habermas's model of argumentation. He asserts that only those which 
command consensus and intersubjectivity are to be regarded as 
legitimate (White, 1986:428; 1991:138-9). For White, the problem of 
Foucault's work lies in its inability to provide any criteria to 
distinguish different forms of otherness and resistance. He says that 
Foucault "provides us, ultimately, with no way of distinguishing the 
resistance of women's movement or the Polish Solidarity movement 
from, say, the Ku Klux Klan or Jim Jones's People's Temple" (White, 
1986:430). 
As Foucault's work is used by White in a juridico-discursive mode 
of analysis, its shortcomings seem to outweigh its insights. Though 
White regards the notion of otherness as Foucault's major 
contribution, he sees it as flawed from the beginning because it lacks a 
clear formulation that enables us to distinguish legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of otherness. Preoccupied with questions of 
legitimacy, White contends that Foucault's notion of otherness is not 
so much a useful basis in dealing the questions. 
To close my discussion of the thesis of "an exclusion of the other", 
several points must be noted. First of all, Foucault's analysis of the 
relationship between subject and subjugation reminds us whether our 
model of the subject implies an exclusion of the other. Accordingly, 
Habermas's model of rational subjectivity can be questioned in terms of 
its exclusion of women's experiences and abilities, as well a;Jthe pre-
rational, aesthetic self as the other. One should, however, notice that 
this way of drawing insights emphasizes the negative aspect of power. 
In this way it overlooks Foucault's further insights of a productive 
concept of power. Moreover, as it represents power in a negative way, 
one may, as White does, seek to submit power to the rule of right and 
search for a principle of legitimacy which Foucault refuses to provide. I 
suggest that in order to fully appreciate the nature and extent of 
Foucault's insights, one needs to read his work from the perspective of 
a strategic model. 
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Foucault's challenge: production of subjects 
When power is analyzed from the perspective of a strategic model, 
what concerns us is "the totality of the means put into operation to 
implement power effectively or to maintain it". Instead of asking 
"what legitimates power", one asks "how power is exercised"; "by what 
means power effects are maintained". In order to implement power 
effectively, Foucault argues, power cannot merely prohibit, negate and 
repress; power must be productive: power produces knowledge; power 
produces subjects. In Chapter 4 we have seen how power joins hands 
with knowledge; this chapter discusses how power operates through a 
production of subjectivity. We do not only have an alliance of 
knowledge-power, but a knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance in 
modern societies. 
Habermas's theory, which is preoccupied with the differentiation 
between legitimate and illegitimate power, overlooks the way in which 
power operates. For Habermas, legitimate power is to do with rational 
subjects engaging in free and undistorted discussion, whereas 
illegitimate power is to do with distorted communication and a 
negation of this modern rational subjectivity. The way he represents 
power, I argue, has two problems. Firstly, it represents power as 
negative. Foucault's work, in contrast, shows that power can be 
positive. Power does not necessarily operate through a negation of 
subjectivity; on the contrary, the operation of power may well involve 
a fostering rather than a suppressing of individuality, a production 
rather than a repression of subjectivity. Foucault's analysis, which 
shifts our attention to the concrete operation of power, can be used to 
show the inadequacy of Habermas's theory in capturing the productive 
aspects of power. Secondly, Habermas privileges a certain modern, 
rational subjectivity as the basis of critique, as our comfort. Foucault, in 
contrast, argues that power does not operate through a negation of a 
modern, rational subjectivity; on the contrary, it is through the 
modern, rational, autonomous, self-reflective subjectivity that modern 
forms of power operate. In this way, the comfort that Habermas's 
project provides in modern rational, reflective subjectivity is exposed 
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o.s bei~ misguided. In this section, I shall elaborate these insights of 
Foucault's strategic model. 
Foucault's analysis of disciplinary-normalizing power, I suggest, 
should not be read merely in terms of what it excludes and subjugates, 
but rather in terms of the subjectivity and individuality that it produces 
and fosters. This is where the novelty of Foucault's work lies. It 
demonstrates that individuals can be subjected to the power of 
normalization while at the same time experienci., individuality and 
subjectivity. 
In disciplinary processes, individuals are subject to procedures, 
norms, and controls, that is, the force of normalization. Nevertheless, 
Foucault argues, normalization is not exactly a force of expiation or 
even repression, but rather a power of individualization. It recognizes 
rather than negates individuality; it promotes rather than suppresses 
individuality. Normalization, Foucault elaborates, brings five quite 
distinct operations into play. In addition to homogenization and 
exclusion, the operations of normalization include comparison, 
differentiation, and hierarchization.9 Therefore, while a norm is set up 
as the rule, and those who fail to conform are condemned as the "bad" 
or the "shameful" class, nevertheless, the norm also functions as a 
standard for comparison, classification, hierarchization, and 
distribution of rank.1° The norm serves a power of individualization: it 
9 Foucault writes, "the art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed 
neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct 
operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of 
comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It 
differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that 
the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as 
an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and 
hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the 'nature ' of individuals. It 
introduces, through this 'value-giving' measure, the constraints of a conformity that 
must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to 
all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal (the 'shameful ' class of the 
Ecole Militaire). The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every 
instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, 
homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes" (Foucault, 1979a:182-3). 
10 Foucault gives the example of the military school Ecole Militaire in which "a 
complex system of 'honorary' classification was developed; this classification was 
made visible to all in the form of slight variations in uniform and more or less noble or 
ignoble punishments were associated as a mark of privilege or infamy, with the ranks 
thus distributed ... The first class, known as the 'very good', were distinguished by a 
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"individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine 
levels, to fix specialities and to render differences useful by fitting them 
one to another" (Foucault, 1979a:184). 
In contrast to the juridico-discursive mode of analysis which 
assumes that power simply negates, Foucault shows that the power of 
normalization does not merely operate according to the simple 
procedure of a division and rejection. It works in a more complicated 
way. It does not only reject and exclude but also compares and 
hierarchizes. It does not only impose homogeneity; it is also a power of 
individualization. 
Similarly, what is involved in the production of subjects of 
sexuality is not exactly a force of repression or expiation, but rather a 
power of individualization. While the heterosexual couple is seen as 
the norm or the legitimate couple and those who fail to conform are 
seen as abnormal or perverts, the procedure through which power 
operates is more than a simple division and rejection. One should not 
emphasize exclusion at the expense of other operations. Instead one 
should notice that individuals are compared, differentiated, and 
hierarchized according to their differing nature and qualities. Some 
kinds of sexuality are seen as more acceptable than others; some kinds 
of pursued pleasure are seen as more normal than others. Individuals 
come to recognize themselves as a subject with a certain nature and 
quality. They are marked by their own individuality. They are turned 
into a subject on the basis of a norm which functions as a technique of 
individualization. 
silver epaulette; they enjoyed the honor of being treated as 'purely military troops '; 
they therefore had a right to military punishment, (arrests and, in serious cases, 
imprisonment). The second class, the 'good', wore an epaulette of red silk and silver; 
they could be arrested and condemned to prison, but also to the cage and to kneeling. The 
class of 'mediocres' had the right to an epaulette of red wool; to the preceding penalties 
was added, if necessary, the wearing of sackcloth. The last class, that of the 'bad', was 
marked by an epaulette of brown wool; 'the pupils of this class will be subjected to all 
the punishments used in the Hotel, or all those that are thought necessary, even 
solitary confinement in a dark dungeon'. To this was added, for a time, the 'shameful' 
class, for which special regulations were drawn up 'so that those who belonged to it 
would be separated from the others and would be dressed in sackcloth"' (Foucault, 
1979a:181-2). 
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Besides showing that the power of normalization works is more 
complicated than simply a division and rejection, Foucault's strategic 
model helps us to focus on the totality of means by which power 
operates. In Chapter 4, we have seen that knowledge provides the 
internal condition for the exercise of power. In this chapter, we see that 
power operates not only through a production of knowledge but also 
through a production of subjects. We do not only have an alliance 
between power and knowledge, but a modern knowledge-power-
subjectivity alliance. In light of Foucault's strategic model, we should 
focus on how power operates according to the matrix of knowledge-
power-subjecti vi ty. 
In the beginning of Part II, I discussed how the functioning of the 
penitentiary apparatus of the prison requires the production of a new 
class of subjects--the delinquent. What should be noticed is that in 
relation to the production of the delinquent, a whole web of analyses 
and knowledges was built up. This defines and analyzes the ways in 
which the delinquent is different from the criminal. Knowledges of 
criminology are developed in relation to this new class of subjects. The 
task of criminology is not only to define the act scientifically qua 
offence, but to define the individual qua delinquent. The delinquent is 
fabricated as the point of application of power, and as the object of a 
form of knowledge that Foucault calls "penitentiary science". From the 
fabrication of the delinquent is witnessed a knowledge-power-
subjectivity alliance. 
In the area of sexual perversity, one can trace the exercise of power 
according to the knowledge-power-subjectivity matrix. According to 
Foucault, the "new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an 
incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals". 
The advance of the knowledge of psychiatry enables the production of a 
whole range of perverse subjects that awaits correction and therapeutic 
intervention. Psychiatry initially "set out to discover the etiology of 
mental illnesses, focusing its gaze first on 'excess', then onanism, then 
frustration, then 'frauds against procreation"', but gradually it annexed 
the whole of the sexual perversions as its own province (Foucault, 
1979b:30). With the psychiatrization of sexual perversions, there were 
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more and more categories created: "Krafft-Ebing's zoophiles and 
zooerasts, Rohleder's auto-monosexualists, and later mixoscopophiles, 
gynecomasts, prebyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts and dyspareunist 
women" (Foucault, 1979b:42-3). All these names referred to a nature. 
There was an incorporation of perversions, and a specification of the 
individuals according to these categories of sexual perversions. They 
provide surface for power intervention. The function of power 
operates not by an exclusion of these sexualities, but a solidification of 
each of them. Each of these categories is fabricated as an object of 
knowledge and as a target for power intervention. 
The most ironic thing is: the operation of power depends upon not 
only the production of perverse subjects, but the production of free, 
rational, and self-reflective subjects. Foucault (1979b) shows that in 
sexual liberation individuals are constituted as free, rational, and self-
reflective subjects; nevertheless, at the same time this enables them to 
be more deeply entangled in the network of power. 
The appearance of sexual liberation is related to people's thinking 
that they were too sexually repressed and needed above all liberation. 
In seeking liberation, they presuppose that there is a certain nature 
inside themselves to be liberated. They want to be free from all the 
rules, customs and prohibitions and enjoy their sexual nature. They 
want to throw away the taboos and talk about the things deep inside 
them. There is an incitement to talk about sex. A whole web of 
discourses, knowledges and analyses are produced to talk about the 
nature of sex, and to inform individuals what particular kind of sexual 
nature they have. In this way, on the one hand, there is an experience 
of freedom and autonomous subjectivity, on the other hand, 
individuals are subjected to new forms of practice of power-knowledge. 
In searching for their sexual nature, individuals require both the 
help of experts, be they psychologists, psychoanalysts or social workers, 
and the attention and care from the priest. To these experts and 
spiritual masters, individuals confess their thoughts and desires; they 
confess their sins. They go about telling, with the greatest precision, 
whatever is most difficult to tell. In order to obtain the truth about seX tAc,.,/ 
nature, confession is established as the major ritual through which 
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they can obtain the truth. "Western man has become a confessing 
animal". The ritual of confession is, nevertheless, unfolded within a 
power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence of a 
partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who 
requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in 
order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile (Foucault, 
1979b:61-2). Hence while through the ritual of confession, individuals 
are enlightened about the truth inside themselves, and are purified and 
have their burdens of wrongs taken away, yet at the same time 
individuals subject themselves to new relations of power. Confession 
liberates; nevertheless, at the same time it subjects individuals to new 
forms of power. 
In the example of sexual liberation, Foucault demonstrates the 
positive aspects of power that Habermas's theory fails to capture. He 
shows that power operates not by making sex a taboo, but rather 
through an incitement to talk about sex. Power no longer controls by 
repression, but by producing truths, by producing images of how to 
realize one's true sexual nature, of how to become a full, healthy, 
fulfilled sexual being. Foucault argues that in throwing away the 
previous sexual prohibitions, people subject themselves to new forms 
of power and new relations of domination. Po,ver no longer merely 
controls by prohibition, but by techniques of examination and self-
examination, practices of psychoanalysis and confession. In going for 
liberation, people feel that they are free from power, nevertheless they 
do not realize that they are at the same time entangled more deeply in 
networks of power to be escaped. 
Foucault's strategic model does not only draw our attention to the 
positive aspects of power, but also raises questions about a major 
assumption of Habermas's critical theory. Habermas's theory assumes 
that power has to do with distorted communication in which the 
modern, rational, autonomous, reflective subjectivity is negated . 
Foucault shows that modern forms of power actually operate ~ with a 
constitution of this subjectivity. In the example of sexual liberation, it is 
demonstrated that power operates through an incitement to talk about 
and reflect upon the sexual nature. Individuals are constituted as 
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autonomous and rational subjects who freely discuss sex; they are 
constituted as self-reflective subjects who seek a self-decipherment of 
their true nature. While power is put into operation, individuals are 
not deprived of a free and rational subjectivity; while they are subjected 
to the confessional technology of power, individuals are not deprived 
of an autonomous, self-reflective subjectivity. Instead they are 
experiencing a rational, autonomous, and self-reflective subjectivity 
when power is put into operation. 
In this sense, one could no longer rely upon a notion of rational, 
autonomous, self-reflective subjectivity to provide us. the basis of hope. 
Foucault's work exposes this misguided comfort in Habermas's theory. 
Habermas's notion of communicative action, which is considered as 
the basis of critique, relies upon an a priori theory of an autonomous, 
rational subject engaging in free, undistorted, reflective discussion. He 
does not realize that modern forms of power can operate with a 
constitution rather than a negation of rational and autonomous 
(inter)subjectivity. The operation of modern power actually relies upon 
a constitution of individuals as rational subjects who discuss sex freely, 
and a constitution of individuals as autonomous and self-reflective 
subjects who ponder their true nature. If modern forms of power can 
operate through the production of free, rational and self-reflective 
subjects, we can no longer lay our faith in Habermas's notion of 
rational, autonomous, reflective (inter)subjectivity. We should instead 
examine the involvement of this subjectivity in the deployment of 
modern power. 
Habermas's project therefore has to press upon itself not only the 
question of an exclusion of the other, but also the questions of whether 
it produces a modern rational subjectivity and whether this subjectivity 
is involved in the deployment of modern power. One may question 
whether the notion of a self-reflective subject, which has been 
governing the thought of the Frankfurt School and Habermas, forms 
part of the condition for the development of modern forms of power. 
Reflexivity, as Connolly (1987) elaborates, seeks to make all impulses 
that govern the self as well as all forces that govern the order 
transparent to the subject. Nevertheless, he argues, reflexivity is shown 
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to be a trap, for it draws us into confessional relationships and brings us 
more thoroughly within the orbit of normalization. 
Reflexivity is a trap. It obliges us to bring the self 
more completely under the control of historically 
constructed standards of reason and morality; it draws 
us into confessional relationships in which 
therapeutic authorities first translate our dreams, 
wishes, and anxieties into clinical vocabularies and 
then hand them back to us as officially prescribed 
avenues to freedom; and it sets the stage for political 
authorities to impose virtue on those who have not 
internalized the officially sanctioned standards of self-
consciousness. (Connolly, 1987:108) 
Habermas has been trying to move away from the notion of self-
consciousness and reflexivity, and instead talks about intersubjectivity. 
His theory, nevertheless, still presupposes an a priori notion of a 
responsible and rational subject who possesses certain attributes and 
capabilities. Responsible subjects, for him, are those who can orient 
their actions to intersubjectively recognized validity claims. In 
addition, throughout his work, human beings are considered as 
rational speaking and acting subjects when they are willing and able to 
provide grounds for their assertions, claims and expressed feelings. One 
may question whether the production of these notions of subjects 
provides the condition of existence for modern forms of power. For 
instance, one may ask: whether it is part of a body of discourses which 
are integrated with diverse institutions in the constitution of 
responsible and obedient citizens, and whether it sets the stage for 
political authorities to impose punishment on those "irresponsible" 
subjects who fail to orient their action to intersubjectively recognized 
validity claims. Or one may ask: whether it leads to an incitement not 
only to talk about feelings but to justify them, and whether it invites 
therapeutic intervention for those who fail to justify their feelings 
according to the standard of a rational speaking and acting subject. In 
short, one may question whether Habermas's notions of responsible 
and rational subjects bring us more thoroughly within the orbit of 
normalization. , 
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In Foucault's work, we see that there is a modern knowledge-
power-subjectivity alliance. Bodies of knowledges, for instance, 
psychiatry, are integrated into the functioning of the power of 
normalization and produce power effects in the constitution of 
subjectivi~s. In these knowledges the specification of a norm is 
inseparable from the specification of means of effecting normativity 
and correcting deviance. For instance, psychiatry, in defining what is 
our sexual nature, at the same time, specifies how we can fulfil or 
realize our nature as well as correct the attitudes or acts that violate this 
nature. Psychiatry is integrated with institutional practice which 
corrects deviance and constitutes individuals as normal, fulfilled 
sexual beings. Habermas's theory, of course, has a different nature from 
psychiatry. One cannot simply conclude that Habermas's theory would 
function in the same way as psychiatry, for while it specifies a norm of 
the rational subject, it is far from a specification which corrects 
deviance and effects normativity. Nevertheless, discourses of the 
rational subject may take form in knowledges of ethics and pedagogy 
which are integrated with the functioning of the power of 
normalization. Hence Habermas's theory has to be reminded of the 
danger of incorporation into a modern knowledge-power-subjectivity 
alliance. 
In suggesting this about Habermas's theory, I do not intend to reject 
the theory on a normative ground. My reading of Foucault's work here 
is based on a strategic model rather than a normative model. A strategic 
model is concerned with the means by which the effects of power are 
maintained, whereas a normative model focuses on the differentiation 
between legitimate and illegitimate power, acceptable and unacceptable 
power. Reading Foucault from a normative model may lead one to 
reject Habermas's work on a normative ground. Fraser (1985:177-81), 
for instance, provides a reading of Foucault from a normative model. 
She is interested in whether Habermas's theory is normatively 
acceptable or unacceptable, and Foucault's work is read as providing an 
answer to this normative question. 
Fraser argues that Foucault's work can be read as a rejection of 
humanism on normative grounds, and Habermas's conceptualization 
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of autonomy is one of its targets. In her view, "Foucault is claiming that 
even a perfectly realized autonomous subjectivity would be a form of 
normalizing, disciplinary domination", that even if Habermas's ideal 
speech situation was realized, this would not be freedom. For these 
humanist ideals are the very goals of disciplinary power: a fully 
panopticized society in which the disciplinary norms are so thoroughly 
internalized that they would not be experienced from without and that 
individuals would be autonomous. Fraser understands Foucault's 
challenge as this: "even Habermas's version of humanist ideals is 
internal to the disciplinary regime and devoid of critical, emancipatory 
force with respect to it. Thus such ideals should be rejected on 
normative grounds" (Fraser, 1985:180). 
While Foucault's work exposes our misguided comfort in ideals of 
rational, autonomous subjectivity and shows that they can be an 
internal condition for the exercise of power, nevertheless, I contend, it 
is not intended to serve as a normative ground on which we should 
reject these ideals. What Foucault shows is the danger of these ideals. 
To say that they are dangerous is, however, not exactly the same as 
saying they are bad.11 There should not be a simple rejection of these 
ideals on a normative ground, but rather a scrutiny of them in terms of 
their role in the deployment of modern power. 
Reading Foucault from a normative model tends to see Foucault's 
weakness outweigh its strengths. Just as White does, Fraser seems to 
see some of Foucault's insights, but gets caught up with the normative 
question, she criticizes Foucault in terms of a failure to provide a 
normative ground of critique. Fraser (1985:180) criticizes that a 
normative rejection of humanism requires appeal to some alternative, 
posthumanist, ethical paradigm capable of identifying objectionable 
features of a fully realized autonomous society. Foucault's failure to 
provide such a normative basis leads Fraser to conclude that Foucault 
has not given us good reasons to reject humanism on normative 
grounds. 
11 Foucault says: "My point is not that everything is bad, but rather everything is 
dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad" (Foucault, 1986a:343). 
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Fraser does not realize that it is indeed not Foucault's intention to 
give good normative reasons for us to reject humanism or Habermas's 
theory. Foucault wants to show us the modern knowledge-power-
subjectivity alliance and the danger of being incorporated into this 
alliance. From the perspective of a strategic model, Habermas's theory 
is not to be rejected as a negative power, but rather reminded of the 
danger of being integrated into the functions of modern power. 
The questions left are: how can we avoid such a danger? what 
could we do about the modern knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance? 
In Chapter 4, I have discussed Foucault's calling for the 
insurrection of subjugated knowledges. He gives endorsement to their 
struggles against the domination of scientific knowledges; yet he does 
not seek to provide any theory to support them or to unite them 
according to a notion of truth. For Foucault, this would be in danger of 
constructing with our own hands the kind of systematic, unitary 
discourses of truth that we struggle against. 
In relation to the problem of subjectivity, Foucault is happy to see 
the struggles against the submission of subjectivity, that is "against that 
which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this 
way (struggles against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and 
submission)". He contends that these struggles represent "a refusal of a 
scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is" 
(Foucault, 1982:212-3). Nevertheless, in his latest studies of the Greek 
aesthetics of existence, he seems to articulate a certain notion of the 
aesthetic subject. Does he, as his critics understand it, try to provide a 
ground of critique or a ground for resistance? 
In Part III, I shall discuss Foucault's idea of an aesthetics of existence 
and show how it helps us reflect upon resistance against the modern 
knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance. I shall also take issue with 
criticisms of the inadequacies of Foucault's idea as a normative basis. 
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5.3 An Aesthetics of Existence 
There are some critics who view Foucault's idea of an aesthetics of 
existence as an attempt to provide a normative ground of critique. 
White (1986), for instance, contends that Foucault was notoriously 
reluctant to engage in extensive speculation about a new kind of 
subjectivity, but in some of his last work the outlines of an aesthetic do 
appear. White argues that Foucault's notion of an aesthetic subject is 
nevertheless flawed for its inadequacy in providing a basis for the 
endorsement of new social movements. He contends that what 
Foucault needs is a notion of juridical subjectivity that one can find in 
Habermas's work. Wolin (1986), in a critique of Foucault, views 
Foucault's aestheticism as an exclusive primacy of an artistic approach 
to life, in opposition to science and morality. He criticizes this approach 
as being extremely one-sided and inadequate, since it provides no trace 
of human solidarity or mutuality, and is insensible to other human 
values. 
I suggest that Foucault's idea of the Greek aesthetics of existence 
should not be read as a normative ground that Foucault provides for 
critique. Nor should it be seen as an attempt to set up an a priori theory 
of the subject for the endorsement of resistance.12 As one can see what 
he does to the subjugated knowledges, he stands by the side of these 
knowledges but he never provides any theory to support them or to 
unite them according to a notion of truth. Similarly, he is not ready to 
provide a theory of the subject to become the center of a new 
philosophy. For Foucault, this would be in danger of constructing with 
our own hands the kind of systematic, unitary discourses of truth and 
subject that we struggle against. 
12 I acknowledge that there may be some confusion with Foucault's position toward the 
Greek ethics. For instance, in an interview, he seems to treat it as a basis, a principle 
that assures us from the danger of domination. He says, "if you care for yourself 
correctly i.e. if you know ontologically what you are ... you cannot abuse your power over 
others. There is therefore no danger" (Foucault, 1988a:8). This is, however, not the 
stance he takes in his studies of the ancient ethics. See Foucault, 1987; 1990. 
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Therefore, although in his last works Foucault seems to pay a lot of 
attention to the Greek aesthetics of existence and their practice of care 
for self, nevertheless, in contrast to his critics' understanding, he does 
not intend to treat it as a basis, a principle to be rediscovered or as a key 
to everything. In an interview, Foucault agrees that we may try to 
actualize the notion of care for self in the struggle against modern 
forms of power; nevertheless, he says: 
I am not doing that in order to say: "Unfortunately 
we have forgotten the care for self. Here is the care for 
self. It is the key to everything". Nothing is more 
foreign to me than the idea that philosophy strayed at 
a certain moment of time, and that it has forgotten 
something and that somewhere in her history there 
exists a principle, a basis that must be rediscovered ... 
This does not mean that contact with such and such a 
philosopher cannot produce something but we would 
have to understand that this thing is new. (Foucault, 
1988a:14-S) 
Perhaps we may expect that our contact with notions of care for self and 
aesthetics of existence could produce something, and this 'something', I 
suggest, is a glimpse of the possibility of a form of becoming a subject 
which is not tied to the modern forms of power. 
In Volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault shows how 
power makes individuals subjects. In Volume 2 and 3, the focus of his 
study shifts to individuals themselves, and examines how individuals 
turn themselves into subjects through practices of self. As the study 
focuses on· the way in which subjects constitute themselves in an active 
fashion, one may question whether this contradicts his earlier study 
which portrays individuals as passive subjects, and whether this shift 
implies an attempt to set up an a priori theory of subject which ignores 
the problem of power. 
It cannot be denied that there is a theoretical shift in Foucault's 
work;13 nevertheless, this does not mean that it returns to an a priori 
theory of the subject as an autonomous, rational agent who stands 
13 In an interview, Foucault explains the shifts of focus in the three volumes of The 
History of Sexuality; see Foucault, 1986b. 
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outside power and resists power. For there is no absence of power in 
the process of self-constitution, and the practices through which 
subjects constitutes themselves are linked to subjection. These 
practices, as Foucault says, are not something that individuals invent 
by themselves, but rather patterns that they find in their culture, which 
are proposed, suggested and imposed on them by their society and 
social group (Foucault, 1988a:11). In other words, the problem of 
subjection still exists in the self-constitution. Nevertheless, in 
analyzing different modes of subjection, I contend, Foucault shows us 
an alternative way of self-constitution to the one associated with 
modern forms of power. 
In the constitution of oneself as an ethical subject, one has to be 
subjected according to rules of conduct. Nevertheless, there can be 
different modes of subjection, and Foucault would like to draw our 
attention to the mode of subjection associated with the Greek aesthetics 
of existence. He writes, there are different modes of subjection, that is, 
different ways in which individuals establish their relation to the rule 
and thereby feel obliged to follow the rule. For example, with regard to 
the rule of conjugal fidelity, individuals can comply with it because of 
customary reasons; that is, they acknowledge themselves as a member 
of the group that accepts it, and hence silently preserves it as a custom. 
Individuals can practise it for religious reasons, that is, they regard 
themselves as belonging to a spiritual tradition, and hence follows the 
rule according to the sacred text or divine law. On the other hand, one 
can practise fidelity because of an aesthetic of existence, that is, one's 
"seeking to give one's personal life a form that answers to criteria of 
brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection". (Foucault, 1987:27) 
An "aesthetics of existence", Foucault elaborates: 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which 
men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but 
also seek to transform themselves, to change 
themselves in their singular being, and to make their 
life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic 
values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (Foucault, 
1987:10-11) 
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The theme of an aesthetics of existence can be found in Baudelaire's 
idea of "dandyism". The dandy is the individual who makes his body, 
his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence a work of art. 
There is a determination to live a beautiful life and to leave others 
memories of a beautiful existence (Foucault, 1986f:41-2). As an aesthetic 
of existence seeks to fulfil certain aesthetic values and stylistic criteria, 
its mode of self-constitution is very different from that of a juridical 
form of morality which lends support to modern forms of power. 
According to Foucault, one of the examples of a juridical form of 
morality is Christian morality.14 What is emphasized is a codification 
of behavior, a strict definition of what is permitted and what is 
forbidden; what is valued is the systematicity of codes, its richness, its 
capacity to embrace every possible case and every area of behavior; what 
is important is the authority that enforces the code, that requires it to be 
learned and observed, that penalizes violations of the code. With a 
juridical form of morality, one constitutes oneself as an ethical subject 
by observing universal laws, in the respect of an authority and in the 
fear of punishment. "[T]he ethical subject refers his conduct to a law, or 
sets of laws, to which he must submit at the risk of committing offences 
that may make him liable to punishment" (Foucault, 1987:29-30). 
In contrast to the Christian juridical form of morality, Foucault 
writes, the Greek morality aims at an aesthetics of existence in which 
the system of codes and rules of behavior are rather rudimentary. 
When constituting oneself as an subject, the exact observance of the 
code is relatively unimportant. The emphasis is rather placed on the 
relationship one has with oneself, on the practices that enable one to 
transform one's mode of being (Foucault, 1987:30). Compared to the 
juridical form of morality, 
the individual did not make himself into an ethical 
subject by universalizing the principles that informed 
his action; on the contrary, he did so by means of an 
attitude and a quest that individualized his action, 
modulated it, and perhaps even gave him a special 
14 In particular, Foucault (1987:30) is referring to the Christian morality since the 
development of the penitential system in the thirteen century up to the eve of the 
Reformation. 
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brilliance by virtue of the rational and deliberate 
structure his action manifested. (Foucault, 1987:62) 
The Greek morality, in Foucault's view, is unlike the Christian 
morality which might lend support to modern forms of power. A 
comparison of the Greek and Christian morality of sexual behavior 
helps illustrate why this is so. Their difference, according to Foucault, 
lies firstly in the ethical substance and secondly in the form of 
subjection. In terms of ethical substance, the Greek sexual ethic focuses 
on the aphrodisia, that is, "acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a 
certain form of pleasure" (Foucault, 1987:40). Similar to the pleasures of 
food and drink, sexual pleasure is liable to the danger of self-
indulgence. Hence for the Greeks, the concern was whether it is 
excessive. Moderation was emphasized in teachings: only when one 
constituted oneself as a moderate subject and exhibited a voluntary self-
mastery over one's desires was one considered to be free. Individual 
freedom was not understood as the independence of a free will, nor 
was it the will of an all-powerful agency. Freedom was not to be the 
slave (Foucault, 1987:79). When one seeks an aesthetics of existence and 
makes a beautiful life one's goal, one exercises perfect dominion over 
oneself. One supervises one's body and soul, and shapes ones conduct by 
moderation. No excess or violence is to disturb the beautiful order.15 
In classical Greek thought, sexual activity was associated with a 
force that was potentially excessive by nature. The question was how to 
control and regulate it. · Christian morality, in comparison, is also 
concerned about the excessive force of desires. Nevertheless, in the 
Christian doctrine of the flesh, the excessive force of desires led to the 
fall of mankind and marked the internal weakness of human nature. 
One is hence not just preoccupied with the question of excess but the 
profound nature of desires, their canonical forms and their secret 
lS Foucault writes, "We may also recall Xenophon's idealized description of Cyrus' 
court, which presented a vision of beauty for its own enjoyment, due to the perfect 
dominion that each individual exercised over himself; the ruler publicly exhibited a 
mastery and a restraint that spread to everyone, issuing out from them, according to the 
rank they held, in the form of a moderate conduct, a respect for oneself and for others, a 
careful supervision of the soul and the body, and a frugal economy of acts, so that no 
involuntary and violent movement disturbed the beautiful order that seemed to be 
present in everyone's mind ... " (Foucault, 1987:91). 
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potential (Foucault, 1987:39-40). In the Christian morality of sexual 
behavior, the ethical substance is defined by "a domain of desires that 
lie hidden among the mysteries of the heart" (Foucault, 1987:62). 
Precautions have to be taken in order to prevent desire from secretly 
entering the soul and destroying the soul. While the Greek ethic 
requires one to exercise self-mastery, the Christian morality requires 
one to detect the secret traces of desires. The relationship that one has 
with oneself takes the forms of decipherment, confession, self-
accusation, struggles against temptation, renunciation, spiritual 
combat, and so on (Foucault, 1987:63). In contrast to the Greek ethic in 
which the self-relationship is one of "command-obedience", or 
"mastery-docility", the Christian morality emphasizes a self-
relationship of "decipherment-purification" (Foucault, 1987:70). 
As the Christian morality stresses the profound nature of desires 
and self-decipherment, it represents the form of morality which 
supports modern forms of power.1 6 For the focus on the profound 
nature and canonical forms of desires makes the question of knowledge 
and truth central to the formation of the ethical subject. One is to 
search for the truth of desire and to be guided by the truth. This will to 
truth lends support to the modern forms of power. Moreover, 
individuals make themselves into an ethical subject by self-
decipherment. Unlike the kind of self-supervision in the Greek ethic 
which is an exercise of freedom, self-decipherment in the Christian 
morality requires the advice of pastors or masters. Individuals are 
questioned, examined, and analyzed. They are subjected to the 
authority and control of someone else. This is in accord with the 
development of modern confessional practices in which individuals 
are subjected to the authority and control of professionals and experts. 
In addition to the difference in ethical substance, the Greek and the 
Christian moralities of sexual behavior differ in their form of 
subjection. In the Christian morality, subjection is to take the form of a 
16 See Foucault, 1993, for a contrast of Christianity with other ancient ethics in terms of 
their practices of self-examination and their subjects' relations to truth. Foucault points 
out that Seneca, for instance, examines with himself as an administrator. The 
vocabulary used is administrative rather than judicial. 
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recognition of the law. The law is imposed on everyone to embrace 
every area of behavior and every possible act. The law specifies the sets 
of acts that are allowed and forbidden, their forms and their conditions. 
The Greeks, on the contrary, "would never say, like a Christian 
spiritual director, which gestures to make or avoid making, which 
preliminary caresses were allowed, which position to take, or in which 
conditions one should interrupt the act" (Foucault, 1987:38-39) 
Subjection, in the Greek ethic, is to take the form of a savoir-faire. That 
is, while there might be certain general, formal principles that guide 
behavior, the emphasis is on a practice that adapts behavior according 
to time, circumstance and need. There is not any precise code that 
prescribes everybody's acts. 
There were several general principles guiding the use of pleasures 
in Greek ethics which specified that it was to be practiced according to 
need, time, and status (Foucault, 1987:54-62). Firstly, the principle of 
need. While the use of pleasures was regulated by need, it was not to 
reduce pleasure to nothing; on the contrary, it was to maintain pleasure 
and to do so through the need that awakened desire. To observe the 
principle of need enabled one to avoid excess or immoderation. It 
provided for what was necessary to the body, for what was necessary by 
nature. Yet unlike Christian morality, need could never take the form 
of a precise codification or a law applicable to everyone alike in every 
circumstance. 
Secondly, in the use of pleasures, morality was an art of the "right 
time". This can be referred to a few things: the age of one's life, the 
right time or season of a year, and the right time of a day. Besides, it 
referred to the choice of moment for sexual activity, which had to 
depend on circumstances and other activities. If one served as a good 
example of moderation, it was not because one had renounced 
pleasures, but that one knew how to distribute pleasures over the 
course of existence, and not permitting them to divert one from 
work. Again there could not be a table or a precise code that prescribed 
one's choice of moment. 
Thirdly, the art of the use of pleasure had to be adapted according to 
one's status. The Greeks might not reproach people of humble and 
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insignificant status even when they committed a dishonourable act. On 
the other hand, for those who attained distinct status, a small mistake 
would bring disgrace. They were expected to adopt self-mastery and a 
deliberate rigorous standards of sexual conduct. The more one was in 
1 rM€. 
the public eye, the more was expectedl\by people, and the more one 
had to seek to make one's life into a brilliant work whose reputation 
would spread and last long. 
In short, 
here everything was a matter of adjustment, 
circumstance, and personal position .... And for this 
there was no need of anything resembling a text that 
would have the force of law, but rather, of a techne or 
"practice", a savoir-faire that by taking general 
principles into account would guide action in its 
time, according to its context, and in view of its ends. 
(Foucault, 1987:62) 
The Greek ethic is not oriented toward a codification of acts, nor toward 
a hermeneutics of desires, but toward a stylization of attitudes and an 
aesthetics of existence. It i50vstylization because the rules of conduct 
presented themselves as a sort of open-ended requirement (Foucault, 
1987:92). One is to give oneself a style that merits remembrance. For the 
Greeks, "reflection on sexual behavior as a moral domain was not a 
means of internalizing, justifying, or forma-lizing general interdictions 
imposed on everyone; rather, it was a means of developing ... an 
aesthetics of existence" (Foucault, 1987:253). 
In exam1n1ng different modes of self-constitution, Foucault 
provides us with a glimpse of the possibility of a form of becoming the 
subject which is not in line with that of modern forms of power. 
Nevertheless, this is not an alternative which stands outside power-
knowledge. The Greek ethic is also integrated with practices of power-
knowledge. Yet, the type of knowledge it seeks and the relationship 
between the subject and truth are different from what we have in 
modern societies. 
In disciplinary processes, the exercise of power requires the 
production of knowledge and truth. Similarly, in antiquity, "one could 
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not practise moderation without a certain form of knowledge that was 
at least one of its essential conditions. One could not form oneself as an 
ethical subject in the use of pleasures without forming oneself at the 
same time as a subject of knowledge" (Foucault, 1987:86). For example, 
in practising the Greek ethic of sexual behavior, one needs the 
knowledge of what is the right age to begin the practice of pleasure; one 
also needs to know what is the right time of a day to have sexual 
activity so as to be beneficial to the body. In other words, when one 
seeks for an aesthetics of existence, knowledge and truth play an 
indispensable role. The question is: what type of knowledge does it 
require? As seen in the Greek and Christian sexual moralities, 
knowledge can be differentiated according to whether it is oriented to Q.. 
codification of acts that prescribes all our behavior, or whether it is a 
sort of open-ended requirement that allows adjustments to 
circumstances and encourages a stylization of behavior. 
Of further importance is: in what way do we relate to truth and 
knowledge? Behind the development of modern forms of power is a 
will to truth: one is demanded to pursue the truth, to speak the truth, 
to reflect upon one's true nature. In contrast, when one seeks for an 
aesthetics of existence, one cares for truth because one cares for self. The 
care for self is put before the care for truth. To care for self means to 
master one's appetites, to improve one's self, to surpass one's self. The 
care for self requires knowledge of certain rules of conduct which are 
at the same time truths and regulations. To care for self is to fit one's 
self with these truths (Foucault, 1988a:5). Nevertheless, in what way 
should we· fit ourselves with these truths? In an aesthetics of existence, 
one cares for truth only because one cares for self. What is established is 
an instrumental relationship with truth. The truth is pursued for a 
certain end, for instance, in order to ensure a certain use of pleasures. 
What one seeks is a practical reason that guides what one ought to do, 
that helps one adapt behavior according to need, time, and 
circumstance. 
In Greek antiquity, the relation to truth was an instrumental 
condition "for establishing the individual as a moderate subject leading 
a life of moderation; it was not an epistemological condition enabling 
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the individual to recognize himself in his singularity as a desiring 
subject and to purify himself of the desire that was thus brought to 
light". While the pursuit of truth was an essential factor in the self-
constitution of the subject, nevertheless, "it was not equivalent to an 
obligation of the subject to speak truthfully concerning himself; it 
never opened up the soul as a domain of potential knowledge where 
barely discernible traces of desire needed to be read and interpreted" 
(Foucault, 1985:89). Hence the pursuit of truth in the Greek aesthetics of 
existence is unlike the will to truth which lends support to the 
development of modern forms of power. 
What must be emphasized is that Foucault's idea of an aesthetic 
subject should not be read as an attempt to construct an a priori theory 
of the subject as the basis of resistance. In contrast to Habermas, 
Foucault does not set up an a priori notion of the subject who stands 
outside power and resists power. Instead, he talks about a way of 
becoming the subject which is inseparable from practices of power-
knowledge. This way of becoming the subject, as found in the Greek 
aesthetics of existence, involves subjection and pursuits of truth and 
knowledges. Nevertheless, the mode of subjection and the way in 
which the subject relates to truth and knowledges are different from 
what one has in modern western societies. While individuals are 
subjected to rules, Foucault's view of aesthetics emphasizes not a 
subjection to a universal and precise code, but rather a practice which 
adapts behavior according to circumstances and needs. While truth and 
knowledges are required for self-constitution, they are sought only for a 
certain specific use. Individuals are not expected to search for the truth. 
In contrast to Habermas's pursuit of the true nature of rational subjects, 
individuals who opt for an aesthetics of existence are not expected to 
ponder their true nature, to reveal the truth, or to speak the truth. They 
are, therefore, not drawn into confessional relationships in which 
certain authorities interpret their nature and prescribe their way to 
freedom. 
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Conclusion 
In contrast to Habermas's claim of his project moving away from the 
philosophy of the subject, I point out that his theory of communicative 
action still relies upon an a priori notion of the modern rational subject 
who possesses certain linguistic competences. Habermas 's reliance 
upon a certain notion of modern rational subject not only reveals his 
failure to overcome the problems of the philosophy of the subject, but 
also allows Foucault to say something about his project. I argue that 
there are two kinds of challenge that Foucault has for Habermas: one 
uses Foucault's thesis of an exclusion of otherness to criticize 
Habermas; the other considers Habermas 's weakness from the 
perspective of a strategic model. 
In terms of the thesis of an exclusion of otherness, Habermas 's 
discussion of the rational subject, which emphasizes both the 
obligation and competence of providing grounds for one 's claims, 
excludes and condemns those who fall below the standard as the other. 
Specifically, it excludes those who remain privatistic about their 
feelings or those who refuse to fulfil the obligation of the rational 
subject as deviant. It also excludes those who lack argumentative 
capabilities as irrational, and they are likely to be women in a male-
dominated society. In demanding that we prove our claims and justify 
our feelings, Habermas fails to recognize that his demand implies a 
subjugation of the other. 
While one may criticize Habermas in terms of an exclusion of the 
other, nevertheless, I contend that this way of drawing insights from 
Foucault presupposes a negative concept of power that Foucault 
himself seeks to surpass. It assumes that if Habermas's project has a 
problem, it has to do with its negating a certain subjectivity. I argue that 
when considering Foucault 's challenge from the perspective of a 
strategic model, the problem of Habermas is not so much an exclusion 
of the other as a production of certain modern subjectivities. 
209 
11: 
1, 
IV 
I 
I 
:I 
Habermas's theory of communicative action presupposes an a 
priori notion of an autonomous, rational subject who engages in free, 
undistorted, and reflective discussion. It overlooks the fact that modern 
forms of power operate precisely through a production of rational and 
autonomous subjectivity. The operation of modern forms of power 
relies upon a constitution of individuals as rational subjects who freely 
discuss their sex, or as autonomous and reflective subjects who ponder 
their true nature. Instead of merely pressing upon itself the question of 
an exclusion of the other, I suggest that Habermas's theory has to be 
questioned in terms of its production of certain modern subjectivites 
which may provide the condition of existence for modern forms of 
power. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, Habermas's ideal of a 
rational, autonomous, and reflective (inter)subjectivity is exposed to be 
misguided comfort. Modern subjectivities, in addition to truths and 
knowledges, are shown to be involved in the operation of power. What 
shall we do with this modern knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance? 
Foucault's discussion of the Greek aesthetics of existence, I contend, 
should not be read as a theory of the subject which provides us a new 
basis of hope. Instead, it provides us with an example of a form of 
becoming the subject which is not in line with the modern practices of 
power-knowledge. This example, however, is not to be copied or 
transplanted in any society. It only allows us to have a glimpse of who.t 
an alternative knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance might look like. 
One has to start thinking about that alternative in one's own specific 
cultural site of struggle. Moreover, one must bear in mind that, in 
seeking to have an alternative, the "alternative" should not be 
imagined as something outside the power-knowledge practices. One is 
rather playing another game within the practices that are available. 
As Foucault says, "[w]e escaped then a domination of truth, not by 
playing a game that was a complete stranger to the game of truth, but in 
playing it otherwise or in playing another game, another set, other 
trumps in the game of truth" (Foucault, 1988a:15). The Greek aesthetics 
of existence, for instance, also requires one to submit to truth. 
However, one cares for truth only because one cares for self. Truth is 
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only pursued for a certain specific use. The pursuit of truth does not 
demonstrate a will to truth which lends itself to an intensification of 
modern forms of power. Instead, it serves the transformation of one's 
life into a free and beautiful existence. What we need are therefore 
innovative ways of self-constitution and of using truth which may 
subvert the modern knowledge-power-subjectivity alliance. Foucault's 
discussion of the Greek aesthetics of existence, as I showed, helps us 
reflect upon who.t they might look like. 
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Chapter 6 
ENLIGHTENMENT, POWER AND CRITIQUE 
In a critique of Horkheimer and Adamo's Dialectic of Enlightenment, Habermas 
(1982b) comments that enlightened thinking has been understood as an 
opposing force to myth, and yet Horkheimer and Adorno proclaim that 
"[m]yth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology". 
In Habermas's view, the critique of enlightenment provided by Horkheimer 
and Adorno is one-sided and totalizing. For it sees that "the process of 
enlightenment is from the very beginning dependent on an impulse of self-
preservation which mutilates reason because it can only make use of it in the 
form of purposive-rational domination of nature and instinct" (Habermas, 
1982b:17). Therefore, Habermas continues, what it sees about enlightenment is 
a domination of an objectified external nature and a repressed inner nature; 
what it sees is: enlightenment is domination. Habermas criticizes this view of 
enlightenment as one-sided since it fails to affirm the achievements of the 
Enlightenment which manifest elements of reason. Moreover, he contends 
that their critique is totalizing since it turns against reason and deprives itself 
of the ground of critique. 
In Habermas's view, Foucault's critique has made the same mistake.I He 
comments that Foucault's totalizing critique turns against truth and deprives 
itself of the ground of critique. For him, Foucault's last essays on 
Enlightenment demonstrate that he has come to recognize the mistake he 
made and seeks to have a notion of reason to ground his critique. Habermas 
says, Foucault 
1 In his critique of Horkheimer and Adorno, Habermas refers to the works of Nietzsche and 
Foucault as the other variant of the totalizing critique. He says that Foucault sees a pluralism 
of power/ discourse formations which can be differentiated according to their style and 
intensity, but cannot be judged in terms of their validity. See Habermas, 1982b, pp.28££. Also 
see Habermas, 1987a, for his most systematic critique of Foucault. 
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contrasts his critique of power with the "analysis of truth" 
in such a fashion that the former becomes deprived of the 
normative yardsticks that it would have to borrow from the 
latter. Perhaps the force of this contradiction caught up 
with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him again 
into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity 
which he thought he could explode. (Habermas, 1986:108) 
For Habermas, Foucault's later writings, which identify the connection of 
his project with the Enlightenment, represent a pro-Enlightenment stance 
which contradicts his anti-Enlightenment position in the earlier work. 
Foucault, indeed, identifies Enlightenment as a certain attitude, a certain 
philosophizing ethos, which characterizes his project. But does it mean that 
Foucault is now identifying with the Enlightenment and seeks to remain 
within its tradition? Does it mean that Foucault is now affirming the 
achievements of the Enlightenment and treating them as elements of reason 
that have to be preserved? Has Foucault adopted, as Habermas sees it, 
contradictory positions in his discussions of Enlightenment? 
Before discussing Foucault's ideas of Enlightenment, there is a need to 
clarify two related but distinct senses of "Enlightenment": one referring to a 
historical period; the other referring to a certain attitude or orientation. When 
Foucault says that the Enlightenment, which discovered liberties, also 
invented the disciplines, he is referring to "Enlightenment" as a historical 
period. In contrast, his later work on "What is Enlightenment?" discusses 
Enlightenment as a certain attitude or a certain way of philosophizing that has 
affinities with his project. What must be noticed is that while Foucault uses 
the term "Enlightenment" in these two sense; he treats them as relatively 
independent. His approach to Enlightenment is: what is to be made of 
Enlightenment? He does not see that there is a certain orientation that defines 
the essence of the Enlightenment period. Instead, for him, based on different 
perspectives and purposes, one can approach that period in different ways 
and make different things out of it. 
Habermas's use of the term "Enlightenment" also contains these two 
senses. Nevertheless, in contrast to Foucault's treating them as relatively 
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independent, he tends to see that it is the Enlightenment attitude or 
orientation which defines the Enlightenment period. In arguing against a 
totalizing critique of Enlightenment, Habermas maintains that there are 
achievements of the Enlightenment that should not be overlooked. Here 
Habermas's use of "Enlightenment" mainly refers to a historical period. But 
why does he say that we should not overlook the achievements? It is because, 
for him, they represent a certain orientation that is essential to the 
Enlightenment period and that has to be preserved; if one is to evaluate the 
Enlightenment, one must not leave out this core aspect of the Enlightenment. 
For Habermas, the orientation of the Enlightenment is expressed in terms 
of the project carried out by the eighteenth century philosophers, which 
aimed at developing objective science, universal morality and law, and 
autonomous art, according to their inner logic. According to Habermas, 
this project intended to release the cognitive potentials of 
each of these domains to set them free from their esoteric 
forms. The Enlightenment philosophers wanted to utilize 
this accumulation of specialized culture for the enrichment 
of everyday life, that is to say, for the rational organization 
of everyday social life. (Habermas, 1981:9) 
Habermas thinks that this orientation, or the intentions of the Enlightenment 
thinkers, is the essence of the Enlightenment period. One should not overlook 
them by adopting a totalizing critique. Moreover, in his view, one should 
preserve this orientation by carrying on the project of Enlightenment, and he 
understands his work as a continuation of that project. He carries on the 
Enlightenment project not only by holding on to the intentions of the 
Enlightenment philosophers, that is, utilizing the rational and cognitive 
potentials of science, universal morality and art to promote social and political 
emancipation, but also by reconstructing a notion of communicative reason as 
the essential kernel of the Enlightenment that has to be preserved. 
Foucault's inquiries of Enlightenment, in contrast, are "not oriented 
retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in 
the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any 
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event"(Foucault, 1986f:43). While he identifies Enlightenment as a certain 
critical attitude that characterizes his project, he does not mean that this 
attitude is what defines the essence of the Enlightenment period. He sees the 
Enlightenment as a set of events and complex historical processes, which are 
not governed by a unified system of rationality, nor do they possess any 
necessary coherence amongst them.2 Instead, each may have specific 
conditions of existence and produce specific effects. From this perspective, 
Foucault comes to have a rather different of view of the Enlightenment period 
from Habermas. 
In the first part of this chapter, I shall discuss Foucault's view of the 
Enlightenment period, and elaborate on its insights for Habermas's theory. 
Foucault sees that it is power that provides the specific conditions of existence 
for certain Enlightenment reforms, and it is these reforms that produce effects 
of power and domination. In showing how the Enlightenment transmits and 
puts in motion relations of domination and disciplinary methods of 
subjugation, Foucault brings to light the dark side of the Enlightenment. 
Nevertheless, do Foucault's insights consist merely in exposing the dark side 
of the Enlightenment? Is Foucault's critique of the Enlightenment, as 
Habermas sees it, pessimistic and one-sided? I argue that Foucault is aware of 
both the bright side and the dark side of the Enlightenment, for he says that 
the Enlightenment has discovered liberties as well as invented disciplines. 
What Foucault pursues is not a one-sided criticism of the Enlightenment. 
Instead, he seeks to show the strategical integration between power and the 
Enlightenment, which has implications for Habermas's theory and for his 
evaluation of the achievements of the Enlightenment. 
In the second part of the chapter, I shall examine Foucault's later essays 
on Enlightenment, which mainly concern the other sense of the term 
"Enlightenment", that is, Enlightenment as an attitude. Habermas sees 
2 Dean (1994:57) points out that from Foucault's perspective, enlightenment should not be 
seen as "a unified process coherent or consistent across all specific facets and instances of 
rationalization ... What emerges is an understanding of plural, non-unified, systems of 
rationality, possessing no necessary coherence amongst themselves, and having specific, and 
analyzable conditions of existence". See his discussion of Foucault's view of enlightenment in 
Dean, 1994, Chapter 3. 
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Foucault's later essays as representing a position which is contradictory to his 
earlier anti-Enlightenment stance. He understands it as a sign of Foucault's 
concession to defeat, for Foucault is now corning to search for a notion of 
reason to ground his critique. Reading Foucault in this way, Haberrnas would 
naturally find that he has nothing to learn from Foucault. I would like to show 
that Foucault's discussion of Enlightenment subverts the distinctions and 
binary oppositions -- reason/unreason, emancipation/ domination, pro-
Enlightenrnent/ anti-Enlightenment -- that underline Haberrnas's theory, and 
provides us with an alternative way of upholding reason which is no longer 
preoccupied with the construction of a normative notion for the 
differentiation and judgement of these distinctions. 
6.1 Achievements and Evils of the Enlightenment 
In a critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Habermas argues that one should 
maintain a balanced view of the Enlightenment by distinguishing between the 
achievements and the evils of the Enlightenment. While there are 
irrationalities and evils of the Enlightenment, Habermas contends, the 
achievements of the Enlightenment should be seen as elements of reason 
which provide hope for emancipation. Habermas's project is guided by the 
problematic of constructing a notion of reason according to which the 
achievements and the evils of the Enlightenment can be differentiated. Based 
on the transcendental project of reconstruction of universal pragmatics of 
language, Habermas identifies an internal relation between communicative 
action and reason and constructs a notion of communicative reason according 
to which one can differentiate the good side and the bad side of the 
Enlightenment. 
Habermas holds that the development of sciences as well as the 
development of universal law and morality and the establishment of the 
system of rights should be seen as an expression of communicative reason, for 
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their cognitive potential points toward a consensus which is based on the 
mere force of the better argument. These developments, he contends, should 
be considered as the achievements of the Enlightenment, and they manifest a 
form of rationality that has to be preserved. In affirming the value of these 
developments, Habermas is, nevertheless, aware of the problems associated 
with the development of science and technology. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
he provides a critique of science and technology in terms of their role in the 
formation of ideologies that suppress public discussion and discursive will 
formation. He regards the domination of purposive-instrumental rationality 
as a major pathology of modern societies. In other words, Habermas sees that 
the development of science has its own problems. Nevertheless, for him, the 
development of the universal law and morality and the establishment of the 
system of rights, which rely upon communicative action for action 
coordination, should be seen as elements of reason, as achievements of the 
Enlightenment. 
Foucault extends his critique of the Enlightenment to the spheres which 
provide Habermas with comfort. He shows the problems, or evils, associated 
with the development of universal law and morality and the establishment of 
the system of right. He demonstrates that the Enlightenment discourses and 
reforms provide the condition of existence for new forms of power and 
relations of domination. He says that "the system of right, the domain of law, 
are permanent agentsof these relations of domination, these polymorphous 
techniques of subjugation" (Foucault, 1980c:96). 
In showing that the Enlightenment is intermeshed with new forms of 
power, Fouc~ult does not intend to assert that Enlightenment is evil, nor that 
reason is domination. Otherwise, Foucault would be, as Habermas contends, 
undertaking a totalising critique of Enlightenment.3 What Foucault seeks to 
show are the specific relations that exist between power and the 
Enlightenment discourses, rationalities, reforms and practices. In this part of 
3 Dean (1994:128-9) argues that Habermas attributes to Foucault a general position within 
the discourse of modernity in order to criticize his work as a totalizing critique. He criticizes 
Habermas's reading of Foucault's argument as "knowledge is power"; "reason is 
domination". 
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the chapter, I shall first use some of the examples of the Enlightenment 
reforms to illustrate the ways in which the Enlightenment is intermeshed with 
relations of power and domination. Specifically, I want to show that while the 
Enlightenment establishes an egalitarian juridical framework in which social 
contract and rights are constantly emphasized, nevertheless, there are 
instances in which the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class 
and the development of disciplinary power constitute the other side of it. 
After examining the specific relations between power and the Enlightenment, 
I shall elaborate on Foucault's insights for Habermas's theory. 
Power and the Enlightenment 
Foucault's study shows that while the Enlightenment reforms establish a 
formal egalitarian juridical framework which puts stress on rights and justice, 
nevertheless, they also bring about new legislation that is utilized and 
annexed in the global form of capitalist domination. In effect, the 
Enlightenment reforms privilege the property class and uproot the conditions 
of existence of people from the lower strata. 
According to Foucault (1979a:82-9), Enlightenment reformers not only 
called for a delimitation of the power of the monarcl\~l sovereignty to punish, 
but also attacked the popular illegalities that were widely practised under the 
ancient monarchal regime. Foucault writes that under the ancient regime the 
lower strata of the population benefited from the practice of tolerated 
illegalities. This space of tolerance was for them indispensable as a 
condition of existence. For instance, vagabondage was supposed to be 
severely punished according to the terms of the ordinance, but they were 
rarely implemented. This provided the condition of existence for the 
unemployed as well as workers who had left their employers, for domestic 
servants who had fled their masters, for deserting soldiers and so forth. 
Moreover, peasants refusal to pay certain state rents and the non-application 
of artisans of manufacturing regulations were seen as acceptable in the eyes of 
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some landowners or entrepreneurs. Smuggling was even welcomel by the 
entire population and protected by officials. The popular illegalities, 
according to Foucault, formed part of the political and economic life of the 
society. 
In the eighteenth century, Foucault writes, the Enlightenment discourse of 
legal rights turned into a discourse about illegalities of properties. This 
discourse coincided with the interest of the bourgeoisie who gradually 
disapproved illegalities with regard to their own property rights. The 
transition to intensive agriculture witnessed a more and more restrictive 
pressure over various tolerated practices and the rights to use common lands. 
These tolerated practices, or tolerated 'rights', came into conflict with the new 
landowners' capacities to use property for purposes they saw fit. 
Tolerated rights including the right to free pasture and wood-collecting were 
now regarded as theft that had to be punished. In the field of commerce and 
industry, the construction of large warehouses was a step to prevent the theft 
of raw materials, tools or produce. Practices which almost amounted to 
acquired rights, such as the right to collect bits of iron or rope around ships or 
to resell the sugar sweeping, were now regarded as intolerable. Other 
practices which were once accepted morally, like the smuggling of the 
pilferers, were ruled out under the introduction of new legislation. 
The setting up of new legislation to attack popular illegalities, in effect, 
privileges the property class and uproots the conditions of existence of the 
people in the lower strata. In Foucault's view, the introduction of this 
legislation is not based on general interest or popular consent, but rather 
maintained qy force. He says: 
although the new criminal legislation appears to be 
characterized by less severe penalties, a clearer codification, 
a marked diminution of the arbitrary, a more generally 
accepted consensus concerning the power to punish (in the 
absence of a more real division in its exercise), it is 
sustained in reality by an upheaval in the traditional 
economy of illegalities and a rigorous application of force 
to maintain their new adjustment. (Foucault, 1979a:89) 
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Foucault argues that the introduction of the new criminal legislation 
implies a class-based redistribution of illegalities that favours the bourgeoisie 
and disadvantages the worker. Workers are increasingly subjected to the 
criminal law grounded in property, while the bourgeoisie retains the laws 
that define illegalities through rights. 
This great redistribution of illegalities was even to be 
expressed through a specialization of legal circuits: for 
illegalities of property -- for theft -- there were ordinary 
courts and punishments; for the illegalities of rights --
fraud, tax evasion, irregular commercial operations --
special legal institutions applied with transactions, 
accommodations, reduced fines, etc. The bourgeoisie 
reserved to itself the fruitful domain of the illegality of 
rights. (Foucault, 1979a:87) 
A remark has to be made here. In examining the relationship that exists 
between the attack on popular illegalities and the interest of the bourgeoisie, 
Foucault does not intend to posit a general thesis that the Enlightenment 
discourse or reform is essentially an instrument used by the bourgeoisie to 
dominate the proletariat or the lower class. He suggests that one should avoid 
a descending analysis which sees power as starting from the centre, 
permeating to the base, and reproducing itself down to the most molecular 
elements of society. One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, 
that is, starting from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each has its own 
history and its own trajectory, and see how these mechanisms have been 
colonized, utilized, transformed and extended by forms of global domination 
(Foucault, 1980c:99). In this case, Foucault starts from the mechanism of the 
attack of popular illegalities, which has its own history in the Enlightenment 
reform and is relatively autonomous to the power of the bourgeoisie, and 
examines how it has been annexed and utilized by a global form of 
domination. It is from the same perspective that Foucault analyzes the 
relationships that exist between the Enlightenment and disciplinary power. 
Foucault does not merely see the Enlightenment in terms of its 
relationship with the global form of capitalist domination. He also providesa 
novel analysis of the relationship between the Enlightenment -- its discourse, 
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rationalities, reforms and practices -- and a new form of power -- the 
disciplines. Foucault makes this claim: '"Enlightenment', which discovered the 
liberties, also invented the disciplines" (Foucault, 1979a:222). 
Foucault's study, in Discipline and Punish, shows the changes of the forms 
of punishment from torturing and public display to correction, control and 
surveillance in prison. In contrast to the interpretation that these changes 
represent a progress in human history or a progress of human rights, Foucault 
sees them in terms of the emergence of a new economy of power. Foucault 
argues that it is owing to the needs of a new economy of power that a change 
in the punitive practice is brought about. Instead of assuming that the 
Enlightenment discourses and reforms lead to a change in punitive practice, 
Foucault draws our attention to the broader socio-historical processes in 
which the need for a new economy of power emerges, and argues that it is 
-the~s;.5 on which the change in punitive practice is made possible. 
In the classical period, Foucault writes, public executions served to 
manifest the power of the monarch. The application of torture on the body of 
the criminal was intended to be a demonstration of the vengeance of the 
sovereign. Nevertheless, the spectacle of public executions had increasingly 
become an occasion for the crowd to support the criminal rather than the 
monarch. The tyranny often had to confront rebellion (Foucault, 1979a:74). As 
public executions resulted in a weakening rather than an enhancement of the 
power of the monarch, there emerged a need to minimize the political cost to 
punish. 
In addition, the change in punitive practice was correlative with the shift 
in the pattern of crimes (Foucault, 1979a:75). From the end of seventeenth 
century, Foucault writes, crimes started to lose their violence: offences against 
property seemed to take over crimes of murder and physical assault; crimes 
were conducted by small groups or skilled individuals rather than by large 
organized armed gangs. This changing pattern of crime, according to 
Foucault, requires a less intense but a more detailed and interventionist form 
of punishment. In his words, 
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the shift from a criminality of blood to a criminality of 
fraud forms part of a whole complex mechanism, 
embracing the development of production, the increase of 
wealth, a higher juridical and moral value placed on 
property relations, stricter methods of surveillance, a 
tighter partitioning of the population, more efficient 
techniques of locating and obtaining information: the shift 
in illegal practice is correlative with an extension and a 
refinement of punitive practices. (Foucault, 1979a:77) 
Foucault argues that it is in response to the need for a new economy of 
power that a change of the form of punishment results. He supports his 
argument through a scrutiny of the discourses of the Enlightenment 
reformers. He points out that the discourses were not so much directed at the 
cruelty of those in authority as at the bad economy of power. According to 
Foucault, reformers criticized that there was too much power for the lower 
jurisdiction, for judges, for persecutors, for royal magistrates and for the king, 
as they were able to make arbitrary legal decisions. Moreover, reformers saw 
the confusion of the law and of its implementation as a result of the 
multiplicity of courts and overlapping of different legal systems. Therefore, 
Foucault argues, even from the perspective of reformers, a new economy of 
power should replace the badly regulated distribution of power, so that it is 
neither too concentrated at certain privileged points nor too divided between 
opposing authorities (Foucault, 1979a:79-80). 
In Foucault's view, the aim of the reform movement can be understood in 
terms of the setting up of a new economy of power so as to ensure its better 
distribution. Power is to be "distributed in homogeneous circuits capable of 
operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the 
social body". The effects of distribution are to be "more regular, more 
effective, more constant, more detailed"(Foucault, 1979a:80). On the one hand, 
the effectiveness of power is to be increased; on the other hand, the cost of the 
exercise of power has to be reduced. This is what is meant by an economy of 
power: an increase of its effectiveness and a diminution of its costs. As 
mentioned before, one of the costs of the past punitive practice lies in the 
danger of rebellion aroused in public executions. Now with a series of 
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techniques that guarantee its discretion, its low exteriorization and its relative 
invisibility, power penetrates deeper into the social body and causes lesser 
resistance. 
Foucault elaborates on how the Enlightenment reforms of corrective 
practice put in motion techniques and methods of disciplinary subjugation. 
For reformers, criminals paid their debt to the society through punishment; 
yet it was through the corrective practices in prison that individuals were 
restored as the subject of the law. The corrective practices emphasized the 
principle of work. Prisoners were put to compulsory work and rewarded 
individually. This was intended to integrate them into the economy and 
restore them as juridical subjects. Nevertheless, Foucault argues, in order to 
accomplish this aim, a series of disciplinary techniques were used. Their daily 
life was partitioned according to an absolutely strict time-table. Each moment 
was to be devoted to a particular activity; duties and prohibitions of each 
moment were specified (Foucault, 1979a:124). Prisoners were also distributed 
in space. This not only broke dangerous communication, but also allowed 
their supervisors to locate, to observe and to supervise each individual. 
Disciplinary techniques are applied onto the body to shape its 
movements, its gestures, its habits. They coerce the body in a continuous and 
subtle way. In contrast to the claim of the Enlightenment reform, Foucault 
claims, disciplinary techniques -- time-tables, regular activities, compulsory 
movements, solidary meditation, silence, work in common -- are used not so 
much to restore the individual as a juridical subject but to produce an 
obedient subject, to produce a docile body (Foucault, 1979a:128). 
Besides bringing to light the disciplinary coercion used by the 
reformed punitive practice, Foucault demonstrates that the Enlightenment 
reforms give rise to new relations of domination. In contrast to the 
Enlightenment discourses which emphasize an equality between each fellow 
being, Foucault argues that what is involved in discipline is a non-reversible 
subordination of one group of people by another, a surplus of power that is 
fixed on the same side, and an inequality of position between different groups 
of people. The relations of domination are entirely different from that of 
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contractual obligation (Foucault, 1979a:222-3). This can be illustrated by the 
relationship between the prisoner and the supervisor that exists in the 
reformed punitive practice. 
On first entering the prison, Foucault writes, prisoners were read the 
regulations and the supervisor would make them promise to do their duty. 
Not only did the supervisor make prisoners obey through persuasion, the 
supervisor also made them behave well with the power to punish. 
Disobedience would lead to physical punishment, deprivation, humiliation 
and solitary confinement. Furthermore, prisoners were dependent upon the 
comments of the supervisor for pardons. The supervisor was granted the 
power to determine whether one could be released earlier. All these 
guaranteed a non-reversible subordination of the prisoner to the power of the 
supervisor. In such a relation of domination, power was constantly fixed on 
the side of the supervisor. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Enlightenment discourses which stressed a 
transparent power, the exercise of the power to punish was characterized by 
secrecy (Foucault, 1979a:124-5, 129). As the penal reform advocated the 
principle of not publicizing the penalty, there was no longer any public 
display, nor was the prisoner required to serve any public work on the street. 
The public did not need to play the role of a witness at street spectacle. 
Punishment and correction now operated privately between prisoners and 
those who supervised them. As the relation between the one who punished 
and those who were punished was characterized by secrecy, the one who 
punished could exercise a total power, which no third party could disturb. 
Foucault further argues that while, in prison, the supervisor becomes a 
judge, the judgement does not operate according to the law, but rather to the 
norm. The law defines what is legal and illegal; the norm defines what is 
normal and abnormal, who is dangerous and non-dangerous. The judgement 
is based on the development of a knowledge of each individual in prison 
(Foucault, 1979a:125-6). 
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When new prisoners arrived, Foucault writes, the administration 
received a report concerning the crime, a summary of the examinations of the 
defendants, notes on their behaviour before and after the sentences. 
Throughout the imprisonment their behaviour was observed and recorded by 
their supervisors. This resulted in an ever-growing knowledge of each of the 
prisoners. Based on this knowledge, prisoners were not only classified 
according to the crime they committed, but the dispositions they revealed. 
Prisoners were categorized according to the potentiality of danger within 
them. In this way, the prison became an autonomous apparatus of 
knowledge. It had its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge. It 
fixed its own norms and decided its own results (Foucault, 1979a:129). 
Foucault's work shows that on the one hand, the reformers' discourses 
discover contract and rights as the major principles of the political sphere; on 
the other hand, they bring along a disciplinary technology which does not 
operate according to the principle of contract and rights. Instead of being a 
power which is rendered visible, transparent, localizable and controllable, the 
disciplinary technology operates in processes which are invisible, <lispers~ 
secret and autonomous. While the juridical model of Enlightenment 
discourses seeks to restore the individual as the juridical subject, the 
disciplinary practice produces docile bodies; while the juridical model 
represents power as operating according to the law, the disciplinary power 
operates according to the norm. 
In sum, the Enlightenment establishes a formal egalitarian juridical 
framework and lays the foundation for a democratic parliamentary regime; 
nevertheless, the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class and the 
development of disciplinary power constitute the other, dark side of it. 
Foucault says: 
Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became 
in the course of the eighteenth century the politically 
dominant class was marked by the establishment of an 
explicit, coded and formally egalitarian juridical 
framework, made possible by the organization of a 
parliamentary, representative regime. But the development 
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and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted 
the other, dark side of these processes. The general juridical 
form that guaranteed a system of rights that were 
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, 
everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of 
micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and 
asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. And although, in 
a formal way, the representative regime makes it possible, 
directly or indirectly, with or without relays, for the will of 
all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the 
disciplines provide, at the base, a guarantee of the 
submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporal 
disciplines constituted the foundation of the formal, 
juridical liberties. (Foucault, 1979a:222) 
Foucault's challenge to Habermas 
Foucault shows that the Enlightenment, which discovers liberties, also invents 
the disciplines. The emergence of a new form of power -- the disciplines--
constitutes the other, dark side of the process. But what is the challenge that 
Foucault's work poses to Habermas's theory? It cannot be denied that 
Foucault successfully brings to light the dark side of the Enlightenment. 
Nevertheless, one may say that this critical awareness of the Enlightenment is 
nothing new or original, and Habermas is certainly aware of its dark side. In 
academic literature as well as public discussion, there is an increasing 
awareness of the fact that science and technology create as many problems as 
they solve. It is recognized that on the one hand we live in an age of material 
comfort brought about by technological advancement, and on the other hand, 
we live in a world in which technology is used as a weapon of mass slaughter. 
The nightmare of Hiroshima still haunts the minds of people. Science, which 
promised to free us from superstition and tyranny, has led us to the road of 
destruction and self-destruction. Progress, a self-image of Enlightenment, is 
increasingly in doubt. The dream of Enlightenment is over; the faith in 
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Enlightenment is shaken. More and more people talk about progress into the 
abyss. 
Habermas is among those who are critical of science and technology. In 
his view, Enlightenment has gone into an abyss with its spread of 
instrumental-purposive rationality to the extreme that communicative 
rationality is displaced. In his thesis "colonization of the lifeworld", he argues 
that the systemic mechanisms invade the lifeworld and replace the role of 
communicative action in the life-forms of the consumer, the employee and the 
citizen. As the life-forms of the consumer and the employee are subject to the 
imperatives of the economic system, they are one-sidedly rationalized in , a 
utilitarian fashion. Consumerism, possessive individualism, hedonism, 
motives of competition and performance, and so forth gain strength. 
Moreover, bureaucratization and the dominance of experts displace the 
process of opinion formation of the citizen. In both the private and the public 
spheres, Habermas says, moral-practical elements are driven out by system 
imperatives (Habermas, 1987b:322-3, 325). 
While being critical about the process of Enlightenment, Habermas 
maintains that one should have a balanced view of Enlightenment. He points 
out that in the spheres of science, morality and art, one can see the 
achievements of Enlightenment. Specifically, Habermas (1982b:18) refers to 
the theoretical self-reflection of scientific knowledge, to the development of 
universal law and morality which have been embodied in systems of right 
and in democratic political institutions, and to the liberating force contained 
in discourses of art criticism. In a critique of Adorno and Horkheimer's work 
Dialectic of ~nlightenment, Habermas argues against their one-sided and 
pessimistic account of the Enlightenment. He proposes that one should see 
both the rational and the irrational elements, both the achievements and the 
evils of Enlightenment. 
From Habermas's perspective, Foucault's work can be criticized as one-
sided and pessimistic. Defenders of Foucault may say that, by bringing to 
light the dark of the Enlightenment, his contribution lies in stripping away the 
veil of the Enlightenment and counteracting the optimism of it. Nevertheless, 
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this way of defending Foucault, I contend, enables Habermas to charge that 
Foucault is pessimistic and holds a one-sided view of the Enlightenment. In 
addition, Habermas's work can be seen as outweighing Foucault's since it 
does not only emphasize the dark side but also the bright side of 
Enlightenment. Seeing Foucault's work in terms of its bringing to light the 
dark side of Enlightenment can, at most, add insights to what Habermas has 
said. Instead of posing any radical challenge to Habermas's theory, Foucault's 
insights can be assimilated into Habermas's project. 
In order to appreciate the profundity of Foucault's insights, I suggest that 
one should not consider the difference between Foucault and Habermas in 
terms of pessimism and optimism, or of one holding a one-sided view and the 
other a balanced view. Their difference does not lie in the fact that Habermas 
is more optimistic and able to see the achievements of Enlightenment and the 
progress of human history, while Foucault is more pessimistic and 
emphasizes merely the evils of Enlightenment and talks about domination 
after domination. As mentioned before, Habermas is aware of both the 
achievements and the evils of Enlightenment. And Foucault too emphasizes 
that the Enlightenment discovers liberties as well as invents disciplines. In 
this sense, Foucault is, like Habermas, aware of both the bright side and the 
dark side of the Enlightenment. Neither of them adopts a one-sided view of it. 
Foucault's challenge, I argue, lies in his providing an alternative to 
Habermas's approach to the Enlightenment. Habermas's approach, as I point 
out throughout my discussion in the thesis, is primarily preoccupied with the 
construction of a basis according to which one can differentiate legitimate and 
illegitimate power. In the context of the discussion of the Enlightenment, he is 
concerned with developing a notion of reason according to which one can 
differentiate achievements and evils of the Enlightenment. Foucault's work, in 
contrast, can be considered in terms of a strategic model which allows us to 
see a complex interplay between power and the Enlightenment, its 
discourses, rationalities, reforms and practices. 
Seeing that there is an internal relation between reason and 
communicative practice oriented to understanding, Habermas suggests that 
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the notion of communicative action can serve as the measuring yard for the 
differentiation of achievements and evils of the Enlightenment. For instance, 
the development of universal law and morality, which is seen as a societal 
evolutionary trend toward a dependence on the communicative action as the 
mechanism of social integration, is welcome by Habermas as an achievement 
of the Enlightenment. For Habermas, the distinction between achievements 
and evils of the Enlightenment is at the same time a distinction between 
reason and unreason. He is critical of Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as 
Nietzsche and, who fail to affirm the achievements of the Enlightenment and 
the elements of reason that are manifested. He comments that they conduct a 
totalising critique of Enlightenment, and in this way they do not only turn 
against Enlightenment but reason, and thus deprive themselves of the ground 
of critique. 
Foucault's work is not oriented toward the construction of a basis for the 
distinction between achievements and evils of the Enlightenment. Instead, it 
can be considered in terms of a strategic model which focuses on how the 
effects of power are produced. Foucault does not start from a transcendental 
notion of reason and ask: which parts of the Enlightenment are achievements 
or manifest elements of reason? He reverses the mode of analysis by first of all 
looking at the points where power effects are felt, where struggles are 
witnessed. Seeing that there are struggles against the power of men over 
women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of 
medicine over the population, of administration over people, Foucault traces 
these relations of domination to a modern form of power which took shape in 
the Enlightenment. He then analyzes how the Enlightenment discourses and 
reforms provide the rationalities and techniques for this modern form of 
power. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, the Enlightenment discourses 
and reforms are seen in terms of their effects, and their roles in the 
deployment of disciplinary power. One should not rely on any transcendental 
notion to identify certain discourses or reforms as elements of reason. One 
cannot say that this and that reform is inherently good or bad, or is essentially 
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an element of reason or unreason. It is through looking at the effects 
produced, as well as the way in which it is taken up and used, can we begin to 
judge it. In this sense, one should not base on a notion of communicative 
action to identify the development of universal law and morality and the 
establishment of a system of rights as elements of reason, but rather analyze 
the development in terms of how universal law and rights are taken up and 
used, the effects that are produced, and the part they play in a deployment of 
power. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, one sees that there is a tactical 
integration between the Enlightenment reforms and the new economy of 
power. On the one hand, it is the need for a new economy of power that 
provides the condition of existence for the reform of punitive practice. On the 
other hand, the reform of punitive practice transmits and puts in motion a 
series of disciplinary techniques and new forms of power and domination. As 
illustrated above by the example of the reformed punitive practice, the 
disciplinary technology operates in processes which are invisible, <lispers~ 
secret and autonomous. The effects of power that are produced are more 
regular, more constant, more detailed. 
From the perspective of a strategic model, the Enlightenment discourses 
and reforms are far from being an agent of emancipation. Instead, they are 
shown to be agents of coercion, agents of relations of domination. This is why 
Foucault says that 
the 
the system of right, the domain of .,Jaw, are permanent 
agents of these relations of domination, these 
poly~orphous techniques of subjugation. Rights should be 
viewed, I believed, not in terms of a legitimacy to be 
established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that 
it instigates. (Foucault, 1980c:96) 
According to the insights of Foucault's work, Habermas's attempt to draw 
a line between achievements and evils according to a transcendental notion of 
reason is mistaken. His attempt to classify things once and for all misleads us 
to believe that certain things, such as the system of right, are unproblematic, 
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while in fact they can be like truths and knowledges, or subjectivites, 
integrated into a system of power and produce effects of domination. 
For Habermas, the task is to distinguish between reason and unreason, 
achievements and evils of Enlightenment, legitimate and illegitimate power 
so as to disconnect one from the other. From Foucault's perspective, the task 
is, rather, to understand the intricacy between reason and unreason, between 
achievements and evils of the Enlightenment, between legitimate and 
illegitimate power. Habermas's approach, which presupposes a distinction 
and a disconnection of achievements and evils of the Enlightenment, tends to 
lose sight of the fact that the bright side of an Enlightenment reform is often 
intricated with its dark side. 
i,c:,. 
Foucault's work shows that in attacking the monarcl\al form of sovereign 
power, one is also attacking the practice of popular illegalities. While the 
reform achieves a delimitation of the personal power of the sovereign, at the 
same time it uproots the conditions of the existence of the people from the 
lower strata. The achievement and the evil of Enlightenment go together. 
They go side by side with each other; they become the correlative of each 
other. In a similar sense, while the penal reform brings about a progress of 
human rights, in terms of the right from public display, torture and 
'inhumane' treatment, at the same time it gives rise to new forms of domination 
and disciplinary coercion. The disciplinary power forms the foundation of the 
formal juridical liberties. The development of a system of rights and a 
representative democratic regime is sustained by the development of 
disciplinary power. 
In light of Foucault's work, Enlightenment reforms which were 
-the 
previously seen as achievements, as well as"basis of hope in Habermas's 
project, are now questioned. This questioning, nevertheless, is not a 
condemnation of the achievements as evils; otherwise, Foucault's work can be 
criticized as one-sided and pessimistic. Instead, Foucault's questioning 
renders the status of the reforms, or achievements, ambiguous. 4 If one sees the 
4 See Connolly, 1987; for a discussion of Foucault's insights in terms of the idea of 
ambiguity. 
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achievement of the Enlightenment reform in terms of a delimitation of the 
monarc~~l power to punish, this achievement is shown to be ambiguous 
because at the same time there is an attack against popular illegalities which 
uproots the condition of existence of people from the lower strata; if one sees 
the achievement of the penal reform in terms of a right from torture, this 
achievement is rendered ambiguous because at the same time there emerges a 
new form of power which coerces our body in a different way. 
"Achievements" are shown to be so much entangled with ''evils' ' that they 
should no longer be seen as achievements in a pure, innocent and absolute 
sense. 
Had one to evaluate the Enlightenment, perhaps what could be drawn 
from Foucault's work is this kind of ambiguous evaluation. As Foucault says, 
he does not intend to condemn Enlightenment or its rationality. What he 
wants to show is "how ambiguous things are", and that an irrationality is at 
the same time a certain form of rationality. In his words, 
one should not forget -- and I'm not saying this in order to 
criticize rationality, but in order to show how ambiguous 
things are -- it was on the basis of the flamboyant 
rationality of social Darwinism that racism was formulated, 
becoming one of the most enduring and powerful 
ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, 
but an irrationality that was at the same time, after all, a 
certain form of rationality. ( Emphases added. Foucault, 
1986e:249) 
Reading Foucault in this way, one should be more able to see the 
problems associated with labelling Foucault as anti-Enlightenment. Since 
Foucault does not aim at a one-sided attack on the Enlightenment, he 
certainly should not be seen as anti-Enlightenment. Indeed, for Foucault, 
positions of pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment are misleading. They 
are too simplistic to capture the intricacy of power and the Enlightenment. In 
Foucault's view, one has to refus~choose between pro-Enlightenment and 
anti-Enlightenment; one has to refuse everything which presents itself in the 
form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative. 
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It even means precisely that one has to refuse everything 
that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative: you either accept the 
Enlightenment and remain in the tradition of its 
rationalism ... or else you criticize the Enlightenment and 
then try to escape from its principles of rationality ... And 
we do not break free of this blackmail by introducing 
"dialectical" nuances while seeking to determine what good 
and bad elements there may have been in the 
Enlightenment. (Foucault, 1986f:43) 
Foucault's position in the earlier work should not be read as anti-
Enlightenment; nor should his later writings on Enlightenment be seen as pro-
Enlightenment. What Foucault seeks to challenge are these kinds of binary 
oppositions and "simplistic and authoritarian alternatives". I shall elaborate 
on this challenge of Foucault in my discussion of his later work in Part II. 
6.2 "What is Enlightenment?" 
In his later writings, Foucault takes up Kant's discussion of "What is 
Enlightenment?", and identifies Enlightenment in terms of a certain attitude 
and a certain way of philosophizing which have affinities with his project. For 
Habermas, these later essays demonstrate a pro-Enlightenment stance which 
is incompatible with Foucault's anti-modern stance in the earlier work. 
Habermas asks: 
How. does such a singularly affirmative understanding of 
modern philosophizing, always directed to our own 
actuality and imprinted in the here-and-now, fit with 
Foucault's unyielding criticism of modernity? How can 
Foucault's self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition 
of the Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable 
criticism of this very form of knowledge of modernity? 
(Habermas, 1986:106) 
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Habermas reads Foucault's later essays as a concession of defeat. He sees 
that Foucault has finally come to recognize the mistake he made in his 
totalizing critique of Enlightenment. Habermas comments that Foucault's 
critique deprives himself of the ground of critique, and that "the force of this 
contradiction caught up with Foucault in this last of his texts, drawing him 
again into the circle of the philosophical discourse of modernity which he 
thought he could explode" (Habermas, 1986:108). 
The question that one would ask is: what is Foucault doing with his 
discussions of Kant's article "What is Enlightenment?"5 In order to answer this 
question, we must examine more closely Foucault's discussions. I shall first 
summarize his reflection on the question "What is Enlightenment?" as well as 
the ways in which he finds affinities between Enlightenment and his project. 
Then I shall turn to Habermas's criticisms of Foucault. Is Foucault, as 
Habermas assumes, identifying with the Enlightenment tradition and 
adopting a pro-Enlightenment position which contradicts his earlier position? 
Is he, as Habermas does, trying to identify the positive elements of 
Enlightenment so as to ground his critique in a notion of reason? 
Foucault discusses Kant's text "What is Enlightenment?" and identifies 
Enlightenment as a certain attitude. According to Foucault, Kant characterizes 
Enlightenment as a process which releases us from the status of immaturity. 
By "immaturity", Kant refers to a certain state of our will that makes us accept 
someone's authority. We are in a state of immaturity "when a book takes the 
5 One should notice that Foucault had quite an extensive involvement with Kant's article. He 
returned to this topic at least on three occasions, each time drawing a slightly different 
implication from Kant's work. The best known of Foucault's discussionsof Kant stems from a 
lecture delivered in the United States and published in 1984 by Paul Rabinow iJJoucault 
Reader. It links Kant's question about Enlightenment to Baudelaire's account of the 
experience of modernity. Another occasion that Foucault discussed Kant's article was in 
January 1983 when he opened a course at the College de France with a lecture. This time he 
links Kant's question "What is Enlightenment?" to his question "What is Revolution?" The 
other occasion which is the least known was in a 1978 lecture before the Societe francaise de 
Philosophie. Foucault links Kant's article to his work on the notion of govemmentality and 
defined Enlightenment in terms of a resistance to specific forms of govemmentalization 
(Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994 :286). My discussion here mainly uses the first two essays. 
Also see Dean, 1994, Chapter 3; Gordon, 1986. For a discussion of Foucault's 1978 lecture, see 
Schmidt and Wartenberg, 1994, pp. 287££. 
234 
-
I 
-, 
I 
' 
I 
j 
I 
I 
! 
Ii: 
I 
I 
' 
l 
I 
I: 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~' 
J 
~ 
,I 
( 
I 
1  
! 
Lt 
place of our understanding, when a spiritual director takes the place of our 
conscience, when a doctor decides for us what our diet is to be". We are seen 
as immature since in these areas the use of reason is replaced by a submission 
to authority. To the extent that we give up the use of reason and submit to 
authority, we ourselves are responsible for our immaturity. In order to escape 
from the immaturity, we have to bring about the change in ourselves. Kant, 
therefore, does not only see Enlightenment as a historical process, but also 
presents it as a task and an obligation. Each individual is responsible for that 
overall process. Enlightenment is an act of courage to be accomplished 
personally. One has to give oneself a motto: "dare to know", "have the 
courage, the audacity, to know" (Foucault, 1986f:34-5). 
In Foucault's reading of Kant's text, Enlightenment represents an attitude 
of having the courage to use reason rather than submitting to authority. This 
is an attitude of seeking to transgress the limits set by authority, an attitude of 
permanent questioning, an attitude of permanent critique. This attitude 
provides the motive for a particular way of philosophizing. Foucault 
identifies Enlightenment in terms of this way of philosophizing. He argues 
that Kant's text "What is Enlightenment?", which was written in 1784, can be 
seen in terms of the question of the present. It is an engagement in a mode of 
reflective relation to the present. This reflection upon the question of the 
present, Foucault claims, has affinities with his project: it is a type of 
philosophical interrogation "that simultaneously problematizes man's relation 
to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self 
as an autonomous subject". Through a reading of Kant's text, Foucault shows 
that the type of philosophical interrogation that his project pursues "is rooted 
in the Enlightenment" (Foucault, 1986f:42). 
Foucault discusses Enlightenment in terms of a particular way of 
philosophizing which is centred upon the question of the present. While the 
question of the present has been posed by others, he argues that Kant's way of 
posing the question is novel. In other philosophical discussions, the present 
may be represented as belonging to a certain era of the world which is distinct 
from others through some inherent characteristics or dramatic events. Or the 
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present may be interrogated in an attempt to decipher in it the signs of a 
forthcoming event. The present may also be analyzed as a point of transition 
toward the dawning of a new world. Nevertheless, Foucault says, Kant is "not 
seeking to understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future 
achievement", but rather dealing "with the contemporary reality alone" 
(Foucault, 1986f:34). When Kant asks "What is Enlightenment?", it is a 
question of the contemporary moment. "What is happening today? What is 
happening now? And what is this 'now' which we inhabit, and which defines 
the moment in which I am writing?" In short, "the question is: what is there in 
the present which can have contemporary meaning for philosophical 
reflection?" (Foucault, 1986a:88-9). 
In Foucault's view, the question of the present can be seen "as a 
philosophical event incorporating within it the philosopher who speakers of 
it". Therefore, he argues, the question "What is Enlightenment?" points to an 
ontology of ourselves. Foucault states: 
for the philosopher to pose the question of his own 
inclusion in the present (it) will no longer be a question of 
his adherence to a doctrine or a tradition; it will no longer 
even simply be the question of his belonging to a human 
community in general, but rather that of his membership of 
a certain 'we', a we corresponding to a cultural ensemble 
characteristic of his own contemporaneity. (Foucault, 
1986a:89) 
According to Foucault, this 'we', an identity of the philosopher, d}he first time 
problematized, and it begins to become an indispensable theme of 
philosophica~ reflection. The Enlightenment is seen by Foucault in terms of an 
ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves. It is considered in terms of a 
way of philosophizing which is guided by the questions: what is the present? 
what is ourselves in the present? 
Foucault argues that Kant's essay on Revolution, which was written in 
1789, represents another form of the question of the present. In answering 
whether there is a progress of mankind, he writes, Kant identifies progress in 
an event which has a singular, indeterminate, contingent character. In Kant's 
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view, what is significant in Revolution is not so much its success or failure, 
but the way it is perceived by the spectators. What constitutes a sign of 
progress is the enthusiasm of the spectators, the fact that "the Revolution is 
surrounded by a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm" 
(Foucault, 1986a:93). This enthusiasm, for Kant, is the sign of a moral 
disposition of humanity. Foucault argues that this moral disposition is 
something that cannot even be elicited by the subtlest politician, but manifests 
itself "only in an indeterminate manner and as something in the character of a 
contingent event" (Foucault, 1986a:94). Therefore, for Foucault, instead of 
searching for origins and approaching history in terms of the necessary, 
Kant's essay represents a way of philosophizing which affirms the primacy of 
the singular, of the event, of the contingent. 
Foucault contends that Kant's way of demonstrating progress has 
something that is akin to the perspective of genealogy. Genealogy is guided 
by the critical question: "in what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and 
the product of arbitrary constraints?" (Foucault, 1986f:45). Kant's essay, 
Foucault argues, can be read in terms of its affirmation of the importance of 
the singular, the contingent and the indeterminate event. 
Putting together Kant's texts on Enlightenment and Revolution, that is, 
their emphases on an attitude of using reason rather than submitting to 
authority, their problematizing one's relation to the present and one's 
historical being, their stress on the contingent and the indeterminate, Foucault 
sees that Kant has founded a critical tradition of an ontology of the present, an 
ontology of ourselves. This is where Foucault sees the connection between his 
project and Enlightenment. The thread that connects Foucault's project with 
Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather a 
philosophical ethos that can be described as a permanent critique of our 
historical era. 
Foucault's way of identifying the connection between his project and 
Enlightenment, I argue, has several implications for Habermas's presumption. 
Habermas contends that Foucault now identifies with the Enlightenment 
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tradition, and adopts a pro-Enlightenment stance which contradicts his earlier 
position. Nevertheless, whe~~xamined closely\foucault's discussion, it is 
doubtful if Foucault actually "identifies" with the Enlightenment tradition, or 
if he identifies with the Enlightenment tradition in the way Habermas 
assumes. 
Habermas considers his project as a project of Enlightenment. In a short 
but pungent essay titled "Modernity versus Postmodernity", Habermas 
(1981:13) identifies Foucault as one of those "young conservatives" who adopt 
an antimodern stance and elaborate a totalist critique of modernity. In 
arguing against Foucault's anti-modem stance, Habermas holds that there are 
certain intentions of the Enlightenment philosophers that were essential to us 
and should be preserved. They include their efforts in developing objective 
sciences, universal morality and law, and autonomous art and their intentions 
to promote not only the control of natural forces, but also moral and social 
justice, as well as happiness of humankind. While seeing that the 
modernization process has not fulfilled the intentions of the Enlightenment, 
he believes that we should not lose our faith in Enlightenment. He asks: 
"should we try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment, feeble as 
they may be, or should we declare the entire project of modernity a lost 
cause?" (Habermas, 1981:9) Habermas maintains that instead of declaring the 
project of Enlightenment a lost cause, we should carry on the project so as to 
fulfil the intentions of the Enlightenment. 
Habermas's way of identifying with the Enlightenment tradition consists 
1n holding on to what he finds as the cause or the intentions of the 
Enlightenm~nt. Foucault, in contrast, pursues a rather different way of 
"identifying" with the Enlightenment tradition. His approach to 
Enlightenment is: what is to be made of Enlightenment? From different 
perspectives, or based on different purposes, one can make different things 
out of Enlightenment. From the perspective of power, what is made of 
Enlightenment is a set of rationalities and techniques that are ready to be 
annexed, transformed and extended by a new form of power. Enlightenment 
is to be examined in terms of its role in the deployment of modern power. 
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Nevertheless, from another perspective, what is made of Enlightenment can 
be a certain attitude, a certain way of philosophizing, which have affinities 
with a critical project. None of these approaches contain any faithfulness to 
the doctrines of the Enlightenment, doctrines like Rousseau's notion of social 
contract, Kant's three Critiques. On the contrary, they use and approach 
Enlightenment for their own purpose.6 
For Foucault, there is a certain attitude, a certain way of philosophizing to 
be made of Enlightenment. Although he identifies the connection of his 
project with Enlightenment, he can hardly be described as an heir of the 
Enlightenment who carries on the project of Enlightenment. For he does not 
think that there are any essential doctrines of the Enlightenment to which we 
should be faithful. Nor does he think that we should fight for the cause of the 
Enlightenment. The critical task, for him, does not consist in laying faith or 
hope in Enlightenment. As he concludes the essay in this way, "I do not know 
whether it must be said today that the critical task still entails faith in 
Enlightenment; I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits" 
(Foucault, 1986f:50). 
Therefore one cannot simply say that Foucault is now identifying with the 
Enlightenment tradition. Nor can one assume that Foucault now adopts a pro-
Enlightenment stance which contradicts his earlier position. One must notice 
that what Foucault advocates is a philosophical ethos that involves a 
reflection on the limits that are imposed on us, a permanent critique of our 
historical era. His position about Enlightenment cannot be classified 
according to the dichotomy of pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment. 
Foucault acknowledges that we are historically determined to a certain extent 
by the Enlightenment,7 that Enlightenment constitutes the historical era in 
6 In the 1978 lecture, Foucault approaches Enlightenment from the problematic of 
"governmentality" and sees Enlightenment as resistance to specific forms of 
governmentalization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Schmidt and 
Wartenberg, 1994, pp.287ff. 
7 Foucault says: "We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are 
historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment ... these enquires will not 
be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the 
Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented 
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which we are now living. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we have to 
accept the Enlightenment and lay our allegiance to it. On the contrary, in 
situating himself and his project in the historical era of Enlightenment, 
Foucault aims at a permanent critique of the Enlightenment, a permanent 
critique of the historical era in which he is living. This is what his earlier work 
was doing. It exposes the dark side of the Enlightenment and shows how new 
forms of power are intermeshed with the Enlightenment discourses and 
reforms. 
One should not consider Foucault's earlier work as anti-Enlightenment. 
Nor should one see his later essays as shifting to a pro-Enlightenment stance. 
In identifying the connection of his project with the Enlightenment, Foucault 
is not coming back to the kind of operation that Habermas performs. He is not 
trying to determine which elements of the Enlightenment are good, and set up 
a model in relation to these elements in order to preserve them. Instead, he 
asks "what is to be made of the Enlightenment?", and considers that there can 
be a certain philosophizing ethos, which characterizes his project, to be made 
of it. 
Foucault states, the philosophical ethos of the permanent critique of our 
historical era implies a refusal of the blackmail of Enlightenment, that is, 
either accept the Enlightenment and remain within its tradition, or else you 
criticize the Enlightenment and try to escape from its principles of rationality 
(Foucault, 1986f:42-3). One can find this blackmail of Enlightenment 
underlying Habermas's accusation of Foucault. Habermas assumes that 
Foucault adopts an anti-Enlightenment position in the earlier work by 
criticizing the Enlightenment and trying to escape from its principles of 
rationality, whereas in his later essays on Kant Foucault shifts to a pro-
Enlightenment position and seeks to remain within its tradition. Habermas 
concludes that Foucault's positions are inconsistent and incompatible. 
Habermas's conclusion not only reveals his blackmail of the Enlightenment, 
toward the 'contemporary limits of the necessary,' that is, toward what is not or no longer 
indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects" (Foucault, 1986f:43). 
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but also his overlooking Foucault's intention to subvert these simplistic 
alternatives and binary oppositions. 
The novelty of Foucault's approach lies in its attempt to break free of the 
blackmail of Enlightenment. While Foucault criticizes the Enlightenment in 
terms of its relation to power, he is not, as Habermas sees it, making an 
unmistakable criticism which condemns the Enlightenment as evil. Instead, 
he shows us the danger of a certain Enlightenment discourse, rationality, 
reform and practice. Now in showing the affinities between his project and 
the Enlightenment, he is not, as Habermas understands it, identifying with 
the Enlightenment and trying to remain within its tradition. Instead, he sees 
that there can be a certain attitude to be made out of the Enlightenment. If 
Foucault's earlier work does not contain a determinate negation of the 
Enlightenment, nor does his later work contain an affirmation of it, then they 
cannot have constituted any incompatibility of positions. Rather than ask how 
can Foucault hold incompatible positions, Habermas should begin to 
appreciate Foucault's attempt to break free of the blackmail of Enlightenment. 
One may say, doesn't Foucault now also come to examine the rationality 
of the Enlightenment? If the answer is "yes", can we say, as Habermas does, 
that Foucault is trying to search for a notion of reason in order to ground his 
critique? 
It is true that both Habermas and Foucault come to examine the 
rationality of Enlightenment.8 Nevertheless, unlike Habermas's project which 
seeks to construct a notion of communicative reason that serves as the basis 
for the differentiation of achievements and evils of the Enlightenment, of 
reason and unreason, of legitimate and illegitimate power, Foucault's work 
never attempts to construct such a normative basis for his critique. As noticed 
8 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986) point out that both Foucault and Habermas agree that critical 
reason begins with the rejection of any effort which seeks to develop theories that mirror 
substantive universal truths about human nature. Both agree that Enlightenment is a process 
which releases us from immaturity; and that maturity consists in man's taking over the 
responsibility for using his critical reason. Nevertheless, they claim, from here on their 
understanding of critical reason dilier in a radical way. See Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986, for a 
discussion of the difference between Habermas and Foucault in their approach to reason. 
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by Dean, "the notion of reason that emerges in Foucault's work is not a 
normative but a performative one. It questions reason in its use, not as a norm 
by which various historical forms of reason can be evaluated" (Dean, 
1994:115).9 For Foucault, what matters is the use of reason, the effects of its 
use. He thinks that the central issue is: 
What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical 
effects" What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How 
can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to 
practicing a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by 
intrinsic dangers? (Foucault, 1986e:249) 
From Habermas's perspective, Foucault owes us a notion of reason that 
serves as the normative basis of critique. From Foucault's perspective, 
however, what must be examined is the use of reason. Foucault understands 
that there are different uses of reason. Some uses of reason, which Kant sees 
as illegitimate uses of reason, are what give rise to dogmatism and 
heteronomy, along with illusion. Other uses, which Kant sees as legitimate 
uses of reason, would assure the autonomy of reason (Foucault, 1986f:38). 
While both Foucault and Kant are concerned with the autonomy of reason, 
nevertheless, they approach it in an entirely different way. 
For Kant, it is necessary to specify clearly the conditions that guarantee 
the autonomy of reason. Kant's three Critiques, Foucault says, can be seen as 
defining the conditions for the legitimate use of reason, the principles that 
assure the autonomy of reason. "[I]ts role is that of defining the conditions 
under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be 
known, what must be done, and what may be hoped" (Foucault, 1986f:38). 
Kant lays down the critical tradition of philosophy which defines the 
conditions under which a true knowledge is possible. Habermas's project, I 
contend, represents a similar approach. He seeks to reconstruct the conditions 
under which rational consensus is possible, and refers to it as the basis of 
theoretical truth and universal morality. In his model of rational discourse, 
9 Dean (1994:116) argues that "Foucault's approach to the question of rationality is thus 
multiple, pragmatic, practical, and problem-oriented, rather than unitary, formal, theoretic, 
and general". 
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Habermas defines the conditions under which the use of communicative 
reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be 
done, and what may be hoped. 
Contrary to Kant's or Habermas's approach, Foucault refuses to define 
conditions, to specify principles, or to set any limits. Instead, he puts his 
reason to use, without subjecting to any authority. His use of reason takes the 
form of permanent question, the form of permanent critique. He contends that 
if critique is to analyze and reflect upon limits, it is in order to transgress 
limits. He conducts a genealogical critique which "will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, 
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think" (Foucault, 1986f:46). This 
critique is not oriented toward the construction of a normative theory of 
reason, but rather demonstrates a certain use of reason. If Foucault's project is 
connected to Enlightenment, it is not through a normative theory of reason, 
but a certain attitude. It is an attitude of having the courage to question, 
having the courage to transgress limits. Foucault says, his critical ontology of 
ourselves 
has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, 
nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an 
ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we 
are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the 
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault, 1986f:50) 
Habermas, preoccupied with how to construct a normative notion to 
ground critique, sees that Foucault, in discussing Kant's texts, is now 
searching for a notion of reason to ground critique. He misses the point that 
what concerns Foucault is not so much a normative notion of reason, but 
rather one's way of using reason. Unlike Habermas's project which is devoted 
to constructing a notion of communicative reason that serves as the universal 
standard of critique and provides the hope for emancipation, Foucault's 
project never attempts to construct such a notion. Nor would he believe in 
laying a hope upon any notion of reason or any theory of Enlightenment. 
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Foucault says that there is not anything that is functionally -- by its nature --
absolutely liberating. Liberty is never assured by the projects, theories or laws 
that are intended to guarantee it. Rather, '"liberty' is what must be exercised" 
(Foucault, 1986e:245). For Foucault, to engage in a permanent critique is an 
exercise of this liberty. This way of using reason represents an autonomy of 
reason. It is a use of reason which avoids dogmatism, heteronomy and 
illusion. 
From Foucault's perspective, what concerns us is the way in which one 
uses reason. Habermas's effort to develop a quasi-transcendental basis of 
critique can be seen as a certain way of using reason. Habermas's way of 
using reason is, similar to Kant's, oriented to setting limits, defining 
conditions. His criticism of Foucault's lack of a ground of critique 
presupposes that this is the only legitimate way of using reason. Foucault's 
work, I argue, can be seen as an alternative way to use reason. It suggests that 
we should transform the use of reason from the form of setting necessary 
limits into one that takes a possible transgression. For Foucault, the use of 
reason is no longer to be practised in the search for universal structures, but 
rather in the form of a genealogical critique that gives impetus to the 
undefined work of freedom. 
I contend that Foucault's insights consist in his presenting an alternative 
approach to Habermas's approach to the use of reason. Foucault's approach to 
the use of reason is not to be found in any transcendental project, but rather in 
a genealogical project and in an archaeological method. 
Archaeological--and not transcendental--in the sense that it 
will not seek to identify the universal structures of all 
knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to 
treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we 
think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this 
critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not 
deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible 
for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility 
of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or 
think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that 
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had finally become a science; it is seeking to give new 
impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work 
of freedom. (Foucault, 1986f:46) 
In contrast to Habermas 1s project which is oriented to the search for 
universal conditions and the setting of necessary limits, Foucault's use of 
reason takes the form of a possible transgression of limits. Foucault's use of 
reason can be seen as an exercise of freedom, as a manifestation of the 
autonomy of reason. It works on the limits and asks what is no longer 
indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects. It is 
oriented to inventing and re-inventing of ourselves. While it questions the 
historical era that determines who we are, it does not represent a determinate 
negation of the historical era in which we are now living. It is not preoccupied 
with setting up distinctions and binary oppositions between what must be 
negated and what must bE;, preserved. Instead, it simultaneously respects the 
historical reality of the present and seeks to violate it. In this sense, Foucault's 
work should be appreciated in terms of its providing us with an alternative 
approach to critique, which subverts the distinctions and binary oppositions 
to which Habermas theory are wedded. 
Conclusion 
Habermas's approach to critique, as I argue throughout the thesis, can be 
considered in terms of a juridico-discursive model which seeks to differentiate 
legitimate and illegitimate power. In a similar sense, his approach to the 
Enlightenment is concerned with a differentiation of achievements and evils, 
of what must be preserved and what must be condemned. It performs an 
operation of a division and rejection. The achievements of the Enlightenment 
are seen as elements of reason that have to be preserved; the evils of the 
Enlightenment are seen as elements of unreason that have to be rejected. 
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Foucault's approach, in contrast, can be considered as a strategic model which 
looks into the tactical integration between power and the Enlightenment, and 
the effects produced by the Enlightenment discourses, reforms and practices. 
For example, it shows that it is the need for a new economy of power that 
constitutes the condition of existence for the reform of punitive practice, and it 
is the reformed punitive practice that transmits and puts in motion methods 
of disciplinary subjugation and relations of domination. In showing the 
specific relations that exist between power and the Enlightenment, Foucault 
questions the role of the Enlightenment in the deployment of modern power. 
This question, however, is not equivalent to a simple rejection of the 
Enlightenment. Instead of seeing the Enlightenment as evil that has to be 
rejected, what Foucault demonstrates are the ambiguities of the achievements 
of the Enlightenment. 
In Foucault's work, we see that the Enlightenment discourses and reforms 
are entangled with power, that there is an intricacy between achievements 
and evils of the Enlightenment, between rationality and irrationality, between 
legitimate and illegitimate power. From the perspective of Foucault's work, 
there may be irrationalities and relations of domination in the Enlightenment, 
but they are at the same time a kind of rationality and enlightened practice; 
and vice versa, the Enlightenment may bring about a certain freedom, but the 
freedom is at the same time a kind of unfreedom. 
For . instance, before the Enlightenment reform, the power of the 
LC 
monarc1ial sovereignty was unlimited; nevertheless, side by side, there was 
freedom for the subjects to practise illegalities which provided them with the 
conditions of existence. So much so that the reform achieved to limit the 
power of the monarchical sovereignty, the freedom to practise popular 
illegalities was also removed. Therefore, the relations between the reform of 
the sovereign power and the growth of freedom are not as simple as one may 
have believed. On the one hand, the reform of the sovereign power frees 
people from the uncontrollable power of the sovereign; on the other hand, it 
results in a reduction of their freedom to practise illegalities. In a similar 
sense, the relations between the reform of the punitive practice and the 
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growth of freedom are not as simple as one may have assumed. On the one 
hand, the reform frees people from torture and the force of the sovereign; on 
the other hand, it results in the development of a series of disciplinary 
techniques which coerce the body in a more regular and subtle way. 
Foucault's work, therefore, subverts the distinctions and binary 
oppositions that underline Habermas's project. If there is an entanglement 
between power and the Enlightenment, between rationality and irrationality, 
between legitimate and illegitimate power, perhaps what we need is not so 
much an approach which operates by a simple division and rejection, but 
rather one which helps us respect the complex reality while seeking to 
transgress it. It is not one which is oriented to the drawing of boundaries and 
setting of limits, but rather oriented to the transgression of limits that are 
imposed on us. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
My Introductory Chapter began by examining Habermas's criticisms of 
Foucault. I pointed out that Habermas's criticisms of Foucault are made in 
terms of his own preoccupation and his own language, and hence deprive 
Foucault's work of the right to stand on its own. Moreover, preoccupied 
with the question of the ground of critique, Habermas fails to see the 
insights of Foucault's work and the challenges it may have for his theory. I 
noted that Foucault does not address the question of the ground of critique 
and his suspension of this question creates difficulties, as both his critics 
and sympathetic commentators have pointed out. Nevertheless, in 
suspending the question of the ground of critique, I argue, Foucault 
introduces us to a strategic model of power, which is a perspective no less 
fruitful than Habermas's model of critique. In Part I of this concluding 
chapter, I shall summarize the insights of Foucault's strategic model and 
the challenges that Foucault's work poses to Habermas's theory. I argue 
that Foucault's strategic model shifts our attention to the question of 
"how", that is by what means the effects of power are produced and 
maintained. From this perspective, not only is Habermas's theory shown 
to be inadequate with regard to this problem, but a lot of its assumptions 
and ideals are exposed as misguided comfort. 
While focusing on the problems of Habermas's theory, it does not 
mean that Foucault's work is unproblematic. I have discussed some of the 
limitations of his work in previous chapters. Here I shall focus on a major 
issue raised by his critics -- the lack of a normative ground of Foucault's 
critique. Instead of accusing Foucault of failing to provide a normative 
basis of critique, I ask whether we must have a normative basis in order to 
practise critique, and whether Foucault has successfully shown us an 
alternative approach which does not require the specification of a 
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normative yardstick. In Part II, I shall discuss the specific nature and 
characteristics of Foucault's approach to critique. I argue that Foucault does 
provide us an alternative to Habermas's normative approach, and 
Foucault's approach implies that normative frameworks should not be 
treated as principles of legitimation or foundations of critique, but rather 
as tools that one uses in the fight against power. 
7.1 A Summary of Foucault's Challenge to Habermas 
Both Habermas's and Foucault's projects can be read as a critique of power. 
Nevertheless, Habermas is primarily preoccupied with the question of 
reconstructing the ground of critique. He sees the problem of earlier critical 
theory in terms of a totalizing critique; that is, one that turns against 
reason and hence deprives itself of the ground of critique. Contrary to 
treating reason as completely subjected to the dictates of bourgeois 
ideology and purposive-instrumental rationality, Habermas thinks that we 
must retain a notion of reason in order to ground critique. This notion of 
reason, Habermas contends, is a form of Enlightenment rationality that is 
expressed in the development of autonomous spheres of validity claims, 
namely the truth claim associated with science, the claim of normative 
rightness associated with universal law and morality, and the claim of 
authenticity and beauty associated with art. Habermas carries out a quasi-
transcendental project of universal pragmatics to reconstruct this form of 
Enlighten111ent rationality as inherent to our intersubjective 
communication and calls it communicative reason. Hence for Habermas, 
the reconstruction of a notion of communicative reason, serves two 
purposes simultaneously: firstly, it serves to affirm the achievements of 
the Enlightenment and oppose any one-sided or totalist criticism of the 
Enlightenment; secondly, it serves to provide the ground of critique 1n 
reason. 
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Habermas maintains that the development of science and other 
knowledges, as well as the development of universal law and morality 
and the establishment of systems of right should be seen as an expression 
of this communicative rationality since their cognitive potential points 
toward a consensus based on the mere force of the better argument, that is, 
communicative reason. These developments, for Habermas, are the 
achievements of the Enlightenment, and they manifest a form of 
communicative rationality that has to be preserved. Habermas sees that 
although in the process of rationalization one has witnessed a domination 
of the purposive-instrumental rationality of the political-administrative 
and the economic systems at the expense of communicative rationality, 
nevertheless, he maintains, rather than declare the Enlightenment project 
a lost cause, one should carry on with it, by discovering, affirming, and 
promoting this communicative rationality. In Habermas's view, Foucault 
pursues a totalist critique of Enlightenment and fails to see its 
achievements. This results not only in a one-sided and pessimistic account 
of the Enlightenment, but also in a lack of the ground of Foucault's 
critique. 
In Habermas's view, the major weakness of Foucault's project lies in 
its lack of a ground of critique. This means that Foucault's work cannot 
claim superiority according to the standard of truth and universal validity 
claims. In particular, Foucault's genealogical knowledges and the 
subjugated knowledges that he advocates cannot claim superiority 
according to the standard of truth, and hence these knowledges cannot 
differentiate themselves from falsehood. Moreover, since Foucault is 
unable to answer the question of "why fight?", the normative positions 
that Foucault presupposes or advocates would be unable to claim 
superiority according to the universal validity claim of normative 
rightness. 
For Habermas, the reconstruction of the notion of communicative 
reason not only serves to affirm the achievements of the Enlightenment 
and allow critique to be grounded in reason, but also provides a basis with 
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which one can differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. According 
to Habermas, the asymmetrical character of power relations implies that 
those who are subordinated are structurally disadvantaged since the one in 
higher authority can cause harm to them when they disobey. The 
disadvantage to one of the parties can only be compensated by reference to 
collectively desired goals. His notion of communicative action points 
toward an ideal way for the determination of collectively desired goals. 
Power which is based on the rational consensus achieved in 
communicative action is considered as legitimate. For Habermas, the 
question of how to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power is 
essential to any critique of power. From his perspective, Foucault can be 
criticized in terms of his failure to provide a yardstick for such a 
differentiation. 
In sum, there are four kinds of task that Habermas seeks to accomplish 
with the construction of a notion of communicative reason. Firstly, he 
specifies what are the achievements of the Enlightenment and what 
should be preserved from it. Secondly, he reconstructs a notion of reason 
so as to enable knowledges to claim superiority according to the standard 
of truth. Thirdly, the notion of communicative reason allows normative 
positions to claim superiority according to the standard of universal 
validity claims. Lastly, Habermas considers the notion of communicative 
reason as a basis with which one can differentiate legitimate and 
illegitimate power. 
In contrast, Foucault seems to have produced nothing parallel to 
Habermas's achievement. He does not focus on the achievements of the 
Enlightenment in order to say what must be preserved. He does not appeal 
to any notion of truth to ground his knowledges, nor does he appeal to 
any normative notion to ground his positions. Foucault also fails to 
provide a yardstick for the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate 
power. Nevertheless, instead of dismissing Foucault's work for these 
omissions, one must understand why Foucault brackets all these questions 
in order to see the insights resulting from the bracketing. Perhaps we could 
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start with why Foucault refrains from providing a yardstick for the 
differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power. 
The question of how to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power, 
I suggest, should be considered as part of the juridico-discursive model of 
power that Foucault seeks to surpass. According to Foucault, this model of 
power has several characteristics. Firstly, it represents power as operating 
like a law which merely negates, prohibits and says no. Secondly, it often 
privileges the theory of sovereignty. That is, it presupposes that power can 
be located in an identifiable source -- the sovereign -- be it the monarch in 
the past or the democratic sovereignty in modern western societies. Since 
power is represented as negative, the question thus raises is: how to 
impose limits upon the sovereign. Therefore, thirdly, the juridico-
discursive model is preoccupied with how to submit power to the rule of 
right. It is concerned with what legitimates power, and how to draw the 
limits and boundaries. When power is exercised within limits and 
operates according to a principle of legitimation, it is considered as 
legitimate. Illegitimate power is one which violates the principle and 
transgresses its limit. I suggest that Habermas's view of power can be seen 
as juridico-discursive. 
For Habermas, there is a problem associated with the asymmetrical 
character of power since the one in the higher position can sanction those 
who disobey. Nevertheless, instead of keeping this problem in focus and 
allowing it to remind us of the problem of power, Habermas is 
preoccupied with the question "what legitimates power?". He argues that 
power has to be legitimated with reference to collective goals, and his 
model of rational discourse is seen as providing the way for the 
determination of collective goals. Habermas, hence, provides a principle of 
legitimation for power. Illegitimate power is one which violates this 
principle of legitimation. Moreover, Habermas presupposes that power is 
located in an identifiable source, the sovereign, and seeks to submit it to 
the rule of right. Power, in his view, is located in the central political 
institutions, in the system of state administration. When power is 
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exercised within its confines, it is considered as legitimate. Power's 
transgression of its limits not only renders itself illegitimate but may also 
result in pathologies of modern societies. According to his thesis of the 
11colonization of lifeworld 11 , modern pathologies are conceived as an 
intrusion of system mechanisms into the domain of lifeworld that 
requires communicative action as the mechanism of social integration. 
That is, they are explained in terms of an expansion of the role of state 
bureaucrats and experts that leads to a suppression of opinion formation 
in the lifeworld. Habermas is concerned with drawing the boundary 
between power as the system mechanism and communicative action as 
the mechanism of social integration. He seeks to confine power in the 
sphere of the political-administrative system and asserts the role of 
communicative action in the sphere of lifeworld. Thus, he is preoccupied 
with the task of submitting power to the rule of right. Foucault, 1n 
contrast, challenges this juridico-discursive mode of analysis. 
In Foucault's view, we must break free from the juridico-discursive 
model of power, for the existence of power is not ensured by rights, but 
rather by techniques. The notion of right cannot explain how the effects of 
power are produced and maintained. Instead one should be concerned 
with the point where power surmounts the rules of right, invests itself in 
institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with 
instruments or more violent means of intervention. Only by focusing on 
the diverse local institutions and their concrete mechanisms, on the 
techniques and instruments, can one see how power is implemented 
effectively. In analyzing disciplinary power in modern societies, Foucault 
focuses on techniques like the partition of time, space and movement in 
order to show how power penetrates and is inscribed onto the body. Rather 
than ask what legitimates power, Foucault looks into how things work at 
the level of ongoing subjugation, at the level of those continuous and 
uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures and 
dictate our behavior. 
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I Habermas pursues a juridico-discursive analysis of power which asks 
the question: what legitimates power? Preoccupied with the task of 
providing a principle of legitimation for power, Habermas fails to see that 
the existence of power is not ensured by rights, but by techniques. For 
instance, in terms of right, it is claimed that the prison restores the 
individual as a juridical subject. Nevertheless, focusing on the techniques 
and instruments that are used in prison, one sees that there are time-
tables, compulsory movement, regular activities, solitary meditation, work 
in common, which function not so much as a restoration of juridical 
subjects as a production of docile bodies. Hence, side by side with right, 
Foucault argues, there is disciplinary coercion which brings about docile 
bodies, obedient citizens. The focus on the issue of right in effect conceals 
the operation of disciplinary power. It leads to Habermas's failure to see 
the techniques of disciplinary power as well as the elements of domination 
inherent in its techniques. In addition, while the focus on the question of 
legitimation of power may result in a democratization of sovereign power, 
nevertheless, one fails to realize that at the same time this 
democratization of sovereignty is fundamentally determined by and 
grounded in techniques of disciplinary coercion. 
Moreover, with a presupposition that power is located in the state 
administrative system, Habermas is unable to see the emergence of a new 
form of power--the disciplinary power--which is developed from a 
multiplicity of minor processes, of different origins and diverse locations, 
rather than from the central political institutions. The spread of 
disciplinary power is not as Habermas describes it, with the thesis of 
colonization -of lifeworld, an intrusion of the system mechanisms into the 
lifeworld. It is, rather, understood as infinitesimal mechanisms, each with 
its own history, developed in diverse, local institutions including the 
family institution of lifeworld, and may be taken up and utilized by global 
forms of domination. 
In suspending the question of the differentiation of legitimate and 
illegitimate power, Foucault aims at shifting our attention to the question 
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of "how power is exercised". This question of "how" is not asked in the 
sense of "how power manifests itself", but rather in the sense of "by what 
means power is exercised". In contrast to the juridico-discursive model, 
which pursues the normative question of what legitimates power, it is a 
strategic model which examines the totality of means put into operation to 
implement power effectively or to maintain it. From the perspective of the 
strategic model, Foucault shows us that, unlike what is represented by the 
juridico-discursive model, power is positive rather than negative, 
productive rather than repressive. One must, however, notice that this 
positive conception of power should not be considered from a normative 
point of view. The positivity of power does not carry any direct 
implication that power is therefore normatively desirable. While saying 
that power is productive and enabling, it does not imply that for that 
reason power is acceptable and legitimate. The positive concept of power 
is, instead, concerned with a strategic model which focuses on the concrete 
operation of power. According to this strategic model, in order for power 
to operate and produce effects, it must be productive: power produces 
utility; power produces subjectivities; power produces truths and 
knowledges. 
From the perspective of the strategic model, we should be able to 
understand why Foucault refrains from appealing to the notion of truth to 
ground his work. Habermas demands that Foucault's knowledges, as well 
as the subjugated knowledges he advocates, should claim superiority 
according to the standard of truth. He sees that only in this way can they 
attain the status of truth and be differentiated from falsehood. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the strategic model, one is not 
concerned with the differentiation between truth and falsehood, but rather 
the effects of power produced. In Foucault's project, the problem is not to 
make a division between that which falls under scientificity and truth, and 
that which falls under ideology and falsehood. It is, rather, to see 
historically how power effects "are produced within discourses which in 
themselves are neither true nor false" (Foucault, 1980b:118). For instance, 
the medical discourses on masturbation and homosexuality in the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are not to be seen in terms of their 
truth and falsehood, but rather in terms of their production of certain 
subjects and their relation to the intensification of practices of knowledge-
power. Foucault states that we must question not the truth or falsehood of 
certain discourses, but 
their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects of 
power and knowledge they ensure) and their strategical 
integration (what conjunction and what force 
relationship make their utilization necessary in a given 
episode of the various confrontations that occur). 
(Foucault, 1979b:102) 
While Habermas is preoccupied with the question of the meaning of 
truth and universal validity claims, it is not a question central to 
Foucault's project; nor would his project seek to answer what is truth.1 
Foucault suspends the question of division between truth and falsehood 
in order to bring us to a strategic perspective which examines the power 
effects of discourses and knowledges. 
Furthermore, central to people's experience in modern western 
societies, it is the power effects associated with discourses of truth and 
science that are of concern. For instance, it is through the development of 
criminal psychology that the power of penality can be implemented 
effectively. This scientific knowledge reveals the true nature of the 
individuals and thus they can be judged in truth. In discussing the 
normalizing effects on individuals' sexuality, Foucault shows that situated 
at the intersection of a scientific discourse of sexuality and a technique of 
confession, · there emerged a domain of sexuality as the target for 
therapeutic intervention. Individuals are assessed and diagnosed 
according to the scientific, true knowledge of medical and psychiatric 
professions. They are asked to confess, to speak the truth, to reveal the 
truth deep inside themselves. Power effects are produced through the 
1 Hoy defends Foucault's bracketing of the question of truth claims by pointing out that 
Foucault's enterprise is neither epistemological nor ontological, but rather critical-
historical. Instead of answering the question "what is truth?", it shows the relation 
between power and what counts as knowledge. See Hoy ,1986, pp.129££. 
256 
-
i 
i 
I 
I 
1, 
i 
I 
1:•· 
1lf 
,,, 
~ 
I 
111 
,I 
I 
I 
l : 
production of truth. Therefore, Foucault claims, the problem is no longer 
falsehood or ideology but truth. It is truth rather than false ideologies that 
produces power effects. 
Habermas's preoccupation with the issue of the ground of critique 
leads him to demand that Foucault's knowledges and the subjugated 
knowledges should claim superiority according to a notion of truth. 
Nevertheless, for Foucault, this is precisely the step he refuses to take. 
Foucault refuses to raise a banner of truth for his work, for what his work 
does is to problematize the status of truth and invite us to see the role that 
truth plays in a power complex. He states that "it's not a matter of a battle 
'on behalf' of truth but of a battle about the status of truth and the 
economic and political role which it plays" (Foucault, 1980b:132). 
From the perspective of a strategic model, not only can we understand 
why Foucault refrains from appealing to a notion of truth to ground his 
work, we can also appreciate the insights of Foucault's work and the 
challenges that it has for Habermas. Habermas develops a model of 
rational discourse to elaborate how a cognitive truth claim is to be 
grounded in reason, that is, on the basis of the mere force of the better 
argument. With a presupposition of the notion of an ideal speech 
situation, his model of rational discourse asserts that truth, or true 
knowledge, is a result of noncoercive, undistorted and power-free 
discussion. The production of truth, in other words, is represented as free 
from power. Foucault, in contrast, shows power's production of truths and 
knowledges. For instance, in prison, the production of a whole corpus of 
individualizing knowledges was not outside power; on the contrary, it is a 
set of power relations that constitutes the condition for the development 
of the individualizing knowledges, relations including those of 
administrators and prisoners, or inspectors and prisoners. Similarly, the 
production of the truth of sex is only possible with power relations 
between patients and psychiatrists. Therefore, in opposition to Habermas's 
representation of truths and knowledges, Foucault urges us to "abandon a 
whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only 
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where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop 
only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests" (Foucault, 
1979a:27). 
According to Foucault, there is a mutual production between power 
and these true knowledges, that is, on the one hand, power produces true 
knowledges, and on the other hand, it is through these knowledges that 
power effects are produced. The flaw of Habermas's model is shown to be 
in its misrepresenting the production of knowledges as power-free. 
Habermas is, however, certainly aware of the power effects of knowledges. 
His critique of science and ideology shows the way in which science lends 
itself to ideological formation, and hence serves as an instrument of state 
domination. Nevertheless, what must be noticed is that knowledge in this 
case is represented as something which originally stands outside power, 
but at a certain point falls a prey to power. Habermas's understanding of 
the power effects of knowledge is still based on the assumption that 
knowledge is inherently outside power. Foucault's work, I contend, 
challenges his understanding of an external relation between power and 
knowledge. 
In Foucault's view, the relationship between power and these 
knowledges is internal rather than external; their relationship is one of 
constitutive interdependence. He argues, 
if sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, 
this was only because relations of power had established 
it as a possible object; and conversely if power was able to 
take it as a target, this was because techniques of 
knowledge and procedures of discourse are capable of 
investing it. (Foucault, 1979b:98) 
In other words, power relations constitute the internal condition for the 
production of knowledges, and, vice versa, knowledges constitute the 
internal condition for the exercise of power. As knowledges constitute the 
internal condition for the exercise of power, the power effects that 
knowledge produces are not, as Habermas assumes, an external, accidental 
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by-product. Instead, the effects of normalizing power are directly implied in 
the knowledge of sexuality; power effects circulate right at the point where 
scientific statements are formed. Therefore, Foucault says, "it is not so 
much a matter of knowing what external power imposes itself on science, 
as of what effects of power circulate among scientific statements" (Foucault, 
1980b:112). It is also not a matter of how science lends itself to the 
formation of ideology. In contrast to what Habermas understands, Foucault 
states that the political question of today should not be considered in terms 
of "science" and "ideology", but rather in terms of "truth" and "power" 
(Foucault, 1980b:132). 
Preoccupied with a division between truth and falsehood, or truth and 
ideology, Habermas fails to realize that the problem today is not so much 
falsehood and ideology, but truth. For him, it seems that truth will make 
us free; truth would safeguard us from the danger of power and falsehood. 
Habermas thinks that knowledges should claim superiority according to 
the standard of truth so as to differentiate themselves from power and 
falsehood; failing to attain the status of truth would make them 
susceptible in their relation to power. He contends that if the subjugated 
knowledges that Foucault advocates cannot claim superiority according to 
truth, then after conquering the dominant discourse today, the subjugated 
knowledges may "themselves become the theoretical avant-garde of 
tomorrow and themselves establish a new hierarchy of power" (Habermas, 
1987a:281). For Habermas, truth is that which provides us with comfort; 
truth is that which protects us from power. 
What Habermas seeks is a differentiation of knowledges according to 
the standard of universal truth. It is a clear, decisive, once-and-for-all 
division between true and false. This division, for him, is important for 
the problem of power. He believes that truth is not only external to power, 
but in opposition to it. From Foucault's perspective, these beliefs are 
shown to be mistaken. If one is concerned with the problem of power, one 
should adopt a strategic model which looks into the means by which 
power effects are produced. One would then see the involvement of 
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knowledges and truths in the production of power effects. This step is not 
a differentiation of knowledges according to the standard of truth, but 
rather a differentiation of the effects and relations they have with certain 
dominant forms of power. One may give support to those forms of 
knowledges which oppose a certain dominant form of power. This is what 
Foucault does in his calling for an insurrection of subjugated knowledges. 
He supports these knowledges in their opposition to the effects of the 
centralizing powers that are linked to the institution and functioning of an 
organized scientific discourse in modern western society. It is true for 
Habermas to say that the subjugated knowledges may become a dominant 
discourse tomorrow and subjugate other forms of knowledges. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of a strategic model, this is what we 
should look at -- their relations with certain dominant forms of power --
and this is where the attack is to be launched again. In contrast to 
Habermas's work, Foucault's approach does not divide knowledges once 
and for all; nor does it give us comfort in any forms of knowledge. On the 
contrary, it warns us of the danger; it reminds us to watch over the power 
effects of any knowledges. The battle goes on; it never ends. 
In showing the involvement of truths and knowledges in the 
production of power effects, Foucault's approach exposes the misguided 
comfort provided by Habermas's project. Truth does not promise freedom; 
on the contrary, it is through the constitution of truths and knowledges 
that power effects are produced. Furthermore, from a strategic model, we 
see that in order for power to operate, it not only produces truths and 
knowledges, but also subjectivi~es. Power does not work through a 
negation of subjectivities, and resistance does not mean an awakening of 
subjectivities; on the contrary, power operates through a production of 
subjectivities. Habermas's notion of communicative action relies upon an 
a priori notion of modern rational subjectivity. I argue that, from 
Foucault's perspective, modern rational subjectivit1s are far from being 
able to provide us with any comfort; they should, rather, be seen as part of 
the problem. 
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Foucault shows that the operation of power depends not only upon 
the production of perverse subjects, but the production of free, rational, 
self-reflective subjects. In sex liberation, Foucault argues, individuals are 
constituted as autonomous and rational subjects who freely discuss sex; as 
self-reflective subjects who seek self-decipherment of their true nature. In 
experiencing an autonomous, rational, self-reflective subjectivity, they are 
subject to new relations of domination, such as those involving the social 
worker~judge, the psychiatrist-judge, the priest-judge, the teacher-judge, 
the parent-judge. They are at the same time subject to the effects of the 
power of normalization. They are drawn into confessional practice. They 
are required to tell the truth, to reveal the deepest secrets within 
themselves. Individuals are constituted as autonomous, rational, self-
reflective subjects, while at the same time entangled more deeply in a 
network of power. 
Habermas's notion of communicative action presupposes certain 
rational subjects engaging in free, reflective, undistorted discussion. Power 
is conceived in terms of distorted communication and a negation of this 
rational subjectivity. Foucault's approach shows that power operates not 
so much through a negation of rational subjectivity, but rather through a 
production of such subjectivity. One can no longer rely upon an ideal of 
subjectivity to provide any comfort. From the perspective of Foucault, not 
only is Habermas's ideal of rational, autonomous subjectivity exposed as 
misguided comfort, but his notion of subjectivity has to be questioned in 
terms of its involvement in the operation of modern forms of power. 
Instead of seeing his theory in opposition to power, Habermas is reminded 
of its danger of being incorporated into the modern knowledge-power-
subjectivity alliance. 
From the perspective of the strategic model, modern rational 
subjectivites, truths and scientific knowledges are shown to be involved in 
the operation of power. They can no longer provide us with comfort or a 
basis for hope. Habermas, in contrast, tends to see the development of 
science and theoretical knowledges, and of universal law and morality as 
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an expression of a form of Enlightenment rationality that has to be 
preserved, for their cognitive potential points toward a notion of 
communicative reason. These developments, for Habermas, are the 
achievements of the Enlightenment, and they should be affirmed. He is 
critical of Foucault for adopting an anti-Enlightenment stance and for 
failing to affirm the achievements of the Enlightenment. Is Foucault 
really, as Habermas thinks, anti-Enlightenment? 
First of all, one must understand that Foucault does not mean the 
Enlightenment was bad and that it is consisted only of evils. What he tries 
to demonstrate is the ambiguities associated with the achievements of the 
Enlightenment. If one sees the achievement of the Enlightenment reform 
in terms of a delimitation of the monarchical power to punish, this 
achievement is shown to be ambiguous because at the same time there 
was an attack on popular illegalities which uprooted the condition of 
existence of people from the lower strata; if one sees the achievement of 
penal reform in terms of a right of protection from torture, this 
achievement is shown to be ambiguous because at the same time there 
emerged a new form of power which coerced the body in a different way. 
From Foucault's work, "achievements" are so much entangled with 
"evils" that they should no longer be seen as achievements in a pure, 
innocent, and absolute sense. 
Positions of pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment are, 
therefore, misleading, for they are too simplistic to capture the intricacy of 
Enlightenment and power. In Foucault's view, one has to refuse choosing 
between pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment; one has to refuse 
everything which presents itself in the form of a simplistic and 
authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain 
within its tradition, or else you criticize the Enlightenment and try to 
escape from its principles of rationality. Habermas's criticism reveals this 
mistake. He assumes that Foucault's earlier work is anti-Enlightenment 
and Foucault's later essays on "What is Enlightenment?" is pro-
Enlightenment. Underlying Habermas's view is a "blackmail" of the 
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Enlightenment that Foucault seeks to subvert, and indeed Foucault's 
insights lie in his attempt to break free of this "blackmail" of 
Enlightenment. 
In his later writings on "What is Enlightenment?", Foucault identifies 
the connection between his project and the Enlightenment in terms of a 
certain philosophical ethos. Nevertheless, this type of philosophical ethos 
does not consist in laying faith or hope in the Enlightenment. Instead it is 
oriented to a permanent critique of one's historical mode of being. 
Foucault's permanent critique demonstrates an example of how he 
subverts the blackmail of Enlightenment. On the one hand, he 
acknowledges that the Enlightenment constitutes the historical era in 
which he is now living; on the other hand, instead of seeking to identify 
with the Enlightenment tradition, he aims at a permanent critique of the 
historical era of Enlightenment. Put in another way, while he questions 
the historical era of Enlightenment, he does not aims at a determinate 
negation of it. Instead he simultaneously respects the historical reality and 
experiments with ways of transgressing the limits. In contrast to 
Habermas's project which is preoccupied with setting up distinctions and 
binary oppositions between what must be negated and what must be 
preserved, Foucault's approach subverts these oppositions. It helps us 
respect the complex reality while seeking a transgression of the limits that 
are imposed on us. 
In sum, from Habermas's perspective, there could be four kinds of 
weaknesses in Foucault's work: firstly, Foucault's critique fails to provide a 
yardstick for the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power; 
secondly, Foucault's knowledges are unable to claim superiority according 
to the standard of truth; thirdly, his normative positions fail to claim 
superiority according to the standard of universal validity claims; and 
fourthly, Foucault adopts an anti-Enlightenment stance and fails to affirm 
the achievements of the En 116htenment. However, from Foucault's 
perspective, we see that firstly, the differentiation between legitimate and 
illegitimate power is a preoccupation of the juridico-discursive model 
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which Foucault seeks to surpass. Foucault introduces us to a strategic 
model which focuses not so much on the question of right, that is, how to 
submit power to the rule of right, but rather on the techniques and 
mechanisms by which power effects are produced. In this way, one sees 
that truth is the means through which power operates. Therefore, 
secondly, instead of appealing to the notion of truth as the ground of 
critique, Foucault seeks to problematize th~ status of truth. Thirdly, from 
the perspective of a strategic model, we see that achievements of the 
Enlightenment are so "entangled" with "evils" that they can no longer be 
considered as pure achievements. Foucault is opposed to the simplistic 
alternative of pro-Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment that Habermas 
holds, and he engages in a permanent critique of the historical era of the 
Enlightenment which implies an attempt to break free from this 
"blackmail" of the Enlightenment. Lastly, we are left with Foucault's lack 
of a normative ground, and this, in the view of Habermas and many 
others, is the major problem of his work. Part II will be devoted to a 
discussion of this issue. 
7.2 Foucault's Lack of a Normative Ground 
In suspending the question of the ground of critique, Foucault introduces 
us to a strategic model which is full of insights and contains challenges for 
Habermas's theory. Nevertheless, the lack of a normative basis in 
Foucault's critique seems to be a common concern. Habermas as well as 
some other critics and Foucault's sympathetic commentators all raise the 
question that Foucault's normative positions would have to imply a 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power, acceptable and 
unacceptable power .2 If Foucault does not appeal to certain normative 
principles, they ask, how could he justify his positions? How could he say 
2See Introduction, p.13, footnote 9. Also see Fraser, 1989, 1985a; White, 1986; McCarthy, 
1990; Bernstein, 1992. 
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that a certain power is unacceptable or acceptable, and how could he assert 
that disciplinary power is unacceptable and that we should oppose it? 
Habermas criticizes Foucault's refusal to appeal to normative 
principles as a kind of cryptonormativism. He says that Foucault 
understands himself as a dissident who offers resistance to humanistically 
disguised disciplinary power, but he opts for a value-free historiography. 
Underlying his indictments of disciplinary power, Habermas claims, one 
can find a set of normative standards that Foucault refuses to admit. For 
instance, "the asymmetric relationship between power holders and those 
subject to power, as well as the reifying effect of technologies of power, 
which violate the moral and bodily integrity of subjects capable of speech 
and action are objectionable for Foucault" (Habermas, 1987a:284). 
Nevertheless, to his disappointment, Foucault never appeals to any 
normative principles to ground his critique. Habermas comments: if 
Foucault does not ground his critique in any normative principles, "if it is 
just a matter of mobilizing counterpower, of strategic battles and wily 
confrontations, why should we muster any resistance at all against this all-
persuasive power ... why fight at all?" Following Fraser, he says: it is only 
with the introduction of normative notions of some kind that Foucault 
could begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power /knowledge 
regime and why we ought to oppose it (Habermas, 1987a:284). 
In this section I shall consider the charge that Foucault lacks a 
normative basis for his critique. Habermas's criticism is based on his view 
that one must construct certain normative principles to ground critique so 
as to comm?tnd universal, rational consensus. Foucault's work, I argue, 
should be considered as an alternative to Habermas's normative approach 
of critique, and its right to be different should be affirmed. Foucault's 
critique does not produce any normative principles; instead it seeks to 
question what has been taken for granted, including the normative 
principles that one often relies upon. It is a form of critique that is oriented 
to transgression of limits, rather than setting of limits. 
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Difference between Foucault's and Habennas's approaches to critique 
Habermas 1s normative approach to critique assumes that when you 
criticize or question something, you must have a normative principle on 
the basis of which to conduct the critique. The normative principle that 
Habermas has in mind performs two kinds of function. Firstly, it enables 
one to differentiate between what is legitimate and illegitimate, what is 
acceptable and unacceptable. Habermas does not expect critique simply to 
tell us what is wrong with a certain power, but rather to provide a 
principle according to which one can have a clear-cut division between 
legitimate and illegitimate power. Secondly, the normative principle can 
provide a ground for critique so that its claim can transcend local context 
and obtain a status of universal truth. With such a normative principle, 
not only can people's action be regulated in an unambiguous way, but the 
critique can be considered as justified or well-grounded, and capable of 
commanding universal assent. For instance, Habermas might think that 
Foucault's critique of disciplinary power could have appealed to 
normative principles which affirm the moral and bodily integrity of 
subjects capable of speech and action. With a construction of these moral 
principles, from Habermas's perspective, not only could Foucault tell us 
why disciplinary power is illegitimate and unacceptable, but Foucault's 
critique could be safely grounded and capable of commanding universal, 
rational consensus. 
With Habermas's approach, critique implies a moral claim that would 
command u·niversal consensus; it expresses a moral demand to which 
everybody should submit. The normative principle functions as a 
principle of legitimation which establishes the rule of right for power. 
When power operates according to the normative principle, it is 
considered as legitimate and everyone is obliged to obey; when power 
violates the principle, it is considered as illegitimate and everyone ought 
to oppose it. Critique of power not only means a differentiation of 
legitimate and illegitimate power, but expresses a universal claim of 
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people's obligation to submit to legitimate power and to oppose 
illegitimate power. Foucault's approach, in contrast, provides us with an 
alternative understanding to the issue of normative principles and the 
nature of critique.3 
The purpose of Foucault's critique is not to make a claim that would 
command universal consensus; nor does it aim at providing any 
normative principle that would unambiguously regulate our action. It is 
rather to open up space, to open up thinking by exposing something 
unthought in it.4 Instead of worrying about the possibility of coming to a 
rational agreement, Foucault's critique is a matter of injecting a little 
anxiety or uncertainty into forms of action and thought. It is a matter of 
questioning what we have agreed upon, what we have taken for granted. It 
questions the normative principles that we have internalized and often 
rely upon.5 The questioning is, however, not carried out by providing 
answers to normative questions, but by opening a distance between us and 
the familiar phenomena, producing discord and unsettling effects. It is a 
type of philosophical interrogation which "simultaneously problematizes 
man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the 
constitution of the self as an autonomous subject" (Foucault, 1986f:42). 
Instead of constructing principles to inform people what they are or what 
they should think and do, Foucault's genealogical critique seeks to separate 
3 Despite the difference between Foucault's approach and the approach of Habermas 's 
critical theory, for the sake of convenience, I call both approaches as "critique". In a 
response to Habermas's criticism of Foucault's lack of a normative basis, Dean (1994:133) 
argues that Foucault's work "is not critique, but rather a critical and effective form of 
history concerned with the analysis of the differential regimes of truth and their 
consequences" .. For an interesting and useful elaboration of Foucault's form of critical history 
as an alternative to that of critical theory, see Dean, 1994. Also see Rajchman, 1988, for a 
discussion of the difference between Habermas's and Foucault's conception of philosophical 
argument and form of critique. 
4 For a discussion of thinking the unthought; see Hoy, 1988, pp.22ff. 
5 As Dean (1994:133) says, Foucault's work "refuses a universalist normative basis because it 
does not seek to function on the basis of the defence of universal values. It is concerned 
rather to analyze and reflect upon the effects of holding such values and their implications 
in practices. This does not mean that Foucault's position cannot be connected to various 
normative regimes -- it is just that it is simply not pertinent to the task of genealogy as 
effective history, as a history that is capable of problematizing that which we take to be 
true and universal". 
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out, from the contingency that has made people what they are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing and thinking what they are, do, or 
think. Rather than ask what is necessary and universal, Foucault seeks to 
separate out what is no longer indispensable for liberty. 
In contrast to Habermas's preoccupation with how to construct certain 
principles that would provide a normative basis for critique, Foucault's 
approach does not construct such principles. His refusal to provide a 
normative basis, however, does not mean that his work is value-free, or 
that it would lead to inaction. He shows us the intensification and excess 
of power in modern society and therewith mobilizes attacks against power. 
He analyzes the emergence of a form of power which frames the everyday 
lives of individuals, the adaptation and refinement of its mechanisms that 
places under surveillance their everyday behavior, their identity, their 
activity, their apparently unimportant gestures. He portrays a picture of 
panopticized society so as to draw our attention to the danger of modern 
forms of power. Foucault's critique is both politically engaged and capable 
of mobilizing people into action. Nevertheless, in doing so, it does not 
appeal to normative principles but rather shows the danger of certain 
modern forms of power.6 
By showing the danger of modern forms of power, Foucault has 
provided a certain answer to the question of "why fight?". Nevertheless, it 
is not an answer which says these modern forms of power are bad and 
therefore everybody must fight against them. The answer provided by 
Foucault differs from what is expected by Habermas in two ways: firstly, it 
does not contain normative principles which would divide power into 
legitimate and illegitimate; secondly, it does not imply any moral demand 
to which everybody has to submit. 
6 Dreyfus and Rabinow point out that Foucault is not trying to construct a general theory to 
justify his action; rather he is offering an interpretive analytic of our current situation. 
Foucault uses language to articulate an understanding of our situation which moves us to 
action. His analysis sheds light on the specific dangers that each specific type of 
power/knowledge produces. See Dreyfus and Rabinow ,1986, pp.114ff; 1983, pp.253-64. 
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Habermas is preoccupied with the construction of a normative 
principle according to which one can differentiate legitimate and 
illegitimate power. The normative principle that he pursues is not one 
which simply tells us what is wrong with a certain form of power, but 
rather one which enables us to have a clear-cut, once-and-for-all division 
between legitimate and illegitimate power, just like a division between 
lawful and unlawful. Habermas's pursuit of such a normative principle, I 
suggest, can be considered in terms of a juridico-discursive conception of 
power which represents power as one which represses and negates. As 
power is represented as negative, one seeks to set the limits of power and 
submit it to the rules of right. Nevertheless, I argue, if one looks at power 
from the perspective of Foucault's strategic model, a procedure of simple 
division and rejection is not only inadequate but also dangerous. 
A strategic model concerns the totality of means by which power 
operates. From this perspective, we see that modern subjectivities, truths 
and scientific knowledges are the means by which power produces effects. 
In addition, the Enlightenment reforms and the system of rights were 
shown to be agents of relations of domination. Nevertheless, in 
demonstrating their roles in the deployment of modern forms of power, 
Foucault does not mean they are bad and we should launch an attack to 
defeat them. What Foucault tries to show is a complex interplay between 
power, knowledges, subjectivites, Enlightenment reforms and the system 
of right. From his work, we should be able to see why there is great 
difficulty in eluding the embrace of power, and why the negative 
conception of power is inadequate and even dangerous in describing the 
mechanisms of power.7 If power does not operate through a mere 
negation but rather through a production of utilities, desires, knowledges 
and subjectivities, and if it is difficult to embrace the effects of all these 
connections, resistance could not be imagined as simply a great Refusal. 
What we need is no longer a principle that informs a simple division and 
7Foucault says: "The fact that power is so deeply rooted and the difficulty of eluding its 
embrace are effects of all these connections. That is why the notion of repression which 
mechanisms of power are reduced to strikes me as very inadequate and possibly dangerous" 
(Foucault, 1980a:59) . 
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rejection, that is, a division between legitimate and illegitimate power and 
a rejection of the illegitimate. Instead, Foucault suggests a simultaneous 
respect for this complex reality and an attempt to transgress it. 
In showing the danger of certain modern forms of power, Foucault 
does not mean they are bad and have to be rejected. 8 Criticism, for 
Foucault, is not a matter of drawing the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate, or between black and white, good and bad, true and false; nor 
does it mean a rejection or negation. Criticism is instead a reflection upon 
the complex reality and the limits that have been imposed on us, while 
patiently experimenting with the possibility of transgressing the limits. 
The critical task, Foucault says, "requires work on our limits, that is, a 
patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty" (Foucault, 
1984d:50).Therefore, in contrast to Habermas, Foucault's critique does not 
seek to provide any normative principle according to which one can 
differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. 
For Habermas, only with a construction of normative principles can 
critique be seen as safely grounded and capable of commanding universal, 
rational consensus. Critique of power, for him, does not only seek a 
differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate power, but also expresses a 
universal demand of people's obligation to submit to legitimate power 
and to oppose illegitimate power. Foucault's approach to critique, I argue, 
should not be seen as implying any moral demand to which everybody 
must submit. In pointing out the danger of disciplinary power, Foucault's 
critique serves as a tactic to mobilize counterpower. It moves people to 
fight, but it_ does not lay a moral demand on people and claims that 
everyone must resist disciplinary power; it mobilizes counterpower, but it 
never demands one's obligation to resist. 
I acknowledge that Foucault himself does not always refrain from 
making moral demands, and it is a weakness of his work that it seems to 
8 Foucault (1986b:343) clarifies that to say that something is dangerous is not to say that it 
is bad. If things are dangerous, then we always have something to do, and this should lead 
us to pessimistic activism rather than apathy. 
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imply a moral demand of people to resist disciplinary power. Habermas 
sees that Foucault tells people to resist disciplinary power but fails to 
construct any normative principles to justify the demand. Habermas's 
understanding of Foucault, I contend, is caused by some of the confusions 
in Foucault's work. It is true that Foucault's Discipline and Punish often 
relates disciplinary power to coercion and domination, and Foucault calls 
for an anti-disciplinarian politics. Taken together, these lead people to 
think that disciplinary power is bad and people ought to resist it. 
Moreover, in a later interview, Foucault defines domination in a 
pejorative sense by referring to it as "relations of power that are fixed in 
such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of 
liberty is extremely limited" (Foucault 1988a:12). He suggests minimizing 
domination by giving "one's self the rules of law, ... the practice of self, 
which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of 
domination" (Foucault, 1988a:18). Hence it seems that Foucault's work 
contains a moral demand that one ought to resist disciplinary power and 
domination. 
In History of Sexuality Vol. 1, however, Foucault (1979b:82) comes to 
see his work as "an analytics of power: a definition of domains formed by 
relations of power". This is the perspective of a strategic model that I 
suggest throughout my discussion. From this perspective, disciplinary 
power should not be seen as necessarily bad, but rather as something 
which produces utility, individuality and knowledge. Moreover, 
domination, too, should not be seen as something bad or to be resisted. In 
the same interview, Foucault discusses relations of domination in the 
pedagogical · institution. He does not think that one should avoid these 
relations of domination, but rather some of the effects associated with 
them, including what happened to a student when subjected to the 
arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher.9 
9 Foucault says: "I don't see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given name of 
truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits 
knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is rather to know how you are 
to avoid in these practices -- where power cannot not play and where it is not evil in itself--
the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless 
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With an acknowledgment of some of the confusions of Foucault's 
work, I suggest that one should not see Foucault's critique in terms of a 
moral demand to which everybody must submit. It does not provide any 
principle of legitimation according to which one is obliged to obey or resist. 
Whether one should obey or resist is a question left to the individual's 
decision. In calling for anti-disciplinarian politics, it is not a demand that 
one must take part in it. Instead, Foucault identifies his role as giving 
support to those who choose to fight, and suggesting the ways they might 
resist. 
For instance, Foucault speaks to those who find disciplinary power 
intolerable and who want to fight against it: "if one wants to look for a 
non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against discipline 
and disciplinary power, it is not toward the ancient right of sovereignty 
that one should return, but toward the possibility of a new form of right" 
(Foucault, 1980c:108). Seeing that there are struggles developed in recent 
years "against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission", 
Foucault speaks to those who engage in the struggles: "Maybe the target 
nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are ... We 
have to promote new forms of subjectivity ... " (Foucault, 1982:212, 216). 
Foucault may make normative statements about what one should do. 
Nevertheless, they should be considered as suggestions in relation to 
where and how to attack power. The normative statements should not be 
understood as normative principles which legitimate power or resistance. 
Whether to fight or not is a question that left to the reflection and decision 
of the individual. As Gordon notes: 
Foucault has made clear, the object is not the fabrication 
of a knowledge for the instruction, correction and 
guidance of every possible resistance. At this point the 
authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian 
professor and so forth" (Foucault, 1988a:12). Patton (1994:65) points out that asymmetrical 
power relations are not in themselves evil. Foucault's use of this example shows certain 
objectionable cases of domination, but suggests that there can be other effects of domination 
which may not be objectionable. Patton maintains that "this indeed appears to be 
Foucault's general position: the exercise of power over others is not always bad, and states 
of domination are not always to be avoided". 
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contribution of the intellectual as historical analyst ends 
and gives way to the reflection and decisions, not of the 
managers and theoreticians of resistance but of those 
who themselves choose to resist. (Gordon, 1979:44) 
In sum, I suggest that one should see Foucault's critique as an 
alternative to Habermas's normative approach of critique. It concerns 
reflection upon the limits that have been imposed on people. The 
reflection, however, does not seek a procedure of division and rejection; it 
is rather a matter of simultaneous respect for the complex reality while 
experimenting with the possibility of transgressing it. Moreover, 
Foucault's critique serves as a tactic which moves people to fight, but it 
does not make any moral demand to which everybody must submit. It 
does not provide any principles which legitimate power or resistance and 
demand people's obligation to obey or resist. While Foucault provides us 
with an alternative way of looking at power, nevertheless, there are still 
questions, difficulties, and limitations associated with this approach that 
require our attention. 
Questions, difficulties, limitations of Foucault's critique 
Foucault's critique is characterized by a suspension of the normative 
question. What is the nature of this suspension and what implications 
does it have?1° For instance, does it imply a rejectionist stance toward all 
normative frameworks? Or does it merely reject certain values and 
frameworks, like those of humanism? Does it stop us from producing 
normative notions? Moreover, would there be any difficulties caused by 
Foucault's suspension of the normative question? What are the 
limitations of Foucault's critique? 
lO See Fraser ,1989, pp.21ff; for her discussion of the nature and extent of Foucault's 
bracketing of the normative question, . 
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One may read Foucault's work as rejecting all normative framework 
for a normative reason: norm is normalizing. That is, in order to avoid 
being part of normalizing power, one should refrain from producing any 
norms. Bernstein's understanding of Foucault's reason for refusing 
normative foundation is an example: "For Foucault, talk about 
'normative foundations' elicits 'normalization', which he takes to be one 
of the primary dangers of the disciplinary society". This reading of 
Foucault, I contend, confuses two senses of "norm": "norm as normative", 
and "norm as normalizing". When norm is understood as normative, it 
means that norm is based on values and moral principles in the 
regulation of people's behavior. Normative theories are those which are 
involved in the production of norms which are normative. On the other 
hand, when referring to norm as normalizing, Foucault means that power 
now takes the form of norm rather than law; power normalizes rather 
than prohibits.11 Disciplinary power, in Foucault's view, operates through 
the setting up of a principle of rule, or a norm, which functions as a 
minimum threshold, as an average, or as an optimum to be respected. The 
setting up of a norm allows five quite distinct operations to come into 
play. The power of penalty, Foucault says, compares, differentiates, 
hierarchizes, homogenizes and excludes; in short, it normalizes (Foucault 
1979a:182-3). Norm can be considered as the normative; norm can also be 
understood as normalizing in Foucault's specific analyses of the operation 
of power. Nevertheless, one cannot say that the normative is normalizing 
and for this reason Foucault refuses the normative, including all 
normative frameworks. To say so would have failed to make a 
differentiation between "norm as normative" and "norm as normalizing". 
One might refuse normative frameworks by referring to the strategic 
model. One may say, from the strategic model we see that power operates 
through a constitution of norms, in addition to its constitution of 
11 In discussing the development of bio-power, Foucault says that power is now to enhance 
life rather than to take life. It is the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, 
that gives power its access to our body. In order to take charge of life, it needs continuous 
regulatory and corrective mechanisms. This leads to a growing importance of the action of 
the norm, and even the law now operates more and more as a norm (Foucault, 1979b:143-4). 
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knowledges and subjectivities, and we should negate them in order to 
counter power. In opposition to this reading of Foucault, I would like to 
point out that if Foucault's approach meant that power constitutes 
everything, and hence either we had to oppose everything or we were all 
trapped in it, then Foucault would have kept the biggest negative 
hypothesis for his own use. He would have kept the practical consequence 
of a juridico-discursive representation of power-as-law which simply 
negates and represses, and sees norms, subjectivities and knowledges as 
instruments of power that are bad in themselves. Foucault has anticipated 
the possibility that people might raise this question for his strategic model. 
He says, they might criticize: 
By constantly referring to positive technologies of 
power, you are playing a double game where you hope to 
win on all counts; you confuse your adversaries by 
appearing to take the weaker position, and, discussing 
repression alone, you would have us believe, wrongly, 
that you have rid yourself of the problem of law; and yet 
you keep the essential practical consequence of the 
principle of power-as-law, namely the fact that there is 
no escaping from power, that it is always-already present, 
constituting that very thing which one attempts to 
counter it with. As to the idea of a power-repression, you 
have retained its most fragile theoretical element, and 
this in order to criticize it; you have retained the most 
sterilizing political consequence of the idea of power-
law, but only in order to preserve it for your own use. 
(Foucault, 1979b:82) 
It is important to notice that the strategic model should not have kept 
the negative· hypothesis for its own use. In showing that power operates 
through the production of knowledges, subjectivities and even norms, it 
does not mean that they are bad in themselves or that we must refrain 
from producing any knowledges, subjectivities and norms. Foucault 
(1980a:192-3) makes it clear that he does not want one to take his work as 
anti-psychiatry when his genealogy shows how psychiatry constitutes the 
condition for sexuality to be the target of power. Foucault also states clearly 
that he is not anti-Enlightenment when showing how the Enlightenment 
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reforms are intermeshed with new relations of domination. What the 
strategic model tries to show is a complex interplay between power on the 
one hand, and knowledges, subjectivities, norms on the other. What it 
wants to emphasize is their tactical efficacy or strategic role in a power 
complex. While it is true that knowledge of psychiatry made possible a 
strong advance of social controls into the area of sexual perversity, 
Foucault (1979b:101) points out that it also made possible a reverse 
discourse: homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that 
its legitimacy or 'naturality" be acknowledged, often in the same 
vocabularies, using the same categories provided by the discourses and 
knowledges. Therefore, instead of negating certain knowledges once and 
for all, we should see what kinds of power effects they ensure, and 
question their tactical integration with a certain power complex. 
With regard to the question of norms or normative framework, I 
suggest that Foucault's strategic model does not imply a rejection of all 
kinds of normative frameworks, but rather a questioning of the strategic 
role of certain normative frameworks played in the deployment of 
modern power. In particular, Foucault questions the role of humanist 
values in the modern power complex.12 He shows that humanist values 
like emancipation, autonomy and subjectivity could not provide us with 
the basis of hope; instead, they are part of the problem. For instance, 
modern forms of power are shown to operate through the constitution of 
autonomous subjectivity; the reliance on construction of humanist 
frameworks only conceals the operation of modern forms of power. If 
humanist values are the problem rather than the solution, what shall we 
do with them? Foucault provides an example of what we may do with 
humanist frameworks. 
12 Foucault (1988c:15) also questions humanism in terms of its presenting a dogmatic and 
universal model of freedom: "What I am afraid of about humanism is that it presents a 
certain form of our ethics as a universal model for any kind of freedom. I think that there 
are more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can 
imagine in humanism as it is dogmatically represented on every side of the political 
rainbow: the Left, the Centre, the Right". 
276 
... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
C 
I 
I~ 
I 
1: 
11 
I 
:1 
,, 
I 
In his critique, Foucault suspends the normative question and avoids 
appealing to any humanist notions. This should not be seen so much as a 
rejection of normative frameworks, but rather as a reflection on the limits 
that have been imposed on us and an experimenting with the possibility 
of transgressing the limits. On the one hand, Foucault works on the limits 
by carrying out a genealogical analysis which questions the humanist 
values that we have taken for granted; on the other hand, he seeks to 
transgress the limits by conducting a critique which is politically engaged 
while at the same time refusing to appeal to humanist values which are 
often seen as necessary for critique. One may not be able to conclude 
whether his experimenting with a transgression of the limits is a complete 
success, but at least one can appreciate his work from this perspective. 
There are, however, other ways that we may treat humanist values or 
normative frameworks. As discussed above, psychiatry made possible an 
intensification of power, but there is also a reverse discourse in which 
homosexuality began to speak for itself, using the same vocabularies and 
categories found in psychiatry by which it is disqualified. In this sense, it is 
possible to have a reverse of humanist discourses so that the.j can be turned 
around and used to oppose modern forms of power. According to 
Foucault, "discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or 
raised up against it ... discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy" (Foucault, 1979b:101). In other 
words, one may conceive of humanist discourses as tactical elements 
which operate in a field of power relations. The tactical function that they 
perform is neither uniform nor stable. Sometimes they serve power and 
other times they resist power. It is dangerous to say humanist discourses 
are bad and should be discarded once and for all. 
Foucault's discussion of the notion of right may give some clue as to 
how we might treat normative frameworks. While demonstrating the 
system of right as permanent agent of relations of domination, permanent 
agent of polymorphous techniques of subjugation, Foucault nevertheless 
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thinks that there is no other recourse available to us in the fight against 
power. He claims that we are in a kind of double alley: on the one hand, it 
is not through the recourse to sovereignty against discipline that the effects 
of disciplinary power can be limited, as rights and disciplinary 
mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general 
mechanism of power in our society; on the other hand, in real life, what 
do the organizations that oppose power do if not precisely appeal to this 
canon of right? (Foucault, 1980c:108). Hence, we cannot afford to give up 
the whole discourse of right; we still need to appeal to normative notions 
of right in our fight against power. While we are not able to give up the 
whole discourse of right, nevertheless, we can make an innovative use of 
it.13 Foucault suggests that we can turn toward a new form of right. It is 
not the right derived from the traditional right of sovereignty, the right 
grounded in the discovery of what we are and what we can be. These rights 
lend support to the development of disciplinary power; they are agents of 
relations of domination, agents of polymorphous techniques of 
subjugation. The new form of right, Foucault suggests, should be anti-
disciplinarian. It should take "life" as a political object, as the issue of 
political struggles. It is "the right to life, to one's body, to health, to 
happiness, to the satisfaction of needs" (Foucault, 1979b:145; 1980c:108). 
In our fight against power, we still need to appeal to normative 
notions. Nevertheless, I argue, normative notions should simply be seen 
as tools that one might use to oppose power. Being "tools", they are subject 
to our use. They are not the foundation of our critique or action. They are 
not to be seen as principles which enable critique to be safely grounded and 
capable of commanding universal, rational consensus. Nor can they be 
considered as a principle of legitimation, as one which affirms that a 
certain power or resistance is legitimate and thus demanding everybody's 
obligation to obey. Seeing normative notions as tools, we are concerned 
with their usefulness in the fight. We are not concerned with which of 
13 In a fight for the defence of the Vietnamese boat people, Foucault invokes the notion of 
"international citizenry "and appeals to the normative notion of right. See Keenan, 1987, 
pp.20££; for an interesting discussion of how Foucault uses the discourse of right. 
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them is closer to reality or truth, which of them reveals our true nature or 
informs us of the essence of history. The usefulness of a tool is not to be 
evaluated according to a theory of truth, but rather in relation to the 
specific contexts of struggles in which they are used. The idea of tools 
allows one to choose which normative notions are useful and which 
combination of tools one may use. It also allows people to invent their 
own tools or to improve the tools in their own way. 
From this perspective, Habermas's notion of communicative action 
should not be seen as a principle that legitimates power or a ground of 
critique, but rather simply as a tool one may use in the fight against power. 
The notion of a free, undistorted communication can be used as a tool to 
question power relations. As Foucault suggests in an interview, "it is 
perhaps a critical idea to maintain at all times: to ask oneself what 
proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in such a power relation, and 
whether that degree of nonconsensuality is necessary or not, and then one 
may question every power relation to that extent" (Foucault, 1986d:379). 
One can perhaps practise a politics of consensuality. Habermas's problem 
lies in his removing the political statement of the notion of ideal speech 
situation from the realm of political discourse, recasting it in a neutral, 
intellectualist language of universal pragmatics, and treating it as a 
universal basis of critique or action. 
In short, Foucault's critique does not imply a rejectionist stance toward 
all normative notions. Instead it teaches us how to treat these normative 
notions: as tools rather than as principles of legitimation or foundations of 
critique. If :r:1ormative notions can be used as tools in our fight against 
power, we should not refrain from producing normative notions. On the 
contrary, we need to invent more tools for the fight. If Foucault's critique 
aims at opening up space, the question one may ask is: after successfully 
opening up space, what are we going to do with the space? Perhaps we can 
use the space to elaborate normative notions that are useful for the fight. I 
believe that Foucault's critique would be happy to see the space taken up 
by the invention of tools used in the fight. One may devote effort to 
279 
! 
I 
I 
l 
l 
I 
OI 
I 
I 
,II: 
f 
l 
,j 
I 
I 
I 
,J 
T 
I 
j 
I 
elaborating normative notions like care for self, care for otherness, and so 
on, so as to counter modern forms of power. The effort to elaborate these 
normative notions, however, must be distinguished from that of 
developing certain uncontestable principles of legitimation or ground of 
action, for the latter may include projects which investigate what is 
necessary and fixed in our existence. In elaborating normative notions, 
one must bear in mind that they are simply tools to be used, and though 
they may result in setting certain new limits, they are nevertheless limits 
that await transgression. 
I have discussed the implications of Foucault's critique for how we 
should treat normative notions. Now we come to the difficulties caused by 
Foucault's suspension of the normative question, as well as the limitation 
of his approach of critique. From the perspective of Foucault's critique, 
normative notions are not bases which ground our action, but rather 
simply tools we use to fight against power. Habermas and other 
universalists would question this approach in terms of the groundlessness 
of one's action. As discussed before, Habermas asks: why should we 
muster any resistance at all? Why is struggle preferable to submission? If 
one is to adopt Foucault's approach, perhaps the first difficulty one has to 
face is a kind of groundlessness of one's resistance or action. Of course, one 
may answer the question of "why fight?" by referring to the danger that 
one perceives in society.1 4 Nevertheless, there would not be a moral 
ground capable of commanding universal, rational consensus. One must 
be able to be at home with this kind of groundlessness. 
In relation to the lack of a universal moral ground for resistance, the 
other kind of difficulty caused by Foucault's approach is the lack of a 
14 Or, as Dean (1994:130) points out, one may answer "why fight?" and question power 
"from a variety of ethical, political and technical perspectives, such as potential for 
individual or collective choice, degree of participation in decision-making, their 
cumbersome nature, and so on". One does not have to evoke universal normative standpoints 
and political visions from which forms of power might be judged. As argued by Deans, 
Foucault's approach has the "capacity to multiply forms of criticism while abstaining from 
the sacred and hierarchical duty of the social critic to speak from the position of 
privileged access to a superior world or set of values". 
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yardstick. White, for instance, sees that Foucault's contribution lies in his 
reminding us of an exclusion of otherness in the process of 
rationalization. Nevertheless, he goes on, Foucault does not provide us 
with a criterion to distinguish different forms of otherness; nor does he 
provide us with any basis for the distinction of different kinds of resistance 
and social movement. "He provides us, ultimately, with no way of 
distinguishing the resistance of the women's movement or the Polish 
Solidarity movement from, say, the Ku Klux Klan or Jim Jones's People's 
Temple" (White, 1986:430). Bernstein, who attempts a sympathetic reading 
of Foucault's work, also makes the following comment: Foucault is 
constantly tempting us with his references to new possibilities of thinking 
and acting, but these references are in danger of becoming empty unless we 
have some sense of which possibilities and changes are desirable and why 
(Bernstein, 1992:301). 
Though these comments are made in Foucault's language, 
nevertheless, they pursue the same old question of a yardstick. Habermas 
pursues the question of a yardstick according to which one can 
differentiate legitimate and illegitimate power. For him, Foucault's 
critique owes us a criterion based on which one can distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate power. For White, Foucault owes us a criterion 
based on which one can distinguish acceptable from unacceptable 
resistance; for Bernstein, Foucault owes us a criterion which enables one to 
distinguish desirable from undesirable changes. 
I think it must be admitted that Foucault's critique does not provide a 
clear yardst~ck for us to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
power, acceptable and unacceptable resistance, desirable and undesirable 
changes. If one expects Foucault's work to provide such an answer, one is 
certain to be disappointed. For those who pursue the question of a 
yardstick, this can be considered as a major limitation of Foucault's 
critique. Yet, before deciding whether the criticism is justified, we should 
ask whether we still need to pursue the question of a yardstick. In the 
above discussion, I have pointed out that, from a strategic model, the 
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question of differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate implies a 
juridico-discursive model that Foucault seeks to surpass. I have also 
suggested that leaving behind this question we would be able to focus on 
the techniques and mechanisms through which power effects are 
produced. Moreover, from Foucault 1s perspective, critique of power is not 
a matter of providing a procedure of simple division and rejection, but 
rather of reflecting upon the limits that are imposed on us while 
experimenting with the possibility of transgressing the limits. 
In addition, what must be pointed out is that Foucault's refusal to 
specify a principle for the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate 
power is a determination to leave the question to the reflection and 
decision of individuals. This approach confines the role of theoreticians to 
a critical-historical analysis and respects individuals' judgement and 
decision. Its advantage lies in the self-limitation of theoreticians so that 
they are not going to proclaim normative principles from above. 
Habermas, in order to construct a principle of critique, carries out a quasi-
transcendental project which investigates the universal conditions of 
intersubjective understanding. The investigation, however, is not so 
much an understanding of the perspective of those participating in 
intersubjective communication. Instead, Habermas raises himself above 
the participants, engages in a monological reflection, and proclaims the 
truth about language from above. He declares that "[t]he human interest in 
autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a 
priori ... Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of 
universal and unconstrained consensus" (Habermas, 1978:314). 
I acknowledge that Foucault's refusal to provide a yardstick has created 
difficulties but, at the same time, it is an attempt to conduct critique which 
really respects individuals' reflection and decision. Individuals no longer 
need to wait for the instruction of a master, but can rather exercise their 
sense of judgement with regard to which power is acceptable or 
unacceptable, which change is desirable or undesirable. 
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The reflection and decision that individuals have to make include 
what is the main danger. As Foucault says: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous . . . I think that the ethico-
political choice we have to make every day is to 
determine which is the main danger. (Foucault, 
1986b:343) 
Foucault's work does not answer the normative question, but it 
moves people to act by portraying a picture of the danger of modern 
western societies. As elaborated by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986:115), 
Foucault's work can be seen as an interpretive approach which identifies 
what he takes to be our current problem or main danger, describing with 
detachment how this situation arose and, at the same time, using 
rhetorical skills to increase shared uneasiness in the face of the ubiquitous 
danger as he extrapolated it. For instance, it portrays the danger of a 
disciplinary society in which normalizing power has become so 
omnipresent, so finely attuned, so penetrating and interiorized, and 
therefore so invisible that it no longer requires the virtual presence of 
psychoanalysts, priests or wardens. It is a fully panopticized society in 
which the hierarchical, asymmetrical domination of some persons by 
others would become superfluous and individuals would all police 
themselves. 
Nevertheless, one must notice that this is the danger that Foucault 
perceives, and other people, such as Habermas, could have perceived a 
different kind of danger. As elaborated by Fraser, Foucault's nightmare is a 
fully panopticized society: "even a perfectly realized autonomous 
subjectivity would be a form of normalizing, disciplinary domination"; 
even if the ideal speech situation were realized, this would not be freedom 
(Fraser, 1985a:180,181). Fraser points out that Habermas also has his own 
fear and perceives a different kind of danger. 
Habermas fears "the end of the individual", a form of 
life in which people are no longer socialized to demand 
rational, normative legitimation of social authority. In 
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this dystopian vision, they just cynically go along out of 
privatized strategic considerations, and the stance of 
communicative interaction in effect dies out. (Fraser, 
1985a:180-1) 
If Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation cannot safeguard 
against the danger perceived by Foucault, I contend, Foucault's work is 
also unable to safeguard against the danger perceived by Habermas. One 
must realize this limitation of Foucault's work. Foucault's work is an 
interpretive approach which identifies what he takes to be our current 
problem or main danger. One could identify another danger. Moreover, as 
Foucault says, the danger that we identified earlier may have been changed 
and there would be new problems.15 One must exercise one's own sense of 
judgement. 
Therefore, I conclude, what we obtain from Foucault is not a set of 
doctrines, but a certain attitude, a certain way of philosophizing and, above 
all, a certain awareness of the danger in modern western societies. Yet each 
individual still has to make the ethico-political choice to determine which 
is the main danger, and it is a decision that one should make every day. 
There is no unassailable principle of criterion of judgement provided to 
guide or regulate our action. Each of us must make the decision every day 
to determine which is the main danger in our own society. 
15 In an interview, Foucault gives support to Castel's analysis of mental hospitals and 
holds that it was right to criticize mental hospitals as they were the danger. 
Nevertheless, Foucault contends that the danger has changed and there are new problems 
with the more free clinics (Foucault, 1986b:343-4). 
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